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Foreword
Modern developments in biotechnology and the continu-
ing expansion of global trade have allowed society to gain 
greater access to, and to derive benefits from, the world’s 
biological and genetic diversity. Eleven years ago the 
Convention on Biological Diversity () entered into 
force, with a goal of ensuring that in the process of obtain-
ing and sharing such benefits, society would promote the 
conservation and sustainable use of the world’s biological 
diversity. Since then countries have been attempting to in-
corporate the  objectives into national legislation, with 
varying success from country to country. Several Pacific 
Rim nations were pioneers in the development of access 
and benefit-sharing () laws and policies and faced a 
wide variety of technical and legal difficulties in designing 
and implementing novel access rules and regulations.
As countries struggle with creating  regimes and 
implementing them, they find a dearth of information about 
the process and the experience of others. The purpose of 
this book is to start to address this vacuum, by providing a 
comparative analysis of national  legislation and poli-
cies in the  Pacific Rim countries that signed the . 
The  Project of the Environmental Law Center at the 
World Conservation Union (-) and the University 
of California Genetic Resources Conservation Program 
( ) are pleased to present the results of a three-year 
process of cooperation, consultation, and analysis that in-
volved more than   experts from all the Pacific Rim 
countries that signed the . This is the broadest survey 
of the status of national  policy and legislation con-
ducted to date. Clearly the aim of this fruitful partnership 
and process is not to present a consensus document. It is, 
however, an important publication with valuable insights 
that will contribute not only to the development and refine-
ment of national  policies, but also to the consideration 
of any future international regime on .
This publication would not have been possible with-
out the generous support of the University of California 
Pacific Rim Research Program, the  Project (-
), the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (), and  . It is being published 
by  due to the recognition by Tomme Young (Senior 
Legal Officer with -,  Project) of the value of 
having this knowledge reach as broad an international audi-
ence as possible. The initiative and the product itself can be 
attributed to Santiago Carrizosa ( ) who conceived 
it, obtained funding for it, identified and solicited quality 
responses and text from the more than  participating 
experts, and then carried out a masterful comparative 
analysis of the results.
We are grateful to all of the experts who contributed 
to the publication, which reflects their own professional 
views and not necessarily those of the supporting orga-
nizations.
Patrick McGuire, Director, UC GRCP
John Scanlon, Director, IUCN-ELC
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Today, genetic resources are no longer the common 
heritage of humankind and they cannot be treated as 
freely accessible commodities. The  United Nations 
Convention on Biological Diversity ()1 and the  
 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture () (see Box ) recognized 
the sovereign rights of countries to control the use of their 
genetic resources. These two agreements also stressed that 
the authority to determine access to genetic resources 
rests with national governments and is subject to national 
policies. The objectives of the  are the conservation of 
biological diversity, its sustainable use, and the fair and eq-
uitable sharing of benefits derived from the use of genetic 
resources. Similarly, the objectives of the  are the 
conservation, sustainable use, and equitable sharing of the 
benefits derived from plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture. This Treaty also stressed that these objectives 
shall be accomplished by “linking this Treaty to the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity” ( ). 
The , sometimes also called the “biotrade conven-
tion”, encouraged member countries to facilitate access 
to genetic resources and take measures to ensure the fair 
and equitable sharing of benefits derived from the use of 
these resources. The  emphasized that access to genetic 
resources should be on mutually agreed terms and subject 
to prior informed consent of the resource provider. Since 
the  came into force, bilateral agreements have been 
the main vehicle to facilitate access under the few national 
access and benefit-sharing () policies that were devel-
oped to include the objectives and principles of the . 
On the other hand, under the ,  goals will be 
achieved through a multilateral system of exchange of 
genetic resources. This access system is limited to plant 
genetic resources for food and agriculture; access to ge-
netic resources for chemical, pharmaceutical, nonfood, and 
nonagricultural uses would still be negotiated bilaterally in 
accordance with national  policies and the . Initially, 
the exchange of germplasm of the food and forage crops 
listed in the  Annex, and subject to modification, 
will be regulated by this multilateral system ( ).
In April , the sixth Conference of the Parties to 
the  adopted the  Bonn Guidelines on Access to 
Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the 
Benefits Arising out of their Utilization (hereafter, Bonn 
Guidelines on ). These guidelines apply to all genetic 
resources covered by the , with the exception of those 
covered by the . The guidelines are voluntary, flex-
ible, and were designed mainly to facilitate the develop-
ment process of national  policies and contracts. The 
guidelines outline the roles and responsibilities of users 
and providers or genetic resources and encourage stake-
holders to use a bilateral approach to facilitate  goals. 
The guidelines describe key issues that include: a) involve-
ment of relevant stakeholders and capacity building; b) 
steps in the  process; c) elements of a prior-informed-
consent system; d) monetary and nonmonetary benefits; 
e) incentives; f) national monitoring and reporting; and g) 
accountability. In late , the Plan of Implementation 
that came out of the Johannesburg World Summit on 
Sustainable Development () recommended a) the 
promotion of the wide implementation of and continued 
work on the  Bonn Guidelines on  as an input for 
countries developing  policies and b) the negotiation of 
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the development of an international regime to promote the 
fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from the use 
of genetic resources. In March , at the Open-Ended 
Inter-Sessional Meeting on the Multi-Year Program of 
Work for the Conference of the Parties to the , delegates 
decided to broaden the mandate of the plan of implementa-
tion and included into the international regime the “access” 
component in addition to benefit sharing. However, there 
was disagreement about the legal nature of this regime. 
Many developing countries called for a legally binding 
regime, but the United States of America () stressed 
that in Johannesburg the  deliberately left out the 
term “legally binding” from the plan of implementation. 
No agreement was reached at the meeting. In December 
, this and other issues about the international regime 
were debated further at the second meeting of the Ad Hoc 
Open-Ended Working Group () on . Delegates 
failed to reach consensus and the debate continued at the 
seventh meeting of the Conference of the Parties ( 
) to the  in February . At  , delegates did 
not resolve major issues such as the binding nature of 
the international regime on . However, they reached 
consensus on the terms of reference for the international 
regime and mandated the  on  to develop and 
negotiate the international regime on  based on the 
terms of reference. Members of the working group will 
elaborate and negotiate the nature, scope, and elements of 
the international regime. Before  , the  on  
will hold two sessions, one in Thailand and one in Spain. 
The  regime will address strategies for the protection 
of traditional knowledge. Therefore, the  on  
together with the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Inter-Sessional 
Working Group on Article (j) of the  will examine sui 
generis systems, databases, registers, intellectual property 
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The  is a binding legal agreement adopted by the 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization () 
Conference on  November . Despite the fact that the 
USA and Japan abstained from approving the treaty, there 
were no votes against it. The USA, however, signed the treaty 
in November . Forty countries (the minimum required for 
its entry into force) ratified, approved, accepted, or acceded to 
the  and it entered into force on  June .
Background
The  is the result of a long and complex process initi-
ated in  when the International Undertaking on Plant 
Genetic Resources, a nonbinding legal instrument, was ap-
proved by  Resolution /. The Undertaking reflected 
the concerns of countries regarding access to and use of plant 
genetic resources, the role of intellectual property, especially 
patents and plant breeders’ rights as applied to biological 
materials, the relation between sovereignty and the principle 
of “common heritage of mankind” and small farmers’ con-
tribution to the conservation of plant genetic resources (later 
reflected in the adoption by the Undertaking of the “Farmers’ 
Rights” concept). Tensions and frictions were evident among 
biodiversity-rich countries in the South and industrialized and 
technologically advanced but biodiversity-poor countries in 
the North.
In , at the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (), the Convention on Biological 
Diversity () established a set of new binding principles 
and rules applicable to access to genetic resources in general. 
Agenda  (another outcome of ) specifically called 
for the  to both strengthen the Undertaking and harmonize 
it with the . In November , ’s Resolution / 
recognized the need to review the Undertaking as applied to 
plant genetic resources for food and agriculture in particular 
and develop a binding treaty in conformity with the  rules. 
In  the process of revising the Undertaking was begun 
within the  and the Commission on Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture adopted a revised Undertaking in 
July  (http://www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/IU.htm). This then 
became the  when adopted by consensus at the  
headquarters in Rome in November .
Objective and scope
The  objectives are “the conservation and sustainable 
use of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture and the 
fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of their 
use, in harmony with the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
for sustainable development and food security” (Article .). 
Although its initial general provisions (on conservation and 
sustainable use in general) apply to all plant genetic resources 
for food and agriculture, it is its access and benefit sharing 
() norms which are of particular relevance and interest in 
the context of the current international debate. 
The  entered into force in a context where multiple, 
sometimes overlapping and even conflicting policies and leg-
islation on  are in place. It seems that existing  laws 
and policies such as the  Decision  of the Andean 
Community on a Common Regime on Access to Genetic 
Resources and the  Law of Biodiversity of Costa Rica 
may have to be adjusted and amended in order to prevent 
conflicts with overall  obligations and mandates.
Exchanging genetic resources and sharing the benefits 
The  access provisions will operate through a  Multi-
lateral System of Access and Benefit Sharing. Under this 
System, standardized Material Transfer Agreements (s), 
approved by the Treaty’s Governing Body, will determine 
conditions and requirements to facilitate access to an initial 
number of  food and forage crops. The System is based 
on the fact that, in terms of plant genetic resources for food 
and agriculture in particular, interdependence among coun-
tries and regions prevails and no country is self sufficient 
individually to provide its agriculture system with plant 
genetic resources for breeding, conservation, and food se-
curity purposes. 
Benefits from facilitated access under the  will 
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rights (s), and other measures that can contribute to the 
implementation of Article (j).
While these working groups, member countries, and 
signatories of the  and  debate how to incorpo-
rate into national policies this relatively new and complex 
array of  concepts, some genetic resources are becom-
ing more valuable as the agriculture, pharmaceutical, and 
biotechnology industries continue to provide improved 
means to assay and use them. The economic value of 
the information contained in the genes and biochemical 
compounds of genetic resources has increased with the de-
velopment of novel technologies such as high-throughput 
analysis, combinatorial chemistry, bioinformatics, and ge-
nomics. In ,  of the top  best-selling pharmaceuti-
cal products were either biologicals, natural products or 
entities derived from natural products, or synthetic versions 
based on a natural template. Worldwide sales of these  
products reached about , million  ( K 
and L ). Most of the sales were made by mul-
tinationals such as Pfizer (), GlaxoSmithKline (), 
Merck and Co. (), Novartis (Switzerland), and Bristol 
Myers Squibb (). In  and , however, some 
pharmaceutical companies such as Merck have reduced or 
closed some of their natural products discovery programs 
(J. R, pers. comm. February , J. Cabrera, 
pers. comm. February ).
These multinationals have an important market share 
in developing countries such as Chile and the Philippines. 
However, countries such as China, Egypt, and India fa-
vor mainly their domestic pharmaceutical industries that 
manufacture almost exclusively generic drugs ( K 
and L ). Counterfeiting of pharmaceutical and 
I 
be shared fairly and equitably among parties through: a) 
exchange of information; b) access to and transfer of tech-
nology; c) capacity building; and d) sharing of monetary or 
commercial benefits from the use of resources. Under cur-
rent national  laws and policies, monetary benefits are 
negotiated bilaterally and they include royalty rates, up-front 
payments, and milestone payments. In the case of the -
, the sharing of monetary benefits is an issue which still 
needs to be addressed and decided by the Governing Body. 
Being part of the System is already an important benefit for 
countries (Article ).
Ex situ conservation centers
Ex situ conservation centers (especially the International 
Agriculture Research Centers), hold an important portion 
of the world’s collections of plant genetic resources for food 
and agriculture. These are held “in trust” for the benefit of 
humankind and were obtained mostly prior to the CBD en-
tering into force. These centers will sign agreements with 
the  Governing Body (to replace current agreements 
with ) which will determine the new policies and rules 
regarding access to and use of these materials. A specific  
is under negotiation for this purpose. 
Intellectual property (IP)
The  recognizes that “access and transfer [of plant 
genetic resources] shall be provided on terms which recognize 
and are consistent with the adequate and effective protection 
of intellectual property rights” (Article ..b.iii). Clearly 
there is an express recognition of the need to respect . On 
the other hand,  (whether patents or plant breeders’ rights) 
shall not be applied to plant genetic resources in the form 
received from the Multilateral System (Article ..d). It has 
not been decided whether this restriction of  also applies 
to components or derivatives of these resources. If patents 
were allowed over isolated components and depending on 
how countries were to apply and interpret national and inter-
national  rules, there could be certain restrictions regarding 
access to and use of plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture containing these components or derivatives even 
if they are part of the Multilateral System.
Farmers’ Rights
As part of the Undertaking, Farmers’ Rights were to be 
implemented through an international fund to compensate 
small farmers for their conservation and development of plant 
genetic resources efforts. Under the , Farmers’ Rights 
will be implemented at the national level through individual 
government action (Article ). This may be undertaken either 
through development of laws for the protection of traditional 
knowledge, the participation of indigenous peoples in the 
benefits derived from the use of plant genetic resources for 
food and agriculture, or through participation of indigenous 
peoples in decision-making processes pertaining to these. 
In the last few years many countries may have actually been 
implementing their  obligation in regards to Farmers’ 
Rights. The , the  Intergovernmental Committee on 
Genetic Resources and Intellectual Property, Traditional 
Knowledge and Folklore, and other initiatives have triggered 
a series of national and regional policy and legal processes 
oriented at the protection of traditional knowledge in general. 
In the case of Peru for example, the  Law  for 
the protection of indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge 
related to biodiversity will certainly be giving substantive 
content to the Farmers’ Rights provisions of the . 
Similarly, general provisions on the protection of traditional 
knowledge in  laws in Costa Rica, Philippines, and a few 
others, could also be indirectly addressing Farmers’ Rights 
(see Chapter ).
Final Word
Many countries are still analyzing the implications of the 
Treaty on their national access regulations and intellectual 
property rights. One simple but sometimes politically dif-
ficult way to overcome potential problems is for countries 
expressly to recognize (as they develop their  policies 
and laws) that the  Multilateral System as it applies 
to the list of crops is an exceptional regime, with its own set 
of rules and principles, which should not be affected by other 
laws and regulations.
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many other products is a common practice in these and 
many other developing (and developed) countries that 
translates into significant economic losses for multina-
tionals. Therefore, these multinationals have lobbied to 
prevent these activities and strengthen intellectual property 
protection for their products all over the world in order 
to recover their significant investments (S et al. 
, R ). These multinationals were particularly 
effective during the – Uruguay Round of mul-
tilateral trade negotiations when the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ()2 
was adopted. Unlike the Convention of the International 
Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants () 
or any other intellectual property rights treaty3,  es-
tablishes legal enforcement of minimum standards for all 
s. According to , member countries have to provide 
patent protection for microorganisms (as products) and 
for nonbiological and microbiological processes used for 
the production of plants and animals. Plants and animals 
themselves may be excluded from patentability. However, 
plant varieties must be protected by plant breeders’ rights 
or another sui generis system.  has a timetable for 
compliance. For example, the least developed countries 
have until  to provide patent protection for pharma-
ceuticals ( News ). Failure to comply with this 
timetable might bring trade sanctions (D ).
In November , trade ministers from all over the 
world adopted the Doha Ministerial Declaration in order 
to facilitate the implementation of current agreements of 
the World Trade Organization (), among other issues. 
The Declaration encourages the  Council to review 
the relationship between  and the  and the protec-
tion of traditional knowledge and folklore.4 The outcome 
of this review is still unclear. However, several analysts 
suggest that the impact of  on the  is strong, and 
they have challenged the patent scenario promoted by  
(S ). Indigenous communities and other sectors 
of society reject the idea of patenting life, and this position 
has had direct and indirect consequences that include the 
cancellation of bioprospecting5 projects (S , see 
Chapter ). Others argue that patents should not be used to 
protect genes that have just been isolated in vitro because 
according to traditional patent law this is a discovery and 
not an invention6 (C , D , see 
Chapter ). On the other hand, many argue that when 
patents are linked to bioprospecting agreements, they can 
support local capacity building and conservation (R et 
al. ,  K and L ).
Bioprospecting projects are long-term efforts whose 
fruits could materialize perhaps  or  years into the 
future provided that products are developed and marketed. 
In the short run, however, these projects can provide and 
have provided research, training, and educational op-
portunities to biodiversity stakeholders from developing 
countries. They have also transferred technology required 
to carry out specific tests and have provided incentives 
for the development of in situ and ex situ conservation 
activities (R et al. , see Chapters , , and 
). However, it is unrealistic to pretend that current and 
future bioprospecting projects can be a significant source 
of funding for the conservation of biological diversity or 
a guaranteed means of generating, particularly in the short 
term, major levels of revenue (S et al. ). Costa 
Rica, the only country in the world that has over a decade 
of documented experience implementing bioprospecting 
projects, has accumulated valuable data about the impact 
of these projects on conservation. Between  and 
, these projects channeled about . million  to 
conservation purposes. This is equivalent to an average of 
,  per year, an amount which is quite insig-
nificant compared to the  million  per year that 
Costa Rica gets from ecological tourism (see Chapter ). 
Research and development for the production of pharma-
ceuticals and other biotechnology products derived from 
biodiversity can be a risky, costly, and time-consuming 
activity (DM et al. , R et al. ).
Bioprospecting projects have been the target of heavy 
criticism in the last few years. Claims of biopiracy, unfair 
distribution of benefits, illegal appropriation of traditional 
knowledge, and the problem of the patenting of life have 
contributed to revive the old south-north debate that fo-
cuses on access to genetic resources on the one hand and 
the economic returns of using them on the other (S 
, , see Chapter ). The essence of the debate 
is that industrialized countries are the primary users and 
economic beneficiaries of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge that are “produced” in developing countries. 
The apparent solution to this disparity is to provide some 
legal and social mechanism for balancing inequities be-
tween the north and south in access to genetic resources 
and financial benefits from using them. This mechanism 
has to be the result of a participatory process that involves 
all sectors of society. Otherwise, as history has shown, 
 initiatives are likely to fail (see Chapter ). This is the 
challenge faced by the policy makers and bioprospectors 
who are designing  policies (see Chapters , , and ). 
These policies should promote the conservation, sustain-
able use, and equitable distribution of the benefits derived 
from terrestrial and marine biodiversity. But they also need 
to facilitate the access and exchange of genetic resources 
found in megadiversity countries that form the basis for 
the improvement of agricultural crops, for the develop-
ment of key medicines and pharmaceutical products, and 
for crop-protection products that are fundamental to the 
survival of the world’s population.
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The Pacific Rim countries include  of the  so-called 
megadiversity countries or the biologically wealthiest na-
tions of the world (M et al. ). These  
countries7 cover only % of the world’s continental surface 
but harbor about % of the world’s biodiversity. Many of 
these nations are within centers of origin and diversity of 
crops such as maize (Mexico), potato (Peru and Bolivia), 
rice (Philippines), and soybean (China). The agricultural 
productivity of countries such as Australia and the  is 
heavily dependent on a supply of genetic resources from 
the Pacific Rim region ( ).
Furthermore, Pacific Rim countries are also valuable 
sources of genes and biochemicals that are currently 
used by the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries 
in healthcare and agriculture. In the , % of the top 
 prescription drugs used in  were nature-inspired 
compounds, semisynthetics and their analogs, and natural 
products or chemicals found in nature. Only % were 
completely human-made drugs. Almost % of these drugs 
come from plants, % from fungi, % from bacteria, and 
% from snake venom (F ). Most of the con-
tributions of nature to the pharmaceutical industry come 
from plants, but only . to .% of the , known 
species of flowering plants have been intensively exam-
ined for possible medicinal value (G ). The 
biotechnology industry has also used living organisms to 
clean up polluted sites, to provide energy, and to separate 
valuable minerals from ore, among other uses ( K 
and L ).
Two years after the  came into force, a handful 
of biodiversity-rich Pacific Rim countries pioneered the 
first comprehensive  frameworks in the world. In 
the Asian region of the Pacific Rim, the Philippines, a 
megadiversity country, developed in  the first  
regime (Chapter ). Similarly, in mid-, the Andean 
Community of Nations8 adopted Decision  (Chapter 
), the first instance in which a group of biodiversity-rich 
countries realized that they had to act as a unit to enact 
legislation to protect common traditional knowledge and 
ecological regions, in this case the Pacific Rim, the Andes, 
and the Amazon region. Two years later, on  April , 
the Costa Rican government adopted the “Biodiversity 
Law” which established  rules and procedures for 
bioprospectors with commercial and academic purposes 
(Chapter ).
I 
Regional Significance and ABS Frameworks
Problem Statement
Since the  came into force in , designing legal 
frameworks to regulate access to genetic resources has 
been a central task in the realm of international environ-
mental policy. Political scientists, sociologists, economists, 
molecular biologists, ecologists, and scientists from many 
other disciplines have contributed to the debate on the , 
s, bioprospecting initiatives, and contractual arrange-
ments, and this information has contributed to the devel-
opment of the first  frameworks. For example, R 
et al. () and the C G () presented 
valuable insights on the relationships among the , the 
International Undertaking of the , s, benefit-sharing 
strategies, and bioprospecting initiatives for pharmaceuti-
cal and agricultural purposes. The debate on the impact 
of s on biodiversity conservation and traditional 
knowledge promoted by V (), G (), 
S (), and B and S () also 
influenced the development of recommendations for  
frameworks (M et al. ,  K and L 
) that still need to be tested. Others such as G 
() and L () have attempted to provide a menu 
for the development of  frameworks. In ,   of 
the  adopted the  Bonn Guidelines on  designed 
to help countries develop their access regulations.
However, over eight years have passed since the first 
access framework was adopted by the Philippines, and 
there are still many questions regarding the impact of this 
and other policies regarding the exchange of genetic re-
sources9 and on the implementation of these policies at a 
national level. Some of these issues have been addressed. 
For example, in , a workshop at Columbia University 
resulted in an interesting report that reviewed seven ex-
amples of bioprospecting agreements implemented in 
seven countries. Issues analyzed by the report included: 
a) stakeholders; b) property rights; c) prior informed con-
sent; d) benefit sharing; e) compliance; and f) biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable use ( ). Similarly, 
B and R () analyzed access policies within 
the context of conservation and sustainable use in seven 
countries. G et al. () published case studies 
of  policy progress in  Southeast Asian countries 
and N et al. () published a handbook that 
addresses laws, policies, and institutions that govern  
issues in  African countries. But no comprehensive study 
has been conducted about the difficulties and successes 
that these and other nations experienced while developing 
their  frameworks. Moreover, no comparative analyses 
have been conducted on the experience this far of nations 
that have engaged in the development and implementation 
of  policies.
The Pacific Rim countries that pioneered the develop-
ment of  frameworks have faced a wide variety of tech-
nical, political, social, and legal difficulties in designing 
and implementing novel  policies at a national level. 
The Andean Pact countries, the Philippines, and Costa 
Rica, for example, have had problems ensuring that these 
policies embody the principles of the  and at the same 
time take into account the beliefs and opinions of key sec-
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tors of society about how genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge should be used and administered. Today, most 
of the economic value of genetic resources comes from 
the information that they provide to the biotechnology 
industry, and regulating access to this information cre-
ates challenges that many countries have never faced 
before. These nations have also had conceptual, finan-
cial, and administrative difficulties in implementing their 
 policies at a national level (P  L , 
C , C ). Moreover, in countries 
such as Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru a lack of clarity 
about the implementation of key  laws has specifically 
prevented scientists from collecting plants and animals 
for noncommercial research purposes (G , 
R ).
There is also a lack of information about the role of 
access policies on  issues, benefit-sharing strategies, and 
bioprospecting initiatives for pharmaceutical, agricultural, 
and industrial purposes. The experience of these pioneer 
countries will certainly facilitate the development of bal-
anced and sound  policies. These policies might in turn 
facilitate the exchange of genetic resources and benefits for 
many Pacific Rim countries whose unrestricted or misman-
aged access to genetic resources has already led to unsound 
practices that have depleted a significant concentration of 
species and ecosystems crucial for the survival of many 
local cultures and industries. We have undertaken this study 
to determine and address the problems of development 
and implementation of  frameworks, the unexpected 
consequences of  frameworks on bioprospecting proj-
ects, and the lack of access to information among countries 
about  issues.
Study Design and Organization of this Report
Many Pacific Rim countries share ecological similarities 
in large terrestrial and marine regions, and they also share 
the need to regulate access to their rich genetic resources. 
There is already much experience in the region that can be 
shared not only among the Pacific Rim countries, but also 
between these countries and other non-Pacific Rim coun-
tries that may also be facing access concerns. Therefore, 
in early , with financial support from the University 
of California’s Pacific Rim Research Program, an effort 
was initiated to identify existing access frameworks, 
benefit-sharing strategies,  issues, and bioprospecting 
initiatives in the Pacific Rim region and develop a com-
parative analysis. Between  and , over  experts 
from  Pacific Rim countries that signed the  were 
identified and contacted. Thirteen of them were asked to 
develop in-depth reports about the  legislation status, 
s, and bioprospecting projects of five countries that 
have these type of policies in place and three countries 
that are currently working on legal  frameworks. The 
forty-nine experts from the other  countries were asked 
to respond to a survey. Specific issues that all of the experts 
were asked to discuss included: a) the process that led to 
or will lead to the development of national  laws and 
policies; b) successes and concerns that countries experi-
enced during the design of these regulations; c) successes 
and concerns experienced during the implementation of 
these regulations; d) influence of these frameworks and  
issues on bioprospecting initiatives; and e) novel benefit-
sharing strategies that have been implemented locally. This 
report presents comparative analyses of the above issues 
(Chapters  through ) and a selection of eight case stud-
ies that show in detail the status and experiences of five 
countries that have  frameworks and three countries 
that are struggling to develop such frameworks (Chapters 
 through ). 
In October , a preliminary overview of the results 
of the study was presented at a workshop at the University 
of California, Davis.10 Forty-five experts on  issues 
from seventeen Pacific Rim countries, multilateral organi-
zations involved in  implementation, nongovernmental 
organizations (s) with  expertise, collections-based 
organizations, industry, and academia participated. The 
workshop provided an opportunity to identify the main 
elements and gaps of the existing international system 
of  governance, the main elements of what a future 
international regime on  should have, and measures 
that might be taken by the international community to 
enhance effective international governance. A summary of 
the workshop conclusions is presented in Appendix .
One of the participants was Tomme Young, Legal 
Officer at the Environmental Law Center of the World 
Conservation Union in Bonn, Germany. At the workshop 
she presented an analysis of elements for the future in-
ternational regime and she contributed an amplification 
of that address here as Chapter . The chapter presents 
an overview of the existing system of international  
governance, discusses the opportunities and challenges 
facing the international community in negotiation of an 
international regime, and suggests a potential blueprint, 
in the form of proposed areas of action to clarify  
concepts and assumptions, upon which the international 
community may wish to focus in the development of an 
effective international system of  governance.
Finally, Chapter  summarizes the main lessons 
learned from the study and their implications for the de-
velopment of  frameworks. Appendix  provides back-
ground information on authors and Appendix  provides 
contact information for authors and survey respondents.
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Endnotes
1
Diversity of Policies
in Place and in Progress
Santiago Carrizosa
On  December , one and a half years after its sign-
ing, the Convention on Biological Diversity () became 
international law and a binding legal document for the  
countries that ratified it by that date. By October , 
one month before the first meeting of the  Conference 
of the Parties,  countries and the European Community 
had ratified the convention. Today, there are  Parties 
(countries who have ratified, acceded, accepted, or ap-
proved the ), but only about % of these Parties 
have concluded or are developing laws and policies 
regulating access and benefit sharing ().1 The  
Pacific Rim countries examined in this report harbor about 
% of the world’s biodiversity (Mittermeier et al. ). 
These countries are: Australia, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Fiji, Guatemala, Honduras, Japan, Indonesia, Kiribati, Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic (hereafter Laos), Malaysia, 
Marshall Islands, Mexico, Federated States of Micronesia 
(hereafter, Micronesia), Nauru, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Niue, People’s Republic of China (hereafter China), Palau, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Republic 
of Korea, Russian Federation, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon 
Islands, Thailand, Tonga, Tuvalu, the United States of 
America (hereafter, ), Vanuatu, and Vietnam. As of July 
,  of these countries were Parties to the , the  
is a signatory, not a Party2. Our findings indicate that only 
nine of these  Pacific Rim countries (%) had developed 
some sort of  law or policy3,  of them (%) were 
working towards the development of  frameworks, and six 
(%) were not involved in any systematic process leading 
to the development  frameworks (see Table ). Before 
the  was signed, most, if not all, of these countries had 
a permit system to regulate the extraction and manage-
ment of biological resources and the transition from these 
permit systems to more comprehensive  frameworks 
has proven to be difficult. Chapter  provides a detailed 
account of the problems faced by selected countries during 
the development process of their  laws and policies. 
Overview of Regional and National ABS Policies and Laws
Several national and regional initiatives have been under-
taken by Pacific Rim countries to develop  frameworks. 
The presence of common ecoregions (i.e., the Andes and 
Amazon) and ethnic and cultural beliefs were factors 
that promoted the development of a Common Regime 
on Access to Genetic Resources (Decision ) of the 
Andean Community4. Following the lead of the Andean 
Community, countries of the Central American region 
developed a draft protocol on “Access to genetic and 
biochemical resources, and their associated knowledge” 
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations5 () 
drafted the “ Framework Agreement on Access 
to Biological and Genetic Resources”.6 However, these 
drafts are not as comprehensive, detailed, and prescrip-
tive as Decision . They were developed by each body 
knowing that their member countries already had or were 
about to develop national  laws and policies. In contrast, 
the Andean countries had no national  policies before 
Decision  was developed. Furthermore, when Decision 
 was approved under the Cartagena Agreement of the 
Andean Pact Countries it became binding and was auto-
matically integrated into national legislation. Initially, the 
 
application by a country of Decision  did not require 
the development of any new national law, but only some 
additional dispositions and regulations might be needed. 
Venezuela applied this regime directly to several access 
applications7 and Colombia attempted unsuccessfully 
to negotiate an access application under Decision . 
However, technical ambiguities, social protest, political 
concerns, and institutional limitations, among other fac-
tors, forced Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and recently Colombia 
to develop national policies to facilitate the implementa-
tion of Decision  into their national context. Peru, for 
example, should be approving the regulation of Decision 
 sometime in  (M. Ruiz, pers. comm. January 
) and Colombia is currently working on a proposal 
for a national  policy (see Chapter ). Furthermore, 
traditional knowledge is part of the scope of protection 
provided by Decision , but the Andean Community 
has still to develop a regional policy to address this issue. 
On  August  Peru became the first country in the 
Andean region that adopted a national comprehensive legal 
system (Law No. ) for the protection of indigenous 
communities’ collective knowledge associated with bio-
diversity (P C ). On  July , 
the Andean Community adopted a Regional Biodiversity 
Strategy (Decision ). This strategy includes an  
component that describes some of the problems experi-
enced by the Andean countries in implementing Decision 
 and proposes a course of action to facilitate its imple-
mentation (A C ).
The only Pacific Rim country in South America that 
does not have any  policy is Chile. This country has 
been the research site of several bioprospecting8 groups but 
so far this has not been a significant incentive for policy 
makers to develop a comprehensive  framework. In 
late  the Ministry of Agriculture developed an  
proposal that applies only to agricultural genetic resources. 
The proposal however, was discarded after much criticism, 
but efforts to develop a new proposal continue. Also, in 
 the National Commission of the Environment pub-
lished the country’s National Biodiversity Strategy that 
called for the development of an  policy. The strategy 
is the guiding chart of the National Biodiversity Action 
Plan that was initiated in mid-.
Costa Rica, one of the main promoters of the Central 
American draft protocol on , is the only country in 
that region that has a national law (the  Law of 
Biodiversity No. ) which includes  provisions. In 
December , the Costa Rican government published a 
general access procedure that functions as a bylaw of the 
Law of Biodiversity. Nicaragua has followed the example 
of Costa Rica and developed a proposal for a law of biodi-
versity that will be consistent with the protocol and should 
be sent to Congress in  or . Nicaragua’s draft 
law of biodiversity responds to the mandate (Article ) 
of the  General Law of the Environment and Natural 
Resources No.  (). Similarly, Honduras is plan-
ning to develop a law of biodiversity that will include 
 provisions and from there they will derive a more 
specific  framework. As a first step, however, Honduras 
is developing a proposal to assess national capacity and 
priorities regarding access to genetic resources. Some 
objectives of this proposal include: a) identification of 
advances in the area of genetic resources; b) identification 
of the importance of genetic resources at a national level; 
c) definition of priorities; and d) identification of local 
organizations that use genetic resources. Honduras has 
endorsed the Central American draft protocol on  and 
will likely ratify it once this country’s priorities regarding 
this issue have been identified. Panama will ratify the draft 
protocol in  or  and it is currently working on an 
 policy that will complement existing natural resource 
use legislation that includes: a) Forestry Law No.  of  
February ; b) Law No.  of  December ; c) 
Wildlife Law No.  of  June ; and d) Resolution 
-- of January . The legal mandate to develop 
an  policy in Panama is included in the  General 
Law of the Environment No.  () that designates the 
National Authority for the Environment9 () as the 
competent authority for the regulation, management, and 
control of the access to and use of biogenetic resources. 
According to ,  must elaborate legal instru-
ments and economic mechanisms to facilitate  goals 
in Panama (Article ).  also states that indigenous 
communities must have a share of the benefits derived 
from the use of natural resources found in their lands 
(Article ) and clarifies that holders of rights granted 
for the use of natural resources do not hold rights for the 
use of genetic resources contained in them (Article ) 
(L A L ). National initiatives 
to develop more specific  regulations include draft 
Law No.  that might create an Institute on Traditional 
Indigenous Medicine. This draft law includes some access, 
benefit-sharing, s, and marketing provisions for prod-
ucts used in traditional indigenous medicine (see Chapter 
). El Salvador just completed  guidelines that are 
likely to provide a course of action about how to imple-
ment existing and future policy. Finally, Guatemala’s  
Action Plan of the National Strategy for the Conservation 
and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity addressed the need 
to develop an  policy. But policy-makers from this 
country do not seem to be engaged in a systematic and 
participatory process to do so. Guatemala is also a signa-
tory of the Central American draft protocol on “Access to 
genetic and biochemical resources, and their associated 
knowledge” and it will become national law once it is 
ratified by this nation.
In North America, Mexico has used Article  of the  
Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection 
General Act () to facilitate access for two bio-
prospecting projects (see Chapters  and ). This article 
and Article   were introduced in the  reform 
of the act and they set forth principles regarding prior 
informed consent () and benefit-sharing issues for col-
lections of biological species for scientific, economic, and 
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biotechnology purposes. The  Wildlife General Act 
() and the  Sustainable Forestry Development 
General Act () regulate the collection of wildlife 
resources and forest biological resources respectively and 
address  and benefit-sharing issues as well. However, 
, , and  lack details about how to achieve 
the implementation of  requirements and other  
principles. Currently, there are two pieces of legislation 
in Congress that purport to fill this gap. One submitted 
by the Federal Representative Alejandro Cruz Gutierrez 
(Institutional Revolutionary Party) and the other by Federal 
Senator Jorge Nordhausen (National Action Party). The 
proposal of Senator Nordhausen, entitled “Law for Access 
and Use of Biological and Genetic Resources” (), 
is more comprehensive and may be approved sometime in 
 or  (Jorge Larson, pers. comm. February ). 
Therefore, it will be discussed in this report. Canada has 
undertaken some background research on  issues and 
held some preliminary discussions with provincial govern-
ments and some aboriginal groups. The  is not a  
Party and it does not have a national  policy. Access is 
usually regulated by the landowner. Multiple federal and state 
laws regulate genetic resources found on land owned by the 
federal or state governments. In contrast, genetic resources 
found on private lands are controlled by the owner unless 
these resources are protected by the Endangered Species Act 
or other relevant federal or state laws. The owner of genetic 
resources is relatively free to negotiate  conditions with 
the bioprospector. 
The only European country that borders the Pacific Rim 
is the Russian Federation and, despite its high biological 
diversity, this country has not developed a comprehensive 
 framework. The Ministry of Industry, Science, and 
Technology is analyzing  issues such as ownership of 
genetic resources in the context of existing legislation. 
These issues have been addressed thanks to the momen-
tum created by a  national report on access to genetic 
resources. 
In the Asian region of the Pacific Rim, the Philippines 
and Thailand are the only two countries that have com-
pleted national  frameworks. In , the Philippines 
enacted Republic Act No. , known as the Wildlife 
Resources and Conservation Act (hereafter Wildlife Act) 
that addressed many of the criticisms of an earlier policy, 
the  Executive Order No.  ( ). The Wildlife 
Act is a codification of existing laws on the protection 
and conservation of wildlife resources. It includes only 
two provisions that deal with bioprospecting issues but it 
modifies   considerably and facilitates access to the 
country’s genetic resources. In July , draft “Guidelines 
for Bioprospecting Activities in the Philippines”10 was re-
leased for review and comment. These guidelines outline 
detailed  requirements for commercial bioprospectors 
and facilitate the implementation of the Wildlife Act. The 
guidelines would also facilitate the implementation of 
those provisions of   that were not repealed by, or 
are consistent with, the Wildlife Act. Even though Thailand 
did not become a  Party until January , in , 
this country adopted the following laws and regulations 
that cover  issues and apply to bioprospectors: a) the 
Royal Forest Department () Regulation on Forestry 
Studying and Research Conducting within Forested Areas 
(); b) the Plant Variety Protection Act (); 
and c) Act on Protection and Promotion of Traditional 
Medicinal Intelligence (). In addition, foreign 
bioprospectors have to comply with the regulation on the 
permission for foreign researchers to conduct research 
in Thailand that was enacted by the National Research 
Council of Thailand () in . These policies, how-
ever, present overlapping problems. Therefore, in  
the Prime Minister enacted a regulation on Conservation 
and Utilization of Biological Resources that is basically a 
mandate for all government bodies to coordinate the devel-
opment and implementation of  rules and procedures, 
among other issues.
In Malaysia, the federal government is currently fi-
nalizing a bill on  that could be enacted in  or 
. This bill will complement  policies already 
enacted at a state level by Sarawak and Sabah. Singapore 
is also developing a national  policy and guidelines. 
Indonesia is currently working on an Act on Genetic 
Resource Management that includes a government regu-
lation on  issues. In Cambodia,  issues are partially 
regulated by the  Forestry Law. Laos, however, is 
not currently engaged in the development of national  
frameworks. On the other hand Vietnam’s  National 
Action Plan on Biological Diversity addressed the need 
to develop an  policy. Therefore, in the last few years 
the government has been collecting and analyzing  
literature and it is planning to start working actively on 
a national  policy in  or . The two Asian 
economic powers, China and Japan, also lack  policies 
but both countries are collecting information, conducting 
studies, and analyzing trends regarding  policies. The 
Environmental Protection Administration of China is also 
putting together a team to develop a comprehensive  
law or policy. The Republic of Korea is currently amend-
ing its  Natural Environment Conservation Act. The 
amended act will include specific  provisions and it is 
likely to be completed in  or . It should be noted 
that this act has been repeatedly amended since . For 
example, the  amendment included Article . that 
allowed foreigners to collect and use domestic biological 
resources for commercial, medical, or scientific uses. This 
article, however, was removed from the act by Law No. 
 of  February . 
In addition to these national  policies, several Asian 
nations have been active in the development of a regional 
policy known as the  Framework Agreement on 
Access to Biological and Genetic Resources, scheduled 
to be adopted in  or  by the  countries. 
The  framework will cover the following Pacific 
Rim countries whose  frameworks are analyzed in this 
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report: Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Laos, 
and Cambodia.
In Oceania, Australia has carried out an interesting process 
that resulted in the development of the  Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Amendment 
Regulations () that will apply to  issues in 
the commonwealth areas of Australia. These regulations, 
which will reform the  Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act, are likely to be introduced 
in Parliament in . At a state level, Queensland and 
Western Australia are also undertaking activities to develop 
 laws. In mid-, Queensland adopted a Biodiscovery 
Bill and Western Australia is currently discussing a licens-
ing regime for terrestrial bioprospecting activities that will 
be included in a draft Biodiversity Conservation Act. These 
states are consulting with Environment Australia to ensure 
that where jurisdictions overlap with commonwealth ter-
ritories, these regulations are not duplicated. In addition to 
this, in  the Natural Resource Management Ministerial 
Council adopted a federal agreement on a “Nationally 
Consistent Approach for Access to and the Utilization of 
Australia’s Native Genetic and Biochemical Resources”. 
This agreement includes  principles to facilitate the 
development or review of legislative, administrative, or 
policy  initiatives for a nationally consistent approach 
in each jurisdiction.
Australia’s neighbor, New Zealand, has undertaken 
some key activities towards the development of a national 
 policy. In November , the Ministry of Economic 
Development published a discussion paper on bioprospect-
ing. The paper invited the public to submit comments by 
the end of February . In May  the Ministry posted 
a summary of the submissions on its website.11 However, 
future efforts to develop  legislation can be compli-
cated by a claim by a number of tribes (Iwi) of the Maori 
people to a tribunal in which they assert exclusive rights 
over both traditional knowledge and indigenous genetic 
resources under the Waitangi Treaty of . This claim 
was presented to the tribunals in  and is not likely 
to be settled in the near future. Nevertheless, government 
officials continue to debate bioprospecting issues together 
with this community and other stakeholders. In Samoa, in 
, the Department of Lands, Surveys, and Environment 
adopted a preliminary regulation titled “Conditions for 
Access to and Benefit Sharing of Samoa’s Biodiversity 
Resources” (). In addition, this department is 
working on a more comprehensive  regulation that will 
be appended to the  Lands and Environment Act that 
is currently under revision. In March , Micronesia fin-
ished its National Biodiversity Strategy and it is expected 
that the development of  policy will follow from the 
needs identified by the strategy. 
Cook Islands, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Niue, Solomon 
Islands, and Vanuatu lack  policies but have working 
groups and committees in place analyzing existing leg-
islation and proposing courses of action for the develop-
ment of local policies. Vanuatu, for example, is analyzing 
 provisions that might be included in the draft of its 
Environment Act. Palau is planning to start working on 
 policies sometime between  and , depending 
on the availability of funding and technical capacity. In 
Papua New Guinea, the Department of Environment and 
Conservation is working closely with lawyers from the 
Department of Justice and Attorney General to develop 
a framework on intellectual property rights and . 
Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, and Tuvalu have received techni-
cal advice from the South Pacific Regional Environment 
Program, -South Pacific Program, the Foundation for 
International Environmental Law and Development, and 
other local organizations, but these countries are not cur-
rently engaged in a systematic development process of  
policies. The  laws and policies of these countries are 
in different stages of development and implementation and 
all of them provide valuable lessons. Table  summarizes 
the information provided in the preceding paragraphs and 
provides additional details.
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Analyzing ABS Policies and Laws of Selected Countries
The remainder of this chapter focuses on national  
policies and laws that are already in place and drafts of 
 policies and laws that are still going through an ex-
ecutive or legislative process and may still be modified. 
These drafts include interesting provisions that merit 
careful analysis and are useful for the purposes of this 
report. Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, 
Philippines, Samoa, and Thailand comprise the group 
that has already adopted national  laws and policies. 
Despite the fact that they may still be modified at a politi-
cal and legislative level, these laws and policies can be 
used by bioprospectors. As noted above, the  does not 
have a national  policy and it is not likely to develop 
one in the future. However, depending on the region where 
biological or genetic resources are found, there are certain 
regulations that bioprospectors have to follow in order 
to access genetic resources. This section examines the 
application of National Park Service () regulations to 
 activity (i.e., the Diversa/Yellowstone National Park 
bioprospecting project) and it suggests that these regula-
tions are analogous to  laws and policies developed by 
other countries under the umbrella of the .
Australia, Malaysia, and Nicaragua comprise the group 
that is in the process of developing or adopting  poli-
cies or laws. Australia’s amendment regulations on access 
to genetic resources are likely to be passed by Parliament 
in  or  and Malaysia’s federal bill on access to 
genetic resources is likely to be approved by Parliament 
in . Nicaragua’s Ministry for the Environment and 
Natural Resources recently concluded a final draft of the 
 
Law of Biodiversity and it should be sent to Congress in 
 or .
This section discusses the main provisions of  
laws and policies of these nations that have been inspired 
by the  and influenced by international and national 
social, economic, and political factors. These provisions 
are: a) ownership; b) scope; c) access procedure; d) prior 
informed consent; e) benefit sharing and compensation 
mechanisms; f) intellectual property rights and the pro-
tection of traditional knowledge; g) in situ biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable use; and h) enforcement 
and monitoring. Each of these issues will be presented as 
national laws and policies describe them. Then, a subse-
quent analysis will compare and contrast the main issues 
and implications for the main actors that play a part in 
bioprospecting initiatives, namely government authorities, 
bioprospectors, and the providers of genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge.
Ownership
Ownership of genetic resources determines access condi-
tions, procedures, rules, and rights over these resources. 
Traditionally, the constitutions of countries define the 
concept of ownership of natural resources. The concept 
of ownership of genetic resources is novel and in some 
cases  laws have made the connection between natural 
and genetic resources. This section compares and contrasts 
ownership systems of natural and genetic resources pro-
posed by the selected countries.
Australia: Draft EPBCAR
In the commonwealth areas of Australia, the Common-
wealth owns the biological resources in the land in accor-
dance with common law principles discussed by V 
(). The Australian Constitution, however, does not 
explicitly provide for this. Rather, ownership flows from 
the common law. This provides that ownership of land 
includes the substrata. That being the case, natural things 
growing on it or in it are owned by the Commonwealth. 
Insofar as genetic and biochemical resources are physical 
elements found within biological resources then, where 
the Commonwealth owns the biological resources, then 
it must also own those constituent elements12 (G. Burton, 
pers. comm. January ).
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru: Decision 391
Decision  establishes that genetic resources and their 
derivatives found in the Andean Community are considered 
the goods or patrimony of the State, depending on the 
country’s national legislation. This applies to resources 
found in private, public, and indigenous lands and in in situ 
and ex situ conditions (A C ).
Costa Rica: The Law of Biodiversity
This law states that genetic and biochemical resources 
are considered to be in the public domain, independent of 
any private ownership of the land where they are located. 
Therefore, these resources belong to the State and it can 
regulate access to them (see Chapter ). 
Malaysia:
Draft federal bill on access to genetic resources
In Malaysia, ownership of biological, genetic, and bio-
chemical resources is still a gray area. The Constitution 
allocates ownership of land and minerals to the thirteen 
states. Therefore, biological, biochemical, and genetic 
resources found in public lands belong to the individual 
state. However, in some states the ownership situation of 
resources found in indigenous and private land is under 
controversy and it is unclear whether these resources be-
long to the state or the owner of the land (see Chapter ). 
The draft of the federal bill on access to genetic resources 
will apply to public, indigenous, and private lands, there-
fore ownership of resources found in these areas will have 
to be clarified before the law is adopted.
Mexico: EEEPGA, WGA, SFDGA, and draft LAUBGR
In Mexico,  has been implemented to regulate  
under the understanding that genetic resources are public 
property. The Constitution defines public property over 
certain natural resources, such as land, oil, and water. It 
does not mention genetic resources, but again as in other 
constitutions it can be implied that natural resources con-
tain the biological, biochemical, and genetic components. 
In addition to this,  recognizes the rights of landowners 
to make a sustainable use of the wildlife resources found 
in their lands ( ) and  establishes that 
the owners of forest resources are the owners of the land 
where these resources are found ( ). Critics, 
however, argue that new legislation has to be developed to 
clarify public, indigenous, and private property status of 
genetic and biochemical resources (see Chapter ). The 
draft  may help clarify the ownership status of 
genetic resources (G P ). 
Nicaragua: Draft Law of Biodiversity
In ,  established that natural resources are 
patrimony of the state ( ). The draft Law of 
Biodiversity takes a step forward by specifying that that 
wildlife, genetic, and biochemical resources are considered 
public domain. Therefore, these resources belong to the 
State which can regulate access to them. Nevertheless, it 
is important to note that the draft law acknowledges that 
indigenous peoples own the wildlife, biochemical, and 
genetic resources found in their territories. This, however, 
does not mean that they can access these resources for 
biotechnological purposes without State intervention. 
The State is still a party in any agreement established 
between an indigenous community and a third party 
( ). 
Philippines: EO 247 and Wildlife Act
The Constitution states that all lands of the public domain, 
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, 
all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, 
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wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are 
owned by the State. The exploration, development, and 
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full 
control and supervision of the State. This provision of 
the Constitution is the basis for   as stated in its 
Preamble. Although it is not categorically stated in   
that ownership of biological and genetic resources belongs 
to the State, it is implied in some of its provisions such as 
the collection of royalties for the use of these resources. 
Furthermore, the claim of State ownership over these re-
sources is expressly stated in commercial and academic 
research agreements that have been subsequently devel-
oped. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that when the 
Constitution says “natural resources”, the term includes 
all that is part or portion of the resource (tissues, genes, 
molecules, etc), plant or animal, living or preserved. Thus, 
exploration and use of these resources is under the full 
control and supervision of the State (P. Benavidez, pers. 
comm. January ).
Samoa: CABSSBR 
Samoa’s Constitution is not specific about ownership of 
natural, biological, or genetic resources. Also, the  
does not include information about ownership of these re-
sources ( ). Land is classified as private, freehold, 
and customary land13 (the latter amounting to about % 
of the country’s total land area) (C. Peteru, pers. comm. 
December ).
Thailand: PVPA, RFSRCFA, and APPTMI
The Constitution states that natural resources are owned 
by the State but it gives the authority to manage such 
resources to the people. Therefore, if natural, biological, 
and genetic resources are found in National Forests or any 
other public land, the owner is the State. If these resources 
are found in a private garden, the landowner will need the 
State’s authorization to commercialize them. In any case, 
ownership issues is still a gray area in Thailand and the 
government is trying to develop laws such as the  
to clarify ownership issues regarding biological, genetic, 
and biochemical resources (J. Donavanik, pers. comm. 
January ).
USA: NPS research specimen collection permit 
Title  of the  Code of Federal Regulation states that all 
specimens collected in a national park under research (or 
access) permits belong to that park. This is the case of the 
collection of samples carried out by Diversa in Yellowstone 
National Park (see Chapter ). 
Analysis: Ownership
The legal status of genetic resources depends on the rights 
upon an organism or its parts, and the information em-
bodied in them. Evidently, the information component of 
genetic resources is the most valuable for bioprospectors. 
However, no State has created a property right system 
for this component. Therefore, countries still rely on the 
physical entity (i.e., organism or its parts) to define the 
legal status of their genetic (and biochemical) resources. 
For example, wild fauna found in in situ conditions has 
been considered res nullius, or no one’s property. This 
concept has been replaced by that of State’s ownership 
which means that the State would have to authorize the 
use by others of this resource ( K ). Plants 
can be considered as State, private, or communal prop-
erty. In theory, the private owner and the co-owners have 
the discretion to use their resources the way they see fit. 
However, private and communal property of plants and 
other biological resources can be subject to government 
restrictions (G ). 
Two ownership systems can be identified from the 
case studies. In one system, priority is given to private or 
communal ownership of natural resources and the private 
or communal owner of the land does not need the State’s 
approval to market his or her biological, biochemical, or 
genetic resources. Nevertheless, there may be restrictions 
to this system if the target species is protected by special 
legislation such as the Endangered Species Act in the 
. A second system considers natural resources (and 
the biological, biochemical, and genetic components) 
as property of the State. The main implication of such a 
regime is that access to these resources is regulated for 
public, communal, and private lands. Therefore, biopros-
pectors are required to have a permit from the State and 
the individual or collective owner or holder of the land 
or collection where the biological or genetic resource is 
found. Under either of these two systems, the State and the 
owner of the land have veto powers and may deny access 
to their resources.
Scope
A precise definition of the scope of  policies and laws 
facilitates their implementation. The concept of scope 
should address several questions about the types of ge-
netic and biological resources covered by a given policy 
or law: Are they found in in situ or ex situ conditions or 
both? Does the policy apply to derivatives? Does it cover 
the traditional or scientific knowledge associated with the 
biological resources? Does it address the use of human 
genetic resources and the use and exchange of biological 
resources by indigenous communities? The scope should 
also include information about the geographic boundar-
ies, context, and coverage of access activities and it may 
also identify access restrictions such as geographic sites, 
genetic and biological material, and actors that can use 
and mobilize biological material without having to apply 
for access.
Australia: Draft EPBCAR 
These regulations will apply to Commonwealth areas which 
are lands owned or leased by the Commonwealth govern-
ment and marine areas over which the Commonwealth has 
sovereignty. The regulations will not apply to the states 
and territories, which have their own legislation and poli-
cies governing access to biological resources. However, 
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in October , the Natural Resource Management 
Ministerial Council proposed fourteen principles to pro-
mote the development or review of legislative, adminis-
trative, or policy frameworks for a nationally consistent 
approach for the Commonwealth, states, and territories 
(see Chapter ).
The regulations also apply to the collection and use 
of native biological resources, genetic resources, and 
biochemical compounds for commercial, scientific, and 
conservation purposes. The scope also covers traditional 
knowledge associated with the use of these resources but 
it excludes human genetic resources and the use and ex-
change of biological resources by indigenous communities. 
The regulations will apply only to native species and not 
to exotic plants and animals. The regulations are not clear 
regarding application to genetic resources found in ex situ 
conditions. Under the regulations, permit provisions may 
not apply to biological resources in the following cases: 
a) if they are found in a collection of a Commonwealth 
department or agency and if there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that access to the biological resources is ad-
ministered consistently with the purpose of the regula-
tions; b) if access to these resources is controlled by 
another Commonwealth, self-governing territory, or state 
law, consistent with the purpose of the regulations (the 
purpose of this provision is to avoid duplication of any 
access arrangements applying in a Commonwealth area); 
and c) if an international agreement, to which Australia 
is a Party, applies (e.g.,  International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture ()) 
(see Chapter ). 
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru: Decision 391
Decision  applies to all in situ and ex situ genetic 
resources (native and domestic) and their derivatives in-
digenous to each member country and to genetic resources 
of migratory species that are collected in any of these coun-
tries for bioprospecting, basic research, conservation, in-
dustrial, and commercial purposes. Derivatives are defined 
as molecules, a combination or mix of natural molecules, 
including crude extracts of living or dead organisms of 
biological origin, coming from the metabolism of living 
beings. Access may also be limited in cases of: a) presence 
of endangered, rare, or endemic species, subspecies, or 
races and b) fragile or vulnerable ecosystems. The scope 
of Decision  excludes all human genetic resources and 
their derivatives and the consumption and exchange of 
all genetic resources, their derivatives, associated knowl-
edge, and biological resources among black, indigenous, 
and local communities (A C ). 
The scope also applies to the collective and individual 
knowledge, innovation, or practice involving a species or 
its derivatives. 
The scope of Peru’s new Law No.  on the protec-
tion of knowledge of indigenous peoples applies only to 
the collective knowledge of indigenous communities about 
uses and properties of biodiversity. Collective knowledge is 
defined as accumulated and transgenerational knowledge 
developed by indigenous communities about properties, 
uses, and characteristics of biological diversity (P 
C ). The scope does not apply to agricultural 
or marine practices or innovations. It is also limited to col-
lective knowledge of the community and does not extend 
to the knowledge of individuals inside the community. The 
scope also poses practical difficulties that include defining 
guidelines to identify collective knowledge that applies to 
biological diversity and the boundaries of the community 
or communities that hold such knowledge. 
Costa Rica: The Law of Biodiversity
This law regulates the use, management, associated 
knowledge, and the equitable distribution of benefits and 
costs derived from the utilization of all in situ and ex situ 
biological and genetic resources (native and domestic). 
The scope also extends to biochemical resources which are 
defined as any material derived from plants, animals, fungi, 
or microorganisms that contains specific characteristics 
or special molecules or leads to the design of them. The 
law excludes access to human genetic and biochemical 
resources and the exchange of genetic and biochemical 
resources that are part of traditional practices of indigenous 
peoples and local communities (see Chapter ).
Malaysia:
Draft federal bill on access to genetic resources
The draft law will regulate access to in situ and ex situ 
biological and genetic resources and their derivatives and 
associated knowledge. These include native and domestic 
resources used by all industries and academia for com-
mercial and noncommercial purposes. With respect to ex 
situ resources, the draft would apply only to those acquired 
after the  entered into force. 
Access to genetic resources will be limited to the 
biological and geographical boundaries as defined by 
the federal government. These include genetic resources 
found on public lands, communal or customary lands, 
and private lands. The draft legislation also preserves the 
rights of indigenous and local communities to continue 
with their traditional customary practices of use, exchange, 
and marketing of biological resources. As an exemption, 
access to human genetic resources is prohibited by the 
draft legislation. It is not clear what will be the relationship 
between the scope of this law and that of access policies 
enacted by the Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak 
(see Chapter ).
Mexico: EEEPGA, WGA, SFDGA, and draft LAUBGR
 regulates access to native plant and animal spe-
cies and other biological resources for scientific (noncom-
mercial), economic (for reproduction and commercial 
objectives), and biotechnological (commercial) purposes. 
Biotechnology is defined as any application that uses bio-
logical resources, living organisms, or their derivatives for 
the creation or modification of products for specific uses 
(see Chapter ). The  does not cover traditional 
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knowledge associated with the species nor access to ex 
situ genetic resources. 
The scope of  includes the scientific, academic, 
or noncommercial collection of wild flora and fauna, their 
parts and derivatives, excluding aquatic and domestic spe-
cies and traditional knowledge.  does not regulate 
ex situ collections directly. However, any scientific and 
museum collection of wildlife species, whether private 
or public, must be registered and permanently updated 
in an official record. Once registered, this collection can 
be exempted, under specific circumstances, from certain 
obligations regulating proof of legal provenance of wildlife 
species as long as they do not have any biotechnological or 
commercial purposes ( ).  regulates 
the collection and use of forest biological resources for 
scientific, economic, and biotechnological purposes. Forest 
biological resources are defined as species and varieties of 
plants, animals, and microorganisms and their biodiversity 
found in forest ecosystems.  states that commercial 
or noncommercial collectors of forest biological resources 
must acknowledge the rights of indigenous peoples on the 
ownership, knowledge, and use of local varieties (-
 ). The law, however, does not define the concept 
of local varieties nor does it differentiate between in situ 
and ex situ forest biological resources. 
If approved, the draft  will regulate access to 
biological, biochemical, and genetic resources and asso-
ciated knowledge found in in situ and ex situ conditions. 
Access is regulated for bioprospecting, industrial, and any 
other economic use. The scope of the draft excludes ac-
cess to human genetic resources and their derivatives and 
the exchange of genetic resources made by indigenous 
peoples and obtained from noncommercial uses, practices, 
and customs (G P ). 
Nicaragua: Draft Law of Biodiversity
The scope of access activities will cover all in situ genetic 
and biological resources and their associated knowledge, 
innovations, and practices. The draft does not specifically 
refer to biochemical resources and it does not apply to ex 
situ genetic resources. However, the scope of the Central 
American Protocol on “Access to genetic and biochemi-
cal resources, and their associated knowledge” applies to 
these two issues. The protocol has already been signed by 
the Central American nations and it will become national 
law once it is ratified by them. Therefore, Nicaragua may 
invoke the protocol to facilitate access to biochemical and 
ex situ genetic resources.
The draft law excludes the following from its scope: a) 
human genetic resources and their derivatives; b) the uti-
lization of genetic resources with purposes different from 
their use as source of genetic resources; c) the exchange of 
genetic resources and their associated knowledge made by 
indigenous and local communities according to traditional 
practices; d) biosafety for pharmaceutical products; and e) 
the use of domestic species, but not their protection and 
conservation ( ). 
Philippines: EO 247 and Wildlife Act
  regulates access to wild biological and genetic 
resources and their by-products and derivatives used for 
commercial and noncommercial purposes. By-products are 
defined as any part taken from wild biological resources 
such as hides, antlers, feathers, fur, internal organs, roots, 
trunks, branches, leaves, stems, flowers, and the like, in-
cluding compounds indirectly produced in a biochemical 
process or cycle. Derivatives refer to something extracted 
from wild biological resources such as blood, oils, resins, 
genes, seeds, spores, pollen, and the like, taken from or 
modified from a product. Genetic resources are defined as 
genetic material of actual or potential value and genetic 
material means any material of plant, animal, microbial 
or other origin containing functional units of heredity. 
Access is regulated in the public domain and in the cases 
of natural occurrence in private or communal lands.  
 also recognizes the rights of indigenous communities 
to their knowledge when it is used for commercial pur-
poses, but this policy does not apply to traditional uses of 
biological and genetic resources by indigenous and local 
communities in accordance with their traditional practices 
(see Chapter ). 
Under   bioprospecting was defined as the 
research, collection, and use of biological and genetic re-
sources for commercial and noncommercial purposes. In 
, however, the Wildlife Act stated that bioprospecting 
would be defined as those activities implemented only for 
commercial purposes. The act “covers all wildlife species 
including exotic species, which are subject to trade, cul-
tured, maintained, bred in captivity, or propagated in the 
country”. This act modified   extensively. It excluded 
academic and scientific collection and research activities 
from   coverage. Today, the Wildlife Act covers 
these activities. The scope of the  draft Guidelines 
for Bioprospecting Activities in the Philippines (see 
endnote ) will cover any commercial bioprospecting of 
biological species carried out in the Philippines (except 
for those accessed under international agreements where 
the Philippines is a party). The scope covers wildlife, mi-
croorganisms, domesticated or propagated species, exotic 
species and all ex situ collections of biological resources 
sourced from the Philippines. The guidelines, however, 
would not apply to collections related to traditional uses of 
biological and genetic resources, subsistence consumption, 
and conventional commercial consumption. The scope 
would also exclude logging or fishing, agrobiodiversity, 
and scientific activities such as taxonomic collections. 
Perhaps agrobiodiversity is being excluded to facilitate 
future implementation of the   whose scope 
is restricted (for now) to the list of crops found in Annex 
 of the Treaty.14 Access to human genetic resources 
and their derivatives is forbidden under the   (see 
Chapter ).
Samoa: CABSSBR
The Samoan conditions cover access to biodiversity 
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resources and traditional knowledge for commercial or 
academic purposes. These include genetic resources, 
organisms or parts of them, populations, and any other 
component of ecosystems with potential use or value for 
humanity ( ). The scope does not mention or 
define the biochemical component. However, taking into 
account that the conditions have been used to regulate 
benefits derived from the use of “prostratin” (a chemical 
compound derived from the plant Homalanthus nutans) 
(C ), it is reasonable to assume that the biochemical 
component is included in the biological component of the 
scope. The scope of the conditions does not address the 
issue of access to ex situ genetic resources, and it does not 
include exclusions to the type of genetic resources sought 
by bioprospectors.
Thailand: PVPA, RFSRCFA, and APPTMI
Access to Thailand’s in situ and ex situ biological and 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge is partially 
covered by these three laws. The  regulates access to 
domestic and wild plant species (including mushrooms and 
seaweed) all over the country for commercial and noncom-
mercial purposes (T C ). The -
 applies to natural, biological, and genetic resources15 
found in forest conservation areas administered by  and 
protected areas managed by the Department of National 
Parks, Wildlife, and Plant Conservation. (C. Hutacharern, 
pers. comm. June ). It is not clear whether the scope 
of the regulation applies to ex situ collections.  
protects traditional knowledge about medicinal formulae 
derived from plants, animals, bacteria, minerals, and ex-
tracts of plants or animals used for diagnosing, treating, 
and preventing diseases, or promoting the health of humans 
or animals. This knowledge includes both that which has 
been passed on from generation to generation and that 
which is in the public domain and has been recorded in 
Thai books, palm leaf, stone inscription, or other materials 
( ). In case of conflict between  and 
the , the  overrules . Additional conflict 
issues between  policies are likely to be solved by a 
National Committee on Conservation and Utilization of 
Biological Diversity that was created by a Prime Minister 
Regulation on Conservation and Utilization of Biological 
Diversity. Thailand is also planning to develop a law spe-
cifically on medical research, which will be addressing 
human genetic resources and another law on endangered 
species (J. Donavanik, pers. comm. November ).
USA: NPS research specimen collection permit
Access to the biological diversity of  national parks 
for research purposes (commercial and noncommercial) is 
governed by  specimen collection permit regulations. 
These regulations have been implemented since  and 
permits for the collection of biological samples throughout 
the  are issued routinely. Permits regulate access to the 
biological resource and the genetic material it contains. 
Access, however, can be denied if the proposed research 
activity has any of the following characteristics (see 
Chapter ): a) adverse effects on the experiences of park 
visitors; b) a potential for negative impacts on the park’s 
natural, cultural, or scenic resources, and particularly to 
nonrenewable resources such as archeological and fossil 
sites or special-status species; c) a potential for creating 
high risk of hazard to the researchers, other park visitors, or 
environments adjacent to the park; d) extensive collecting 
of natural materials or unnecessary replication of exist-
ing voucher collections; e) need for substantial logistical, 
administrative, curatorial, or project monitoring support 
by park staff, or insufficient lead time to allow necessary 
review and consultation; f) conducting investigator lacks 
scientific institutional affiliation and/or recognized expe-
rience in conducting scientific research; and g) lacking 
sufficient scientific detail for justification.
Analysis: Scope
Despite the fact that the scope of the  is limited to 
materials of biological origin that include functional units 
of heredity such as  and , in practice, the scope of 
most  laws examined in this section is broader, includ-
ing biological (specimens and parts of specimens), genetic 
( and ), and biochemical (molecules, combination 
of molecules, and extracts) resources. The scope of most 
of these  policies also applies to traditional knowledge 
and is adamant about restricting access to human genetic 
resources and their derivatives. This broad scope has 
caused difficulties in countries such as Colombia and the 
Philippines (see Chapters  and ). Also most policies in-
clude provisions excluding the use and exchange of genetic 
resources made by indigenous communities.
The main implication of Article () of the  is that 
ex situ genetic resources collected before the  entered 
into force are not covered by it. Therefore, some experts 
argue that pre- ex situ collections of genetic resources 
should not be covered by the scope of  laws or policies 
( K and L , see Chapter ). However, 
in practice, most  policies cover these collections. In 
any case, procedures to access to pre or post- ex situ 
collections have not been clearly defined by the  polices 
presented in this section. Ownership of these collections 
is still controversial. 
Except for the Philippines (draft Guidelines for Bio-
prospecting Activities), access to agricultural genetic 
resources is covered by the scope of  polices of all of 
these countries. So far Australia, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Peru, and Thailand have 
signed or acceded to the  . The  also signed 
it, but there is little probability that the  Congress will 
ratify it. In any case, the   entered into force 
on  June  and present evidence indicates that these 
countries (except for the ) will exclude the food and 
forage crops listed in Annex  of the  from the 
scope of their national  laws and policies.
Access Procedure
Obtaining access can be a long, confusing, and cumber-
some process. Access permits may have to be obtained 
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from several regional and local agencies that administer 
the same resource. In addition, bioprospectors may have 
to negotiate with several providers of genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge. This bureaucracy and overlap-
ping of functions can lead to high transaction costs and 
long processing times for required permits. This section 
discusses the main similarities and differences regarding 
access procedures of the selected countries and presents 
the access definitions proposed by some countries in their 
 laws and policies. 
Australia: Draft EPBCAR
Access to biological resources is defined as the collection 
process and use of organisms, their parts, genetic material, 
and biochemical make-up for conservation, commercial, 
industrial, or taxonomic research purposes. According to 
the draft regulations bioprospectors (with commercial 
and noncommercial purposes) have to obtain a permit16 
to access biological resources in Commonwealth areas 
and establish benefit-sharing agreements with the provid-
ers17 of these resources. Permits are valid for a maximum 
of three years and the cost of a permit is the same for all 
applicants (national or international, commercial or non-
commercial):   for access and no payment for a 
transfer of the permit or variation or revocation of a permit 
condition. Benefits are to be negotiated on a case-by-case 
basis and the benefit-sharing agreement takes effect only if 
a permit is issued. The regulations establish that biopros-
pectors have to submit applications for access permits to 
the Secretary of the Department of the Environment and 
Heritage. 
Once the Secretary has received the benefit-shar-
ing agreement (including the  requirement) and the 
permit application, he or she must give a report to the 
Minister for the Environment and Heritage within  
days of their receipt. This time can be extended if the 
authorities require the following information: a) whether 
the environmental impact assessment () (if required) 
was undertaken and completed; b) relevant information 
from the Commonwealth department or agency; c) ad-
ditional information about the proposed benefit-sharing 
agreement; d) whether bioprospectors complied with the 
regulations requiring consultation with the providers of 
genetic resources; e) the views of any representative of 
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander body within the 
meaning of the Native Title Act of ; and f) whether 
the access provider has received independent legal advice 
about the regulation. If the Minister decides not to grant 
the permit, the bioprospector can appeal through the courts 
under the  Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) 
Act. Detailed administrative arrangements for the handling 
of access applications can be expected to be developed 
once the regulations are enacted 
Under this regulation, the Minister may declare 
that the permit provisions do not apply to biological 
resources if: a) these resources are held in a collection 
by a Commonwealth department or agency and there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that access to this collec-
tion is administered consistently with the purpose of the 
regulations and b) there are reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that access to the resources is controlled by another 
Commonwealth department or agency, self-governing 
territory, or state law, consistent with the purpose of the 
regulations. Due to ownership issues access procedures to 
ex situ collections have not been defined yet. Holders of 
such collections and the Department will discuss potential 
solutions to this problem (see Chapter ).
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru: Decision 391
Access is defined as obtaining and using ex situ and in 
situ genetic resources, their derivatives, and associated 
knowledge with research, bioprospecting, conservation, 
industrial application, and commercial use, among others. 
Decision  proposes an access contract to be negotiated 
between the bioprospector and the Competent National 
Authority () in the member country where resources 
are sought. Prior to the negotiation of the contract the bio-
prospector has to present an application for access to the 
relevant . The application must include: a) information 
about the applicant, including its legal capacity to enter 
into a contract; b) the identity of the supplier of genetic 
or biological resources and their derivatives and/or of the 
associated intangible component (or knowledge); c) the 
identity of the national support institution or individual; d) 
the identity and curriculum vitae of the project leader and 
team; e) the nature of the access activity being requested; 
and f) the area in which the access will be made including 
the geographic coordinates. The application must include 
a project proposal based on a model provided by the . 
Then, the  has  working days (extendable to ) to 
evaluate the application. If the  is satisfied with the 
application, it is placed on the official record and noncon-
fidential information is available for public scrutiny in the 
national official gazette. Otherwise, the application may be 
returned to the applicant for more information or denied. 
A successful application will lead to the negotiation 
of the “access contract”. The parties to the contract are 
the applicant and the . The  also needs to take 
into account the interests of other Andean countries and 
of the suppliers of the biological resources and intangible 
component (traditional knowledge) in the negotiation of 
the access contract. Therefore, the applicant must negotiate 
an annex contract with the supplier of the knowledge and 
an accessory contract with the supplier of the biological 
resource that contains the biochemical or genetic compo-
nent. The provider of the biological resource can be the 
holder of the land or the ex situ conservation center where 
the biological resource is found. Accessory contracts can 
also be signed with national support institutions that are 
not included in the access contract. Annex and accessory 
contracts cannot authorize access to the resource by them-
selves. Access is only granted through the access contract 
negotiated with the  (see Chapter ). Peru’s Law No. 
 endorses the use of an annex contract or license. 
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Under this law, commercial bioprospectors have to identify 
the community or communities that hold the collective 
knowledge and sign a license with them. Such a license 
has to be registered before the Peruvian National Institute 
for the Defense and Protection of Traditional Knowledge 
() (P C ).
Costa Rica: The Law of Biodiversity
Access to biochemical and genetic elements is defined 
as the action of obtaining samples from in situ or ex situ 
elements of indigenous or domestic biodiversity and their 
associated knowledge, for the purposes of basic research, 
economic benefit, or bioprospecting. Bioprospecting is de-
fined as the systematic search, classification, and research 
(with commercial purposes) of new sources of chemical 
compounds, genes, proteins, microorganisms, and other 
products that have present or potential economic value 
with commercial purposes. 
Under this law local and foreign bioprospectors are 
required to obtain access permits to obtain genetic or 
biochemical resources and their associated knowledge. 
These are valid for three years and can be renewed, but 
are not transferable. First, in conformity with the “General 
Access Procedure” ()18 interested parties must register 
with the Technical Office () of the National Commission 
for the Management of Biodiversity (). The 
application includes: a) identification of the interested 
party; b) identification of the responsible researcher; c) 
exact location of place where samples will be collected; 
d) the elements of biodiversity that will be the subject of 
the investigation; e) the owner and manager or holder of 
the premises; f) a list of activities, aims, and purposes; 
and g) an address for legal notifications. Later, the  
must be negotiated between the applicant and the owner 
of the conservation area or indigenous land, resources, or 
ex situ collections. 
The permits will contain a certificate of origin, permis-
sion or prohibition to extract samples, periodic reporting 
obligation, monitoring and control, conditions relative to 
resulting property, and any another applicable condition 
stated by the . Different requirements are established for 
those who request permits for noncommercial bioprospect-
ing19 and for those who need access permits for occasional 
or continuing economic utilization.20 At this stage there is 
no information about the duration of these procedures. In 
any case, the current scheme empowers the owners of the 
lands where biological resources are found to negotiate 
contracts (by means of the ) with bioprospectors.
In case of ex situ collections, different rules will be 
proposed for framework agreements that authorize the 
transfer of multiple materials. In such cases material 
transfer agreements (s) will have to be standardized 
and approved by the . The Law of Biodiversity also 
requires all holders of ex situ genetic resources to register 
with the . Bioprospectors will have to obtain a permit 
in order to access ex situ genetic resources. However, no 
procedure has been defined yet because of the complexi-
ties associated with the holders of genetic resources and 
also because there are other national laws not necessarily 
related to access that regulate ex situ collections. The  
provides  months for the drafting of an access procedure 
for ex situ genetic resources and establishes a moratorium 
on the access of ex situ genetic resources until such pro-
cedure is adopted. 
The Law of Biodiversity requires a determination of 
the administrative fee. The  states that this fee is a fifth 
of the minimum wage. After the  issues a certificate 
of origin, it publishes the requests and final resolutions 
on its website within eight calendar days. An  can be 
requested by the . Its evaluation is the responsibility of 
the National Technical Secretariat (see Chapter ).
Malaysia:
Draft federal bill on access to genetic resources
The draft bill defines access as all activities relating to bio-
prospecting, collection, commercial utilization, research, 
and development of biological resources or the associated 
relevant community knowledge and innovations. If the 
draft bill is adopted, both foreign and local bioprospectors 
will have to follow the same basic access procedure in 
order to obtain access to genetic resources for commercial 
purposes. But international bioprospectors will have ad-
ditional conditions for approval of the access application. 
For example, the application will require foreign biopros-
pectors to have a local collaborating organization to both 
sponsor the collection and be responsible for actions of 
the collector. The local organization will also participate 
in the collection, research, and development of samples 
collected. 
Both national and international bioprospectors will be 
required to sign an access agreement with the competent 
authority and the relevant resource provider. However, the 
relevant authority may decide that the restrictions relat-
ing to access to resources shall not apply to Malaysian 
researchers conducting noncommercial bioprospecting 
activities. The procedure for foreign scientists who want 
to obtain access for noncommercial purposes is still not 
clear at this point. The financial costs of applying for ac-
cess have not been determined yet, but it is not likely to 
deter bioprospectors from applying. 
There shall be no access to biological resources or 
community knowledge and innovation without an access 
license granted by the competent authority. Information 
required in the application for the license includes: a) iden-
tification of the collector; b) identification of material to 
be collected or knowledge to be accessed; c) identification 
of collection sites; d) quantity and intended use of the 
resource; e) time when the access activity is to be carried 
out; e) ; f)  certificate; g) benefit-sharing arrange-
ments; and h) identification of the local collaborator or 
sponsor (a Malaysian institution). This information can 
be made available to the public. Once the application has 
been reviewed it can be approved, returned to the applicant 
if more information is required, or rejected. A decision can 
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be appealed at any time within three months of the date of 
receipt of the decision. Access procedures to ex situ collec-
tions have not been defined yet (see Chapter ). 
Mexico: EEEPGA, WGA, SFDGA, and draft LAUBGR
, , and  do not include an access defi-
nition. But collection of biological resources under any 
of these laws requires a permit from the Secretariat of 
Environment and Natural Resources (). Under 
Article  and   of , local and foreign bio-
prospectors have to apply to  in order to obtain 
access to genetic resources for scientific (noncommercial), 
economic (for reproduction and commercial activities) and 
biotechnology purposes. Under Article  of  and 
Article  of  access for scientific or noncommercial 
purposes requires a permit or a license for a researcher 
with a specific line of work. Both laws require the  
of the landowner, report submissions, and deposit of at 
least one duplicate of the material collected in a local 
institution or scientific collection. Authorization under 
these laws cannot be extended to commercial purposes, 
and nonconfidential research results must be available to 
the public. However, Mexican legislation recognizes that 
scientific or academic collections can later be used for 
industrial or commercial applications. If this is the case 
norm --- mandates a new declaration 
stating a change of purpose, thus setting the stage for 
new  and  contracts. Chapter  suggests that this 
measure has a low transaction cost because the change in 
the  and the negotiation of the  contract would hap-
pen only after a finding that the biological resource has a 
commercial application. However, an argument could be 
made that under controversial social and political circum-
stances (see Chapter ) the costs of the delay that would 
be generated after a discovered commercial application 
could be very high. 
Under Article  of  collectors and users of 
forest biological resources for scientific, economic, or 
biotechnological purposes have to apply for authoriza-
tion to . This application must include the  
of the owner of the land that provided the resources. It 
should be noted that under  and article   of 
 collectors must present the  in order to obtain 
government authorization. In contrast, under article  
of  and , the  is not required to obtain this 
authorization but it is required before collecting activities 
are initiated (see Chapter ). 
According to Article  of , commercial 
and noncommercial bioprospectors that use traditional 
knowledge must submit an agreement to  that 
includes the  of the indigenous community that provided 
the knowledge. This agreement must also acknowledge 
the property rights of indigenous communities to their 
knowledge.  evaluates the application and 
ensures that a benefit-sharing agreement is negotiated 
with the providers of genetic resources. The  Rural 
Sustainable Development Act () gives priority rights 
to indigenous and local communities for obtaining permits 
and authorizations under either  or . Under 
, collections of forest biological resources carried 
out by public entities of the federal, state, or municipal 
governments or the owner of the land, need only to sub-
mit a notification in accordance with the pertinent official 
Mexican norm and the consent of the owner of the land 
( ). 
On the other hand, the draft  defines access 
as the action of obtaining samples from in situ or ex situ 
elements of indigenous or domestic biodiversity and their 
associated knowledge with economic or bioprospecting 
purposes. The draft law would regulate only commercial 
activities, leaving noncommercial applications to the cur-
rent regulatory framework. The access procedure includes 
the following steps: a) the applicant must obtain an autho-
rization from a Federal Executive Authority (); 
b) an access contract must be signed with , the 
provider of the biological and genetic resource, and the 
provider of the traditional knowledge; c) if relevant, an 
authorization must be obtained either for collection done 
by an ex situ conservation body, transport to any area not 
specified in the access agreement, export of the material 
collected, or transfer of the rights and obligations given by 
the access authorization. The draft bill, however, does not 
define the procedure and requirements for authorization for 
ex situ collections. Requirements for an  are not clearly 
regulated and the participation of Mexicans in research 
and development is required (G P 
).
Nicaragua: Draft Law of Biodiversity
Access is defined as the action of obtaining samples from 
biological and genetic resources and their associated 
knowledge, practices, and innovations. Details about ac-
cess procedures for genetic resources found in ex situ and 
in situ conditions have not been defined yet. However, 
the draft Law of Biodiversity states that all domestic and 
foreign bioprospectors will have to obtain an authoriza-
tion from the National Biodiversity Institute in order to 
obtain access to biological and genetic resources. Such 
authorization must include: a) the  of the provider of the 
biological and genetic resource as well as the traditional 
knowledge and b) a description about the intent to sign 
accessory contracts with local or foreign organizations or a 
description of accessory contracts signed with these parties 
before the law came into force. The authorization will also 
require a permit showing that an  was carried out (if 
required). Access to genetic resources may be denied if: 
a) the access application is determined to include false in-
formation; b) the applicant has attempted to access genetic 
resources illegally in the country or overseas; c) access 
activities cause the endangerment or extinction of species; 
or d) access activities cause ecological, social, cultural, or 
economic impacts that cannot be mitigated. Bioprospectors 
will also have to deposit duplicates of specimens collected 
in local ex situ conservation centers. The draft law also 
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states that “framework agreements” will be established 
between the government and universities or other users of 
genetic resources for noncommercial purposes ( 
). The draft law of biodiversity implements Article 
 of  which requires an authorization for studies 
on biotechnology ( ). This authorization has 
to be given by the national competent authority which in 
this case is the National Biodiversity Institute.
Philippines: EO 247 and Wildlife Act
  does not define the concept of access. However, it 
can be argued that this policy uses the concept “prospecting 
or bioprospecting” as a proxy for “access”. Bioprospecting 
is defined as the research, collection, and utilization of 
biological and genetic resources for purposes of applying 
the knowledge derived from these resources to scientific 
and commercial purposes. Under  , local and foreign 
bioprospectors must apply for access to genetic resources 
for commercial and noncommercial purposes. Applications 
for Academic Research Agreements () or Commercial 
Research Agreements () are submitted to the Technical 
Secretariat for an initial evaluation. Then, they are passed 
to the Inter-Agency Committee on Biological and Genetic 
Resources () and the  makes a recommen-
dation to the pertinent agency. Foreign applicants must 
involve a local institution in the research process.   
does not provide for a specific timeframe within which 
to process applications. However, it usually takes about 
five months or longer because the  is required to 
meet once every four months, although the chairman can 
call for special meetings. Also, the application process is 
often slow due to delays in obtaining the . Depending 
on whether it is an  or a  that is sought, certain 
distinctions are incorporated in the application process 
(see Table  of Chapter ). 
The Wildlife Act, however, modified   substan-
tially and excluded the collection and use of biological 
resources for academic or scientific purposes. Therefore, 
an  is no longer required. The Wildlife Act states that 
the collection and use of biological resources for academic 
or scientific purposes can be undertaken through a free 
permit. The Department of Environment and Natural 
Resources (), the Department of Agriculture (), 
and the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development 
() are in charge of implementing the Wildlife Act (P. 
Benavidez, pers. comm. February ).
Under the  draft Guidelines for Bioprospecting 
Activities (see endnote ) commercial bioprospectors 
must pay a fee of ,  for each Bioprospecting 
Undertaking (which replaces the  of  ) and such 
fee may be modified depending on whether the applicant 
is a national and other criteria. In addition, bioprospectors 
must pay ,  per collection site annually during 
the collection period. According to the guidelines access 
to biological resources does not imply automatic access 
to traditional knowledge associated with these resources. 
A bioprospector wishing to access associated traditional 
knowledge must state this purpose in the research pro-
posal. The draft Guidelines provide a detailed procedure 
for the negotiation and execution of the Bioprospecting 
Undertaking with an emphasis on standardizing and 
streamlining the procedure for access. The application 
must include the proposal and documentation that all 
required items (such as  and any benefit-sharing terms 
negotiated and approved by the resource providers) have 
been obtained. The agency receiving the application (the 
Protected Areas Wildlife Bureau () of , the 
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, or ) 
will draft the Bioprospecting Undertaking incorporating 
the terms agreed upon by the applicant and the resource 
providers and forward it to their respective or joint tech-
nical committees for review. Their final evaluation must 
be completed within  days of receipt of application 
and it is forwarded to the appropriate agency signatories. 
The goal is for the agency decision to be made within 
one month from the submission of the application. If the 
Bioprospecting Undertaking is approved, the applicant will 
sign it along with the appropriate signatories, respecting 
the terms negotiated with resource providers, and including 
the standard terms and conditions under the guidelines. 
Bioprospecting may then proceed once the required per-
formance and rehabilitation bond is posted.
Samoa: CABSSBR 
This policy does not define the concept of access. 
Bioprospectors must submit an application form to 
the Director of the Department of Lands, Surveys and 
Environment (). There is an application fee of  
 and % of it is returned if the application is unsuc-
cessful (the remaining % is used for processing costs). 
Upon receipt of the application,  is required to consult 
with pertinent government bodies and publicize the appli-
cation. The evaluation process can take up to  working 
days. The access permit is valid for a year and it can be 
renewed for an additional year. The applicant must also 
obtain an export permit in order to export any specimen out 
of Samoa ( ).  does not provide details 
about access procedures for ex situ genetic resources and 
it does not differentiate between commercial and noncom-
mercial collectors of biological resources.
Thailand: PVPA, RFSRCFA, and APPTMI
These laws and policies do not define the concept of ac-
cess. However, access procedures are quite detailed. Before 
entering the country foreign bioprospectors have to apply 
to  for permission to conduct research in Thailand.21 
According to regulation ..  of , bioprospectors 
have to fill out form - and submit it to  no less 
than  days prior to entering the country. Together with 
this application  requires two letters of endorsement 
from local researchers. A letter of permission from  
is required to obtain the visa at the Royal Thai Embassy 
or Consulate. Within  days of arriving in Thailand, the 
applicant has to report to , pay a processing fee of 
 Baht per researcher, and obtain an identification 
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card. Then, the applicant can apply for access to genetic 
resources under the  or . 
Under the , local and foreign commercial bio-
prospectors have to file a petition with the Department 
of Agriculture and then obtain a  from the holders of 
local genetic resources. When wild plant varieties are 
used, they have to establish a benefit-sharing agreement 
with the government and sometimes with the provider of 
the resource (J. Donavanik, pers. comm. January ). 
The act states that collectors of wild plant varieties that 
have commercial purposes have to present the following 
information to pertinent authorities: a) the purpose of the 
collection; b) the amount or quantity of samples of the 
intended plant variety; c) the obligations of the person to 
whom permission is granted; d) intellectual property rights 
which may result from the development, study, experiment, 
or research activities; e) the amount or rate of, or the term 
for, the profit sharing under the profit-sharing agreement 
with respect to products derived from the use of the plant 
variety thereunder; f) the term of the agreement; g) the 
revocation of the agreement; h) dispute settlement proce-
dure; and i) other items or particulars as prescribed in the 
Ministerial Regulation. Collectors of plant material with 
noncommercial purposes will have to follow a regulation 
that has yet to be developed by the Plant Variety Protection 
Commission (T C ).
Under , national and foreign bioprospectors 
have to submit an application and a “full project pro-
posal” (translated into Thai) to the .  provides 
 days for the review of the application and proposal. A 
Research Proposal Reviewing Subcommittee () and 
the director of the area where samples will be collected 
examine these materials and give a recommendation to 
the Director General of . A positive recommendation 
will result in an access permit that is submitted to  
and then delivered to the applicant. It should be noted that 
if the proposal has a negative review from the director 
of the collection area, then the permit could be denied. 
The final access permit must include the signatures of the 
Director General of , the secretary of the , and the 
Director of the Department of National Parks, Wildlife 
and Plant Conservation. The  will also inform the staff 
that must accompany bioprospectors during the site visits. 
Upon reception of the access permit and  days before 
entering the collection site, the applicant must notify 
the Director General of  and local forestry officials 
(C. Hutacharern, pers. comm. June ). The terms of 
the agreements can vary between one and five years or 
more, but each agreement has to be reviewed annually to 
ensure compliance. An application fee must also be paid 
(C ). 
Bioprospectors may have to use an  in order to ob-
tain access to genetic resources found in ex situ collections 
or in geographical areas not covered by  and . 
However, procedures about how to apply for access to ge-
netic resources under s have not been officially stated 
and they may vary according to the holder of the resource 
(J. Donavanik, pers. comm. January ).
Under , whoever wishes to use traditional 
knowledge protected in the registrar must apply to the 
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Public Health. 
 also protects plants, animals, bacteria, and min-
erals that are of study and research value, have important 
economic value or may become extinct. The commercial 
use or export of these species requires a license from the 
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Public Health 
( ). 
USA: NPS research specimen collection permit
Under  regulations, bioprospectors can access national 
park genetic resources through a collection permit process 
that has been in place since . The regulations apply 
to commercial and noncommercial bioprospectors as long 
as they engage in scientific research activities. Researches 
must apply for a permit on the National Park Service’s 
Research Permit and Reporting System website.22 The 
following information is asked for to successfully com-
plete the application process for such a permit: a) contact 
information about the applicant (required); b) project title 
(required); c) purpose of study (required); d) study start 
and end dates (required); e) identification of any federal 
funding agencies; f) location of activity in the park; g) 
method of access; h) names of co-applicants; i) if you are 
collecting specimens, contact information of repositories; 
j) a copy of the study proposal; and k) a copy of all peer 
reviews.
Once the application has been filed (this is equivalent 
to the ),  officials and outside experts review its 
content for issues that include: a) scientific validity; b) 
researcher and institutional qualifications; c) benefit to the 
 and the public; d) actual or potential impacts to park 
resources; and e) impacts on visitor experiences, wilder-
ness, and safety. Reviewers may recommend denial or ac-
ceptance of the permit application at this stage. If accepted, 
the benefits and risks of the proposal are analyzed under 
the National Environmental Policy Act (). Then the 
reviewers make a recommendation to the Superintendent 
or designee to approve or reject the permit request. If the 
application is approved, the permit and attached condi-
tions (including requirement for annual accomplishment 
report) are sent to applicant for signature. If the applica-
tion is rejected, there is an opportunity for revising and 
resubmitting the application. This process usually takes 
less than three months (see Chapter ).
Analysis: Access Procedure
Most of the above laws and policies define access as the 
action of collecting and using biological, biochemical, 
and genetic resources and their associated knowledge for 
commercial and noncommercial purposes. All of the laws 
and policies reviewed in this section have in common at 
least the following main steps for access: a) submission of 
an access application to a designated national competent 
authority; b) review of the application; c) approval or de-
nial of the application (if denied there is a legal recourse 
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to appeal); and d) negotiation of  and benefit-sharing 
requirements. However, the length of the access process 
varies across countries and depends largely on the length of 
negotiation of  and benefit-sharing agreements with the 
providers of genetic resources and traditional knowledge 
and in some cases with national authorities. 
But should States be directly involved in the benefit-
sharing negotiation of each bioprospecting project? Should 
they be parties to each benefit-sharing contract? Or should 
this negotiation be carried out only by the direct providers 
of genetic resources and traditional knowledge? This is 
a controversial issue. Social protest in countries such as 
Mexico demands the need for a strong State intervention 
not only in the negotiation of these benefits but also in all 
stages of implementation of bioprospecting projects (see 
Chapter ). Involving the State’s bureaucracy in the nego-
tiation of benefit-sharing provisions may lead to inefficien-
cies and high transaction costs as suggested by Chapter . 
Perhaps, State intervention in the negotiation of benefits 
should be focused on an advisory and training role. For 
example, countries such as Australia have proposed inde-
pendent legal advice and training programs to improve the 
negotiation capacity of local providers of genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge. In addition to this, States could 
be more efficient by setting a minimum amount of royal-
ties and other benefit-sharing criteria (see the section on 
Benefit Sharing and Compensation Mechanisms) for those 
bioprospectors that are likely to obtain significant benefits 
from local genetic resources. 
While most countries require the  (see next sec-
tion) from local communities, one country (Thailand) 
does not require bioprospectors to obtain  from local 
communities, only from government officials. Evidently, 
obtaining the  from local communities increases not 
only the length of the access process but also transactions 
costs. This has been the case in the Philippines (see Chapter 
). Additional access requirements of countries such as 
Thailand and Malaysia are also likely to increase the 
length of application and transaction costs. However, since 
national  policies of these and many other countries 
require a local collaborator to be involved in the different 
steps of the research process, having a local counterpart 
that is familiar with local costumes and bureaucracy may 
not only help expedite the access process, but also bring 
legitimacy and transparency to the project. 
Recently several scientists have argued that  poli-
cies restrict noncommercial scientific research activities 
such as taxonomic collections (G ). Some 
countries such as Costa Rica, Mexico, Nicaragua, and 
the Philippines have been trying to differentiate between 
access for commercial and noncommercial purposes. The 
line between commercial and noncommercial bioprospect-
ing is still blurred; however, these countries are taking steps 
in the right direction. 
Most national and regional  laws and policies regu-
late access to biological, genetic, and biochemical com-
ponents found in in situ conditions nationwide. The main 
implication of such a comprehensive scope is that these 
 laws and policies apply to national and international 
representatives of the pharmaceutical, seed, crop protec-
tion, botanical medicine, food, and all other industries 
that use biological, genetic, and biochemical elements 
to develop processes and products. Therefore, to deal ef-
ficiently with a large number of applicants, these countries 
may have to design more practical access criteria. These 
criteria would translate into practical access procedures 
that differentiate between an industry that uses modern 
biotechnology techniques such as genetic engineering and 
combinatorial chemistry and one that uses standard proce-
dures to extract aromatic oils. Otherwise, the policies may 
be unenforceable as they try to regulate access to millions 
of local small firms that use, for example, plant material 
for the development of oils, infusions, and other common 
remedies that can be developed rapidly with relatively 
unsophisticated technology.
Access procedures for ex situ genetic resources remain 
a gray area in all countries due to ownership issues. For 
now, it seems that applications for ex situ collections in the 
countries examined in this section will be considered on 
their own merits with respect to a range of factors. These 
include the ownership of the material from which the ex 
situ accessions were obtained and the circumstances under 
which the material passed into the possession of the ex situ 
holder, including possible terms and conditions proposed 
by the holder (i.e., gene bank or botanical garden) of the 
ex situ genetic resources. For example, ex situ conservation 
centers such as the ones administered by  have adopted 
s as a standard practice to exchange genetic resources 
(C. Qualset, pers. comm. January ). 
Prior Informed Consent (PIC)
The  states that access to genetic resources should be 
granted on mutually agreed terms and subject to  proce-
dures and this principle is endorsed by the laws and policies 
reviewed in this section. Under most regional and national 
 laws and policies, in contrast to the  mandate,  
must be obtained not only from the designated govern-
ment authorities but also from indigenous peoples and the 
landowners concerned. For this summary and analysis,  
is defined as the consent obtained by the applicant from 
the designated government authorities, local community, 
indigenous people, the protected area or ex situ collection 
manager, or private land owner after disclosing fully the 
intent and scope of the bioprospecting activity, in a lan-
guage and process understandable to all, and before any 
collecting of samples or knowledge is undertaken.
Australia: Draft EPBCAR
In Australia, aboriginal groups own significant areas (% 
of the Northern Territory and % of South Australia). 
Therefore, the regulations mandate the use of  in order 
to get access to genetic resources and knowledge provided 
by communities found in these areas. If the access provider 
is the owner of indigenous peoples’ land or a native title 
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holder for the area, the access provider must have given 
informed consent to the agreement. Chapter  lists key 
issues that the Minister of the Environment and Heritage 
must take into account to ensure that bioprospectors will 
comply with  requirements. These include making sure 
that the access provider had sufficient time to review the 
application and to consult with relevant people about the 
pros and cons of the application. 
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru: Decision 391
Decision  requires  from the pertinent government 
authority and the provider of genetic resources, their de-
rivatives, traditional knowledge, innovation, or practices. 
 from the providers of genetic resources or traditional 
knowledge is provided to the government authority in the 
access application (see previous section). When access to 
genetic resources includes access to traditional knowledge 
an annex contract signed by the provider of the knowledge 
will be integrated into the access contract. In certain cases, 
however, (subject to national legislation) the national au-
thority may also sign the annex. In Peru, for example, Law 
No.  requires academic and commercial bioprospec-
tors to obtain the  from organizations that represent the 
interest of the community or communities that hold the 
collective knowledge (P C ).
Costa Rica: The Law of Biodiversity
The legislation is not clear, but it is assumed that the  
will be formalized in a private contract as described by 
the . The role of the  is to endorse the contract. A 
separate  will be obtained from individuals, government, 
or nongovernmental organizations that own lands or ma-
rine resources and provide traditional knowledge. Access 
to flora and fauna found on private lands may also need 
authorizations from state entities, particularly in cases of 
endangered species. In cases where collections are made 
in conservation areas, the  and the respective agreement 
are enough to obtain the access permit (see Chapter ).
Malaysia:
Draft federal bill on access to genetic resources
The pertinent authority shall establish an appropriate 
process for securing  of the resource provider that 
may be affected by the access application. The authority 
shall prescribe the process after consultation with relevant 
parties in order to ensure and verify that  is properly 
obtained. The consultation procedure must include at least 
the following requirements: a) participation of represen-
tatives of the indigenous and local communities and b) 
wide and effective dissemination of relevant information 
to the providers of samples or traditional knowledge and 
other interested parties on the proposed access activity 
(see Chapter ). 
Mexico: EEEPGA, WGA, SFDGA, and draft LAUBGR
 requires two s, one given by the Mexican 
Government in the form of a collecting permit and another 
given by the owners of the land. The first  protects the 
interest of society and the second protects the interest of 
the owner of the land.  does not regulate access to 
traditional knowledge, therefore it does not require any  
from the provider of traditional knowledge (see Chapter 
). While Article  of  requires only the  of the 
owner of the land ( ), Articles  and  
of  require the s from the owner of the property 
and from the indigenous community that provided tradi-
tional knowledge used for commercial and noncommercial 
purposes ( ). The draft  includes 
a  requirement from the government and providers of 
both genetic resources and traditional knowledge (G 
P ). 
Nicaragua: Draft Law of Biodiversity
Bioprospectors are required to obtain the  of the pro-
viders of traditional knowledge and the holders of the 
land where these resources are found. The consent has 
to be clearly stated in a  contract established between 
the bioprospector and provider of the genetic resource or 
knowledge. The contract does not give exclusive use over 
the resource or knowledge. The provider is the rightful 
owner of the knowledge and has the right to establish 
contracts over the same component with other parties. 
The bioprospector cannot transfer the knowledge to other 
parties without the prior consent of the community. This 
contract will be effective once the access contract estab-
lished between the government and the bioprospector is 
signed ( ). The  requirement of the draft 
Law of Biodiversity is consistent with Articles  and  of 
 that protect the interests of the providers of genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge ( ).
Philippines: EO 247 and Wildlife Act
According to   and the Wildlife Act, bioprospecting 
activities, under a , can be allowed only upon obtaining 
the  of the community or individual that provides the 
genetic resource or the knowledge. Before conducting any 
actual bioprospecting activity at the site, the researcher 
must obtain a  certificate. Bioprospecting is permit-
ted in protected areas with the  of the Protected Area 
Management Board (), in the lands of indigenous 
and local communities with their , and on privately 
owned land with the  of the landowner. Under   
the provider of the  had to issue the certificate within 
 days from the submission of the proposal. The Wildlife 
Act, however, removed this requirement. 
Under  , applicants for a  must complete 
the following steps in order to secure a  certificate: a) 
submit copies of the research proposal to the head of the 
local community, city, or municipal mayor of the local 
government unit, , or private landowner concerned 
in a language or dialect understandable to them; b) inform 
the local community, , or the private landowner con-
cerned of the intention to conduct bioprospecting within 
the area through various media advertisements or direct 
communication; c) post a notice in a conspicuous place 
one week prior to the holding of a community assembly; 
 
d) hold community consultation; e) obtain certificates of 
compliance from the head of the local community, mu-
nicipal or city mayor, , or private landowner upon 
determination that applicant has undergone the process 
required by law; and f) submit  certificate to the  
together with proofs of compliance with the  process. 
The research proposal presented to the provider of the 
genetic resource or traditional knowledge must include the 
purpose, methodology, duration of the activity; designate 
the species and quantity to be used or taken; describe the 
proposal for equitable sharing of benefits, if any, to all par-
ties concerned; and state that the proposed activity will not 
affect traditional uses of the resource (see Chapter ). 
This procedure was slightly altered by the  draft 
Guidelines for Bioprospecting Activities that will imple-
ment the Wildlife Act if approved. The necessary steps 
include notification through a letter of intent (including 
research proposal) to the resource providers and the holding 
of a community assembly at which the proposal is presented 
giving a very detailed description of the activity and assur-
ances that traditional uses or consumption of the resource 
will not be affected. The next steps depend on the issuer of 
the : for the , the chair will sign the  certificate 
upon authority granted through an appropriate Resolution 
passed within  days after the consultation favorably grant-
ing such consent; the private landowner, or other concerned 
agencies, must issue the  certificate within  days after 
the consultation; and in the case of indigenous peoples, 
the issuance of the  certificate is governed by pertinent 
rules and regulations under the Republic Act No.  also 
known as the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act. Access to 
traditional knowledge must be explicitly reflected in the cer-
tificate. The guidelines provide a standard  form. Under 
the Wildlife Act, collectors and users of biological resources 
for noncommercial purposes will also have to obtain  
from the providers of these resources. No  procedure has 
been officially adopted yet for this kind of collections, but 
it is likely to involve fewer steps and requirements than the 
one proposed for collectors that have commercial purposes 
(P. Benavidez, pers. comm. February ).
Samoa: CABSSBR 
 is obtained from the government when the access 
application is submitted to the Division of Environment 
and Conservation of the Department of Lands, Surveys, 
and Environment ( ). A final decision on the ap-
plication is made by the Minister of Lands, Surveys, and 
Environment who can require the applicant to provide 
evidence of the prior informed consent of the resource 
owner (or person in effective control of the resources). 
Bioprospecting activities carried out in private or custom-
ary land (% of the land area of the country) will require 
 from the landowners.
Thailand: PVPA, RFSRCFA, and APPTMI
Foreign bioprospectors must obtain initial  from a 
designated government authority (i.e., ) through the 
permission letter that is required to obtain a visa. Under 
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 anyone who collects domestic plant varieties, wild 
plant varieties, or any part of such plant varieties for the 
purposes of variety development, education, experiment, 
or research for commercial interest shall obtain permission 
from the competent official in the Ministry of Agriculture 
(T C ). Under  and , 
bioprospectors obtain  from government officials by 
applying to the  and Ministry of Public Health respec-
tively (C. Hutacharern, pers. comm. June ). It should 
be emphasized that the , , and  do not 
require bioprospectors to obtain  from communities 
living in collection areas 
USA: NPS research specimen collection permit
The  is implemented through the detailed permit ap-
plication and approval process now instituted throughout 
the  (see previous section and Chapter ). 
Analysis: PIC
As interpreted from the , bioprospectors must obtain 
 and this is incorporated in the policies and laws for 
all the countries reviewed in this section. Procedures 
for obtaining  in these countries are usually initiated 
when the access application is submitted to the designated 
government authorities (see previous section).  poli-
cies of these countries, except for Thailand and the , 
also require  from the providers of genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge. However, information about 
how to obtain  from traditional communities remains 
unclear in all countries except for the Philippines (  
and Wildlife Act) and Peru (Law No. ). Thailand is 
the only country that requires foreign bioprospectors to 
obtain  twice from government authorities. The first 
one is obtained prior to entering the country through the 
letter of permission required for the visa. The second 
one is obtained through the application process made to 
the agency that administers the resource that will be ac-
cessed. Unlike the other countries, the  does not have 
a designated government authority regulating access to 
genetic resources that provides the  of the State. In 
the specific case of the  lands, bioprospectors have to 
obtain the consent from the  and such consent, which 
is analogous to the , is obtained through the permit 
application of the .
Despite the fact that  requirements are likely to be 
expensive and cumbersome to obtain for many bioprospec-
tors, the motive for the requirement is twofold: a)  is a 
direct consequence of countries being sovereign to deter-
mine whether or not to grant access to their genetic resour-
ces and b)  will help to ensure that benefits are shared 
equitably, give transparency to bioprospecting projects, 
and contribute to their success. However, bioprospectors 
are likely to run into difficulties and challenges while try-
ing to obtain  from local communities and government 
agencies. These include: a) identifying the representatives 
of the communities and assessing their representation 
power and capacity; b) identifying all the parties affected 
by the project; c) presenting the bioprospecting project, 
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legal concepts (s, property, etc.), and benefits for the 
community in a form and manner understandable to the 
target group; d) identifying and presenting the implications 
of the project for the community; e) identifying communi-
ties who share the same knowledge; and f) obtaining the 
 from several local and national government agencies 
that administer the same biological resource. In any case, 
bioprospectors have to keep in mind that traditional com-
munities and governments may choose to deny access (see 
Chapters , , and ) and this is a legitimate decision based 
on the national sovereignty recognized by the  and the 
 laws and policies described above.
Benefit Sharing and
Compensation Mechanisms
Biodiversity conservation and sustainable use, research 
and training opportunities, public education and aware-
ness, transfer of technology, exchange of information, 
and technical and scientific cooperation are some of the 
key goals of the  that may become operational in the 
context of bioprospecting projects. These are also some 
of the benefits that are usually negotiated in access and 
benefit-sharing contracts23. Contracts formalize this rela-
tionship and attempt to ensure that pharmaceutical, seed, 
agricultural, biotechnology and other companies compen-
sate researchers, collectors, and collaborators from coun-
tries with great biological, genetic, and cultural diversity. 
Trust funds have also been proposed as a mechanism to 
facilitate the equitable distribution of benefits. 
Australia: Draft EPBCAR
Benefit-sharing agreements must be negotiated at the 
beginning of a project, rather than after a lead has been 
identified. In  or , the Minister is likely to pres-
ent a model benefit-sharing agreement, but its use by 
bioprospectors will not be mandatory. These agreements 
must provide for reasonable monetary and nonmonetary 
benefit-sharing arrangements covering matters such as up-
front payments for samples, royalties, milestone payments, 
and participation of Australians in research activities. They 
must also recognize and value any indigenous knowledge 
given by the access provider. A trust fund has also been 
proposed to facilitate the compensation of indigenous 
knowledge, but no decisions have been made so far to 
facilitate its development. The regulations also state that 
an agreement may be both a benefit-sharing agreement 
and an indigenous land-use agreement under the Native 
Title Act (see Chapter ). 
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru: Decision 391
Commercial and noncommercial bioprospectors have to 
negotiate an access agreement with the government and 
an accessory or annex agreement with the providers of the 
genetic resource or the traditional knowledge respectively. 
These agreements have to address at least the following 
benefit-sharing issues: a) establishment of conditions for 
a just and equitable sharing of benefits generated from ac-
cess; b) promotion of the participation of local scientists 
in order to enhance local scientific, technical, and techno-
logical capacities; and c) strengthening of mechanisms to 
transfer knowledge and technologies including environ-
mentally sound biotechnologies. Bioprospectors are also 
obliged to deposit duplicates of samples collected in sites 
designated by the pertinent national authority (A 
C ).
Under Decision , the national authority may also 
establish framework access contracts for projects carried 
out by universities, research centers, or researchers for 
noncommercial purposes. Details about requirements for 
this type of contracts are defined according to local legis-
lation. For example, the draft of the Peruvian regulation 
on genetic resources states that universities and academic 
research centers (based in Peru) may use a framework ac-
cess contract24 to access genetic resources as long as they 
comply with the following requirements: a) participation 
of national professionals in collecting and research activi-
ties; b) indication by the research program of proposed 
methodologies for the collection of samples; c) commit-
ment to inform local authorities about research advances, 
results, and publications generated from access activities; 
d) plan to restrict the transfer of samples to third parties; 
e) provisions about potential s on products or processes 
derived from the use of genetic resources and their de-
rivatives; f) background information about the situation 
of the genetic resources, their derivatives, and associated 
knowledge that are being accessed; g) information about 
access risks, including uses and value of the resource; h) 
provisions about collection and sample payments; and i) 
deposition of duplicates of collected samples in organiza-
tions identified by the national authority (these organiza-
tions may loan these duplicates to foreign partners only 
for taxonomy studies) ( ).
Decision  recognizes the rights and decision-mak-
ing capacity of indigenous, black, and local communities 
with regards to their traditional knowledge, practices, and 
innovations connected with genetic resources and their 
derivatives (A C ). Under Peru’s 
Law No.  commercial bioprospectors have to sign 
an annex contract or license that provides at least the 
following benefit-sharing obligations: a) an up-front pay-
ment or its equivalent that contributes to the sustainable 
development of indigenous communities; b) royalties no 
less than % of the gross sale of products (before taxes) 
derived from the use of collective knowledge accessed 
by the bioprospector; and c) the strengthening of local 
capacities of indigenous communities in relation to their 
collective knowledge associated with biological diversity 
(P C ). 
Decision  states that the member countries shall 
set up trust funds or other financial mechanisms to distrib-
ute the benefits derived from bioprospecting initiatives. 
Neither Colombia, Ecuador, nor Peru has so far received 
economic benefits that can be channeled to a trust fund. 
Peru’s Law No. , however, creates a trust fund for the 
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development of indigenous peoples. No less than % of 
the gross sales (before taxes) of products derived from the 
collective knowledge will go to the trust fund (P 
C ).
Costa Rica: The Law of Biodiversity
This law regulates the equitable distribution of benefits 
and the protection of traditional knowledge. In addition 
to monetary and nonmonetary benefits negotiated among 
the parties to a bioprospecting initiative, the Law of 
Biodiversity mandates bioprospectors to pay % of the 
research budget and % of the royalties to the National 
System of Protected Areas, the indigenous representative, 
or the landholder that provided the genetic, biological, or 
biochemical resources (see Chapter ). 
Malaysia:
Draft federal bill on access to genetic resources
The draft bill regulates the sharing of benefits derived from 
the use of genetic resources and traditional knowledge. 
In determining the nature and combination of benefits 
from access to either biological resources or traditional 
knowledge, the pertinent authority shall take into account 
relevant factors that include: a) the conservation status of 
the biological resource; b) endemism or rarity of the bio-
logical resource; c) the existing, potential, intrinsic, and 
commercial value of the resource; d) the proposed use of 
the resource; and e) whether traditional knowledge is in-
volved. In any case, since local organizations must be part 
of any bioprospecting venture, monetary or nonmonetary 
benefits are likely to be received by these entities.
Furthermore, a provision of the bill proposes the es-
tablishment of a common trust fund to channel benefits 
derived from the use of traditional knowledge. Therefore, 
bioprospectors will have to pay to the fund a percentage 
of the gross sales of any product or process utilizing or 
incorporating the traditional knowledge. The competent 
authority and the indigenous or local community will be 
jointly responsible for the equitable distribution of the 
monies solely for the benefit of the concerned indigenous 
or local community. The payment made to the fund will 
be administered by the national competent authority to 
promote the wellbeing of the indigenous and local com-
munities and for the conservation and sustainable use of 
the biological resources (see Chapter ).
Mexico: EEEPGA, WGA, SFDGA, and draft LAUBGR
Article   of the  states that owners of genetic 
or biological resources are entitled to receive a share of 
benefits derived from the use of these resources. Mexico’s 
 does not regulate access to traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources, but it recognizes the 
need to protect and disseminate the knowledge of indige-
nous communities in order to promote the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity (see Chapter ). Similarly, 
Article  of  states that conservation and sustain-
able use activities of wildlife resources must ensure the 
protection of traditional knowledge and the participation 
of rural communities. Furthermore, these activities must 
encourage the equitable distribution of benefits derived 
from the use of such knowledge. Under Article  of 
 bioprospectors that use traditional knowledge must 
sign a  agreement with the indigenous community that 
provided the knowledge. It is not clear whether this is also 
a benefit-sharing agreement, however, according to  
this agreement must acknowledge the property rights of the 
community over its knowledge ( ).
Under the draft  bioprospectors have to negoti-
ate an access and benefit-sharing contract with  
and the provider of the genetic resource and traditional 
knowledge.  can also negotiate access contracts 
with national universities and research centers. In any case, 
the access contract should include the conditions for the 
fair and equitable distribution of benefits derived from the 
commercialization of products derived from local genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge. It should also include 
the type of protection given to traditional knowledge. The 
protection of technologies derived from access activities 
will be shared by the parties and adjusted for  protection 
(G P ).
Nicaragua: Draft Law of Biodiversity
The main access contract that bioprospectors have to ne-
gotiate with the government has to include an accessory 
contract that provides details about benefits negotiated 
with the providers of the genetic resources and indigenous 
knowledge. The  contract described in the previous sec-
tion is also used to protect and compensate indigenous 
knowledge and it includes the following requirements: a) 
identification of the parties; b) description of the collective 
knowledge that will be transferred; c) plans for up-front 
payment and a payment of a percentage of the net sales of 
products marketed as a result of the knowledge provided; 
d) the obligation to inform the provider about the objec-
tives, risks, or implications derived from the use of the 
collective knowledge; and e) the obligation to inform the 
parties about progress in the research, industrialization, 
and marketing of products derived from the knowledge 
provided ( ).
Philippines: EO 247 and Wildlife Act
  provides an  or  to facilitate the sharing 
of monetary and nonmonetary benefits. The Wildlife Act, 
however, does not require an  any longer. The  
was intended primarily for academic purposes, so benefits 
shared included opportunities to publish research, access to 
information, and academic training. An  was valid for 
a period of five years, renewable upon recommendation of 
the . Research intended for commercial use require 
a  that is valid for a period of three years and renewable 
for a period as may be determined by the .
Although the introductory clause of   mentions 
traditional knowledge, nowhere in the text of the law has 
it been discussed. However, traditional knowledge of local 
and indigenous communities is linked with the  of the 
communities where the resources are taken.
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Under   benefit sharing is required at two stages: 
at the time of collection and at the time of commercializa-
tion. At the time of collection, the minimum benefits that 
must be obtained are explicitly provided for in  , 
while benefit sharing at the time of commercialization is 
not expressly required. The parties, however, are free to 
negotiate any kind of monetary and nonmonetary benefits 
(see Chapter ). 
However, the  draft Guidelines for Bioprospecting 
Activities would repeal the benefits-sharing provisions 
of   and require bioprospectors to apply for a 
Bioprospecting Undertaking instead of a . Under the 
guidelines, in addition to the fees discussed above in the 
Access Procedure section, applicants would have to be 
prepared to pay a minimum amount of % of the gross 
sales of products made or derived from collected samples. 
In addition, the applicant would have to provide minimum 
nonmonetary benefits such as equipment for biodiversity 
inventory and monitoring, supplies and equipment for 
resource conservation acitivities; arrangements for tech-
nology transfer; formal training and educational facilities, 
infrastructure directly related to management of the collec-
tion area; health care costs for persons involved; and other 
capacity building and support for in situ conservation and 
development activities. The guidelines include a model 
checklist of indicators (Annex ) for monitoring whether 
the benefit-sharing agreement is fair and equitable (see 
endnote  for access to the guidelines).
Samoa: CABSSBR
The conditions state that a benefit-sharing agreement has to 
be signed between the bioprospector and the government 
of Samoa. This agreement has to acknowledge all relevant 
traditional knowledge and practice that will be used by the 
bioprospectors. The conditions also state that the minimum 
royalty is %. However, it is not clear whether this is % 
of the net or gross sale of final products derived directly 
from collected samples or inspired by the chemistry of 
these samples. Bioprospectors also have to negotiate a 
legally binding agreement with the providers of biological 
resources. This agreement must include royalties, fees, 
and other payments for access to genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge ( ).
Thailand: PVPA, RFSRCFA, and APPTMI
 provides for two benefit-sharing models for com-
mercial users of local domestic,25 general domestic,26 
and wild27 plant varieties. The first model applies to any 
bioprospector who collects or procures a local domestic 
plant variety or any part thereof for the purposes of vari-
ety development, education, experiment, or research for 
commercial purposes. If this is the case, the distribution 
of benefits derived from this activity is as follows: Twenty 
percent of the profits shall be allocated to the persons 
who conserved or developed the plant variety, % to 
the community as its common revenue, and % to the 
local government organization, the farmer’s group, or the 
cooperative that signs the benefit-sharing agreement with 
the bioprospector.
The second benefit-sharing model applies to collectors 
of general domestic plant varieties, wild plant varieties, 
or any part of such plant varieties for the purposes of va-
riety development, education, experiment, or research for 
commercial interest. In this case the profits derived from 
any benefit-sharing agreement must be paid to the Plant 
Varieties Protection Fund. The main objective of this fund 
will be to promote the conservation, research, and devel-
opment activities of plant varieties of local communities 
(T C ). 
Under , commercial bioprospecting projects 
have to establish a benefit-sharing agreement with the  
that includes a payment of royalties on all inventions de-
rived from genetic resources. This agreement may include 
other forms of monetary and nonmonetary compensation 
strategies. The agreement must also state that Thai scien-
tists will be involved in all collection and research activi-
ties. All Thai citizens and governmental organizations must 
have access to collected specimens and relevant data for 
research and studies. A duplicate of specimens collected 
must also be deposited at the Royal Forest Department 
(C ).  states that users of 
traditional knowledge about medicines must submit an 
application to the licensing authority at Ministry of Public 
Health in order to initiate the negotiation process of poten-
tial benefits derived from such a use ( ). 
USA: NPS research specimen collection permit
The  Federal Technology Transfer Act was invoked 
to develop a Cooperative Research and Development 
Agreement ()28 that facilitated the distribution of 
benefits derived from the use of biological samples col-
lected in Yellowstone National Park. The term of the  
was for an initial five-year period, but it provided that the 
benefit-sharing obligations survived termination which is 
very important since development of valuable discoveries 
can take more than ten years to achieve (see Chapter ).
Analysis:
Benefit Sharing and Compensation Mechanisms
Contracts are the heart of bioprospecting initiatives. They 
are the main mechanism used by countries to ensure that 
monetary and nonmonetary benefits are negotiated under 
mutually agreed terms. Monetary and nonmonetary ben-
efits have been thoroughly identified by the literature and 
include royalties, up-front payments, milestone payments, 
research funding, license fees, salaries and infrastructure, 
sharing of research results, biodiversity conservation, 
training, participation of nationals on research activities, 
technology transfer, and recovery of traditional knowledge. 
These and many other benefits should be negotiated on a 
case-by-case basis among parties directly involved in the 
projects. In some cases these parties must follow minimum 
benefit-sharing criteria. For example, Costa Rica, Peru, 
the Philippines, and Samoa have chosen to set a baseline 
or criteria for the benefits that they expect to receive. 
Samoa, for example, demands a minimum % royalty (no 
 
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information is provided about whether this is taken from 
net or gross sales of products). Furthermore, Malaysia’s 
draft bill proposes to use a set of criteria to identify the 
nature and combination of benefits. Unfortunately, most 
countries seem to be focused on the negotiation of royal-
ties that might never materialize and they tend to give less 
importance to nonmonetary benefits that might contribute 
to build local capacity. 
These benefit-sharing criteria, however, are merely a 
starting point. Whether agreements are fair and equitable 
is a subjective issue that lies in the eye of the beholder 
(or the negotiator). The fairness of contracts depends in 
large part on the skills of the parties to negotiate adequate 
benefit-sharing and compensation provisions. In the past, 
negotiators from developing countries may not have been 
as qualified as their counterparts from industrialized 
countries, but this is changing. The actors involved in the 
business of bioprospecting have increased in diversity and 
number. Information about the rights and obligations of 
bioprospecting parties and their collaborators has prolif-
erated and it is reaching scientists and indigenous groups 
from developing countries. In any case, bioprospectors 
should keep in mind that a fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits derived from access activities is one of the three 
objectives of the  and a requirement of . Article 
() of the  specifically refers to the aim of sharing 
the results of research and development” as well as the 
“benefits arising from the commercialization and other 
utilization of genetic resources”.29
Contracts in combination with  requirements have 
also been proposed to protect and recognize indigenous 
knowledge in monetary and nonmonetary terms.  laws 
and policies of most countries propose access, annex, and 
accessory contracts to this purpose. In addition to this, most 
countries have endorsed trust funds as a useful mechanism 
to distribute benefits among several communities that share 
the knowledge used by bioprospectors. However, there is 
little experience and information on the practical operation 
of these trust funds and therefore on their usefulness. 
IPRs and the Protection
of Traditional Knowledge
Article () of the  recognizes the potential influence 
of patents and other s on the implementation of the 
Convention and called on Contracting Parties to ensure 
that “such rights are supportive of and do not run counter 
to its objectives”.30 This statement reflects uncertainty and 
disagreement about the impact of patents and s on the 
 objectives. This was probably due to the different 
political positions on this controversial issue during the 
negotiations of the  and the lack of agreement on the 
impacts of patents and other s on biodiversity which 
led to such a broadly and ambiguous text. Even today 
there is great disagreement about the impacts of s on 
biodiversity and traditional knowledge (C , 
D , S , see Chapters  and ) and 
the issue will not be settled in the near future. 
Under the , Parties are not obliged to have a patent 
system for the protection of inventions derived from bio-
logical diversity and traditional knowledge. However, un-
der the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (), member countries have to provide 
patent protection for microorganisms (as products) and 
for nonbiological and microbiological processes used for 
the production of plants and animals. The scope of patent 
protection does not have to include plants and animals. 
But, plant breeders’ rights or another sui generis system 
must protect plant varieties. Furthermore under , the 
World Trade Organization () can enforce minimum 
standards for all s. 
Sixty percent of the  Pacific Rim countries examined 
in this report are  members and have complied or are 
in the process of complying with  requirements, % 
are  observers, and the remaining % of countries do 
not fall in any of the above categories. Countries within 
this last % include Kiribati, Niue, and Solomon Islands 
which are planning to develop  laws and may apply for 
 membership in the future. In addition, they rely on 
 legislation of developed countries such as the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand with which they have post-
colonial and economic ties (see Table ).
Australia: Draft EPBCAR
Australia’s patent law allows for the patenting of plants, 
microorganisms, genes, and related biological materi-
als, provided that these meet the country’s standards of 
proof for patentability.31 Plant variety protection is also 
provided by plant breeders’ rights. Therefore, Australia 
complies with the relevant  provisions. However, the 
country’s intellectual property regime does not currently 
protect indigenous knowledge. On the other hand, it should 
be noted that the Nationally Consistent Approach states 
that legislative, administrative, or policy frameworks in 
Australian jurisdictions shall “recognize the need to ensure 
the use of traditional knowledge is undertaken with the 
cooperation and approval of the holders of that knowledge 
and on mutually agreed terms” (see Chapter ). This may 
be a narrower principle than that which indigenous people 
appear to be asserting in Australia (see Chapter ). The 
fact that the debate continues, however, suggests that there 
may be a need for a more rigorous attempt to identify the 
issues and to develop acceptable solutions.
The draft regulations do not refer specifically to  
protection of inventions derived from genetic resources 
or indigenous knowledge. They do, however, include 
provisions requiring prior informed consent and adequate 
valuing of indigenous knowledge in the benefit-sharing 
contract. V () also recommended that pat-
ent law should be amended in order to include proof of 
source and, where appropriate, prior informed consent, as 
a prerequisite for granting a patent.
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru: Decision 391
Decision  includes key provisions about s that 
are strengthened by Decision , the Common Regime 
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on Industrial Property that was approved by the Andean 
Community in . Decision  states that member 
countries will not recognize intellectual property rights 
over genetic resources, derivatives, synthesized products, 
or related intangible components that have been obtained 
through access activities which do not comply with the 
provisions of the Decision. According to Decision  na-
tional intellectual property offices shall require applicants 
to submit the registration number of the access contract 
and a copy of it as a prerequisite for the granting of the 
 when there is reasonable evidence to suggest that the 
products or processes for which an  is being sought 
have been obtained from genetic resources of an Andean 
Member Country (A C ). Decision 
 supports Decision  by requiring patent applicants 
to include a copy of the access contract, when products 
or procedures have been obtained or developed based on 
genetic resources from any of the members of the Andean 
Community (A C ). 
Decisions  and  also address the need to pro-
tect traditional knowledge. According to Decision , the 
Andean Community will prepare a proposal for a special 
regime to strengthen the protection of traditional knowl-
edge, innovations, and practices of indigenous, black, and 
local communities that could take the form of a community 
intellectual right system (A C ). So 
far, no regional initiatives to protect traditional knowledge 
have been proposed. In contrast, the  Peruvian Law 
No.  provides a sui generis system for the protec-
tion of indigenous peoples’ collective knowledge about 
properties, uses, and characteristics of biological diversity 
and it has the following objectives: a) promotion, respect, 
protection, preservation, and development of collective 
knowledge of indigenous peoples; b) promotion of the just 
and equitable distribution of benefits derived from the use 
of collective knowledge; c) promotion of the use of collec-
tive knowledge for the benefit of indigenous peoples and 
humanity; d) assurance that collective knowledge is used 
with the prior informed consent of indigenous peoples; 
e) development of capacities of indigenous peoples and 
mechanisms traditionally used by them to share and 
distribute benefits derived and shared collectively; and 
f) prevention of the patenting of inventions derived from 
the collective knowledge of indigenous peoples without 
taking into account the novelty and inventive level of such 
knowledge. The law creates three registers for the protec-
tion of collective knowledge as follows: a) national register 
for collective knowledge that is in the public domain; b) 
national register for confidential collective knowledge; and 
c) local registers for either kind of collective knowledge. 
 will be in charge of the first two registers and 
will provide support for local registers if requested by 
local communities. This organization will also submit to 
patent offices worldwide the public information registered 
by indigenous communities in order to block unauthorized 
patent applications of products and processes that may 
have been developed with such knowledge (P 
C ). 
On the other hand it should be noted that Decision  
will provide intellectual property protection as long as 
applicants prove that they complied with regulations that 
protect the genetic resources and knowledge of indigenous 
peoples and other local communities. Decision  also 
complies with . It protects microorganisms but it 
does not provide protection to plants, animals, sequences 
of genes (that have been isolated), and essentially bio-
logical procedures for the production of plants or animals. 
Decision  also includes a compulsory licensing provi-
sion that allows member states the free use of any invention 
derived from biological resources in a situation of national 
emergency (A C ). 
Plant variety protection is provided by Decision , 
the Common Regime for the Protection of the Rights of 
Breeders of Plant Varieties, that establishes a sui generis 
property rights regime regulating plant breeders’ rights, 
thus protecting farmers and regulating ownership of newly 
developed plant varieties. The regime complies with the 
provisions of the International Union for the Protection of 
New Varieties of Plants () (see Chapter ). 
Costa Rica: The Law of Biodiversity
The Law of Biodiversity established that the State will 
use patents, trademarks, plant breeders’ rights, copyrights, 
and sui generis systems to protect individual or collective 
traditional knowledge, innovations, practices, and inven-
tions. This protection is extended to genetically modified 
microorganisms, but excludes biological processes for 
the production of plants and animals, plants, animals, 
sequences of genes, and any other organism as it exists 
in nature (this protection, however, was derogated by the 
Patents, Industrial Designs, and Utility Models Law as 
amended by Law No.  of  January ). Protection 
is also excluded for any inventions derived from tradi-
tional knowledge or biological practices that are part of 
the public domain. The Law of Biodiversity also includes 
a compulsory licensing system that allows the State to 
use any invention derived from biological resources in a 
situation of national emergency. 
Intellectual property right authorities must consult the 
 before granting protection of intellectual or industrial 
property related innovations that involve biodiversity ele-
ments. The submission of the certificate of origin and prior 
informed consent will be required. The Law of Biodiversity 
also establishes that under sui generis community intel-
lectual rights, the State protects traditional knowledge, 
practices, and innovations of indigenous communities. A 
participatory process mandated in the Law of Biodiversity 
is working on the sui generis community intellectual rights. 
Consultations with indigenous and peasant communities 
are expected to be completed in . 
The Law of Biodiversity also focuses on the protec-
tion of knowledge by means of a register. During the 
consultation process with local communities (and later), 
they may register their knowledge, traditional practices, or 
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innovations. The service is voluntary and free of charge. 
This register will allow the  to reject any claim of in-
tellectual property derived from knowledge protected by 
this system.
Costa Rica has comprehensive legislation related to 
s that include: a) the Patent, Drawings and Utility 
Models Law No. , emended by Law No.  of 
 January  to make it compatible with  and b) 
Plant Breeders’ Rights draft published in The Gazette on 
 August  and yet to be approved. This draft was 
developed in accordance with the model law of  and 
its  Act (see Chapter ).
Malaysia:
Draft federal bill on access to genetic resources
The draft does not recognize protection for: a) plants, ani-
mals, and naturally occurring microorganisms, including 
parts thereof and b) biological and naturally occurring 
microbiological processes. Approval of the competent 
authority is required in order to obtain a patent that in-
volves the use of biological resources. The draft has to 
be consistent with the provisions of the Malaysian Patent 
Act of . It is not clear, however, whether genes are 
patentable under the Act. It is necessary to harmonize 
the provisions of this Act with Malaysia’s international 
obligations under . To satisfy the requirements of 
, Malaysia developed the draft Protection of New 
Plant Varieties bill. This is essentially a sui generis system 
for the protection of plant genetic resources. Congress has 
not passed the bill yet.
Moreover, there is no specific provision in the act to 
protect indigenous knowledge related to genetic resources. 
Malaysia has been discussing a proposal for a sui generis 
system of community intellectual rights. The system’s 
objectives are to: a) recognize the ownership rights of 
communities over their knowledge, innovations, and prac-
tices; b) protect communities’ knowledge, innovations, and 
practices; and c) ensure the equitable sharing of benefits 
derived from their genetic resources and knowledge. The 
proposal, however, was very controversial and it was not 
included in the draft Access to Genetic Resources bill (see 
Chapter ).
Mexico: EEEPGA, WGA, SFDGA, and draft LAUBGR
Neither  nor  includes provisions that pro-
tect intellectual property derived from genetic resources 
or traditional knowledge. However,  protects the 
knowledge of traditional communities about local forest 
biological resources found in their land. Article  states 
that collectors of forest biological resources for commer-
cial and noncommercial purposes must acknowledge the 
rights of indigenous communities over the knowledge, 
ownership, and use of local varieties. Furthermore, any 
patenting of forest genetic resources and by-products 
will be legally void unless the collector acknowledges 
the aforementioned rights of indigenous communities. 
However, some exceptions may apply in the context 
of agreed relevant international agreements or treaties 
( ). 
The  Industrial Property Act protects inventions 
derived from genetic resources, but there is no protection 
for traditional knowledge. Furthermore, the act does not 
include requirements for disclosing the origin of samples 
or knowledge used for the invention of products or pro-
cesses that are to be patented. Under the act patents must 
comply with the requirements of novelty, inventive step, 
and industrial application, and there is an exception to 
patenting biological and genetic material. However, the 
Mexican patent office considers that once biological or 
genetic materials have been isolated and characterized, it 
is no longer “as it is found in nature”. Therefore, sequences 
of genes can be patented under Mexican law. Mexico’s 
 also gives property rights to plant breeders for plant 
varieties (see Chapter ). 
Under Article  of , the inter-secretarial com-
mission together with the Mexican council must develop 
measures to defend s of peasant and indigenous com-
munities. However, no such measures have been adopted 
so far by the Mexican government. Mexico’s current 
legislation does not provide a comprehensive protection 
to traditional knowledge. The draft , however, 
includes a provision that promotes the evaluation of the 
proportion of “relevant knowledge” given by each party in 
order to distribute the resulting s. There are no details 
about how to implement this measure. The draft law also 
proposes a register system to protect traditional knowledge 
(G P ).
Nicaragua: Draft Law of Biodiversity
The draft law states that access contracts must refer to the 
type of  protection that will be sought for inventions 
derived under the agreement. This draft also proposes sui 
generis community intellectual rights to protect the knowl-
edge, practices, and innovations of local communities. In 
addition, the draft promotes the development of a regis-
ter to protect the knowledge of these communities. This 
register will be voluntary and confidential. The draft law 
also requires  authorities to ask for access authorization 
(including proof that  was sought) before  protection 
is granted on inventions derived from biodiversity or indig-
enous knowledge. In late , the government developed 
a proposal for sui generis community intellectual rights 
to protect the knowledge, practices, and innovations of 
local communities 
Nicaragua’s  laws include the Patent Law  and 
plant breeders’ rights to protect new plant varieties. Plants, 
animals, and biological processes to produce any organ-
ism are excluded from patent protection. But protection 
is given to sequences of genes that have been isolated 
and characterized and it can be extended to any product 
that includes such a sequence (J. Hernández, pers. comm. 
November ). 
Philippines: EO 247 and Wildlife Act
  recognizes the rights of indigenous communities 
to their knowledge and practices when this information is 
 
used for commercial purposes. The Philippines, however, 
has yet to pass a sui generis  system that will cover tra-
ditional knowledge associated with biological and genetic 
resources of local and indigenous communities. The  
Traditional Alternative Medicine Act protects knowledge 
of traditional medicine in a very limited way. The law 
provides for a policy for indigenous groups seeking to 
protect their knowledge. This policy, however, is still under 
development (P. Benavidez, pers. comm. July ).
Both the  Intellectual Property Code and the  
Plant Variety Protection Law comply with . The 
code excludes plant varieties, animal breeds, or essen-
tially biological processes for the production of plants or 
animals from patent protection. However, microorganisms 
and nonbiological and microbiological processes can be 
protected by patents. The Plant Variety Protection Law al-
lows compulsory licensing at any time after two years from 
the granting of the protection. This situation may occur if 
the variety is required for the production of any medicine 
or food preparation, among other reasons (see Chapter 
). Protection under the Law is patterned after the  
plant breeders’ rights.   also includes a compulsory 
licensing provision that applies to products or technologies 
developed from the use of endemic species. In this case 
the invention must be available for use in the Philippines 
without paying royalty to the inventor. 
The Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of  empha-
sizes that indigenous communities “are entitled to the 
recognition of the full ownership and control and protec-
tion of their cultural and intellectual rights” (B et 
al. ). Under the act, bioprospectors have to obtain the 
 from indigenous communities. Unfortunately, there 
is no provision in the intellectual property code of the 
country that denies intellectual property right protection 
to bioprospectors who fail to present the  of the local 
community that provided the genetic resource or knowl-
edge (P. Benavidez, pers. comm. March ). 
Samoa: CABSSBR 
The conditions provide that traditional knowledge has to 
be acknowledged in any benefit-sharing agreement ( 
). This includes the negotiation of access to s or 
traditional knowledge owned by or vested in any indi-
vidual, group of individuals, or representatives thereof, 
and the payment of fees, royalties, or license payments 
for such rights or access. The  Intellectual Property 
Rights Law and the  Village Fono Act also provide 
a general framework for the recognition of ownership of 
traditional knowledge. These regulations, however, are 
likely to be strengthened with future legislation (D 
 E  C ). 
Thailand: PVPA, RFSRCFA, and APPTMI
Existing  laws have been revised to be in line with 
the requirements of the  Agreement. Thailand’s 
 Patent Act (amended in  and ) protects 
inventions derived from biological resources except for 
plants, animals, or essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants and animals. Applications for gene 
sequences are accepted by the patent office, but there are 
still problems with interpretation of the law and they may 
be denied. Thailand’s  also protects new plant vari-
eties, traditional varieties, community varieties, and wild 
varieties (J. Donavanik, pers. comm. January ). Under 
 bioprospectors must obtain the approval of  
before they apply for intellectual property right protec-
tion (i.e., copyright, patent, trademark, etc.). Depending 
on particulars of the situation  may ask bioprospectors 
to share ownership of intellectual property protection (C. 
Hutacharern, pers. comm. June ).
The  provides a sui generis system to protect 
traditional knowledge associated with formulae of medi-
cines derived from plants, animals, bacteria, and minerals. 
According to the act, such protection takes effect when 
such knowledge (oral or written) about formulae of 
medicines is registered at the National Institute of Thai 
Traditional Medicine. The act creates the following three 
categories of sui generis “medicinal intellectual property 
rights”:
• The national formula of traditional Thai drugs or 
the national text on traditional Thai medicine; 
• general formula of traditional Thai drugs or gen-
eral traditional Thai medicine document; and 
• personal formula of traditional Thai drugs or 
personal text on traditional Thai medicine ( 
).
National formula is defined as the one that has a special 
medical or public health value; general formula is the one 
that has been widely used, and personal formula is the 
one that is not national or general and has been developed 
by a person or group of persons. The inventor, improver, 
or inheritor of the personal formula may register such 
knowledge. The act protects registered knowledge for the 
lifetime of the bearer and  additional years from the time 
the owner or last owner (in case of joint ownership) of the 
registration has passed away ( ). 
USA: NPS research specimen collection permit
The Patent Act of  defined patentable statutory subject 
matter as “any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter, or any new or useful improve-
ment [thereof]”. The Plant Patent Act of  gave pro-
tection to clonally propagated varieties of plants such as 
fruit trees and tubers. In , the  granted protection 
to new, uniform, and distinct plant varieties. In , the 
 Supreme Court opened the door for patents to be ap-
plied to plants, animals, microorganisms, genes, and  
sequences. In late , the Supreme Court confirmed 
that plant varieties are eligible for protection by utility 
patents, as well as under the Plant Patent Act of  and 
the  of . The distinction between what the law 
rewards (new, useful, and nonobvious discoveries based 
on research results) and what the law protects (naturally 
occurring life forms that remain free for all to use) is at 
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the core of the biodiversity prospecting access and benefit-
sharing issues first pioneered in the  at Yellowstone 
(see Chapter ).
Analysis:
IPRs and the Protection of Traditional Knowledge
Traditional and sui generis  systems, registers,  
requirements, certificates of origin, and benefit-sharing 
agreements are the main instruments used by most coun-
tries to protect scientific and the traditional knowledge at 
different levels. All of the countries reviewed above, except 
for Samoa and Malaysia, have  legislation that complies 
fully with . They provide intellectual protection to 
inventions derived from biological resources that exclude 
plants, animals, and biological processes to develop these 
organisms. These countries, except for Costa Rica, also 
have legislation to protect new plant varieties and Thailand 
extends this protection to wild plant varieties. However,  
protection depends on the application of the patentability 
test. In other words, inventions have to be novel, useful, 
and nonobvious. Unlike Australia, Costa Rica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, and the , the Andean Community does not 
protect gene sequences that have been isolated and charac-
terized. According to these countries, genes exist in nature 
and their mere isolation does not comply with the novelty 
and inventive steps of the patentability test. Thailand ac-
cepts applications for the protection of gene sequences, 
but patent clerks still have trouble interpreting the norm (J. 
Donavanik, pers. comm. February ). Bioprospectors 
may also object to the fact that the Andean Community 
(Decision ) and Costa Rica (Law of Biodiversity) in-
clude a compulsory licensing provision that allows these 
nations to use any invention without having to pay royalties 
in case of national emergency or security. 
Can traditional  systems be applied to protect in-
ventions derived from the use of traditional knowledge? 
Patents, for example, protect only those inventions that 
can only be attributed to individuals or small groups 
of people. Some argue that in traditional societies the 
sources of knowledge can be traced to individuals, kin-
ship, or gender-based groups. On the other hand, most 
traditional knowledge is in the public domain and cannot 
be attributable to a single community or geographical loca-
tion making it ineligible for patent protection. In addition, 
many communities resent the fact that their traditional 
knowledge has been stolen to patent plants or inventions 
derived from plants. Examples include the ayahuasca 
( ), the neem tree (D ), and the 
enola bean (see Box  of Chapter ). Others have ethical 
concerns about the idea of monopolizing and commercial-
izing their knowledge. These concerns and issues have 
discouraged most traditional communities from facilitating 
the use of knowledge for patenting purposes. 
In the last few years there has been intensive debate at a 
national and international level to protect indigenous or tra-
ditional knowledge. This debate has reached international 
bodies like the World Intellectual Property Organization 
() which is examining proposals to protect traditional 
knowledge. Specifically, the Global Intellectual Property 
Division and the Intergovernmental Committee on Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore of  
have been looking at the  needs of holders of traditional 
knowledge and the feasibility of establishing databases or 
registers to protect traditional or indigenous knowledge, 
among other issues. 
 can provide a space for the discussion of these 
issues but it does not have the power to oblige countries 
to develop legislation that protects traditional knowledge. 
 can utilize economic sanctions to advance these is-
sues worldwide. However, there is still great disagreement 
among countries about fundamental issues such as the 
patenting of life and whether the  agreement should 
be amended in order to make it consistent with  ob-
ligations such as the protection of traditional knowledge 
and  requirements. For example, in early June , at 
a meeting of the  council, the Africa Group empha-
sized that  should include some sort of international 
mechanism to ensure the effective protection of traditional 
knowledge. In contrast, the  called for traditional 
knowledge to be removed from the agenda of the  
Council. Furthermore, the Africa Group called for a ban 
on the patenting of life, a request that was opposed by the 
 and the European Union. On the other hand, the Indian 
Group proposed that  should be amended in order to 
require patent applicants to disclose the source of origin of 
the biological resource and traditional knowledge and to 
provide evidence of  and benefit sharing. This issue was 
supported by the European Union, but it was not clarified 
whether it should be addressed by  or . Japan, 
Canada, and the  argued that  was already working 
on these issues and proposed to wait for the results before 
further action was taken (A ).
More than % of the countries examined in this re-
port are already addressing these issues in their national 
policies. These countries have either included in their  
policies provisions that call for a sui generis community 
rights system to protect indigenous knowledge, or are ex-
amining options for the development of a similar system. 
Furthermore, these countries are already taking additional 
measures to protect traditional knowledge and to ensure 
that bioprospectors comply with  regulations. These 
include requirements for national  authorities to ask 
for access contracts,  evidence, or some certificate of 
origin when they receive applications for  protection 
of products and processes that have been derived from 
local biological resources or traditional knowledge. The 
Andean Community and Costa Rica already have this 
kind of provision in their  laws and Australia and 
Nicaragua are proposing similar measures in their draft 
regulations. Mexico’s General Law of Sustainable Forestry 
Development also requires bioprospectors to provide  
evidence when inventions derived from forest biological 
resources are patented. However, this requirement applies 
only to local varieties found in forests owned by indigenous 
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communities. Requirements for registers of traditional 
knowledge have been included in the  law of Costa 
Rica and proposed by the draft  law of Nicaragua. 
According to D (), “failure to register does 
not surrender the innovation rights, but doing so may 
block a patent application”. Blocking potential patent 
applications by advertising prior art is precisely the main 
objective of the register of the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science (Science and Human Rights 
Program) known as Traditional Ecological Knowledge-
Prior Art Data Base.32 The register has over , entries 
that include traditional knowledge about medicinal plants 
that has been collected mainly online from other websites. 
The system also gives the option to holders of traditional 
knowledge to submit information to the register. However, 
traditional knowledge under this register is available and 
of easy access to anyone, not only to patent examiners, 
and traditional communities may not want to share their 
knowledge with pharmaceutical companies and other us-
ers. Holders of traditional knowledge may want to maintain 
control over their knowledge and keep their options open 
for negotiation with potential bioprospectors. To this pur-
pose Nicaragua proposes a confidential register and Peru, 
under Peruvian Law No. , protects access to collec-
tive knowledge by a confidential register (one of the three 
registers provided by the law) requiring written consent of 
the holders of such knowledge. Under Thailand’s , 
a register protects traditional knowledge about medicinal 
formulae that are in the public domain and that is regis-
tered by individual or collective owners. However, the act 
is not clear about whether the register protects sensitive 
information in a confidential manner. The Philippine’s 
 Traditional Alternative Medicine Act that protects 
knowledge of traditional medicine is not operational yet, 
and it is uncertain whether it will use the register system to 
protect traditional knowledge (P. Benavidez, pers. comm. 
July ).
In situ Biodiversity
Conservation and Sustainable Use
Some of the in situ biodiversity conservation and sustain-
able use activities listed by Article  of the  include: a) 
establishing a system of protected areas; b) promoting the 
protection of ecosystems, habitats, and populations; and 
c) adopting measures to avoid or minimize impacts on the 
use of biological diversity. Even before the  came into 
force, bioprospecting was identified as a potential source of 
funding and technical expertise to promote the conserva-
tion of biodiversity and its sustainable use (S 
et al. ). 
Australia: Draft EPBCAR
The purpose of the regulations is to provide for the control 
of access to biological resources in Commonwealth areas 
while promoting the conservation and sustainable use 
of biological diversity. Therefore, the regulations and a 
model benefit-sharing agreement will include a require-
ment that at least some of the benefits under the contract 
should promote biodiversity conservation in the area where 
samples are collected. 
The regulations will also require an  when bio-
prospecting activities are likely to have a significant im-
pact on the environment. If this is the case, within  days 
after receiving the access application the applicant must 
provide the Minister of the Environment and Heritage with 
information about the potential environmental impacts of 
the proposed access. Within  days of receiving such 
information, the Minister must publish a notice inviting 
anyone to comment on the likely impacts, and within five 
days after the end of the period given in the invitation for 
comments, the Minister must give the applicant a copy of 
the comments received. Finally, the applicant must give 
the Minister a response to these comments. There is no 
timeframe for such a response, but presumably, it is in 
the applicant’s interests to respond expeditiously. Then, at 
intervals of less than  months, the Minister must invite 
applications from anyone who wants to be informed of 
applications for access permits where an  by public 
notice is required. The Minister is also required to keep a 
register of information about permits. The register must be 
available for public scrutiny. However, information is not 
be included in it if the Minister believes the information is 
confidential or culturally sensitive (see Chapter ).
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru: Decision 391
Decision  regulates access to the region’s genetic re-
sources in order to promote the conservation and sustain-
able use of biodiversity, among other reasons. This law 
also encourages the development of projects and technolo-
gies that promote the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity and its derivative products that contribute to 
the well being of local communities. Therefore, access 
applications, access contract, and accessory contracts 
must include conditions that support research activities 
that promote the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity. Bioprospectors should be guided by the 
precautionary principle. 
Under Decision , the Andean committee on ge-
netic resources will also design and implement programs 
to ensure the conservation of genetic resources and will 
analyze the viability and convenience of an Andean fund 
for the conservation of these resources. This approach is 
already being followed at a national level. The Peruvian 
draft regulation on access to genetic resources proposes 
the creation of a national trust fund for the conservation, 
research and development of genetic resources.
Each country may also require an  from access 
applicants and this information will be included in a 
file that will be available for public scrutiny. In addition, 
member countries may also impose partial or full access 
restrictions if they identify that access activities may: a) 
endanger or threaten rare, endemic, or any other species, 
subspecies, variety, or race; b) endanger the structure or 
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function of ecosystems; c) cause undesirable or uncon-
trollable environmental and socioeconomic impacts; d) 
cause biosafety impacts; and e) affect genetic resources or 
strategic regions. In Peru, under Law No. ,  
may reject the registration of the license signed between 
bioprospectors and representatives of indigenous com-
munities if national environment authorities prove that 
access activities will cause damage to the environment 
and parties to the agreement refuse to mitigate such dam-
age (P C ). 
Costa Rica: The Law of Biodiversity
The general goal of this law is to promote the conser-
vation and sustainable use of biodiversity and to ensure 
the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from 
it. Therefore, the law establishes that up to % of the 
research budget and % of royalties of access projects 
will go to the national system of conservation areas, the 
private owner, or indigenous community. Conservation of 
ecosystems is also one of the criteria stated by the  for 
the evaluation or approval of the access applications. 
The  also allows the imposition of restrictions on 
access to genetic resources to ensure their conservation and 
sustainable use. “To establish complete or partial restric-
tions some of the elements that will be considered are: a) 
the danger of extinction of the species, subspecies, race, or 
variety; b) reasons of scarcity and endemic conditions; c) 
vulnerable or fragile conditions in the structure or function 
of the ecosystems; d) adverse effects on human health, the 
species, and the ecosystems or on essential elements of the 
autonomy or cultural identity of peoples and communities; 
and e) strategic genetic resources or geographical areas 
qualified as such.” (see Chapter ). Access for military 
purposes is to be prohibited in all cases. An  can also 
be requested by the . 
Malaysia:
Draft federal bill on access to genetic resources
Under this draft law, when an access application is made 
the official carrying out the evaluation of the application 
will take into consideration: a) the conservation status of 
the resource that will be collected or used; b) the contribu-
tion of the project to the conservation and sustainable use 
of the biological resources; and c) adverse impacts, risks, 
and dangers of the project to any component of biologi-
cal diversity and its sustainable use. Bioprospectors are 
required to submit an environmental and socioeconomic 
impact assessment. 
When traditional knowledge cannot be attributed to a 
particular community another provision of the bill propos-
es the establishment of a common trust fund. The purpose 
of the trust fund will be not only to promote the welfare of 
indigenous communities, but also for the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity (see Chapter ).
Mexico: EEEPGA, WGA, SFDGA, and draft LAUBGR
One of the goals of the  is to promote the conser-
vation of biological diversity. Access will not be granted 
if bioprospecting activities are likely to compromise the 
viability of species, habitats, and ecosystems. Article  
 states that any income received from permits, authoriza-
tions, and licenses (derived from bioprospecting projects) 
will be used to promote the conservation and restoration of 
biodiversity in the areas where specimens were collected. 
Also, the  provides for the implementation of  
studies when any activity is likely to cause damage to lo-
cal ecosystems or public health. Furthermore, Article  
of  states that any utilization of forest resources, 
either for commercial or noncommercial purposes, in areas 
which are habitats for endemic, threatened, or endangered 
species of native flora and fauna, must be done without 
altering the environmental conditions which allow their 
subsistence, development and evolution ( ). 
Similarly, Article  of  emphasizes that permits will 
not be granted if collecting activities affect the viability of 
populations, species, habitats, and ecosystems ( 
).
Two of the main objectives of the draft  are 
to regulate the access to genetic resources and to ensure 
the conservation of biological and genetic resources. The 
draft law also proposes the establishment of a trust fund 
for the conservation and use of genetic resources and re-
quires an  of proposed activities including measures 
that will be taken to mitigate negative impacts (G 
P ).
Nicaragua: Draft Law of Biodiversity
The draft law regulates access to genetic resources while 
conserving biological diversity. Access to genetic resources 
will require an environmental permit that must be issued 
based on a previous analysis of environmental impacts and 
risks of access activities. The evaluation of access applica-
tions will take into account whether proposed activities 
contribute to: a) the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological and genetic resources and b) the preservation of 
endemic, threatened, or endangered species. Access will 
be denied when access activities: a) endanger or threaten 
one or more species and b) cause uncontrolled ecological, 
social, economic, and cultural environmental impacts. In 
any case, the National Biodiversity Institute will take into 
account the precautionary principle to ensure that access 
activities do not deplete biological diversity. 
Philippines: EO 247 and Wildlife Act
Under  , access applicants, the government, and local 
communities may define actions to ensure conservation of 
biological diversity as part of benefit-sharing agreements. 
However, this is up to the parties. There is no financing 
mechanism or trust fund in place to support biodiversity 
conservation objectives. The Wildlife Act provides such 
a mechanism. Under the act a wildlife management fund 
is created to finance restoration of habitats affected by 
activities committed in violation of the law. The fund also 
supports scientific research, enforcement and monitoring, 
and local capacity-building activities. 
The act’s objectives include: a) conserve and protect 
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wildlife species and their habitats to promote ecological 
balance and enhance biological diversity; b) regulate the 
collection and trade of wildlife; and c) initiate or support 
scientific studies on the conservation of biological diver-
sity. Access applicants may be asked to prepare an . This 
is usually required for projects that will carry out activities 
in environmentally critical areas. However, no  has ever 
been required from any applicant (see Chapter ). 
The  draft Guidelines for Bioprospecting Activities 
(see endnote ) state that local communities shall ensure 
that the funds received are used solely for biodiversity 
conservation or environmental protection, including alter-
native or supplemental livelihood opportunities for com-
munity members. Furthermore, any bioprospecting activity 
involving species listed under  and the  Red List 
shall be governed by these guidelines in addition to specific 
regulations on the conservation of these species.
Samoa: CABSSBR 
Samoa’s conditions make no reference to the use of 
benefits from bioprospecting for conservation purposes. 
However, once the access application has been submitted 
the Minister of Lands, Surveys, and Environment may 
require an  to be conducted.
Thailand: PVPA, RFSRCFA, and APPTMI
 and  provide for the establishment of trust 
funds called the “Plant Varieties Protection Fund” and 
the “Fund on Traditional Thai Medicine Intelligence” 
respectively, to promote activities related to the conserva-
tion, research, and development of plant varieties and the 
conservation and promotion of intelligence on traditional 
Thai medicine, respectively.  requires  studies for 
access activities likely to have a negative environmental 
impact and  proposes the development of a “Plan 
for the conservation of herbs” to promote the conservation 
of areas where animals, plants, bacteria, and minerals used 
for the development of medicines are found.
 does not specifically promote the use of bio-
prospecting benefits for biodiversity conservation activi-
ties. However, conservation is one of the mandates of the 
Royal Forest Department and it is safe to assume that a 
share of potential profits will go to this purpose.  
states that access permits may be cancelled if bioprospect-
ing activities cause negative impacts to the environment 
and to natural, biological, and genetic resources. If samples 
are collected, one duplicate must remain in the facilities 
indicated by . If there is only one specimen available, 
it must remain in Thailand (C. Hutacharern, pers. comm. 
June ). 
USA: NPS research specimen collection permit
The  operates consistently with the main conservation 
principles provided in the . Bioprospectors that profit 
from research involving national park resources are ex-
pected to invest the benefits resulting from their research 
in the conservation of the park’s biological diversity. Under 
,  authorities may also require bioprospectors to 
determine the environmental impact of proposed activities 
(see Chapter ). 
Analysis:
In situ Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Use
All of the  laws and policies mentioned above, except 
for Samoa’s conditions, promote the conservation of 
biological diversity and trust funds are the main strategy 
to collect and distribute monies for conservation and sus-
tainable use goals. But, in most of these countries, these 
are stated as general goals, and it is up to government 
authorities and access applicants to negotiate biodiversity 
conservation activities as part of benefit-sharing agree-
ments. Costa Rica’s Law of Biodiversity is the only policy 
that specifically states that bioprospectors must invest a 
percentage of the research budget and royalties in the areas 
where genetic resources are collected. If the collection site 
is part of the national system of conservation areas, benefits 
are likely to go into conservation initiatives. However, if 
collections take place in other public land, or in private or 
indigenous land there is no guarantee that benefits will go 
into conservation activities (see Chapter ). 
Article () of the  states that Contracting Parties 
must “create conditions to facilitate access to genetic re-
sources for environmentally sound uses”.33 All of the 
countries examined above may require bioprospectors to 
present some sort of proof (i.e., ) that access activities 
will not have a negative impact on biological diversity 
and ecological processes. In some cases the scope of the 
 is broadly defined to include social and economic 
impacts. This is a justifiable concern given available evi-
dence of negative impacts in the past. D () and 
P (), for example, report that the collection 
of leaves from wild jaborandi (Pilocarpus jaborandi) by 
an American-Brazilian bioprospecting project had a nega-
tive effect on the shrub as well as on the local economy 
and community that had become totally dependent on 
the commercial exploitation of the species. Similarly, in 
Kenya the  National Cancer Institute was responsible 
for harvesting the whole adult population (, kg) of 
the shrub Maytenus buchanii that is the source of the can-
cer compound maytansine (O ). Furthermore, 
species such as Trilepidea adamsii, an endemic mistletoe of 
New Zealand, and Tecophilaea cyanocrocus, an endemic lily 
of central Chile, are extinct because they were overcollected 
( K ). It is uncertain whether these species were 
critical to the survival of other species and to the structure 
or function of the local ecosystem. But if this were the case, 
both the ecosystem and the species dependent on the target 
species may have been affected by these bioprospecting 
activities. 
Enforcement and Monitoring 
Enforcement and monitoring requirements are essential 
components of meaningful  laws and policies. The 
motivation for these requirements is important not only 
to ensure that benefits are distributed in a timely manner 
but also to monitor the ability of species and ecosystems 
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to recover from negative impacts and their capacity to 
continue delivering ecological services to society. 
Australia: Draft EPBCAR
Enforcement of access regulations is likely to be carried 
out by Environment Australia which manages compliance 
with the . Fifty penalty units34 are set for contra-
vening the regulation which requires a permit for access 
to biological resources. The draft does not include any 
monitoring activities but the outline of the model contract 
proposes a section titled “Monitoring and review of the 
contract” (V ). The regulations also require 
an  when collections are likely to harm the environment 
and this may contribute to the development of baseline 
information about the status of biodiversity. But no de-
tails are provided about how to use this information in 
the context of a monitoring program of impacts caused 
by collections over time. 
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru: Decision 391
Under Decision , the national authority in coordination 
with other organizations will set up appropriate monitor-
ing mechanisms to enforce contracts negotiated with 
bioprospectors. The national support organization will 
also be obliged to cooperate with the national authority 
in monitoring and reporting about activities that involve 
the use of genetic resources, derivative products, and 
traditional knowledge (A C ). The 
national authority is also authorized to enforce Decision 
 according to national standards and mechanisms. For 
example, if approved, the Peruvian draft regulation on 
access to genetic resources would require bioprospectors 
to pay % of the total budget of the project as a bond 
or guarantee that there will be total compliance with the 
provisions agreed on the contract (M. Ruiz, pers. comm. 
January ). Under Decision , the national author-
ity of each country will also have to monitor the state of 
conservation of biological resources. However, explicit 
provisions on monitoring biological and genetic resources 
for conservation purposes are not provided.
Costa Rica: The Law of Biodiversity
Once access is authorized, monitoring and control proce-
dures begin at the expense of the  and in coordination 
with the authorized representatives of the sites where 
access to the resources is taking place. The  has not 
been established due to lack of budget, personnel, con-
stitutional action, and political will, therefore monitoring 
procedures have not been carried out. Infringements of the 
Law of Biodiversity will be penalized according to Costa 
Rica’s Penal Code and pertinent national laws. Penalties 
for violations of access activities will be used to finance 
activities of  and the . An  can also be 
requested by the  based on some general provisions of 
the LB related to . The evaluation is the responsibility 
of the National Technical Secretariat. To date no  has 
been requested of the National Biodiversity Institute or 
any other bioprospector (see Chapter ).
Malaysia:
Draft federal bill on access to genetic resources
Existing monitoring and enforcement authorities would be 
responsible for monitoring and enforcement of the provi-
sions of this draft bill, within their respective sectors or 
jurisdictions. These authorities will also have “powers of 
arrests, entry, search, and seizure with respect to offenses 
under the law”. Under this draft bill, when an access ap-
plication is made the applicant is required to submit an 
 (see Chapter ).
Mexico: EEEPGA, WGA, SFDGA, and draft LAUBGR
 enforces , , and  and would 
enforce the draft  as well. The recently amended 
Criminal Code regulates infringements to , , 
, and the draft  (if adopted). Article  of 
the code punishes with prison sentences of between one 
and ten years and fines of between  and , minimum 
daily wages to those who “illegally execute any activity 
with traffic purposes, or capture, possess, transport, gather, 
introduce to the country, or extract from it, any specimen, 
its products, its subproducts, and other genetic resources, 
of any wild flora and fauna species, terrestrial species, 
or aquatic species on temporary prohibition, considered 
endemic, threatened, endangered, subject to special pro-
tection, or regulated by any international treaty of which 
Mexico has become a Party”. Furthermore, “an additional 
punishment will be applied when the described activities 
are executed in or affect a natural protected area, or when 
they are executed with a commercial purpose”. This pun-
ishment, for example, would include those using biological 
material for biotechnological applications without proper 
permits issued under  . In addition to this, Article  
of  punishes as an administrative infringement the 
use of biological material for biotechnological purposes 
without the acquisition of due permits. The  also 
requires an  when bioprospecting or any other activi-
ties are likely to have a significant environmental impact 
(see Chapter ). 
Nicaragua: Draft Law of Biodiversity
Access contracts will include obligations for the establish-
ment of an evaluation and monitoring system that will 
be financed by the access applicant. These contracts will 
also include penalties and sanctions for potential viola-
tions. The law also includes penalties that range between 
, and ,  to be paid to the national envi-
ronmental trust fund. The draft law also requires and  
of the ecological, social, economic, and cultural impacts 
( ).
Philippines: EO 247 and Wildlife Act
Under   the  is set up to monitor and enforce 
compliance with research agreements, as well as to coor-
dinate further institutional, policy, and technology devel-
opment. The respective member agencies of the  
shall conduct monitoring of research agreements based on 
a standard monitoring plan to be proposed by this commit-
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tee. The plan will include a monitoring team responsible 
for establishing a mechanism to ensure the integration and 
dissemination of the information generated from research, 
collection, and utilization activities. The  shall be 
the lead agency in monitoring the implementation of the 
research agreement. The  regional offices shall also 
participate in the monitoring.
A second monitoring team headed by representatives 
of the Department of Science and Technology and the 
Department of Foreign Affairs monitors the progress of 
the research, utilization, and commercialization outside 
the country. The only commercial bioprospecting project 
that has been granted access is required to submit a report 
every four months and a government representative joins 
project scientists during every field visit. This project was 
not required to submit an .
Under the Wildlife Act, applicants have to pay an eco-
logical or performance bond. The  draft Guidelines for 
Bioprospecting Activities (see endnote ) state that the 
applicant must post a rehabilitation/performance bond, in 
the form of a surety bond, in an amount equivalent to % 
percent of the project cost as reflected in the research bud-
get. The bond would have to be posted within a reasonable 
time after the signing of the Bioprospecting Undertaking. 
No collection of samples may be conducted until after the 
bond has been posted and failure to post the bond can be a 
basis for rescission of the Bioprospecting Undertaking.
Under the guidelines, reporting requirements are as 
follows: the resource user must submit an annual progress 
report to the implementing agencies covering the follow-
ing items: a) status of the procurement of ; b) progress 
of collection of samples; c) benefit-sharing negotiations; 
d) progress on payment of benefits or other provisions of 
the Bioprospecting Undertaking. The annual report must 
be submitted not later than January  of the following 
year. For purposes of compliance monitoring, biopros-
pectors must issue the following certifications as proof 
of compliance, particularly on the proper procurement of 
, delivery of benefit-sharing agreement, and collection 
quota: proper procurement of ; acceptance by resource 
providers of the monetary and nonmonetary benefits re-
quired by the undertaking; and compliance to the collection 
quota as set out in the undertaking.
Noncompliance with the provisions in the Bio-
prospecting Undertaking would result in the automatic 
cancellation the agreement and confiscation of collected 
materials in favor of the government, forfeiture of bond 
and imposition of a perpetual ban on access to biologi-
cal resources in the Philippines by the violator. Such a 
breach would be considered a violation of the Wildlife 
Act and would be subject to the imposition of adminis-
trative and criminal sanctions under existing laws.  Any 
person who conducts bioprospecting without an approved 
Bioprospecting Undertaking would be subject to sanctions 
for collecting without a permit. Furthermore, the violation 
would be published in national and international media 
and it would be reported by the agencies to the relevant 
international and regional monitoring bodies. Collection, 
hunting or possession of wildlife, their by-products and 
derivatives without the necessary permit is penalized 
with imprisonment of up to four years and a fine of up to 
, P (see Chapter ).
Samoa: CABSSBR 
Bioprospectors have to submit a report on the status of the 
analysis of samples every six months. However, the condi-
tions do not set up a monitoring structure or mechanism 
of proposed enforcement strategies, sanctions, or penal-
ties ( ). The Minister of Lands, Surveys, and 
Environment may ask bioprospectors to conduct an .
Thailand: PVPA, RFSRCFA, and APPTMI
The Department of Agriculture and  oversee the  
and , respectively, but no monitoring structure has 
been defined under these policies. However, the Prime 
Minister Regulation on the Conservation and Utilization 
of Biological Diversity created a National Committee on 
Conservation and Utilization of Biological Diversity that 
is likely to address this issue. On the other hand,  
states that every six months, bioprospectors must submit 
three copies of a progress report to the . In addition, 
bioprospectors that cause negative environmental impacts 
are liable and may be punished by Thai laws (J. Donavanik, 
pers. comm. January ).  provides for the cre-
ation of an enforcement force of officials from the Ministry 
of Public Health to enforce the provisions of the act. The 
act also includes penalties such as prison sentences and 
fines for breaches of the act ( ).
USA: NPS research specimen collection permit
There are at least three main routes by which  can use its 
enforcement authority: a) regulations and related statutes; 
b) permit provisions that include regulations and contracts; 
and c) contracts. Collecting without a permit or poaching is 
theft of Federal property and in this case criminal sanctions 
can apply. Failure to comply with regulations and permit 
provisions (assuming a permit is issued) can be less seri-
ous; administrative penalties (possibly judicial) can apply 
(including a punitive % mandatory “royalty” payment 
in the context of the Diversa/Yellowstone National Park 
agreement). If there is an agreement violation or breach of 
contract; damages and injunctive relief can also apply. The 
Diversa/Yellowstone National Park  also included 
audit clauses designed to promote compliance (P. Scott, 
pers. comm. February ). In addition, as part of the 
research permit terms, scientists are required to submit a 
yearly summary of their park research activities, known as 
an Investigator’s Annual Report. In addition, the park may 
require copies of field notes and scientific publications (see 
Chapter ). Besides, it may be that the potential negative 
publicity of being caught by the  is a significant deter-
rent itself (P. Scott, pers. comm. December ). 
Analysis: Enforcement and Monitoring
All countries analyzed above, except for Samoa, have 
proposed measures to ensure that bioprospecting projects 
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comply with  regulations. However, none of these 
monitoring mechanisms are operational yet. Not even the 
Philippines, which has granted access to a couple of bio-
prospecting projects under   (see Chapter ), has a 
monitoring system up and running. This may be related to 
the fact that setting up this kind of system is an expensive 
endeavor. One strategy to finance monitoring activities is 
proposed by Nicaragua’s draft Law of Biodiversity which 
requires access applicants to pay for an evaluation and 
monitoring system. This can be a practical and cost-effec-
tive measure as long as a third independent party runs the 
system to ensure its objectivity. Others looking to ensure 
compliance may want to ask bioprospectors for a bond 
as Peru and the Philippines propose in their national  
policies.
In any case, the complexity of bioprospecting projects 
may make compliance and monitoring systems difficult to 
implement. Bioprospecting projects involve multiple activi-
ties that include: a) collecting samples; b) processing and 
shipping samples to research laboratories usually located 
in foreign countries; c) analyzing samples; d) transferring 
samples between research organizations; and e) developing 
and commercializing products. This is an oversimplified 
description of a complex chain of events where multiple 
actors interact with the samples and products derived from 
them. Therefore, final products or processes may not have 
a physical connection with the genetic resource collected. 
Products may have been manufactured from scratch based 
on the molecular structure of genetic resources collected. 
The samples may be stored in ex situ conservation centers 
for years before the appropriate technology is designed to 
take advantage of them. On the other hand, controlling or 
prohibiting illegal access activities can be impossible. A 
tourist can take samples back to his or her country with 
almost no difficulty. The likelihood of catching such a 
perpetrator is very slim. Furthermore, enforcement under 
statute is very complicated once the collector has left the 
area of jurisdiction. If a citizen of a country patents a prod-
uct derived from a sample illegally collected in another 
country, the source country cannot compel anything to be 
done to the citizen of the country that patented the sample. 
The collector, however, may be deterred by bad publicity 
and blacklisted with the subsequent loss of reputation and 
business opportunities in other countries. 
Most  policies may also require bioprospectors to 
submit an  to ensure that project activities will not have 
significant ecological, social, or economic impacts. Such 
an assessment may provide baseline information that can 
be used to monitor the evolution of ecological, social, or 
economic conditions in sites where collections take place. 
However, so far no country has proposed standards, at 
least about biodiversity indicators and other procedures 
to monitor and evaluate the state of biological diversity 
and its sustainable use. 
In the last decade, several indicator methodologies have 
been proposed to monitor the status of environmental is-
sues and biodiversity conservation efforts at the level of the 
management of community and species (N ) and at 
the provincial, national, regional, or global policy-making 
level ( ). Perhaps the most popular methodol-
ogy for an environmental indicator system, among policy-
makers and scientists, has been the so-called pressure, 
state, response framework ( ). According to 
this framework, pressure indicators measure the forces that 
development trends such as bioprospecting activities (i.e., 
collection of biological samples and traditional knowledge) 
exert on the environment; state indicators are those that 
inform about the present quality and quantity of an envi-
ronmental variable (i.e., population size of species in the 
region where specimens are being collected or number of 
conflicts among local indigenous groups); and response 
indicators inform about the activities implemented to miti-
gate a situation (i.e., reforestation or restoration projects 
or conflict resolution meetings). Additional elements that 
a bioprospecting system of indicators should consider 
include: ) the type of information that should be col-
lected by scientists for the indicators proposed, such as 
number of species and hectares of habitat affected and ) 
the frequency of collection of this information that should 
coincide with the workplan of a given bioprospecting proj-
ect. Information fed to the indicator system could also be 
manipulated to assess whether bioprospecting initiatives 
are complying with the Convention on Biological Diversity 
and relevant access laws and policies. 
Final Comments
The ’s provisions on access to genetic resources, tradi-
tional knowledge, technology transfer, and benefit sharing 
(Articles (j), , , and ) are closely linked to  
articles that address biodiversity conservation, sustainable 
use, monitoring, and capacity building objectives (Articles 
, , , , , , , , , and ). While countries 
such as Costa Rica and Nicaragua have established this 
connection directly through the design of comprehen-
sive single laws and policies that implement all of the 
provisions of the , other countries such as Australia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, 
and Thailand have developed single  regulations that 
are complemented by existing or future environmental, 
sustainable development, or biodiversity related laws 
or policies. In any case,  laws and policies of these 
countries aim at implementing the  and they share key 
similarities that include: a) the establishment of bilateral 
agreements between bioprospecting groups and the na-
tional government that must be negotiated on mutually 
agreed terms; b) the recognition of national sovereignty 
over biological and genetic resources within national 
borders; c) the establishment of procedures for obtain-
ing  from government authorities and the providers of 
samples and traditional knowledge (except for Thailand 
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which requires  only from government authorities); and 
d) the equitable sharing of benefits derived from the use 
of biological diversity. However, as expected, these laws 
and policies also present several differences that are simply 
the result of different policy or regulatory options taken 
by countries and the expression of different legal systems, 
cultural beliefs, and social and economic conditions. For 
example, countries with large percentages of indigenous 
population are still trying to figure out strategies to protect 
indigenous knowledge. Furthermore, most of the countries 
examined in this chapter are working on policies that show 
concern about the potential negative impact of on access 
activities on the environment.
This review also shows that most  laws and 
polices are comprehensive, but sometimes confusing, 
costly, and difficult to implement. They share provisions 
and principles that need further clarification. For example, 
countries such as Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Costa Rica, 
and the Philippines that have had  laws in place since 
the mid-s are still trying to define the scope of their 
access laws, the strategies to protect the knowledge of 
indigenous peoples, and the conditions to facilitate access 
to noncommercial bioprospecting activities. In contrast, 
Samoa’s  conditions consist of one page with an over-
simplified proposal to facilitate access that will still need 
further clarification, but which is practical and refreshing. 
New proposals for  laws and polices are also dealing 
with similar issues and trying to resolve new ones (e.g., the 
ownership issue in Malaysia). In the ,  regulations 
are analogous to some of the provisions of  laws and 
policies that other countries have proposed and these  
regulations facilitate  goals in  land.
In synthesis,  laws and policies developed under 
the umbrella of the  have created a complex and com-
prehensive scenario for access and exchange of genetic 
resources. This is the result of a process marked with 
conceptual and operational concerns and difficulties that 
still continue even for countries that pioneered  regula-
tions in the mid-s. The next chapter examines these 
issues and their influence on the development process of 
selected  laws and policies. 
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 1  K and L () report that the following  countries, 
which are Parties to the CBD, and the United States of America, 
which is a signatory, but not a Party, have developed or are 
developing access and benefit-sharing frameworks: Argentina, 
Australia (at the Commonwealth level and in the states of Western 
Australia and Queensland), Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia (including the 
State of Sarawak), Mexico, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Papua 
New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Samoa, 
Seychelles, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Turkey, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. 
 2 See the  website for a roster of country status with re-
spect to signing and becoming a Party to the , : http:
//www.biodiv.org/world/parties.asp.
 3 All of the countries that developed these access and benefit-sharing 
frameworks are still working to improve their laws or to turn their 
policies or administrative measures into laws (see Chapter ).
 4 The Andean Community (formerly known as the Andean Pact or 
Cartagena Accord) is an economic and social-integration treaty 
among Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Bolivia.
 5 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations or  is a regional 
organization that promotes economic growth, social progress, 
and cultural development in the region. Its member countries are 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei 
Darussalam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia.
 6 The “African model law for the protection of the rights of local 
communities, and farmers and breeders, and for the regulation of 
access to biological resources” is another example of this type of 
regional initiatives.
 7 Between April  and May  Venezuela has invoked 
Decision  to facilitate access to  projects and has subscribed 
five framework agreements with national universities and research 
centers to carry out bioprospecting activities for noncommercial 
purposes (M.E. Febres, Pers. Comm. May ). Under Decision 
, a university, research center, or scientist that subscribes a 
framework agreement with the government is allowed to carry out 
several projects under such agreement.
 8 In this chapter bioprospecting is defined as the search for plants, 
animals, and microbial species for academic, pharmaceutical, 
biotechnological, agricultural, and other industrial purposes.
 9  regulates access to wildlife genetic resources and the 
National Institute for Agricultural Research () controls access 
to agricultural genetic resources (M. Dimas, pers. comm. August 
). 
 10 Draft Guidelines for Bioprospecting Activities in the Philippines 
(Joint --- Administrative Order No. ). Available 
at : http://www.denr.gov.ph/article/view//.
 11 : http://www.med.govt.nz/ers/nat-res/bioprospecting/
index.html.
 12 The situation in Australian States and Territories is not consistent 
or clear. Resolving ownership issues in some states may well be 
controversial. Complicating the issue is that some people confuse 
ownership of biochemical and genetic material from individual 
examples of species with ownership of the species as a whole. 
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Furthermore, there is the misconception held by some people that 
the patent system somehow allows a patentee to assert control 
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the patented invention has been derived (G. Burton, pers. comm. 
January ).
 13 Customary land is held and used according to custom and it is 
owned by a family, clan, or tribe (C. Schuster, pers. comm. August 
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 15 Natural resources are defined as living and nonliving resources 
that include “soil, rock, sand, nutrients, water, air, forest, plants, 
animals, insects, microorganisms, and living residues”; biological 
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area” and genetic resources include “genetic units” and “different 
forms of genes”.
 16 The  currently provides for reserve and wildlife permits: 
a) reserve permits are for activities in Commonwealth areas that 
include reserves, parks, conservation zones, and external territories; 
and b) wildlife permits are for taking, keeping, and moving listed 
threatened migratory, marine, and cetacean species and communi-
ties in Commonwealth areas (V ).
 17 Bioprospectors may find that there can be several access providers; 
for example, if a Commonwealth area is subject to native title, the 
Commonwealth and the native titleholders are both access provid-
ers. If the access provider is the Commonwealth, the Secretary to 
the Commonwealth department that has administrative authority 
for the Commonwealth area may, on behalf of the Commonwealth, 
enter into the benefit-sharing agreement (see Chapter ).
 18 This is a draft bylaw of the Law of Biodiversity that was approved 
on  December .
 19 According to the Law of Biodiversity public universities were 
exempted from control for a term of one year (until  May ) 
in order for them to establish their own controls and regulations 
for noncommercial projects that require access. So far only the 
University of Costa Rica has developed access controls and regula-
tions. This is due to the fact that the law is not currently under 
implementation (J. Cabrera, pers. comm. January ). However, 
once the constitutional challenge is resolved, universities will have 
to develop these access controls and regulations in a predetermined 
period of time. Otherwise they will have to comply with the Law of 
Biodiversity just like commercial bioprospectors. 
 20 If the  authorizes the continuing use of genetic material or of 
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resource. The Law of Biodiversity does not provide information 
about the process, requirements, and length of time needed to 
obtain this concession.
 21 : http://www.nrct.net/modules.php?op=modload&name=Sectio
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).
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A. Countries with ABS laws and policies
. Colombia
As a member of the Andean Community, Colombia is subject 
to the  Decision  on , a regional law, and is cur-
rently working on a policy to facilitate implementation of 
Decision  at a national level.
. Costa Rica
In , Costa Rica enacted the Law of Biodiversity No. . 
In late , the Attorney General of the Republic challenged 
the law, which prevented its implementation. In December 
, a “General Access Procedure” that will operate as the 
bylaw of the Law of Biodiversity was published. Before the 
development of this law, there were some provisions in the 
 Law of Wildlife Conservation (and its  regulation) 
regarding flora and fauna collection permits. There were also 
some bylaws dealing with research, specifically referring to 
national parks.
. Ecuador
As a member of the Andean Community, Ecuador is subject 
to the  Decision  on , a regional law. In , a 
law for the protection of biodiversity was passed by Congress. 
The law includes only one article that determines the State’s 
ownership of biological species as national and public goods. 
This article also states that the commercial exploitation of 
these species will be subject to special regulations issued by 
the President that will guarantee the rights of indigenous com-
munities over their knowledge and genetic resources. Ecuador 
is also working on a draft regulation of Decision  that has 
been in the making since the ratification of Decision . A 
final draft was submitted in April  to the Minister of the 
Environment. That draft received much criticism and was not 
approved by the Minister. There are also general provisions in 
the pending new draft National Law for the Conservation and 
Sustainable Use of Biodiversity debated by Congress in April 
 and February . The draft law is still under discussion 
among government officials (July ). 
. Mexico
Articles  and   of the Ecological Equilibrium and 
Environmental Protection General Act () regulate 
 issues in Mexico. This law incorporates the three main 
principles stated in the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(): prior informed consent, mutually agreed terms, and 
benefit sharing. The  is complemented by a norm 
(---) that facilitates a change of purpose 
from scientific (or noncommercial) to biotechnological (or 
commercial) uses. The  Wildlife General Act () and 
the  Sustainable Forestry Development Act () regu-
late the collection of wildlife and forest biological resources 
respectively. , , and  set the principles but 
not the details that should regulate  initiatives. There are 
two  law proposals in the Federal Congress that pur-
port to fill this gap: one submitted by Federal Senator Jorge 
Nordhausen (National Action Party), and another submitted by 
Federal Representative Alejandro Cruz Gutierrez (Institutional 
Revolutionary Party). So far Congress has not discussed these 
laws in the plenary.
. Philippines
In , the Philippines adopted the first  policy in the 
world, Executive Order  “Prescribing Guidelines and 
Establishing a Regulatory Framework for the Prospecting of 
Table . Access and benefit sharing () policy status of Pacific Rim countries signing the 
Biological and Genetic Resources in the Philippines, their 
By-Products and Derivatives for Scientific and Commercial 
Purposes and for other Purposes”. In , the Philippines 
enacted Republic Act No. , also known as the Wildlife 
Resources and Conservation Act that addressed many of the 
criticisms made to the Executive Order . This Act includes 
only two clauses about bioprospecting issues but it modi-
fies Executive Order  considerably. In July , draft 
“Guidelines for Bioprospecting Activities in the Philippines” 
was released for review and comment by the Department of 
Environment and Natural Resources. If adopted, the guidelines 
would facilitate the implementation of the Wildlife Act and 
those provisions of   not repealed by the Wildlife Act. 
The Philippines has also been actively leading the development 
of the  Framework on Access to Biological and Genetic 
Resources that is scheduled to be adopted in  or .
. Peru
As a member of the Andean Community, Peru is subject to 
the  Decision  on , a regional law. Peru has a 
draft regulation for Decision  that is being reviewed by 
the National Environmental Council. The government is also 
developing a second regulation targeted to facilitate access to 
genetic resources found in indigenous land. In August , 
Peru adopted Law No.  for the protection of indigenous 
communities’ collective knowledge associated with biodiver-
sity.
. Samoa
In , Samoa adopted the “Conditions for access to and 
benefit sharing of Samoa’s Biodiversity Resources”. This is 
a regulation that is being implemented to facilitate access, 
while the country completes a draft bioprospecting regulation. 
However, further progress on this regulation is on hold until 
the Department of Lands, Surveys and Environment completes 
a review of the  Lands, Surveys, and Environment Act. 
The draft bioprospecting regulation is expected to be appended 
to the Act.
. Thailand
 is regulated by the following two laws and two regu-
lations: The  Plant Variety Protection Act, the  
Act on Protection and Promotion of Traditional Medicinal 
Intelligence Act, the  Royal Forest Department 
Regulation on Forestry Studying and Research Conducting 
within Forested Areas, and the  Regulation on the 
Permission of Foreign Researchers of the National Research 
Council of Thailand.
. United States of America (USA)
The USA signed the  but it has not ratified it yet. Access 
to natural resources in the United States is ordinarily managed 
by the private or public owner of the resource. For example, 
access to genetic resources found in national parks is gov-
erned by the National Park Service () regulations. Since 
, the  has issued permits to facilitate the collection 
of specimens, and Cooperative Research and Development 
Agreements (s) can be used to address benefit-sharing 
issues. A  is defined by the Federal Technology Transfer 
Act of  as “any agreement between one or more Federal 
laboratories and one or more non-Federal parties under which 
the Government, through its laboratories, provides person-
nel, services, facilities, equipment, or other resources with or 
without reimbursement (but not funds to non-Federal parties) 
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and the non-Federal parties provide funds, personnel, services, 
facilities, equipment, or other resources toward the conduct of 
specified research or development efforts which are consistent 
with the mission of the laboratory”.
B. Countries working towards the development of ABS 
laws and policies
. Australia
The draft Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Amendment Regulations are expected to be 
enacted in  and they will go under section  (Control 
of access to biological resources) of the  Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act. These regula-
tions will apply only to the “commonwealth area” of the 
country. The states and territories are also working on their 
own  regulations. For example, in mid-, Queensland 
passed a Biodiscovery Bill and Western Australia is currently 
discussing a licensing regime for terrestrial bioprospect-
ing activities that will be included in a draft Biodiversity 
Conservation Act. In addition to this, in  the Natural 
Resource Management Ministerial Council adopted a federal 
agreement on a “Nationally Consistent Approach For Access 
to and the Utilization of Australia’s Native Genetic and 
Biochemical Resources” to facilitate the development  
regulations nationwide.
. Cambodia
In  Cambodia adopted a new Forestry Law. While this 
law is not specific about regulating  issues in relation 
to forest genetic resources, it regulates the commercial and 
noncommercial use of timber that is extracted from all forests 
(natural and planted), including wild vegetation, wildlife prod-
ucts, and services provided by the forest. Also, in , the 
Ministry of Environment made public the country’s National 
Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan. This document does not 
address the need to develop a comprehensive  policy, but it 
states as one of its goals to ensure the equitable sharing of ben-
efits from the protection and sustainable use of biological re-
sources. Furthermore, the strategy and action plan emphasizes 
that existing legislation concerning biodiversity conservation 
and sustainable use is currently under revision in Cambodia.
. Canada
No official decision has been made as to whether Canada 
should have an  policy. However, this country has un-
dertaken some background research on  issues and held 
preliminary discussions with the provinces, some aboriginal 
groups and stakeholders on  issues, especially with respect 
to the negotiation of the  Bonn Guidelines on . The 
National Biodiversity Convention Office has been consulting 
aboriginal people on the Bonn Guidelines. 
. Chile
In late , Chile concluded a proposal for a law to regulate 
access to agricultural genetic resources. This proposal was 
developed by the Ministry of Agriculture without the partici-
pation of all sectors of society and the government and it was 
discarded after much criticism. However, efforts to develop a 
new proposal continue within the Ministry. In December , 
the National Commission of the Environment () pub-
lished the National Biodiversity Strategy that was approved 
by ’s Ministerial Council. Subsequently, in mid- 
the National Biodiversity Action Plan was initiated. It should 
be noted that the strategy emphasizes the need to develop 
legal instruments to regulate access to genetic resources and 
to ensure the fair participation in and equitable distribution of 
benefits derived from their use. 
. China
China, like many other countries, has policies that regulate 
access to genetic resources, but these policies lack benefit-
sharing provisions. However, China’s  National Report 
on Implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
states that a priority action for the country is to draft a genetic 
resources policy or law that regulates prior informed consent 
principles, benefit-sharing issues, and intellectual prop-
erty rights, among other issues. So, in late , the State 
Council of China authorized the Environmental Protection 
Administration () to coordinate all -related issues 
to ensure the implementation of the . Therefore,  is 
currently leading a national project to inventory all genetic 
resources in China. This includes the participation of experts 
from many organizations and universities from the agriculture, 
forestry, fishery, and medical sectors. Also,  is assembling 
a team to develop a comprehensive  policy or law.
. Cook Islands
The country is currently working on a national  policy that 
will go under a proposed National Environmental Act. Central 
government ministries regulate national laws such as this act. 
The island councils of the different inhabited islands and the 
municipal councils for the capital island may adopt by-laws. 
These by-laws are managed under the Island Council.
. El Salvador
In El Salvador there is no integral biodiversity law or strategy 
that regulates the use of and access to genetic, biological, and 
biochemical resources. The current legal framework for the 
regulation of access to genetic resources is partially covered 
by some laws. For example, Article  of the Environmental 
Law states that any access, research, manipulation, and use 
of biological diversity can only be carried out with a permit, 
license, or concession granted by the authority in charge of 
managing the resource in question. Every time this permit is 
granted relevant communities have to be consulted. In , 
however the Environment Ministry developed policy guide-
lines, administrative procedures, and a capacity-building 
strategy on access to genetic and biochemical resources. This 
information is currently being reviewed by the Presidency and 
constitutes the foundation for a national policy on access to 
genetic and biochemical resources that must be adopted by the 
government in  or .
. Fiji
There is no legal or administrative framework in place on . 
There is a draft administrative paper that forms the basis of an 
unwritten understanding between all stakeholders on the issue 
of . A national committee is also working on the develop-
ment of an  policy. Committee members include scientists 
at the local University of the South Pacific and legal officers 
from the state law office.
. Guatemala
The  Action Plan of the National Strategy for the 
Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity states the 
need to develop a national  policy. However, no participa-
tory process has been initiated yet. Guatemala is a signatory of 
the Central American draft protocol on “Access to genetic and 
biochemical resources, and their associated knowledge” but it 
has not been ratified yet by this nation.
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. Honduras
The country is currently working on a national law to regulate 
access and benefit-sharing issues. In , the National 
Strategy on Biodiversity was adopted and one of its strategic 
themes was the  issue.
. Indonesia
Indonesia is currently working on a law that is likely to be 
called Act on Genetic Resource Management. This act will 
include a government regulation on  issues. The govern-
ment is also conducting an assessment of existing legal instru-
ments that regulate  issues. Local officials estimate that  
legislation will be concluded in  or .
. Japan
The Japanese government initiated a survey to collect policies 
on . Also, several ministries are involved in the discussion 
about  issues; currently, discussion is at individual ministry 
levels. The government has also been conducting studies on 
global issues and trends on  policies through research 
contracts or financial assistance with think tanks. For example, 
the Japan Bioindustry Association () has been actively 
participating in the meetings of the Conference of the Parties 
to the .  has also conducted studies and seminars to help 
implement the  in Japan, and in  this organization 
published a policy statement that provided general and volun-
tary prior informed consent and benefit sharing guidelines for 
its members.
. Malaysia
The federal government is working on a national  bill 
that is likely to be adopted in . However, states such as 
Sabah and Sarawak already have the  Sabah Biodiversity 
Enactment, the  Sarawak Biodiversity Center Ordinance 
and the  Sarawak Biodiversity Regulations. The relation-
ship between these policies that regulate  issues and the 
new federal bill is uncertain.
. Marshall Islands
In , the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan 
acknowledged the importance of regulating access to the 
country’s genetic resources and ensuring that the benefits 
derived from the use of these resources are shared equitably. 
Furthermore, the strategy calls for the development of  
legislation that protects the rights of indigenous owners of 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge and facilitates 
access to and benefit sharing of these resources and knowledge 
under prior informed consent obligations. Plans to develop this 
legislation are in progress.
. Micronesia
Micronesia finished its National Biodiversity Strategy and 
Action Plan in March . It is expected that the develop-
ment of  legislation will follow from the needs identi-
fied through this collaborative process between the National 
Government and the four states. The two national govern-
ment departments that would be most involved in the pro-
cess of developing access legislation are the Department of 
Justice and the Department of Economic Affairs, Sustainable 
Development Unit, National Biodiversity Strategy and Action 
Plan. Regional  model guidelines and legislation have been 
developed with the assistance of a number of multilateral bod-
ies (Secretariat of the Pacific Community, -South Pacific 
Program, and the Foundation for International Environmental 
Law and Development () among them) that will assist 
in this effort. However, under the Micronesia’s Immigration 
law, Title  of the Micronesian Code, researchers entering 
the country are required to declare the purpose of their visit. 
The Department of Immigration then refers the request to the 
Division of Archives and Preservation. If acceptable to that 
Division, the Department of Immigration issues an entry per-
mit under the category “researcher’s permit” to the entrant. 
. New Zealand
The  New Zealand Biodiversity Strategy addresses  
goals and includes the following desired outcome for : 
“There is an integrated policy for the management of all 
genetic material in New Zealand and for bioprospecting activi-
ties, in accord with international commitments. There is appro-
priate domestic and international access to indigenous genetic 
material, taking into account New Zealand’s sovereignty and 
rights to the benefits from its genetic material, as well as rights 
and obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi.” In November 
, the Ministry of Economic Development published a 
discussion paper on bioprospecting. The paper invited the pub-
lic to submit comments by the end of February . In May 
 the Ministry posted a summary of the submissions on its 
website (http://www.med.govt.nz/ers/nat-res/bioprospecting/
index.html). Further consultation will follow with stakeholders 
such as the Maori people to examine key bioprospecting issues 
and a future national policy on  or bioprospecting will be 
drafted taking into account this consultation process. However, 
future efforts to develop such a policy can be complicated by a 
claim by a number of tribes (Iwi) of the Maori people to a tri-
bunal. According to this claim the Maori have exclusive own-
ership rights over both traditional knowledge and indigenous 
genetic resources under the Waitangi Treaty of  between 
the chiefs of most New Zealand Iwi at the time and the British 
Government (the Crown). This claim was lodged in , and 
it does not appear that it will be concluded in the near future. 
. Nicaragua
The government developed a proposal for a law of biodiver-
sity that addresses  issues. The proposal should be sent 
to Congress in . Nicaragua’s draft law of biodiversity 
responds to the mandate (Article ) of the  General Law 
of the Environment and Natural Resources No. .
. Niue
The protection of traditional knowledge and  have been 
identified as priority issues in the National Biodiversity 
Strategy and Action Plan. Therefore, funds were used to con-
duct a consultancy to assess capacity needs in Niue related to 
this kind of work. Niue has experienced some access situations 
in the past year that suggest the urgent need for  legisla-
tion. In the absence of this legislation, access applications have 
been handled on a contractual basis. Village stakeholders are 
particularly interested about strategies to protect traditional 
knowledge. An Environment Bill was approved in  and 
this will facilitate the insertion of  regulations and other 
regulations that protect traditional knowledge.  regulations 
may be modeled after the South Pacific Regional Environment 
Program () framework legislation on access and benefit 
sharing. 
. Panama
Panama is currently developing and modifying existing laws 
and policies to facilitate  goals. For example, draft Law 
No. , includes , intellectual property, and marketing pro-
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visions for products used in traditional indigenous medicine. 
Also, Panama is working on an  and indigenous knowledge 
policy that is likely to provide a course of action about how to 
implement existing and future  policies. The  General 
Law of the Environment No.  () designates the National 
Authority for the Environment () as the competent 
authority for the regulation, management, and control of the 
access to and use of biogenetic resources.  shall also 
develop the legal instruments and economic mechanisms to 
this purpose.  clarifies that the holders of rights granted for 
the use of natural resources do not hold rights for the use of 
genetic resources contained in them. 
. Papua New Guinea
The Department of Environment and Conservation is working 
closely with lawyers from the Department of Justice and the 
Attorney General to develop a framework on .
. Republic of Korea
Comprehensive  provisions are proposed for addition to 
the  National Environment Conservation Act No.  
by amendment. The  amendment (Law No. ) of the 
act included one provision that facilitated access but it did not 
regulate benefit-sharing issues. Article . of the act applied 
only to foreigners and it regulated the use of domestic biologi-
cal resources (excluding selected wild animals and plans) 
for commercial, medical or scientific use. This provision, 
however, was removed from the act by Law No.  of  
February .
. Russian Federation
An important problem for the country is the absence of 
coordinated measures towards conservation and sustainable 
utilization of biodiversity. In , Russia started imple-
menting the project of the Global Ecological Foundation 
Biodiversity Conservation. This project included three compo-
nents: Strategy of Biodiversity Conservation (), Protected 
Natural Regions (), and Baikal Region (). The 
Supervisory Committee and Management Group, nominated 
for the project, have already begun preparing The National 
and Regional Strategy, and establishing ecological networks of 
protected areas ( reserves and national parks). In mid-, 
the National Report of the Russian Federation on  was 
prepared for the Conference of the Parties of the . The 
report states that prior to the development of an  policy it 
is necessary to establish a national coordination center for the 
problems related with access to genetic resources. Since , 
the Department of Life and Earth Sciences of the Ministry of 
Industry, Science, and Technologies of the Russian Federation 
has been analyzing gaps, contradictions, and needs of existing 
national laws and policies that apply to  goals. Some of the 
challenges faced by policymakers include identifying land and 
genetic resources ownership rights and increasing awareness 
about  issues among local administrators, members of 
Parliament, policymakers, and the public in general. 
. Singapore
The country is currently formulating policy and guidelines that 
will regulate  issues. An ad hoc inter-agency committee is 
working on a strategy document on access to genetic resourc-
es. Member agencies of the committee include: the Intellectual 
Property Office of Singapore (Ministry of Law), Attorney-
General’s Chambers, Ministry of National Development, 
Agri-Food and Veterinary Authority of Singapore, Ministry 
of Trade and Industry, Economic Development Board, Trade 
Development Board, and National Science and Technology 
Board. The country does not have indigenous peoples engaged 
in traditional practices, therefore issues such as the protection 
of traditional knowledge are not being discussed by poli-
cymakers. Singapore has also been actively involved in the 
development of the  framework agreement on access to 
biological and genetic resources.
. Solomon Islands
In the last few years, this country has experienced a period of 
social and economic crisis on the island of Guadalcanal. The 
shortage of economic resources caused by this situation and a 
weak governmental structure has delayed efforts to develop ac-
cess and benefit-sharing policies. However, they are beginning 
to examine  issues with the assistance of  and other 
organizations such as  South Pacific Program that orga-
nized a workshop in May . In the meantime, bioprospec-
tors may apply for a research permit under the Research Act to 
the Ministry of Education and Training. The Ministry liaises 
with provinces and communities where research activity is to 
occur and a research committee decides whether to approve 
or reject the application. This decision takes into account the 
views of provincial authorities and communities.
. Vanuatu
After a national consultation process, the country is ana-
lyzing  policies that might be included in a draft of its 
Environment Act. Vanuatu, however, has a Cultural Research 
Policy that regulates consultation with local communities, 
chief’s councils, and women’s groups. 
. Vietnam
In  Vietnam developed a National Action Plan on 
Biological Diversity that addresses  issues. In the last few 
years the government has been actively collecting examples 
of  laws and policies and it is planning to start working on 
national  legislation in  or .
C. Countries not involved in any process leading to the 
development of ABS laws and policies
. Kiribati
It is a high priority but the country lacks the funding needed to 
develop  policies. The National Biodiversity Strategy and 
Action Plan, however, may create momentum to begin the  
development process. The plan was completed in February 
 but it has not been tabled yet by the Cabinet for approval 
and endorsement.
. Laos
Lack of financial support and technical expertise has prevented 
this country from developing an  policy. 
. Nauru
 is not a top priority, and there are budgetary constraints.
. Palau
Palau should start working on an  policy in –, 
depending on funding and capacity availability. However, this 
country is currently working on a national biodiversity strategy 
and action plan.
. Tonga
This subject has not been raised with the government by the 
relevant government body, the Ministry of Labor, Commerce, 
and Industries. Tonga, however, is working on a national biodi-
versity strategy and action plan.
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. Tuvalu
Tuvalu ratified the  in December  and developing  
regulations is not a top priority. 
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health purposes (Article ). There is a criterion that is based 
on the thesis that reforms to the Patent Law of  tacitly 
derogated the exclusions of the Law of Biodiversity since they 
were promulgated later on; it excludes some, but not all, of the 
aspects provided in Article  from the patent process.
. Ecuador
Ecuador is a  and  member, a signatory to , and 
a member of Andean Community. See Colombia for informa-
tion about  legislation that covers all Andean Community 
countries.
. Mexico
Mexico is a  and  member and therefore a signa-
tory to .  The  Industrial Property Act (amended in 
 and ) provides patent protection for products and 
processes that comply with the patentability test of novelty, 
inventiveness, and industrial application. It excludes protec-
tion for biological and genetic material as found in nature. The 
 Federal Plan Variety Act protects varieties that are new, 
stable, distinct, and homogeneous.
. Philippines
The Philippines is a  and  member and therefore 
a signatory to . This country is also member of the 
  Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property 
Cooperation. The  Intellectual Property Code was enacted 
in compliance with the minimum standards set under . 
As of , more than  microorganisms have been granted 
patent protection in the Philippines. The law excludes from 
patent protection plant varieties and animal breeds. It also does 
not give protection to traditional knowledge, but allows for 
the creation of a sui generis protection system for community 
intellectual property rights. In , Congress passed a plant 
variety protection bill (Republic Act No. ) that provides 
sui generis protection over plant varieties and Farmer’s Rights. 
Patent protection over life forms including microorganisms 
remains a controversial issue in the Philippines. It is argued 
that life forms are not eligible for patents because nothing new 
is created and the process merely involves reorganizing some-
thing that already exists. In , Republic Act No. , also 
known as the Traditional Alternative Medicine Act was passed 
in order to protect traditional knowledge related to tradi-
tional medicine. This law is not operational yet. However, the 
Philippines has yet to pass a sui generis intellectual property 
rights system that will cover traditional knowledge associated 
with biological and genetic resources.
. Peru
Peru is a  and  member, a signatory to , and as 
member of the Andean Community, it is covered by regional 
 legislation. See Colombia for details about these laws. In 
addition, the  Peruvian Law  provides a sui generis 
system for the protection indigenous peoples’ collective 
knowledge about properties, uses, and characteristics of bio-
logical diversity.  The law creates three registers for the protec-
tion of collective knowledge as follows: a) national register for 
collective knowledge that is in the public domain; b) national 
register for confidential collective knowledge; and c) local 
registers for either kind of collective knowledge.
. Samoa
Samoa is a  member and a  observer. Samoa has a 
 Patents Act that will be strengthened in order to comply 
with the requirements of .
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. Colombia
Colombia is a member of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization () and World Trade Organization (). It 
is also a signatory to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (). All  members 
are de facto Parties to all  agreements. Colombia is also 
a member of the Andean Community and as a member of 
this organization, it is protected by the Common Regime on 
Industrial Property, Decision  of . With this Decision, 
the Andean Community countries complied with . 
Decision  and Decision  (i.e., the Andean  law) have 
a strong connection.  Decision  requires patent applicants 
to present a copy of the access contract when the products 
or procedures of the patent requested have been obtained or 
developed from genetic resources or their derivatives of which 
any of the member countries are countries of origin. If ap-
plicable, a copy of the authorization for the use of traditional 
knowledge from indigenous, Afro-American, and local com-
munities, when the products for which the patent is requested 
have been obtained or developed from such knowledge of 
which any of the member countries is a country of origin. 
Colombia does not have in place a comprehensive system to 
protect traditional knowledge. Decision  establishes that a 
norm to protect these rights has to be proposed at the Andean 
Community level, but this has not occurred. Colombia is also 
covered by the  Decision  of Andean Community that 
protects plant breeders’ rights.
. Costa Rica
Costa Rica is a  and  member and therefore a Party 
to . Intellectual property right requirements and condi-
tions are clearly stated in the Law of Biodiversity. The Law 
established diverse exclusions but the compatibility of some 
of these exclusions with  is debatable. Costa Rica has 
comprehensive legislation related to s. The  Patent, 
Drawings and Utility Models Law No.  was reformed 
by Law No.  of  to make it compatible with . 
The new law has no exclusions for microorganisms, biologi-
cal processes, genes, and genetic sequences as long as the 
patentability requirements are met. A plant breeders’ rights 
draft law is yet to be approved. A proposal for a sui generis 
system of intellectual community rights is being developed 
through a consultation process that begun recently. The 
National Commission for the Management of Biodiversity 
must propose policies on access to genetic and biochemical 
resources of ex situ and in situ biodiversity. It will also act as 
an obligatory consultant in procedures related to the protec-
tion of intellectual property rights on biodiversity. The General 
Access Procedure (bylaw of the Law of Biodiversity) states 
as one of the criteria: Intellectual property rights not affecting 
key agricultural products and processes for the nourishment 
and health of the country’s inhabitants. This criterion also 
includes protection for the resources of local communities and 
indigenous populations. The Law of Biodiversity excludes 
 sequences from patent processes; plants and animals; 
unmodified microorganisms; essential biological processes for 
plant and animal production; the processes or natural cycles; 
inventions essentially derived from the knowledge involved or 
biological traditional practices or in public domain; the inven-
tions that are produced monopolistically that may affect the 
processes or agricultural basic products used for feeding and 
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. Thailand
Thailand is a  and  member. The country’s  
patent law (amended in ) complies with . The  
plant variety protection law protects is considered a sui generis 
protection system. It protects new, traditional, community and 
wild varieties. Thailand is also member of the   
Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Cooperation.
. United States of America ()
The  is a  and  member and therefore a signatory 
to . Unlike the other countries examined in this report 
the  is not a  Party. The Plan Patent Act of  gave 
protection to clonally propagated varieties of plants such as 
fruit trees and tubers. In , the Plan Variety Protection Act 
granted protection to new, uniform and distinct plant varieties. 
In , the Supreme Court opened the door for patents to be 
applied to plants, animals, microorganisms, genes, and  
sequences. In late , the US Supreme Court also ruled that 
plant varieties are eligible for protection by utility patents, 
as well as under the Plant Patent Act of  and the Plant 
Variety Protection Act of . 
B. Countries working towards the development of ABS 
laws and policies
. Australia
Australia is a  and  member and therefore a signatory 
to . The  Patent Act (amended in  and ) 
allows for the patenting of plants, microorganisms, and related 
biological materials, provided that these meet the standards of 
proof for patentability. The  Plant Breeders’ Rights Act 
(amended in ) provides plant variety protection.
. Cambodia
Cambodia is a  member and it is in the process of 
becoming a  member. The  Patents, Utility Model 
Certificates and Industrial Designs Act provides patent protec-
tion. In addition, Cambodia is completing a Plant Variety 
Protection Act.
. Canada
Canada is  and  member and therefore a signatory 
to . The  Patent Act (amended in , , , 
, , , and ) is compatible with . No 
patents are granted on higher life forms. In December  
the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the Harvard Mouse 
cannot be patented. The  Plant Breeders’ Rights Act 
(amended in  and ) protects plant varieties.
. Chile
Chile is a  and  member. The  Industrial 
Property Act provides patent protection. The  Law 
Nº. protects new plant varieties. The current legislation 
only excludes expressly the patenting of plant and animal vari-
eties.  Currently, the Chilean intellectual property legislation is 
being modified in order to make it compatible with require-
ments of . Regarding the modifications proposed for the 
patents system, the main changes are related to the period of 
protection of the rights conferred by the patent (it increases 
from  to  years) and procedural aspects for the concession 
of this right. Specifically in relation to the patentability of dif-
ferent forms of life the Bill excludes plants and animals from 
patent protection (with the exception of microorganisms).
. China
China is a  and  member and therefore a signatory 
to . The  Patent Act (amended in  and ) 
is  compatible. China also has the  Regulation for 
Protection of New Plant Varieties. The patent system does not 
protect genes yet. However, China’s patent authority is consid-
ering incorporating genes under patent protection in the future.
. Cook Islands
This country is neither a  nor a  member. It does not 
have any intellectual property right system.
. El Salvador
El Salvador is a  and  member and therefore a 
signatory to . The  Law on the Promotion and 
Protection of Intellectual Property and its  regulation is 
 compatible. The country is currently working on a plant 
variety protection law, but it has not addressed the issue of a 
sui generis system to protect traditional knowledge.
. Fiji
Fiji is a  and  member and therefore a signatory to 
. It is currently reviewing the Fiji Patent Act of . 
There is no plant variety protection legislation. 
. Guatemala
Guatemala is a  and  member and therefore a signa-
tory to  member. The  Industrial Property Law 
provides patent protection.
. Honduras
Honduras is a  and  member and therefore a signa-
tory to . The  Law on Industrial Property provides 
patent protection. The country is also about to approve a draft 
law for the protection of new varieties of plants.
. Indonesia
Indonesia is a  and  member and therefore a signa-
tory to . Amendments to the  Patent and Trademark 
Acts as well as membership to several international treaties 
were conducted between  and . The Patent Law is 
 compatible. Nonbiological genetic engineering technolo-
gies are also patentable. It excludes all living organisms and 
biological processes used for the production of plants and ani-
mals, except microorganisms and plant varieties. Indonesia’s 
 Law on Plant Variety Protection protects new varieties as 
well as local or indigenous varieties. This country is a member 
of the   Framework Agreement on Intellectual 
Property Cooperation. 
. Japan
Japan has the longest tradition of industrial property rights in 
Asia. This country is a  and  member and therefore a 
signatory to . The Patent Law was amended in  and 
. The  Seeds and Seedlings Law (amended in ) 
provides protection for new plant varieties.
. Malaysia
Malaysia is both a  and  member and therefore a sig-
natory to . Intellectual property rights (nonpatentability, 
limitations, certificate of origin and , compulsory licenses). 
The  Patent Act (amended in , , and ) is 
 compatible. The draft Access to Genetic Resources Bill 
includes a nonpatentability provision which means that no 
patents shall be recognized with respect to: ) plants, animals, 
and naturally occurring microorganisms, including the parts 
thereof and ) essentially biological processes and naturally 
occurring microbiological processes. To satisfy additional 
 requirements there is a draft Protection of New Plant 
Varieties Bill that is essentially a sui generis system for the 
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protection of plant genetic resources. Malaysia is also a mem-
ber of the   Framework Agreement on Intellectual 
Property Cooperation.
. Marshall Islands
At present there is no  legislation in the Marshall Islands. 
This country is neither a  nor a  member. There are 
plans to develop legislation that protects the rights of indig-
enous owners of genetic resources and traditional knowledge, 
and to provide access to that knowledge and resources with the 
prior informed consent of the owners, provided that these own-
ers have an equitable share of the benefits from the use of that 
knowledge and genetic materials.
. Micronesia
This country is neither a  nor a  member and does not 
have either patent legislation or sui generis systems in place 
that would protect inventions derived from genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge.
. New Zealand
New Zealand is a  and  member and therefore a signa-
tory to . The  Patent Act (amended in ) provides 
patent protection for genetic resources. The  Plant Variety 
Rights Act (amended in ) protects new plant varieties.
. Nicaragua
Nicaragua is a  and  member and therefore a signa-
tory to . The  Plant Variety Protection Law and its 
 regulation provide protection for new varieties of plants. 
The  law on Patents, Utility Models, and Industrial 
Designs is compatible with . The country is also develop-
ing a draft law for the protection of traditional knowledge.
. Niue
Niue does not have legislation that protects intellectual 
property derived from biological resources. This country is 
neither a  nor a  member.
. Panama
Panama is a  and  member and therefore a signatory 
to . The  Law on Industrial Property and its  
regulation provide patent protection. Decree No.  of  
and Law No.  of  provide protection for new plant 
varieties. The  Special Regime on Intellectual Property 
over Collective Rights protects collective rights of indigenous 
peoples over models, drawings, designs, symbols, petrogliphs, 
and other innovations. 
. Papua New Guinea
Papua New Guinea is a  and  member and therefore a 
signatory to . The  Patent and Industrial Act protects 
inventions derived from genetic resources.
. Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea is a  and  member and there-
fore a signatory to . The  Patent Law and the  
Law on the Promotion of Inventions comply with . The 
 Seed Industry Law protects plant breeders’ rights.
. Russian Federation
The Russian Federation is a  member and a  ob-
server. The  Patent Law needs to be reformed in order 
to comply with . The  Law on the Protection of 
Selection Achievements provide plant variety protection.
. Singapore
Singapore is a  and  member and therefore a signa-
tory to . The Patent Act (amended in , , and 
) fully complies with . The country also has a plant 
variety protection law and it is a member of the   
Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Cooperation.
. Solomon Islands
This country does not have intellectual property right legisla-
tion. It is neither a  nor a  member.
. Vanuatu
This country is neither a  nor a  member. Vanuatu is 
promoting a Traditional Property Rights Policy to protect tradi-
tional knowledge. The policy would protect information about 
names, designs or forms, oral tradition, practices and skills. 
. Vietnam
Vietnam is a  member and a  observer. The  
Civil Code includes a chapter on industrial property. The Civil 
Code covers the basics of intellectual property, and has been 
supplemented by decrees on patents, trademarks, designs, util-
ity models, and appellations of origin (), and copyright 
(). The Patent Act includes broad compulsory licensing 
provisions under public health or national security condi-
tions. It is uncertain whether genetically modified organisms 
and particularly microorganisms can be protected. Vietnam is 
also a member of the   Framework Agreement on 
Intellectual Property Cooperation.
C. Countries not involved in any process leading to the 
development of ABS laws and policies
. Kiribati
Kiribati does not have an intellectual property right system. 
This country is neither a  nor a  member.
. Laos
Laos is a  member and a  observer. The  Prime 
Minister Decree on Patents, Industrial Designs and Utility 
Models and its  regulation provides for patent protec-
tion. Laos is also a member of the   Framework 
Agreement on Intellectual Property Cooperation.
. Nauru
Nauru does not have an intellectual property right system. This 
country is neither a  nor a  member.
. Palau
There are no statutory or regulatory intellectual property rights 
at this time. This country is neither a  nor a  member.
. Tonga
Tonga is a  member and a  observer. The  
Industrial Property Act provides patent protection, but it needs 
to be reformed in order to comply with . The Bill on 
Seeds and Seedlings protects new varieties of plants.
. Tuvalu
Tuvalu does not have intellectual property rights legislation. 
This country is neither a  nor a  member.
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Scenarios of Policymaking Process
Santiago Carrizosa
The  Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources 
and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits arising out 
of their Utilization (hereafter Bonn Guidelines on access 
and benefit sharing ()) adopted by the Sixth Conference 
of the Parties of the , have provided guidance for the 
countries embarked on the development of  frame-
works. Several international bioprospecting1 projects have 
directly and indirectly encouraged policymakers to develop 
national  policies. However, this has been a long and 
difficult process for many nations. Developing balanced 
 laws is a slow process in which multiple sectors of 
society with different interests, views, and backgrounds 
must play a role. Even countries that enacted  laws and 
policies in the mid-s are still reforming such policies as 
they encounter obstacles that prevent their effective and 
efficient implementation, affect the interests of local com-
munities, and prevent the flow of genetic resources among 
nations. This chapter is divided into two main parts: the 
first part describes the policymaking process and main 
concerns experienced during the development of national 
 laws and polices in Australia, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Philip-
pines, Peru, Samoa, Thailand, and Vanuatu; and the second 
part analyzes the policymaking process and identifies key 
lessons and patterns derived from the case studies pre-
sented in the first part of this chapter.
Policymaking Process and Main Concerns: Case Studies
Australia
Process
Development of  policies in the Commonwealth areas 
began in  when a consultative group of Commonwealth, 
State, and Territory environment ministers produced a 
report on the implementation and implications of ratifica-
tion of the . In , First Ministers established the 
Commonwealth State Working Group (). The  
addressed the issue of establishing a nationally consistent 
system of access arrangements for the Commonwealth, 
States, and Territories and concluded that a nationally 
consistent system should focus on broad principles while 
allowing jurisdictions the freedom to apply those principles 
in ways which meet their needs and which take into ac-
count their existing policy frameworks. 
The  development process continued in mid- 
with the announcement of an inquiry into access to bio-
logical resources in Commonwealth areas. The inquiry, 
initiated by the Minister for the Environment and Heritage, 
was the most significant event in the development process 
of  regulations. Its main objective was to advise on a 
scheme that could be implemented through regulations 
under section  of the Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act of  () to pro-
vide for the control of access to biological resources in 
Commonwealth areas. In January  the inquiry was 
advertised in national, state, and territory newspapers. 
The inquiry received  submissions and held two public 
hearings and consultations with the traditional owners 
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of the three national parks and their representatives (see 
Chapter ). 
In September  the Minister released the inquiry 
report for public comment and promoted another one-year 
period of consultations with Biotechnology Australia de-
partments and other agencies. In September , the 
Minister for the Environment and Heritage released the 
draft of the regulations for a period of public consulta-
tion ending in October . The regulations reflect the 
scheme proposed by the inquiry and they are likely to be 
enacted in . 
Another significant result of the inquiry was the reacti-
vation of the idea of a nationally consistent system as it was 
proposed by the  in . This system would prevent 
the risk of a “price war” among Australian jurisdictions 
that could be caused by bioprospectors while shopping 
for the easiest and most accessible genetic resources. In 
October , Australia’s Natural Resource Management 
Ministerial Council released fourteen principles to promote 
the development or review of legislative, administrative, or 
policy frameworks for a nationally consistent approach in 
each jurisdiction (see Chapter ). Therefore, in December 
 the Government of Western Australia released a con-
sultation paper to promote the idea of a new act (i.e., A 
Biodiversity Conservation Act for Western Australia). The 
new act would include a licensing regime for terrestrial 
bioprospecting activities to ensure that benefits arising 
from the exploitation of Western Australia’s biological 
resources are shared with the Western Australian com-
munity, among other objectives. Australia’s  policy will 
be compatible with the ’s International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture () 
(see Chapter ). 
Concerns 
The main concerns identified by the  inquiry were: 
a) ownership of genetic resources; b) intellectual property 
rights (s) and indigenous knowledge; c) benefit sharing; 
and d) exclusivity issues. Ownership to genetic resources 
found in ex situ conditions was a significant issue for 
scientists, nongovernmental organizations (s), and 
indigenous groups. Under common law, however, neither 
a holder nor a buyer can claim ownership to a plant or 
to the species or genus to which it belongs. The lack of 
clarity about ownership also applied to in situ resources 
under state and territory jurisdiction. In this case, leg-
islative details vary from state to state. Therefore the 
inquiry recommended that Biotechnology Australia and 
the Attorney-General’s Department, in conjunction with 
the state and territory governments, ensure that information 
on the ownership of biological resources is compiled and 
made publicly available. 
Indigenous groups were also concerned about the im-
pact of ownership or exclusive rights over s of these 
groups and on access for traditional uses. The inquiry stat-
ed that according to Australian law, s on any products 
or processes derived from ex situ collections or resources 
found in in situ conditions belong to the inventor. However, 
the inquiry stated that it is up to a Commonwealth agency 
to allow access only if ownership of products derived from 
genetic resources is shared jointly with the inventor, the 
Commonwealth agency, and a representative of indigenous 
communities that may own the resource. Many s and 
indigenous groups also rejected the idea of patenting life, 
namely sequences of genes and the organisms that embody 
these genes. Australian patent law, however, allows this 
practice. Indigenous groups also argued that their cultural 
knowledge related to plants, animals, and the environment 
was being used by scientists, medical researchers, nutri-
tionists, and pharmaceutical companies for commercial 
gain, often without their prior informed consent () and 
without any economic benefits flowing back to them. In the 
knowledge that these are significant and sensitive issues 
for indigenous people, the inquiry recommended further 
research and consultations with stakeholders. 
Scientists were also concerned that the access scheme 
and the model contract might not be sufficiently flexible 
and effective to allow the negotiation of benefits in com-
mercial and noncommercial access situations. In addition, 
the access process could inhibit noncommercial research 
activities. In this regard the inquiry recommended that pro-
visions in the proposed model contract should anticipate 
that most contractual arrangements will be for commercial 
purposes but that in some cases, provisions should be flex-
ible enough to address situations where access conditions 
for noncommercial initiatives are negotiated. 
Exclusivity issues were also addressed during the con-
sultation process. In theory parties to a contract should be 
able to negotiate exclusivity provisions freely. However, 
the Minister can also assess the fairness of exclusivity 
provisions in the contract against evidence of proper , 
mutually agreed terms, and adequate benefit sharing. In 
addition, contractual provisions of an exclusive nature 
which benefit the bioprospector should be reflected in the 
amount of benefits payable to the provider of the genetic 
resource or traditional knowledge (see Chapter ).
Chile 
Process
Chile does not have an  policy yet. In early  the 
Ministry of Agriculture developed a proposal for a law to 
regulate access to agricultural genetic resources that could 
have facilitated the implementation of the ’s 2, 
among other purposes. This proposal was developed with-
out public consultation and it was discarded after much 
criticism. However, efforts to develop a new proposal con-
tinue within the Ministry with support from the National 
Commission of the Environment (). In , 
 published the country’s National Biodiversity 
Strategy. It should be noted that the strategy emphasizes 
the need to develop legal instruments to regulate access 
to genetic resources to ensure fair participation in and eq-
uitable distribution of the benefits derived from their use. 
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The strategy was approved by the ’s ministerial 
council (which is the highest environmental policy body 
in the country) and the National Biodiversity Action Plan 
was initiated in mid-. 
However, Chile’s recent experience in the access and 
benefit-sharing debate goes back to the early s when 
the country’s genetic resources were accessed by several 
bioprospecting projects (see Table  of Chapter ). These 
projects were briefly scrutinized by the press and local 
s and brought momentum for the analysis of  issues 
at workshops. Government authorities also established a 
working group to discuss the issue and several meetings 
were held. In the long run, there were no significant results 
from this initiative at a legislative or political level. This 
failure was due, in considerable part, to the complexity 
of the subject. The process was stalled by the inability 
to identify solutions to the issue of ownership of genetic 
resources and the absence of a national biodiversity policy. 
But the main problem was a lack of political support among 
legislative and executive decision makers to consider this a 
matter of importance for the country (see Chapter ). 
In mid-, the Foundation for International Environ-
mental Law and Development () and the Chilean  
Fundación Sociedades Sustentables released the findings 
of a project for an  policy in Chile. Some of the project’s 
conclusions revealed the lack of technical capacity and 
information about key  issues such as the protection 
of traditional knowledge. Furthermore, the project found 
great contradictions among those that see the need to regu-
late access to genetic resources and those that perceive such 
regulation as a strategy to legalize the misappropriation 
of genetic resources and traditional knowledge. One of 
the most important recommendations of this project is 
the need to develop a participatory process involving all 
government and nongovernment stakeholders to facilitate 
the development of an  policy for Chile.3
Concerns 
Between  and , consultants were hired by -
 to assess legal and political circumstances and propose 
a strategy for developing a national regulation for genetic 
resources. After internal debate, it was concluded that the 
only way to initiate the development of  legislation 
was by addressing the issue of ownership of genetic re-
sources through legislative changes in the property regime 
of Chile. This conclusion prevented the implementation 
of further efforts because the Chilean Constitution gives 
strong protection to private property and any modifica-
tions of this regime would require a legislative reform in 
Congress (see Chapter ). 
China
Process
China, like most countries examined in this report, has 
policies that regulate access to genetic resources4, but 
these policies lack benefit-sharing provisions. Therefore, 
China’s  National Report on implementation of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity states that a priority 
action for the country is to draft a genetic resources policy 
or law that regulates  principles, benefit-sharing issues, 
and s, among other issues. 
In late , the State Council of China authorized the 
State Environmental Protection Administration () to 
coordinate all issues regarding  issues to ensure the 
implementation of the . Consequently,  is currently 
leading a national project to inventory all genetic resources 
in China. This includes the participation of experts from 
many organizations and universities from the agriculture, 
forestry, fishery, and medical sectors. Also,  is as-
sembling a team to develop a comprehensive  policy 
or law. Access and benefit-sharing issues are a new topic 
for Chinese authorities and they are looking for experi-
ence and case studies in foreign countries. Governmental 
officials from different ministries and experts designated 
by the relevant ministries will participate in the  pro-
cess development. However, indigenous representatives 
and foreign consultants are not likely to be invited to this 
process (D. Xue, pers. comm. December ).
Concerns 
So far the main difficulties faced by the process have 
been the overlapping of functions and lack of coordina-
tion between the relevant ministries.  is responsible 
for the implementation of the , but ministries such as 
the Ministry of Agriculture want to be in charge of access 
and benefit-sharing issues pertaining to crops, livestock, 
and fishery production. In addition, there have been dif-
ficulties in defining beneficiaries from access activities. 
Should the state, ministry, organization, or individual 
receive benefits derived from the country’s genetic re-
sources? How should these benefits be allocated? s 
are also likely to be a major concern and obstacle for the 
development and implementation of legislation develop-
ment and implementation in the future. Chinese genetic 
resources have been used to develop inventions that have 
been patented in other countries. Channeling benefits 
derived from these inventions back to China is a problem 
that will be addressed by future legislation (D. Xue, pers. 
comm. December ).
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru
Process
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, along with the other 
members of the Andean Community, participated in the 
development process of Decision . Initial discussions 
for a regional  law included the participation of s, 
government organizations, and indigenous groups. The 
Secretariat of the Andean Community commissioned the 
World Conservation Union, which subsequently involved 
the Peruvian Society for Environmental Law, to develop 
a first draft of the issues that should be addressed by a 
regional access regulation. In mid-, a draft was com-
pleted. It received strong criticism and some governments 
were opposed to having such a document as the basis for 
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discussion. Besides, other proposals had already emerged 
from various groups. In August , a Colombian non-
governmental initiative developed a different proposal for a 
regional access and benefit-sharing law. These documents 
were discussed in a regional workshop in Colombia and 
included wide participation (s, academic institu-
tions, private sector, intergovernmental institutions, and 
indigenous organizations) from the Andean countries. 
Nevertheless, there was increased tension in the debate 
about whether the proposal should implement the  as 
a whole or just its specific  goals. Failure to come to an 
agreement about this and other issues encouraged govern-
ment representatives in charge of the initiative to pull away 
from this participatory process. In addition, most govern-
ments disliked the idea of discussing the development of 
an access norm based on an  proposal. 
Consequently, in November , the Colombian and 
Venezuelan governments jointly presented a new proposal 
for discussion. The following year, the governments of 
Bolivia and Ecuador proposed two different texts of draft 
decisions and the discussions between government offi-
cials evolved around these three governmental drafts. A 
total of six meetings resulted in a final proposal that was 
presented to the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement 
for its approval in July . 
In synthesis, Decision  lacked the input of a par-
ticipatory process where local s, indigenous groups, 
and other stakeholders could have contributed to key 
issues such as the protection of traditional knowledge. 
The conflicting attitude between local s and other 
stakeholders led Andean governments to pull away from 
the broad debate that characterized the early stages of the 
development of the  law. In addition, not all participat-
ing experts had adequate legal, technical, scientific, and 
economic experience to develop an access regime (see 
Chapter ). 
While Venezuela has been applying Decision , 
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru have been working on na-
tional policies to facilitate the implementation of Decision 
 with varying results. Colombia is working on a pro-
posal for an  policy that will be concluded in  (see 
Chapter ). Peru developed a policy that was presented to 
its National Environmental Council for approval in  
and it could be adopted in  (M. Ruiz, pers. comm. 
January ). Ecuador developed a policy in , but 
it was not approved and there are no initiatives to reac-
tivate the process (J. Vogel, pers. comm. April ). In 
addition to these efforts, Peru and other Andean countries 
have proposed a general review of the text of Decision 
 to facilitate its implementation (M. Ruiz, pers. comm. 
April ). In , the Andean Community adopted a 
Regional Strategy on Biodiversity that includes an  
component. The strategy identifies some of the problems 
of Decision  and proposes measures to facilitate the 
identification of solutions (A C ). 
The Andean Community is currently working on an action 
plan for the strategy that might bring new momentum to 
 discussions and consolidate regional efforts to reform 
Decision  and facilitate its implementation. 
Concerns
Should a regional  policy emphasize the biodiversity 
conservation and sustainable development goals? Or 
should this policy focus on  issues in order to take ad-
vantage of millions of dollars that could be obtained from 
genetic resources? This was one of the dilemmas faced by 
stakeholders and policymakers at the beginning of the poli-
cymaking process and it was one of the sources of conflict 
that stopped the participatory process. The potential loss 
of benefits was a major incentive for government officials 
to develop an  proposal as soon as possible. 
Protecting both traditional and scientific knowledge 
was also a major concern addressed by some s which 
advocated for a special access process and treatment for the 
cases that involved traditional knowledge. In the end, the 
governments proposed a solution that considers traditional 
and scientific knowledge as an intangible component as-
sociated with genetic resources and a weak definition of the 
protection of traditional knowledge. Decision  provides 
a contractual approach to protect traditional knowledge but 
delegates the development of a law to protecting traditional 
knowledge to future negotiations. The issue, however, is 
very controversial and no regional proposal dealing spe-
cifically with traditional knowledge has been officially 
discussed yet among the Andean countries. In the last 
stages of the development process of Decision  there 
was intense discussion among government representatives 
about the scope of access activities. The agreed-upon defi-
nition was based on a Colombian proposal, which is very 
close to the current definition found in Decision  (see 
Chapter ). 
Cook Islands
Process
Although this country has most of its traditional knowl-
edge associated with agricultural resources, these genetic 
materials are rarely endemic to the region. The main po-
tential that can be used by the pharmaceutical industry is 
associated with marine resources. Therefore any new  
law will be targeted to this sector. 
Currently there are no national  policies that regulate 
agricultural and marine resources. There is, however, a 
code-of-conduct in effect under the taro germplasm proj-
ect, a regional genebank of taro (Colocasia esculenta) col-
lected throughout the Pacific Islands under the auspices of 
the Secretariat of the Pacific Community ().5 This code 
stipulates that the samples may not be used for commercial 
purposes without . 
At present the only national attempt to regulate ac-
cess to bioprospectors is through a National Research 
Committee. The secretariat for this committee is the 
Prime Ministers Office and its key governmental authori-
ties in charge of agricultural, marine, cultural, and other 
issues. However, it rarely meets. The National Research 
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Committee issues a pre-research permit that is presented by 
the bioprospector to immigration authorities (normally at 
the international airport) who issue a final research permit 
allowing access. However, few researchers go through this 
process. Some exceptions include university students who 
wish to reside in the country for periods that exceed three 
months. Most researchers simply enter on a visitor’s visa 
(which actually restricts activities of research under the 
Immigration Act) issued at the port of entry. 
In the last few years, organizations such as the South 
Pacific Regional Environment Programme (), the 
World Wildlife Fund–South Pacific Program (-), 
and  have created awareness about the  and 
the need to develop a national  law. In March , 
these organizations promoted a regional workshop on the 
implementation of the  in the Pacific Islands region 
that produced a draft list of guidelines on  issues ad-
opted by participants from  Pacific Island countries that 
included government organizations, s, and academic 
institutions. 
A year later, , -, and  organized a 
national workshop on  in the Cook Islands that devel-
oped a list of recommendations for a national  law. The 
meeting had widespread representation and publicity and 
became an important turning point. Consequently, Cook 
Islands, under the leadership of the Ministry of Marine 
Resources, is currently working on a national  policy 
that will go under a proposed National Environmental 
Act. The law is likely to be enforced by an Environment 
Ministry, established under the Act or alternatively by 
the Office of the Prime Minister. Central government 
ministries regulate this type of national law. The Island 
Councils of the different inhabited islands and the mu-
nicipal councils for the capital island may adopt by-laws 
that are managed under the Island Councils.
This process will probably take about three years. 
It has benefited from the input of the Prime Ministers 
Office, Environment Service, Agriculture, Marine, 
Culture, Education, and Justice sectors, Attorney General 
Office, Representatives of Island Councils and Municipal 
Councils, indigenous bodies (traditional healers and carv-
ers), and private sector lawyers.  also provided a tech-
nical staff familiar with  issues and a legal consultant 
(B. Ponia, pers. comm. February ). 
Concerns
Major concerns include how to regulate access to ex situ 
collections and the perception that creating an access regu-
lation actually encourages bioprospecting and the loss of 
traditional knowledge. There are also mixed views on own-
ership of genetic resources and the protection of traditional 
knowledge associated with medicinal plants. 
A major problem that also complicates the develop-
ment of this participatory process is the lack of technical 
capacity. There is a great need to educate people about key 
 issues. But the main obstacle to this process is getting 
the Environment Act passed. At present the Environment 
Service only operates on the main island (Rarotonga). 
The remaining islands, managed by Island Councils, 
are reluctant to have the central government apply an 
Environment Act to them. There has been a process of 
decentralizing government in order to give Island Councils 
as much autonomy as possible. Perhaps the alternative 
to the Environment Act would be a separate Access and 
Benefit-Sharing Act. But this has not been decided yet (B. 
Ponia, pers. comm. February ).
Costa Rica
Process
The development process of the Law of Biodiversity No. 
 took about two years and revealed two opposing 
positions. Some regarded legislating access as a way of 
promoting bioprospecting and legitimizing biopiracy while 
others defended the law as a way to promote the sustainable 
use of genetic resources. In , the first draft of the law 
was developed by Luis Martínez, a former president of 
the Environment Commission of the Legislative Assembly 
with technical support provided by the regional office for 
Mesoamerica of the World Conservation Union. The draft 
law was widely distributed to the public by mail and it 
was also made available on the internet (J. Cabrera, pers. 
comm. April ). Many stakeholders considered this first 
version to be particularly restrictive and opposed both to 
the public good and scientific research.
The Environment Commission made the second draft 
available in January . Even though this draft addressed 
some of the objections made to the first draft, it also re-
peated several of the contentious concepts stated in the ini-
tial version of the document. Therefore, it received similar 
opposition. This situation led to the creation of a Special 
Commission in the Legislative Assembly. Its mandate was 
to create a new draft, taking into consideration the previous 
ones. The Assembly promised to respect the outcome. 
The Commission, led by Jorge Mora, Rector of the 
National University, was established in April . It 
included the main political parties (National Liberation 
and Social Christian Unity), the Advisory Commission 
on Biodiversity, the National Small Farmers Forum, the 
National Indigenous Forum, the Union of Chambers of 
Private Business, the University of Costa Rica, the National 
University, the Costa Rican Federation for Environmental 
Conservation, and the National Biodiversity Institute. The 
Commission met until December  when the new draft 
was sent to Congress. It received the favorable opinion of 
the Environment Commission, and after a few modifica-
tions, the Legislative Assembly approved the draft law in 
April  during the last days of the administration of 
President Figueres Olsen. The Law of Biodiversity entered 
into force as Law of the Republic No.  on  May 
 (see Chapter ).
Concerns 
Time constraints for completing the draft law prevented 
in-depth discussions of some of the most controversial 
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aspects such as ownership of genetic resources and s. In 
addition, there were internal difficulties among the mem-
bers of participating stakeholder groups. For example, 
representatives of the industry sector stated that since 
they were incapable of negotiating on behalf of all their 
associates, they would not vote for any of the proposals 
but would limit themselves to taking part in the debates 
of the Commission. Since the law covered multiple policy 
objectives, the possibility of dedicating sufficient time to 
 issues was diminished due to the pressing need to 
finalize a comprehensive draft.
One of the most controversial issues was ownership of 
genetic resources. Stakeholders such as representatives of 
the farming sector criticized the fact that under the Law of 
Biodiversity these resources were considered to be in the 
public domain, independent of private ownership of the 
land. There were also concerns about integration between 
intellectual property and the procedures of the Law of 
Biodiversity, since diverse exclusions have been estab-
lished. Compatibility of some of these exclusions with 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights () is an issue that needs careful con-
sideration. In the end, some of the patentability exclusions 
were eliminated and others remained, in spite of warnings 
about their possible unconstitutionality (see Chapter ).
The development process for the Law of Biodiversity 
revealed a lack of technical expertise from certain sectors 
such as academic, indigenous, rural, political, and entre-
preneurial groups. Many of them used the process to make 
political rather than technical statements. Therefore, some 
of the issues that may have needed a larger discussion fo-
rum were addressed and defined by a few technocrats. For 
example,  issues were debated by representatives from 
business and academic groups in a Special Subcommittee 
in charge of drafting the law. Concerns of indigenous 
peoples that opposed the use of s were disregarded.
In addition, discussions evolved around conceptual 
issues and ignored procedural, operative, or administra-
tive issues that have impaired the full implementation of 
the law (see Chapter ). Several stakeholders argued that 
since the National System of Conservation Areas had a 
close relationship with the National Biodiversity Institute 
it should not be in charge of granting access permits and 
authorizations. Instead, this duty should have been given 
to a new commission able to represent the wider interest of 
society. Other provisions such as the creation of a National 
Commission for the Management of Biodiversity (-
) were accepted under different proposals. According 
to the Law of Biodiversity, ’s duties include 
the formulation of biodiversity and  policies and the 
management of public funds. However, the Minister of 
the Environment and Energy considered these functions 
unconstitutional and asked the Attorney General’s Office 
to submit a constitutional challenge that is currently under 
review. The suit does not suspend the execution of the 
Law of Biodiversity. However, politically, it has definitely 
delayed ’s implementation of the law. 
El Salvador
Process
 issues were placed on El Salvador’s institutional 
agenda by the  National Biodiversity Strategy. The 
strategy provided a participatory arena for the debate of 
 issues among various sectors of society. In , with 
financial support from the Global Environment Facility 
(), the Environment Minister developed the follow-
ing four reports: a) national assessment of genetic and 
biochemical resources; b) capacity-building strategy for 
access to genetic and biochemical resources associated 
with wildlife; c) administrative procedures for access to 
genetic and biochemical resources; and d) policy guide-
lines on access to genetic and biochemical resources. These 
reports were developed by a variety of actors from gov-
ernment, peasant, and academic institutions. Then, these 
reports were submitted to the Presidency for review, ap-
proval, and adoption under a national policy on access to 
genetic and biochemical resources. The Presidency should 
be adopting the policy sometime in . Subsequently, 
government sectors in charge of administering biological 
resources (e.g., Agriculture Ministry) will develop rules 
and procedures that must be followed by bioprospectors in 
order to get access to these resources. The policy will also 
be consistent with and supported by the Central American 
Protocol on Access to Genetic and Biochemical Resources 
and their Associated Knowledge. The scope of the policy 
will exclude genetic resources covered by the ’s -
 that was already signed and ratified by El Salvador 
(J.E. Quezada-Díaz, pers. comm. January ). The  
Environment Law provides the legal framework for the 
new  policy. Article  of the law states that access, 
research, manipulation and use of genetic resources are 
allowed under permit, license, or concession granted by 
the government agency in charge of administering and 
managing the resource.
Concerns
Opportunities for stakeholders to participate in the de-
velopment process are limited by their lack of expertise. 
Many sectors of society do not realize the implications of 
a policy that regulates access and benefit-sharing issues. 
There is lack of information and misinterpretation about 
concepts such as equitable sharing of benefits, protection 
of traditional knowledge, and  issues. The country has 
yet to begin a process to address these issues properly and 
carefully. Biological resources are owned by the State. 
However, there is on-going debate about ownership is-
sues related to genetic resources. Financial support for the 
development of the policy was provided by the  and 
additional funding will be required to build local capacity 
to facilitate its implementation (J.E. Quezada-Díaz, pers. 
comm. January ).
Honduras
Process
In , under the leadership of the Natural Resources 
A B  S  B
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and Environment Secretariat, the National Strategy on 
Biodiversity was officially presented and one of its stra-
tegic components was the  issue. The strategy was 
the product of nine regional workshops that included the 
participation of indigenous communities, industry, peas-
ants, and government organizations. The strategy created 
momentum for additional discussions on  issues. But it 
is not clear how  goals will be incorporated into national 
law. Some advocate for a comprehensive law similar to 
the Costa Rican Law of Biodiversity. However, there is 
also a possibility to develop a single  law. This is one 
of the issues to be discussed in future meetings. An initial 
discussion of  issues already begun at a government 
level and a preliminary draft has been developed. Next 
steps will include developing a final draft together with 
relevant stakeholders consulted at a national level (J.A. 
Fuentes, pers. comm. June ).
Concerns
The lack of technical capacity is one of the main obstacles 
that the  development process will face in the future. 
The relationship between traditional property rights and 
indigenous knowledge was one of the main concerns ad-
dressed during initial discussions of the draft  policy. 
A great deal of debate went also into details about how to 
protect indigenous knowledge. Issues debated included: a) 
the number of years of protection provided by the system; 
b) the individual or collective nature of indigenous knowl-
edge; c) strategies to protect indigenous knowledge; and 
d) the relationship between trade secrets and traditional 
knowledge. This discussion included also procedural is-
sues such as identifying the characteristics of the govern-
ment agency in charge of administering this system (J.A. 
Fuentes, pers. comm. June ). 
Indonesia
Process
Indonesia is currently working on a draft law, the Act on 
Genetic Resource Management that includes a regulation 
on  issues. This law will be comprehensive and the 
provisions will be consistent with existing laws on agri-
culture, forestry, and biodiversity. The government is also 
conducting an assessment of existing legal instruments 
that regulate  issues. Local officials estimate that  
legislation will be concluded in . 
The act will have a national scope, but provincial 
or district level governments should develop their own 
regulations that must be formulated in line with the 
national law. The law will apply to the pharmaceutical, 
agricultural, botanical medicine, biotechnology, and other 
pertinent sectors. The Act will also be compatible with 
the ’s  that Indonesia should be signing and 
ratifying soon.
As the focal point for the , the Ministry for the 
Environment established an inter-ministerial working 
group to formulate this law. This working group was or-
ganized into smaller groups in charge of technical tasks 
including the analysis of  laws enacted by other coun-
tries. The working group has also organized workshops to 
facilitate the debate and contribute to the identification of 
key issues. Participants include representatives from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Forestry, Ministry 
of Justice and Human Rights, Ministry of Environment, 
Ministry of Research and Technology, Indonesian Institute 
of Science, local universities, s, and national experts. 
There are no foreign consultants involved in the process, 
but the  Bonn Guidelines on  are being used to 
guide the process. Before the draft law is sent to Congress 
it should be available for public comment (B.S. Wardhana, 
pers. comm. March ).
Concerns
The main challenge is likely to be the resolution of 
controversial issues that include ownership of genetic 
resources, indigenous knowledge, and the relationship be-
tween traditional  systems and traditional knowledge. 
For example, the national constitution states that natural 
resources (including genetic resources) are owned by the 
State. However, since local communities have used these 
resources traditionally without major restrictions they be-
lieve that they hold ownership over them (B.S. Wardhana, 
pers. comm. March ).
Malaysia
Process
The development of the draft law on Access to Genetic 
Resources has promoted an interesting cooperation among 
federal and state authorities. This process began in  
with the establishment of the National Committee on 
Biological Diversity, which supported by the Attorney-
General, played a significant role in the development of the 
draft law (see Table  of Chapter ). The process received 
ample input during a National Workshop on Access and 
Benefit Sharing of Genetic Resources held in  (see 
Box  of Chapter ). Two years later a task force, estab-
lished by a National Technical Committee on Biological 
Diversity, completed the final text of the draft law. 
Presently, the Ministry of Science, Technology, and 
the Environment (), in close collaboration with the 
Attorney-General’s Chambers, is handling the whole pro-
cess from the final draft bill to the passing of the draft bill 
into law. This draft bill was scheduled to go through the 
national consultation process in  and , then to the 
Cabinet for approval, and finally to the Parliament for the 
bill to be passed into law. However, the process has pro-
gressed at a relatively slower pace particularly with regard 
to national consultation. Furthermore  gave priority 
to enacting the Biosafety Bill into law. Consequently, the 
draft is not expected to be adopted by the government 
until  or even later. Favorable comments from the 
states of Sabah and Sarawak6 among others, is crucial 
to facilitate the completion and adoption of the draft law 
(see Chapter ). 
 
Concerns
A major issue debated during the development process 
that needs to be clarified further is ownership of genetic 
resources. In Malaysia, there are biological resources 
found on public lands that belong to federal and state gov-
ernments. In some states, ownership rights of biological 
resources found in indigenous or community-held land, 
belong to the community and ownership rights over tradi-
tional knowledge and innovations still need to be clarified. 
 systems for the protection of biological organisms and 
traditional knowledge were also major points of discussion. 
A sui generis system of community intellectual rights was 
proposed but it was not included in the draft bill because it 
turned out to be very controversial. In addition, stakehold-
ers opposed the use of patents to protect genes, plants, and 
other organisms.
In addition, several procedural and conceptual issues 
discussed during the design of the draft law remain un-
resolved. Tasks that remain to be tackled before the draft 
bill is passed into law include: a) determining the federal 
authority in charge of matters relevant to biological diver-
sity; b) ensuring uniformity in relevant state laws; c) deter-
mining the institutional structure for the implementation of 
the draft bill; d) determining the competent authorities and 
negotiating partners to identify and address the interests 
of the holders of indigenous knowledge; and e) ensuring 
adequate participation of indigenous representatives in 
the development of  procedures and benefit-sharing 
requirements (see Chapter ). 
Mexico
Process
The  reform of the  Ecological Equilibrium and 
Environment Protection General Act () introduced 
article   that regulates access and benefit sharing 
for biotechnology purposes. This reform was carried 
out in  months by the Commissions of Ecology and 
Environment of the Senate and House of Representatives 
and the Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources 
(). The reform promoted by these organizations 
was the result of a small process of consultation that in-
cluded few stakeholders. This process, nonetheless, facili-
tated the approval of one  provision and other measures 
that reformed the  (J. Larson and C. López-Silva, 
pers. comm. January ).
Concerns
Issues such as ownership of genetic resources and the 
protection of traditional knowledge were not properly 
discussed and addressed by the reform of the . 
These legal gaps and the lack of a nation-wide participatory 
process of discussion of the reform may have provided im-
petus for the public opposition that led to the cancellation 
of access granted under the law to several bioprospecting 
projects (see Chapter ). 
Nicaragua
Process
The process of developing the draft Law of Biodiversity 
was initiated in  by the national strategy for the con-
servation of biodiversity and briefly supported in  
by a proposal from the Ministry for the Environment and 
Natural Resources (). In ,  reactivated 
the  proposal with financial support from the World 
Conservation Union, the United Nations Development 
Programme, the Mesoamerican Biological Conservation 
Corridor, and the government of Nicaragua. Subsequently, 
an interdisciplinary team of national and international 
experts from Peru, Mexico, Argentina, Costa Rica, and 
Nicaragua developed the draft Law of Biodiversity. 
Representatives of more than % of Nicaraguan in-
digenous communities participated in this process. They 
played a pivotal role in the development of one of the most 
controversial and novel provisions of the draft Law of 
Biodiversity that calls for the development of a sui generis 
system for the protection of the knowledge, practices and 
innovations of local communities. In , the draft was 
available for comment to a group of  specialists from 
s and government organizations that suggested the 
inclusion of biosafety, wildlife, and environmental issues 
into the proposal. Most recently, indigenous communities, 
s, and industry representatives had the opportunity to 
provide additional input and contribute to the final draft. 
In late , Government officials completed a final draft 
that should be sent to Congress in  (J. Hernandez, 
pers. comm. February ).
Concerns 
Traditional knowledge, s, ownership of genetic re-
sources, biosafety, and procedural issues have been the 
main topics of heated discussion during the development 
process of the law. The protection of traditional knowl-
edge was so controversial that some government officials 
from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce opposed its 
inclusion into the draft law. In June , however, resolu-
tions of the  and guidelines of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization endorsing strategies to protect tra-
ditional knowledge provided convincing arguments and 
this provision remained in the draft law.
While the draft law states that genetic resources are 
in the public domain, it provides indigenous communi-
ties with ownership rights to genetic resources found in 
their lands. This property right distinction is likely to 
be controversial when the draft law reaches Congress. 
Policymakers are also uncertain about how to address the 
new commitments of the ’s  that was acceded 
to by Nicaragua in November . 
But perhaps the main problem is a current disagreement 
between the Environment Ministry and the Agriculture and 
Forestry Ministry about jurisdictional powers over access 
to genetic resources for agricultural purposes and biosafety 
issues. The Agriculture and Forestry Ministry argues that 
they handle biosafety issues and that a stand-alone law of 
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biosafety just like the Peruvian proposal should address 
them. The Environment Ministry responds that biosafety is 
one of the main provisions of the  and as such it should 
be included in the Law of Biodiversity. In addition, there 
is overlapping between the draft Law of Biodiversity and 
existing laws. The draft law includes provisions about inva-
sive and domestic species, issues that are already regulated 
by the Law of Production and Commerce of Seeds and the 
Law of Animal and Plant Sanitation (J. Hernandez, pers. 
comm. February ).
Panama
Process
Currently, Panama does not have a clear and comprehen-
sive  law. However, in the last few years the National 
Authority for the Environment () has been using a 
contractual approach to facilitate access to bioprospecting 
projects. The  Bonn Guidelines on  have been 
employed in the negotiation of these projects and will 
be followed in the development of future national  
regulations. 
The development process of  laws and policies 
started with the  General Law of the Environment 
No.  () that designated  as the competent 
authority for the regulation, management, and control of 
the access to and use of biogenetic resources. According 
to ,  had to develop the legal instruments and 
economic mechanisms to facilitate  goals in Panama 
(L A L ). In ,  discus-
sions reached new momentum with the adoption of the 
National Strategy for the Environment that proposed a 
long-term vision for biodiversity issues. This vision was 
reinforced by the  National Biodiversity Strategy 
that proposed the implementation of  principles. In 
addition to this effort, the National Biodiversity Action 
Plan proposed, as one of the  goals for year , the 
equitable distribution of benefits derived from the use of 
biological diversity among all sectors of society. Actions 
to implement this goal have been focused on three main 
fronts: a) the ratification of the Central American Protocol 
on Access to Genetic and Biochemical Resources and their 
associated knowledge that should take place in ; b) 
the development of a national wildlife trust fund that will 
facilitate the distribution of benefits derived from the use 
of genetic resources; and c) the development of new  
procedures that will be adopted by the executive branch. 
Since late  Panama has been working on a policy to 
fill the gaps present in existing legislation regarding  
and indigenous knowledge issues. Representatives from the 
agriculture, biotechnology, industry, and indigenous groups 
have been participating in workshops. Foreign consultants 
from the Central American Commission on Environment 
and Development have also supported this process.
In parallel with the above process, there has been an 
initiative promoted by the Commission of Indigenous 
Affairs since , to complete draft Law No. . This 
includes the establishment of a system to regulate access 
to genetic resources in indigenous lands and a mechanism 
to ensure the equitable sharing of benefits derived from the 
use of these resources. The draft law also includes penal-
ties,  requirements, the right of indigenous groups to 
deny access to their genetic resources, and the intellectual 
protection of indigenous knowledge. According to the draft 
law, indigenous knowledge or genetic resources used by 
traditional communities will not be entitled to  protec-
tion.  protection such as patents for any product derived 
from access activities in indigenous lands will require the 
authorization of indigenous leaders and the proposed in-
stitute. The process to pass draft Law No.  is currently 
on hold due to several factors that include budgetary 
constrains. However, in late  the Ministry of Health 
created a unit on traditional indigenous medicine that will 
address some of the issues proposed by the draft law.
In , Panama adopted a sui generis system for the 
protection of community intellectual rights that is among 
the first in the region. Law  of  June  established 
a special regime for the intellectual protection of commu-
nity rights, cultural identity, and traditional knowledge. 
The law provides protection to traditional knowledge 
of indigenous groups that include customs, models, 
drawings, music, art, and other inventions, through a 
registry system. The Division of Industrial Property of 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry administers the 
system. Registration is voluntary, free of charge, and there 
are no time limits for the protection provided by the reg-
istry. The registry will not prevent the continuous use of 
traditional knowledge but it will protect it from being used 
by others without previous authorization or compensation. 
Policymakers are currently working on a regulation for the 
law that will include monitoring requirements and compen-
sation provisions such as royalties and up-front payments 
if indigenous knowledge is used by third parties. Additional 
work is also taking place on a draft law for the protection 
of the collective rights of local communities to protect the 
biological, medical, and ecological knowledge of indigenous 
peoples (M. Dimas, pers. comm February ). 
Concerns
Lack of technical capacity, pertinent information, and mis-
trust from indigenous groups are some of the concerns and 
obstacles facing the development process of  laws in 
Panama. These issues have contributed to controversial 
and heated debates about ownership of genetic resources, 
traditional knowledge, and s. There are still many over-
lapping issues and judicial obstacles that policymakers 
will have to overcome in order to develop a comprehensive 
and cohesive  system. Panama has not signed the ’s 
 and it is uncertain how national laws and policies 
will assimilate the treaty requirements (M. Dimas, pers. 
comm. February ).
Philippines
Process
The history of  policies in the Philippines has been 
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marked by two significant events: the adoption of the  
Executive Order  ( ) and the enactment of the 
 Wildlife Resources and Conservation Act (hereafter, 
Wildlife Act). The act included only two articles about ac-
cess and benefit-sharing issues, but it addressed many of 
the criticisms made of   and modified it substantially. 
However,   is still quite relevant for the regulation of 
bioprospecting activities (see Chapters  and ). 
The development process of   can be traced 
back to the  Seventh Asian Symposium on Medicinal 
Plants, Species, and Other Natural Products held in the 
Philippines. Two of the main outcomes of the Symposium 
were the Manila Declaration entitled “The Ethical 
Utilization of Asian Biological Resources”, and the “Code 
of Ethics for Foreign Collectors of Biological Samples and 
Contract Guidelines”. These two documents and the  
created great awareness about the issue of bioprospecting 
in Asian countries and encouraged the Philippine Network 
for the Chemistry of Natural Products in Southeast Asia 
(with financial support from ) to develop the first 
draft of  . Subsequently, in October , Antonio 
G.M. La Viña, a legal consultant, was invited to revise the 
draft with input from members of the Philippine Network 
and representatives of key government departments. The 
  was adopted by the Philippines in . In , 
implementing rules and regulations for   were de-
veloped under the aegis of La Viña who was appointed 
under-secretary of the Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources (). Drafts were circulated for com-
ments to stakeholders that included government agencies, 
universities, private organizations, and s. The secretary 
of  signed a final version in mid-. The high level 
of participation in the development of   was quite 
unusual for an executive order in the Philippines, which 
usually requires only limited consultation. In this case, rep-
resentatives of government, scientists, nongovernmental 
organizations, community organizations, and the business 
community were actively involved in the drafting through 
a number of consultative meetings (A.G.M. La Viña, pers. 
comm. March ). 
In , the th Congress passed the Wildlife Act. 
The process began in , when five House bills were 
filed and consolidated into one bill. A similar bill was 
filed in the Senate. The lower house version was used as 
a working draft during the bicameral committee sessions. 
Since the Wildlife Act is actually a codification of exist-
ing laws on the protection and conservation of wildlife 
resources, experience with the implementation of exist-
ing laws helped greatly in the design of the Wildlife Act. 
Concerns and issues raised against old laws such as  
 were addressed in the act. 
The following sectors participated during the dis-
cussion process: government (Bureau of Customs, 
Philippine National Museum, Department of Science 
and Technology, Bureau of Aquatic Resources, National 
Bureau of Investigation, Protected Areas and Wildlife 
Bureau, Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau, 
Department of Trade and Industry, National Committee on 
Biosafety in the Philippines, and the  Regional Center 
for Biodiversity Conservation); academia (University of 
the Philippines () Marine Science Institute and the 
Institute of Plant Breeding- Los Baños); business 
(Floratrade/Philippine Horticultural Society and Southeast 
Asian Fisheries Development Corp); and s (Kalikasan 
Mindoro Foundation and Conservation International). 
Participants were in full support of the Wildlife Act and 
acknowledged its potential to facilitate and streamline  
procedures. Most of the concerns or criticisms against  
 were considered and accommodated. There were also 
no controversial provisions or issues.  redrafted the 
Wildlife Act’s provisions on bioprospecting. This is the 
same agency primarily in charge of implementing   
(See Chapters  and ). In July , the draft “Guidelines 
for Bioprospecting Activities in the Philippines” were re-
leased by  for public review and comment. These 
guidelines were based on national consultations and 
interagency meetings. If adopted, the guidelines would 
facilitate the implementation of the Wildlife Act and those 
provisions of   not repealed by the Wildlife Act.
Concerns
The main difficulty experienced during the design of  
 was the lack of experience of policymakers, both 
domestically and internationally. Another concern was 
its impact on domestic research. Getting all the agencies 
and stakeholders that should be engaged and involved in 
drafting   to commit the time and resources for the 
process was difficult. As noted above, the first draft of  
 came from a group of scientists (a network of Natural 
Chemistry professors and researchers), and promoting sub-
sequent support of the initiative by government agencies 
was difficult.
The process had to overcome several procedural and 
technical issues and perhaps the most difficult one was 
determining the scope of the regulation. Other challenges 
included funding and sanctions. In addition, it was dif-
ficult to determine a strategy to encourage self-regulation 
within the domestic academic community so that   
would not become a bureaucratic nightmare for legitimate 
researchers. The Academic Research Agreement was con-
ceptualized as the way to deal with this concern. Under 
this concept, researchers within an institution need apply 
for access only with that institution and not separately 
with the government. Putting together the administrative 
machinery for implementation was also a difficult problem 
as there are many agencies with some aspect of jurisdic-
tion over bioprospecting activities (A.G.M. La Viña, pers. 
comm. March ). 
Some of the concerns voiced during discussion of the 
Wildlife Act included: a) the need to simplify the permit-
ting system for noncommercial research and development; 
b) the need to provide a list of species that are banned and 
restricted for prosecution purposes; c) government agen-
cies mandated to do research had to be exempted from 
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securing permits for collection; e) species listed under the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora should be prohibited from ex-
ploitation except for scientific, education, experimental 
breeding, and propagation purposes; and f) the need to 
ensure that bioprospectors comply with the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety when samples are imported (see 
Chapter ).
Samoa
Process
Since the mid-s, Samoa has been carrying out initia-
tives to implement the . In , policymakers initi-
ated development of a draft National Biodiversity Strategy 
that was not completed due to lack of funding7. In , 
however, thanks to financial support provided by the , 
the draft was revised, improved, and completed becom-
ing part of the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action 
Plan (). The  was adopted by Samoa in April 
 and provided the conceptual and strategic founda-
tion for the parallel and future efforts on  issues that 
have been supported since  by - and . 
In March , these organizations and  held in Fiji 
a regional workshop on the implementation of the  in 
the Pacific Islands region. Participants at the workshop 
included government organizations, s, and academic 
institutions. 
The workshop produced a draft list of guidelines 
on  issues that was adopted by participants from  
Pacific Island countries. As a result of this workshop and 
the regional guidelines the Department of Lands, Surveys, 
and Environment of Samoa adopted the  “Conditions 
for Access to and Benefit Sharing of Samoa’s Biodiversity 
Resources”. The conditions, however, are likely to be 
replaced by a draft bioprospecting regulation that will 
become part of the  Lands and Environment Act (C. 
Schuster and D.M. Clarke pers. comm. November ).
Concerns 
Lack of funding and local capacity, ownership of ge-
netic resources and traditional knowledge, and the impact 
of s are some of the concerns and difficulties faced by 
stakeholders and policymakers of Samoa. Many stakehold-
ers oppose the patenting of knowledge and have concerns 
about the impact of s on the conservation of biodiversity 
(C. Schuster, pers. comm. November ).
Thailand
Process
Origins of the development process of the  Plant 
Variety Protection Act () and the Royal Forest 
Department () Regulation on Forestry Studying and 
Research Conducting within Forested Areas () 
go back to  when the working group on genetic re-
sources (established under the National Committee on the 
Convention on Biological Diversity) examined legal issues 
associated with access to and benefit sharing of genetic 
resources. Early discussions on the Act on the Protection 
and Promotion of Traditional Medicinal Intelligence (-
) also took place in  when  was concluded 
and Thailand learned about its commitments regarding the 
need for a protection mechanism of plant varieties. 
The development process of the  took two years. 
The drafting process was initiated by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives in  during the govern-
ment of Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh and it 
was passed into law in  while Prime Minister Chuan 
Leekpai was in office. The process was initiated with brain-
storming sessions among government officials resulting 
in a working group that brought together policymakers, 
s, researchers, private sector representatives, lawyers, 
and academics to work on the drafting of the act. The 
first draft was discussed at a public hearing, amendments 
were made, and it was sent off to the Parliament. A major 
obstacle to the process was that Parliament was dissolved 
while the draft law was being discussed. The draft law was 
sent back to government and officials used this opportunity 
to modify some of the provisions unilaterally. However, 
in the end, compromises were made between government 
officials and stakeholders, the draft was resubmitted to the 
next Parliament and passed into law (J. Donavanik, pers. 
comm. January ). 
Between  and ,  officials that included 
forestry experts and lawyers developed the . 
Prompted by complaints from researchers about extremely 
long application times for access permits, among other 
reasons,  set up a Technical Committee in October  
to advise the Director General. The Technical Committee 
met several times in  and early  and discussions 
focused on developing a regulation to facilitate access for 
researchers to state-owned forested areas. In April , a 
Research Proposal Reviewing Subcommittee (RPRS) was 
set up under the Technical Committee to examine issues 
related with the upcoming access regulation. In September 
, the  released and adopted the . In , a 
second unit was split out from the , the Department of 
National Parks, Wildlife, and Plant Conservation (). 
In late , both departments were put under the aegis 
of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment. 
Under the new scheme the general directors of  and 
 regulate access to natural, biological, and genetic 
resources found in forest and protected areas of Thailand 
(C. Hutacharern, pers. comm. December ).
In , the Institute of Traditional Thai Medical 
Practice (Ministry of Public Health) initiated the devel-
opment process of the . The process included the 
participation of traditional healers, specialists in herbal 
medicines, and experts in the development process of tra-
ditional medicines. Other participants included lawyers, 
scholars in the field of traditional medicine, doctors, chem-
ists, and government officials. Stakeholders discussed 
different ideas and strategies to ensure the protection of 
medicinal knowledge about plants and animals. The debate 
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also addressed Article  (j) of the  on the protection 
of traditional knowledge, innovations, and practices. The 
draft went through several public hearings, it was sent to 
Parliament, and became law in  (J. Donavanik, pers. 
comm. January ). 
Concerns
The development process of the  was marked by 
rivalry between domestic s and government officials. 
Ownership of genetic resources, indigenous knowledge, 
and s were controversial issues. For example, s 
did not want modern  protection such as patents on life 
forms or traditional knowledge. The private sector stressed 
the potential of genetic resources as a source of monetary 
and nonmonetary benefits to society. Compromise re-
garding this point was reached by providing a minimum 
standard of protection to allow the protection of inventions 
(J. Donavanik, pers. comm. January ). 
The development process of the  had to over-
come conflicts about details involving monitoring strate-
gies, application proposals, and progress reports among the 
members of the technical committee.  officials where 
also concerned about potential biopiracy and they proposed 
prevention strategies such as assigning a co-researcher to 
every bioprospecting project. Some officials who were 
concerned about biopiracy issues also attempted to put 
additional restrictions in the access process. 
In the early stages of the development process of the 
, the government was not open to the idea of this act 
because its scope had not been clearly defined (see Chapter 
). Furthermore, there were concerns about compatibility 
issues between the act and . These concerns were 
echoed by the American Embassy in Thailand. However, 
the scope was refined, compatibility issues were addressed, 
the government accepted the draft bill, and it was passed 
into law (J. Donavanik, pers. comm. January ). 
Vanuatu
Process
In , the Ministry of Lands, Natural Resources, Energy, 
and Environment established a National Biodiversity 
Advisory Committee that promoted a process of discussion 
of biodiversity issues to facilitate the implementation of 
the . This committee had ample participation by repre-
sentatives of government, academic institutions, and s 
that, together with the Ministry, facilitated the completion 
of the National Biodiversity Action Plan in . In , 
the momentum created by this plan was channeled by the 
Ministry to establish four working groups to have discus-
sions on access and benefit sharing, traditional knowledge 
and rights, and capacity building. Priority has also been 
given to the discussion of the protection of traditional 
knowledge and innovation and the fair and equitable 
sharing of benefits derived from biodiversity. 
Regional and international organizations such as , 
-, and  have supported these initiatives with 
regional and national workshops held in Fiji and Vanuatu in 
March  and April , respectively. The workshops 
have provided a valuable arena for stakeholders to discuss 
a great variety of issues ranging from ownership of biologi-
cal and genetic resources to definitions of access to genetic 
resources. Discussions among stakeholders still continue 
but access and benefit-sharing regulations are expected to 
be incorporated into a draft Environment Act that should 
be introduced into Parliament in  (C. Schuster, pers. 
comm. August ).
Concerns
In the absence of national regulations, government agen-
cies have negotiated ad hoc arrangements with bioprospec-
tors that include a standard application form, not legally 
binding, that has been used since  to regulate foreign 
bioprospectors. Kava (Piper methysticum) and other bio-
logical resources have been heavily exploited in Vanuatu 
and there is a perception that local communities have not 
been adequately compensated for their resources and tradi-
tional knowledge. Local researchers and institutions have 
not been invited to collaborate in bioprospecting initiatives 
and the government does not monitor the use of samples 
once they leave the country. In addition, there are concerns 
that samples initially collected for one purpose are stored 
and then used for another purpose. For example, blood 
samples originally collected for malaria experiments were 
later used for the human genome project. The unauthorized 
use of blood samples resulted in protests from indigenous 
groups (C. Schuster, pers. comm. October ). 
Ownership of land and genetic resources is a complex 
issue. According to the constitution, traditional communi-
ties own all the land in Vanuatu. Therefore,  procedures 
are particularly important, but researchers have shown re-
sistance to follow them. Land cannot be alienated but the 
government may own land acquired by it in the public 
interest. Parliament, after consultation with the national 
Council of Chiefs, may allocate land according to different 
use categories. Lack of financial aid, technical informa-
tion, and expertise are also major concerns in Vanuatu. 
Efforts to complete the National Biodiversity Strategy and 
Action Plan would have not been possible without funds 
from the  and technical assistance from organizations 
such as  and - (C. Schuster, pers. comm. 
October ).
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For the countries reviewed in this chapter,  policymak-
ing has been an incremental process, a sequence of events 
influenced by many actors with different interests, values, 
information roles, perspectives, and agendas. Since the  
came into force, each nation has followed different policy 
timelines driven by its unique social, economic, and politi-
cal circumstances. While a few countries have concluded 
the policymaking process, most are still conducting it, and 
some have not yet found the conditions to initiate it. 
The policymaking process can be visualized in many 
ways. B and L () propose that a frame-
work composed of three stages: a) initiation, b) estimation, 
and c) selection can be used to characterize policymak-
ing efforts. Initiation consists of problem identification 
and agenda setting, estimation involves expert analysis 
and technical consideration, and selection refers to the 
fact that someone, based on technical and political input, 
has to make a decision about the best course of action or 
policy. This framework facilitates the identification and 
understanding of key patterns and lessons from our case 
studies. 
Policy Initiation 
 issues have been poorly defined by the . Most of 
the work has been passed to the member countries that have 
received key input from the  secretariat, Conference 
of the Parties, and other bodies. As  members, coun-
tries have responsibilities that include identifying relevant 
 issues, putting them on the agenda, identifying the 
stakeholders, ensuring equal opportunities to participate, 
initiating the debate, and addressing policy and value 
conflicts. 
The agenda of the policymaking process can be divided 
into systemic and institutional (B ). The systemic 
agenda includes all issues that the “attentive public” agrees 
need to be resolved. The “attentive public” is the informed, 
political, intellectual, and more educated layer of society. 
This public is usually composed of representatives of 
academic, research, advocate, or grassroots organizations. 
They are vocal about recurring issues that are problematic 
and cannot be ignored. When this public can convince its 
government about the importance of these issues, then 
policymakers place these issues on the institutional agenda. 
Sometimes, however, issues bypass the systemic agenda 
and simply originate at the institutional level. The institu-
tional agenda includes issues that the government plans 
to consider seriously and actively. The problem is clearly 
identified, solutions are proposed, and financial resources 
are allocated. Issues placed on the institutional agenda are 
also subject to time constraints 
When the  came into force,  issues were placed 
on the institutional agenda of the international community 
of countries. More than  countries agreed on the need 
to implement the  in order to ensure the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity and the equi-
table distribution of benefits derived from this diversity, 
among other issues. Many countries, however, have been 
unable to address several  issues comprehensively and 
effectively. , for example, has not been a priority for 
% of the Pacific Rim countries examined in this report. 
Lack of technical expertise, budgetary constraints, weak 
government structures and political support, local social 
conflict, and conflict over ownership of biological resourc-
es are some of the reasons cited by  experts that have 
prevented Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Nauru, Palau, Tonga, and Tuvalu from working actively 
towards the development of  policies. The remaining 
% of Pacific Rim countries have managed at least to 
initiate policy processes to incorporate  provisions 
into national laws and policies (see Table  of Chapter 
). They have allocated scarce financial and technical re-
sources needed to begin the collection of key information 
and the identification of the range of possible responses, 
policy choices, and stakeholders. 
The controversial nature of  issues demand the in-
volvement of potential providers, users, and intermediaries 
of genetic resources in the initiation process of  policies. 
If these stakeholders appropriate the policy development 
process as their own, this will increase the legitimacy of the 
policy outcome and facilitate its implementation process. 
Government agencies, legislative commissions, industry 
and academic groups, s, and regional economic and 
social integration organizations have been some of the loci 
for initiation of processes for countries that have completed 
or are currently working on  policies. Industry groups, 
s, and academia played varying roles in the initiation 
process of pioneer  laws such as the Andean Decision 
, the Philippines’s  , and Costa Rica’s Law of 
Biodiversity. The process that resulted in the adoption of 
Decision  by the Andean Community was initiated by 
the Secretariat of the Andean Community with technical 
support from domestic s, international agriculture 
research centers, and government agencies. At the initial 
stage of the policy debate these actors attempted to de-
mocratize the process by holding a workshop but conflict 
and controversy arose among participants and thwarted 
the continuation of the participatory process. Some s, 
for example, advocated a policy instrument focused on 
biodiversity conservation and sustainable use goals, while 
government actors insisted on the importance of keep-
ing the commercial perspective of  issues. No middle 
ground was found and government officials assimilated 
the policymaking process that resulted in the commercial 
orientation of Decision . This outcome suggested that 
the concern of government agencies had the tendency to 
dominate the process conceptually and administratively 
to the exclusion of concerns of some environmental s 
and other participants that should have shared the focus 
of attention. Years after the adoption of Decision  
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and criticism about its restrictive nature (G ), 
Andean countries such as Colombia are still working on 
national policies to facilitate its implementation. 
In the Philippines, an academic/industry group initi-
ated the policy process that resulted in the adoption of 
 . In spite of the participatory process launched 
by this group, involving and making government and 
other sectors support the process was a difficult and long 
undertaking. Similarly, the first draft of Costa Rica’s 
Law of Biodiversity was developed by a Costa Rican ex-
politician with technical support provided by the World 
Conservation Union’s Regional Office for Mesoamerica. 
The process included the participation of a wide variety of 
sectors, but interestingly enough the Costa Rican Ministry 
of the Environment and Energy was not deeply involved 
into the process and no one within the Ministry appropri-
ated the new law as a government initiative (J. Cabrera, 
pers. comm. February ). Therefore, when the new 
Minister came into power, she submitted a constitutional 
challenge that has prevented the full implementation of 
the law. Costa Rica’s Law of Biodiversity has influenced 
other Central American nations such as Nicaragua. In this 
case, however, Nicaragua’s Ministry for the Environment 
and Natural Resources provided leadership to initiate and 
advance a participatory development process of a draft 
Law of Biodiversity that addresses  issues and other 
biodiversity related goals. Presently, however, the draft 
law is stalled because the Agriculture Ministry argues 
that biosafety issues fall under the jurisdiction of this 
body, hence an independent law enforced by the Ministry 
should address them. This brings up the point that  
policy goals are typically under the jurisdiction of multiple 
government organizations that must be actively involved 
into the policymaking process. 
Processes to include  principles into existing laws 
have also been initiated by governmental bodies with vary-
ing degrees of success. For example, Mexico’s -
 and the commissions on ecology and environment 
promoted the reform of . The reform, however, 
was not significant and only two articles ( and  ) 
were included into the Act to facilitate access and ben-
efit-sharing goals. Legal gaps and a lack of a nationwide 
participatory process during the development of the law 
questioned its legitimacy (see Chapter ). Thailand’s 
, was developed by  officials without input 
from other stakeholders. So far the regulation has not been 
tested by commercial bioprospectors. Similarly, Chile’s 
Ministry of Agriculture completed in isolation a draft for 
a law to regulate access to agricultural genetic resources 
that was discarded after severe criticism (see Chapter ). 
In contrast, the process initiated by Environment Australia 
to include  provisions into the  involved the par-
ticipation of biotechnology, indigenous, environmental, 
government, and academic groups through a national 
inquiry and several public hearings. A key factor that 
contributed to the strength and momentum of the process 
was the establishment in  of Biotechnology Australia, 
a multi-departmental government agency, responsible for 
coordinating nonregulatory biotechnology issues for the 
Commonwealth Government (see Chapter ). A differ-
ent but equally effective process to develop a federal  
policy was initiated by a task force integrating federal 
and state representatives from government and s of 
Malaysia. The sufficiently diverse composition of the task 
force provided technical expertise and legitimacy to the 
process. Government and nongovernment agencies with 
strong technical capacities on biotechnology and biodi-
versity research together with environment ministries 
have proven to be an effective combination to advance 
the incorporation of  goals into national policies. This 
pattern is clear not only in Australia and Malaysia, but also 
in Costa Rica and the Philippines.
, -, and  have held a series of work-
shops among Pacific Island countries that initiated  pro-
cesses in countries such as Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, 
Niue, Samoa, and Vanuatu. A direct impact of a workshop 
held in Fiji was Samoa’s adoption of  conditions as 
an executive provisional measure to regulate  goals. 
These conditions have been turned into a bioprospecting 
regulation that will complement an upcoming Land and 
Environment Act (see Chapter ). Other countries such 
as Cambodia, China, El Salvador, Honduras, Indonesia, 
Japan, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of 
Korea, the Russian Federation, Singapore, and Thailand 
have different processes under way that have been initi-
ated by central government bodies in charge of judicial 
and environmental duties (see Table  of Chapter ). 
All of them are still at initial or intermediate stages of 
discussing . 
Policy Estimation
Policy initiation and estimation are usually parallel pro-
cesses (B and L ). Estimation is essen-
tial not only to analyze risks, costs, and benefits of  
goals but also to facilitate the selection of the  policy 
(Law of Biodiversity, stand-alone national  policy, 
etc.) that fits legal, social, administrative, economic, and 
political conditions of the country. Estimation also involves 
the analysis of empirical and theoretical characteristics 
of  issues that apply to , biodiversity conservation, 
ownership of genetic resources, and the protection of 
traditional knowledge (see Chapter ). Sometimes these 
policy goals are in conflict with each other and with ex-
isting policies and forms of government. An example of 
this is the incompatibility between Chile’s current strict 
private property right system and the issue of ownership 
of genetic resources which prevented initial efforts to de-
velop an  policy in that country. Malaysia’s initiatives 
to adopt a national  policy have also been delayed by 
a property rights conflict. The federal government claims 
ownership over genetic resources found in federal land 
that are also claimed by state governments and indigenous 
communities. Similarly, New Zealand’s Maori people have 
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claimed exclusive rights over genetic resources, thereby 
delaying efforts to initiate an  policy (see Table  of 
Chapter ). Ownership of genetic resources found in ex 
situ conditions has also been a concern for Australia, Cook 
Islands, and Nicaragua. 
Policy estimation also has to take into account politi-
cal agendas, misperceptions, value conflicts, and different 
levels of information and expertise. For example, organi-
zations such as  (formerly known as ) label any 
kind of bioprospecting (even if it involves benefit-sharing 
agreements) as biopiracy8 and this message has reached 
many indigenous and grassroots organizations worldwide. 
Some level of opposition to bioprospecting and concerns 
about the inequitable distribution of benefits was identified 
in all the countries addressed in this chapter. The protec-
tion of traditional knowledge and patenting of life are also 
major concerns, particularly in countries such as Australia, 
Ecuador, Honduras, Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and 
Thailand that have significant indigenous populations.
The essential role of policy experts and facilitators of 
explaining the multiple dimensions and implications of 
 policies is certainly needed in all the countries that 
are attempting to implement the .  issues have 
presented new conceptual, political, and operational chal-
lenges to stakeholders. Technical guidance and support 
by the Conference of the Parties of the , the ad hoc 
group of experts on , and regional organizations such 
as  have been instrumental to further key national 
efforts. Countries such as Panama and Indonesia have 
welcomed and are using the Bonn Guidelines on . 
 workshops and technical assistance together with 
technical expertise provided by , -South Pacific 
Programme, and the United Nations University have sup-
ported  initiatives of Pacific Island countries. Efforts 
advanced by these organizations, however, do not have an 
impact unless they are assimilated and appropriated by 
strong and proactive national agencies and s. Building 
local capacity to improve policy initiation and estimation 
is a priority for all the countries reviewed in this chapter 
but particularly so for the Pacific Island countries. 
Policy Selection
Selection involves the most political step in the policymak-
ing process. A decision maker or decision makers select a 
course of action based on available technical, social, and 
political information gathered and analyzed during the 
initiation and estimation stages (B and L 
). If previous analyses present technical contradic-
tions or political conflicts, policymakers may decide not to 
select any policy. For example, in the early s, Chile’s 
National Commission of the Environment examined the 
possibility of developing a national  law, but this effort 
was thwarted by an inability to resolve technical issues, 
lack of political support, and the unwillingness of govern-
ment officials to promote a participatory process to discuss 
the issue (see Chapter ). 
The Mexican experience also shows that the simplistic 
focus of  policy incorporated into the  diverted 
attention from the short- and medium-term problems that 
arise with implementation of the policy (see Chapter ). 
A more comprehensive perspective of  issues can be 
addressed within the context of , which is the first 
step followed by most countries that want to implement the 
 as a whole (M and L ). There is not 
sufficient evidence that  can lead to successful  
policies. But Chile’s recent National Biodiversity Strategy 
and future  may provide the needed framework, re-
sources, political support, and momentum to overcome 
old difficulties in developing an  policy. Countries 
such as Australia, Cook Islands, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Marshall Islands, Micronesia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, 
the Russian Federation, and Tonga have also followed this 
approach. On the other hand, China, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru, Philippines, and Thailand, among other countries, 
have developed or are developing  policies indepen-
dently of any process triggered by an . 
Policy options identified in this report that address  
goals include: 
• Regional and national stand-alone  laws and 
policies (Andean Community, China, Malaysia, 
and the Philippines); 
• Laws of biodiversity, sustainable development, 
or environment acts that include biodiversity con-
servation and sustainable use provisions and  
guidelines. These laws are usually designed to 
implement the  as a whole (Costa Rica, Cook 
Islands, Honduras, Indonesia, and Nicaragua); 
• Existing environmental, sustainable development 
or ecological laws that have been amended (by 
national legislative bodies) or modified (through 
executive regulations) to include  provisions 
(Australia and Mexico); 
•  policies that may be developed further into 
more comprehensive  laws (El Salvador, Samoa, 
and Panama).
It is not realistic to suggest that any one of the above 
policy approaches is a magic wand that can facilitate the 
incorporation of  principles into national policies. Each 
of them has advantages and disadvantages. For example, 
the Costa Rican experience shows that the debate of a 
multi-objective regulation such as the Law of Biodiversity 
may not provide the time or resources to debate adequately 
the intricacies of  issues. Also, Nicaragua’s draft Law 
of Biodiversity overlaps with existing laws and presents 
a jurisdictional conflict to government agencies. Policy 
approaches should be carefully analyzed and selected 
according to national social, political, and institutional 
characteristics, priorities, and local expertise. 
In some countries that share common ecosystems and 
cultural backgrounds, national  policies have been sup-
ported by regional initiatives such as the Central American 

 1 Consistent with my use in Chapter , I define bioprospecting as 
the search for plants, animals, and microbial species for academic, 
pharmaceutical, biotechnological, agricultural, and other industrial 
purposes.
 2 In March  the Ministry of Agriculture started a process of 
consultation and analysis within government agencies to determine 
the consequences and benefits that signature and ratification of the 
 may have for Chile. After a few months of discussions 
Chile signed it on  November  (see Chapter ).
 3 See the  website at : http://www.field.org.uk/biodiversity_
pg.php.
 4 These policies and laws are: a) the 1989 Wild Animal Protection 
Law; b) the 1997 Wild Plant Protection Regulation; c) the 1998 
Regulation for Protection of New Plant Varieties; d) the 1989 
Regulation for Seeds Administration; e) the 2000 Seeds Law; f) the 
1993 Regulation for Protection of Chinese Herb Medicine Varieties; 
g) the 1994 Administrative Regulation for Breeding Livestock, 
Animals, and Poultry; h) the 1994 Regulation for Nature Reserves; 
i) the Provisional Regulation for Seeds Importing and Exporting; 
A B  S  B
Protocol on Access to Genetic and Biochemical Resources 
and their Associated Knowledge and the  framework 
agreement on access to biological and genetic resources. 
One of the goals of these regional frameworks is to ensure 
that national  requirements are consistent to prevent 
bioprospectors from shopping for the best deal in coun-
tries that share similar ecosystems. All Central American 
countries already signed the Protocol and when approved 
it will become national law in each of them. The  
framework is expected to be adopted in  or .
j) the 1998 Provisional Regulation for Human Genetic Resources; 
and k) the 2001 Regulation for Safety of Agricultural Genetically-
Modified Organisms (D. Xue, pers. comm. December 2003).
   “One of the oldest regional organizations in the world,  cel-
ebrated its th anniversary on  February . It is a non-politi-
cal, technical assistance and research body, and fills a consultative 
and advisory role.” : http://www.spc.org.nc/history.htm.
  While the above process was taking place at the federal level, the 
states of Sarawak and Sabah were working on their own access and 
benefit-sharing regulations that culminated in the enactment of the 
Sarawak Biodiversity Center Ordinance of  and  the Sabah 
Biodiversity Enactment of  (see Chapter ).
 7 This preliminary draft was developed with technical support 
provided by the New Zealand Official Development Assistance 
(known today as the New Zealand Agency for International 
Development).
 8 See http://www.etcgroup.org/article.asp?newsid=.
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Final Comment
Ideally, the policy process has to be initiated and ap-
propriated by the highest number possible of providers, 
users, and intermediaries of genetic resources to ensure 
its legitimacy during its development and implementation. 
This is the main lesson identified from  policy processes 
carried out in countries that include Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Mexico, the Philippines, Australia, and Malaysia (see 
Chapters , , , , , and ). The advantages of carry-
ing out a wide participatory process lie in the collection 
of key practical and theoretical information about  
issues (see Chapter ), in the identification of potential 
problems and concerns (this chapter), and in the opportu-
nity to involve key stakeholders that bring legitimacy to 
the policy process, its final outcome, and implementation 
process. This is certainly a long, difficult, and expensive 
process and there are no guarantees about the efficacy and 
efficiency of the policy outcome. However, our case studies 
suggest that  polices that reflect and involve the needs 
and desires of all stakeholders have a higher probability 
of being successful than those that are developed by a 
minority of technocrats.

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Implementation Pathways
Stephen B. Brush and Santiago Carrizosa
The drafting and implementation of national policies and 
laws to facilitate access to genetic resources and ensure the 
equitable sharing of the benefits of access is still very much 
a work in progress. Only % of Pacific Rim countries 
have established access and benefit-sharing () laws and 
policies (see Chapter ) and their experience in implement-
ing them is uneven. Costa Rica, the Philippines, Mexico, 
Samoa, and the  (National Park Service () policy)1 
are the only Pacific Rim countries that have approved ac-
cess applications under  laws and policies developed 
or reformed after the Convention on Biological Diversity 
() came into force in  (see Table  of Chapter ). 
The novel and sometimes experimental nature of some 
of the policy tools employed affects our ability to distill 
definitive lessons or guidelines that can be used to im-
prove existing or pending  frameworks. Nevertheless, 
the range of experiences among Pacific Rim countries in 
processing bioprospecting2 project proposals is useful in 
anticipating obstacles and suggesting pathways to policy 
implementation. Under the  laws and policies of these 
countries a total of  bioprospecting projects3 have been 
approved between  and July  (see Table ). The 
purpose of this chapter is to use the information gathered 
in the Pacific Rim case studies (Chapters  through ) to 
illustrate some critical lessons about the implementation 
of  regimes.
We will analyze the implementation of  policy 
by focusing on three steps in the process of initiating a 
bioprospecting project: a) application to a competent au-
thority, b) review and negotiation of acceptable terms such 
as prior informed consent () procedures and benefit-
sharing obligations with the government and providers of 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge, and c) initia-
tion of approved projects for the collection of biological 
materials and the return of benefits related to collecting. It 
is impossible at this time to determine whether the imple-
mentation of  policies has been successful in meeting 
the overarching goals of the  beyond providing access 
to biological resources (i.e., providing benefit sharing and 
achieving conservation of biological diversity). Our evalu-
ation of the extent to which these goals have been met is 
limited by the following considerations: a) many projects 
which have been initiated under  regimes are still in 
progress, b) a delay is expected in identifying, using, and 
perhaps commercializing useful genetic resources, and c) 
a long time is needed to determine whether biodiversity 
conservation and adequate benefit sharing have indeed 
been achieved.
The Road Towards Implementation of ABS 
Laws and Policies
The  and biopiracy claims prompted governments 
around the world to draft national  policies. Because the 
 recognized that countries have sovereign rights over 
their genetic resources, it did not specify or suggest model 
policies for nations to emulate4, but a few noteworthy ex-
periments in fashioning  agreements have provided 
ideas for national policy frameworks. Parties from several 
countries that lack  frameworks have used Letters of 
Intent (), Letters of Collection (), Memoranda of 
Understanding (), and benefit-sharing or material 
transfer agreements to facilitate access and define benefit-
sharing obligations (see Table ). Since the late s, in 
 
response to the reluctance of biodiversity-rich countries 
to allow bioprospectors to conduct collections freely, the 
National Cancer Institute () in the United States of 
America () developed three standard agreements to 
facilitate the sharing of monetary and nonmonetary ben-
efits. The first agreement, a  , was later improved 
by a   and a  . Under these instruments 
 collectors (e.g., the New York Botanical Garden, the 
Missouri Botanical Garden, the University of Illinois at 
Chicago, and the Coral Reef Research Foundation) were 
able to get access to biological samples found in many 
Pacific Rim countries (see Table , C et al. , 
ten Kate and Laird ). Many of these samples were 
obtained in collaboration with scientists from local re-
search and academic organizations. Perhaps the primary 
example of a comprehensive and influential benefit-sharing 
agreement was the Merck–National Biodiversity Institute 
(io) contract negotiated in Costa Rica in  (R 
et al. ). This agreement not only inspired subsequent 
contracts signed by io with many organizations world-
wide (see Chapter ), but also the agreements established 
under the International Cooperative Biodiversity Group 
()5 program. From  to , the s used 
benefit-sharing agreements that facilitated access to the 
genetic resources of the following Pacific Rim countries: 
Chile (), Costa Rica (), Mexico ( and ), 
Panama (), Peru (), Laos (), and Vietnam 
() (see Table ). 
The timing and publicity of the  Merck–io and 
 agreements helped make them models for creating 
national policies and laws to reach the general goals of 
the  (R et al. ). Among the elements 
of these agreements that are replicated in  policies are 
a bilateral and contractual approach, well-defined parties 
to the contract, exchange of tangible short- and long-term 
benefits for the right to access, biodiversity conservation 
and sustainable use, and an intellectual property framework 
for deriving benefits (R et al. , R et al. 
). These elements are found in many  policies (see 
Chapter ), but in some contexts, they are associated with 
difficulties in the implementation phase.
While much of the period following the  United 
Nations Conference on the Environment and Development 
that gave rise to the  has been devoted to creating poli-
cies and administrative frameworks for access and benefit 
sharing, there is still only a limited number of cases where 
a national  law or policy has been tested in terms of 
applications, negotiations to establish acceptable terms, 
and the initiation of activities under agreements for access 
and benefit sharing. 
Case Studies
Our survey of national laws and policies for access and 
benefit sharing relating to biological resources and the 
case studies done in the Pacific Rim region illustrate two 
general facts. First, relatively few countries have entered 
fully into the implementation stage of their national  
laws and policies, in terms of processing applications for 
biological collections, reviewing and negotiating the terms 
of access and benefit sharing, and carrying out bioprospect-
ing activities. Second, the experience of countries that have 
implemented bioprospecting projects is very uneven and 
information on countries’ experience is difficult to find. 
At one extreme, some countries have succeeded in launch-
ing bioprospecting projects after negotiating with parties 
wishing to collect and use biological resources, while at 
the other extreme, some countries have failed, with the 
result that neither access nor benefit sharing has occurred. 
In this chapter, we will illustrate three types of experience 
in implementing  laws and policies as characterized 
by experiences in launching bioprospecting projects un-
der them: successful implementation, mixed success and 
breakdown, and thwarted implementation.
Successful Implementation
Two rather different countries, Costa Rica and the  
have succeeded in signing and entering into bioprospect-
ing agreements. It is interesting and important to note the 
initiation of projects in these countries is not an instance 
of implementing  policies that were formally developed 
as a government response to the . Rather, these projects 
grew out of personal networks and collaboration between 
researchers, government officials, and private firms and 
preceded the  or emerged outside of its framework.
Costa Rica. Success in initiating bioprospecting projects 
preceded the creation of a legal framework governing 
biodiversity (the  Law of Biodiversity No. ) in 
response to the  mandate. The Law of Biodiversity 
created a national framework that includes the National 
Commission of the Management of Biodiversity (-
). ’s role includes the formulation of  
policies. For example,  developed a General 
Access Procedure that was approved through an executive 
decree in December  (see Chapter ). 
The initial agreement that triggered subsequent ones 
is the Merck–io agreement reached in  (R et 
al. ). io grew out of Costa Rica’s unique environ-
mental, social, scientific, and political context. Scientific 
leadership in Costa Rica and the networks between this 
leadership and scientists outside of Costa Rica also were 
instrumental in developing a model  framework. io 
was established in  with the support of the Ministry 
of Natural Resources, Energy, and Mines (6) as 
part of Costa Rica’s efforts to improve environmental 
protection for its notable biological diversity (G et 
al. ).
io’s novel approach financed conservation through 
debt-for-nature swaps. io grew out of the Biodiversity 
Office, which was a dependency of , but it was 
created as a private, not-for-profit, public-interest associa-
tion dedicated to carrying out research and conservation 
activities for the protection of biological diversity in Costa 
Rica. While io was created prior to the  Law of 
A B  S  B
 
Wildlife Conservation () No. , the  opened 
a window of opportunity for io because an element in 
Costa Rica’s regulatory framework under the  permit-
ted  to allocate biodiversity prospecting conces-
sions in national conservation areas (S and 
G ). io became the agent for that allocation 
by means of a  formal agreement between  
and io that authorized io to negotiate subsequent 
agreements that provided access to genetic resources in 
national parks in return for financial support for io’s 
national biodiversity inventory and the National Parks 
Fund of  (S and G ).
The Merck–io agreement prompted other inter-
national companies and research institutions to seek 
similar arrangements for access to genetic resources in 
Costa Rica by collaborating with io and other national 
institutions such as the University of Costa Rica. A total 
of  bioprospecting projects have been granted access 
to Costa Rica’s biological and genetic resources under 
the   and its  regulations. The Merck–io 
agreement was renewed three times before expiring in 
. io has negotiated  other agreements with in-
ternational and national research institutions and private 
firms for prospecting activities that include chemicals from 
insects, fragrances and aromas, nematicides, and extremo-
philic organisms, in addition to bioassays of plants. Nine 
of these agreements are with private firms, one is with a 
multilateral organization, three are with universities in the 
United Kingdom, , and Canada, and one is with a local 
university and hospital. 
The level of activity reached under the  has helped 
make Costa Rica a model for  strategies based on bio-
prospecting. The success in carrying out bioprospecting 
projects in this framework is due to the special position of 
io as a nongovernmental institution with high scientific 
and administrative capacity and the  agreement with 
 which allows io to broker contracts for access 
to resources on certain public lands as long as io obtains 
the permits mandated by the . Furthermore, the  
/io agreement sets a target for bioprospecting 
projects that % of a project’s annual research budget 
and % of future royalties from the project that accrue 
to io must be donated to the National Parks Fund to 
be reinvested in conservation (S and G 
). Between  and , . million USD have 
been invested in conservation (see Chapter ). By working 
in designated conservation areas, such as the Guanacaste 
National Park, io is alleviated from the need to negoti-
ate with landholders and local communities. Likewise, the 
sharing of benefits is facilitated by io’s scientific and 
educational role and by its special relation to the National 
Park system and . These factors help io and 
its international partners to minimize transaction costs in 
negotiating for access and distribution of benefits. By act-
ing as a singular and nongovernmental authority in nego-
tiating access and benefits, io reduces the complexity 
of negotiating with private firms and universities. Finally, 
its focus on national parks and designated conservation 
areas directly connects benefits to accepted conservation 
activities. 
However, and despite the apparent success of this 
model, Costa Rica went beyond the framework provided 
in the  by enacting the Law of Biodiversity in  
(see Chapter ). The new law is a response to the mandate 
of the  to draft national  policies, and it replaces 
the nongovernmental approach utilized by io with a 
centralized process of issuing access permits through the 
Technical Office of . io is not a member of 
. 
Although the implementation of the Law of Biodiversity 
is not yet fully tested, as Chapter  suggests, it faces some 
severe obstacles. These include lack of clarity about the 
role and power of key elements in the proposed  provi-
sions, ambiguity about the relation to the  framework 
established previously under the , and obscurity 
and complexity in the application procedures. The gen-
eral atmosphere of the new  regime under the Law of 
Biodiversity is to be more restrictive and controlling of the 
process of negotiating access and benefits. Furthermore, 
the constitutional challenge requested by the Ministry of 
Environment and Energy (, the former , 
see endnote ) in  and made by the Attorney General 
against the law’s article that created  (among 
other articles) has brought political uncertainty to the role 
of this commission. The brief record of receiving applica-
tions under the new law appears to validate these concerns. 
Furthermore, none of the three applications submitted to 
date have been finalized (see Chapter ).
The case of Costa Rica suggests that success in imple-
mentation of  policy is best achieved in a decentralized 
system with flexible norms of negotiating benefits, a simple 
and direct system whereby the entity empowered to grant 
access negotiates directly with the organization seeking 
access, and where the number of parties in the negotiation 
and permitting process is minimized. The process envi-
sioned in the Law of Biodiversity appears to move Costa 
Rica away from these norms. 
. Similarly to other countries, the  has a brief histo-
ry regulating  with regard to its own genetic resources. 
The country’s experiment with  of national biological 
resources is represented in this report by a single case, 
the contract between the Yellowstone National Park and 
Diversa Corporation for access to thermophilic bacteria 
found in the hot springs of Yellowstone National Park. 
The Yellowstone–Diversa contract (i.e., a Cooperative 
Research and Development Agreement ()) is simi-
lar to the Merck–io agreement in several ways. Both 
were negotiated outside of the specific  context. In 
Costa Rica’s case, the deal was agreed to before the , 
and the  case involves a country that is not party to the 
. Like io, Yellowstone National Park was created 
before any  policy was conceived, and both the park 
and the institute had well-defined conservation missions 
before entering into bioprospecting contracts. 
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The Merck–io and Yellowstone–Diversa cases 
differ in their genesis. In Costa Rica, negotiations over 
access and benefits preceded bioprospecting activities, 
while in Yellowstone, bioprospecting preceded negotia-
tions over access and benefits. The Yellowstone–Diversa 
, negotiated in , followed the commercial 
success of using biological specimens from Yellowstone 
to create an essential tool for the biotechnology industry. 
The Cetus Corporation obtained samples of the Thermus 
aquaticus bacteria that had been collected in  and 
deposited with the American Type Culture Collection 
(), a nonprofit organization established in  as 
a resource center for biological products.  acquires, 
authenticates, preserves, and distributes biological materi-
als. Biological specimens, such as Thermus aquaticus, are 
held as public goods by , and  does not claim 
intellectual property over them. 
Cetus had acquired the original sample of Thermus 
aquaticus from  in  as a public good. The 
specimens of Thermus aquaticus were deposited with 
 before it had established a special collection and 
material procedure with the  National Park Service 
().  now maintains a special collection of biologi-
cal materials from the , including Thermus aquaticus 
from Yellowstone and has a material transfer agreement 
for the  collections which requires that the person re-
questing material acknowledge ownership by the federal 
government, agree to use the material, its replicates, and 
derivatives for research only and not commercial purposes 
without authorization, and agree to inform the  of find-
ings from the material, its replicates, or derivatives.
Thermus aquaticus proved to be highly valuable 
because it included a heat-stable enzyme named Taq 
polymerase that facilitated efficient, controlled replica-
tion of DNA. The commercial success of patenting, sale, 
and licensing of Taq led to recommendations from several 
groups and political leaders in the  that the  begin 
to regulate access and to seek benefits from its biological 
resources (see Chapter ). 
The  approach followed by the  was to adopt 
the framework of the  Federal Technology Transfer 
Act () whose purpose was to facilitate access by the 
private sector to knowledge and technology developed by 
government agencies or with public funding. The emphasis 
of this act is on access rather than benefit sharing (A et 
al. ). Increased access was meant to increase the rate 
of return on public investment and thus provide increased 
social benefit. The underlying logic of  is that access 
to knowledge, for instance through exclusive licensing of 
patents held by government laboratories, will facilitate 
the development and diffusion of new technology and 
thereby provide for benefit sharing by enhancing social 
welfare.  was one of several laws passed to enhance 
commercial development of publicly owned knowledge or 
resources and to increase private investment in research 
that had been initiated by public agencies (A et al. 
). Although the  emphasized access, it also 
anticipated the possibility of a benefit stream back to the 
federal partner (See Chapter ). The vehicle that the  
promoted for increasing  goals between federally fund-
ed programs and private businesses was the 7. The 
 Yellowstone National Park–Diversa  provided 
access to thermophilic and other biological resources of 
Yellowstone National Park to Diversa in return for short- 
and long-term financial returns (see Chapter ). While 
the Yellowstone–Diversa agreement was challenged as a 
violation of the public trust and the conservation mission 
of Yellowstone National Park, the challenge was dismissed 
by a federal court in . The Yellowstone–Diversa agree-
ment has led both to new products for the company and 
to financial support from the company to the park for its 
conservation work (see Chapter ).
The success of this project is noteworthy because it oc-
curred outside of the  framework. Success in this case 
owes to the legislative context of technology transfer in the 
 that was created to enhance private access to publicly 
owned knowledge and resources. Benefit sharing was not 
unimportant, and it clearly was one intended outcome of 
access, but it was secondary. As in the Merck–io case, 
the negotiations were confined to immediate parties—the 
company and Yellowstone National Park. Success was also 
due to the decentralized nature of the federal government’s 
approach. Rather than a centralized system for negotiat-
ing agreements, by default the  has a de facto loose 
framework that allowed and encouraged these agreements. 
Chapter  notes the “dizzying array of laws, regulations, 
and policies” that exists in the  at different political lev-
els and jurisdictions and prevents a centralized approach. 
Moreover, Chapter  reminds us that the  followed a 
pragmatic approach that emphasized efficiency in refer-
ence to  goals and resulted in conservation benefits 
for the national park rather than a philosophical approach 
based on disputing private benefit from access to public 
goods. As in the case of Costa Rica’s early bioprospect-
ing experience, decentralization favored the success of the 
Yellowstone–Diversa project.
Mixed Success and Breakdown
The case studies of Mexico and the Philippines offer ex-
amples of  regimes that had initial implementation suc-
cess but also saw the implementation process breakdown 
with the closing of nascent bioprospecting projects. These 
cases show the difficulties inherent in involving different 
institutions and communities in a national program to meet 
the general goals of the .
Mexico. Unlike the Costa Rica and  cases, Mexico 
created a post- national legislative  framework as 
part of environmental protection before the negotiation of 
specific agreements. This framework is primarily outlined 
in articles  and   of the  Ecological Equilibrium 
and Environmental Protection General Act () that 
regulate access to all species for commercial and noncom-
mercial purposes. In addition, the  Wildlife General 
Act () and the  Sustainable Forestry Development 
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General Act include relevant  provisions that apply 
specifically to wildlife and forest resources, respectively. 
While Articles  and   provide general  prin-
ciples, national legislation does not specifically address de-
tails about how to implement these principles (see Chapter 
). Article  outlines authorization for the collection of 
wildlife species for scientific and economic8 purposes and 
Article   provides authorization for the collection of 
wildlife species and other biological resources for com-
mercial utilization. A key aspect of Article   is the 
obligation for bioprospecting projects to obtain  from 
the Mexican government as well as from the landowner 
where collection is anticipated. Moreover, this article also 
requires applicants to share benefits with the owners of the 
land where collections are made. 
Like the Merck–io and Yellowstone–Diversa 
agreements, the four Mexican projects we discuss were 
negotiated outside of a national legal  framework or 
centralized approach. However, after negotiation, the 
first three of these four projects, summarized below, were 
granted access permits under environmental legislation 
that did include  principles (i.e., Article  and   
of the ). The fourth project was authorized before 
 principles were incorporated into the .
The first project was between the National Autonomous 
University of Mexico () and the Diversa Corporation 
to access biological materials from public lands and natural 
protected areas in Mexico. ’s rights to collect under 
this agreement were accepted and facilitated by three fed-
eral agencies with responsibility for federal public land 
and protected areas. In this case,  was the Mexican 
beneficiary.
The second project, known as the Maya , was 
negotiated and launched in the southern Mexican state 
of Chiapas. The direct partners were a group of partici-
pating Mayan communities in the Chiapas highlands, a 
national educational and research institution (), the 
University of Georgia in the , and Molecular Nature 
Limited, a biotechnology company from the United 
Kingdom. The aim of the project was to access biota in 
highland Chiapas that the Maya knew to have medicinal 
properties and to ensure the equitable distribution of ben-
efits derived from that utilization. The Mexican beneficia-
ries of the project were to be  and the participating 
Mayan communities.
The third project, known as the Latin American , 
focused on collecting plant material from arid ecosys-
tems in the states of Chihuahua, Oaxaca, and San Luis 
Potosi, but it also sampled xerophytic plants available 
for sale in local markets. Colleting in local markets also 
permitted the analysis of each region’s medicinal plant 
trade network and the evaluation of the collection pres-
sure upon wild populations of plants. The University of 
Arizona in the  coordinated this project,  was 
again the main Mexican beneficiary, and plant material 
was screened by  in Mexico and by three organi-
zations in the : G.W.L. Hansen’s Disease Center, 
American Home Products Corporation’s Wyeth-Ayerst 
Research Laboratories, and American Cyanamid Company 
(T et al. ). This project also sought the 
participation of local communities and associations such 
as the Association of Traditional Healers of Oaxaca 
(T et al. ), although they were not parties 
to the main agreement. Nevertheless, these communities 
received nonmonetary benefits that included urban and 
rural health centers and training for the cultivation of 
medicinal plants (T et al. ).
The fourth project involved a civil society organiza-
tion representing indigenous communities (the Zapotec 
and Chinantec Communities Union–) in the state 
of Oaxaca and the Sandoz Corporation to access micro-
scopic fungi. The member communities of  were 
the Mexican beneficiaries.
The –Diversa and the Latin American  
agreements are the most similar to the Merck–io and 
Yellowstone–Diversa agreements. Like these, the –
Diversa and Latin American  agreements involved 
an independent institution that was given permission to 
facilitate access to public resources by a private company 
and that would benefit from commercialization of dis-
coveries resulting from this access. In all four cases, the 
negotiation of the contract took place with a minimum of 
different parties and a lack of major constraints by a cen-
tralized framework for reviewing the contract. In addition, 
the –Sandoz and Maya  agreements involved 
civil society organizations and rural communities of indig-
enous people. Of all the agreements discussed so far, the 
Maya  is the most complex in terms of the number and 
diversity of actors and source of financial backing. 
Three of the Mexican agreements faced political chal-
lenge, legal uncertainties, and termination before accom-
plishment. The challenge to each was made in a different 
way. The –Diversa agreement was challenged as a 
vehicle for the inappropriate expropriation of publicly 
owned resources (see Chapter ). Even though the project 
had been granted access under Article   of  
(which regulates collection of samples for biotechnological 
purposes), it had a specifically noncommercial scientific 
goal not a biotechnological one. Collection activities un-
der the –Diversa agreement were suspended after a 
legal challenge to the Federal Attorney for the Protection 
of the Environment () resulted in additional  
requirements under Article   from the providers of 
genetic resources. The project expired in .
The Maya  project initiated collection activities 
for scientific purposes but it was vigorously challenged by 
civil society organizations in Chiapas and by international 
organizations that claimed the project was relying on its 
ties to a limited number of communities to expropriate 
resources that were widely shared among many other 
communities (N ). These organizations further 
objected to the possibility of patents being obtained on 
products derived from biological collections from Chiapas. 
National and international political pressure resulted in the 
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withdrawal of  and funding from the consortium 
of  agencies, before the  could obtain the full  
from local communities that was required for authoriza-
tion under Article   of . However, B and 
B () document the extensive effort made by the 
project participants to obtain  and the belief by them that 
it had been obtained. They conclude that  may always be 
ambiguous and open to challenge. The samples collected 
by this  under Article  never left the country (J.C. 
Fernandez, pers. comm. April ).
The Latin American  was granted access under 
Article  of . However, because of the commercial 
and biotechnological nature of the project, access should 
have been granted under Article   that regulates the 
collection of samples for biotechnological purposes (see 
Chapter ). This legal inconsistency, the controversy raised 
by the fact that samples were being collected at local mar-
kets, and fears that this project might be as controversial as 
the Maya  prompted the decision to deny access under 
article   (J.C. Fernandez, pers. comm. April ).
The most successful Mexican project was the –
Sandoz project. Although that project was also challenged 
politically locally and internationally, the challenges did 
not result in suspension or closure because of the sup-
port by indigenous communities and the recognition that 
 was acting within its legal rights to enter into and 
execute the agreement. The –Sandoz agreement 
was not renewed due to the unclear regulatory power of 
the national  framework (see Chapter ). 
Issues that played in the uneven experience of Mexico 
include an incomplete legal  framework, uncertainty 
over local authority to grant access, social controversy, and 
institutional complexity within the bioprospecting projects. 
The legal framework that confronted the –Diversa 
agreement involved a “popular denunciation” to the -
 office, but that office averred that it did not have the 
authority to void the agreement. Nevertheless, the  
office asked that the parties of the agreement revisit the 
issue of  under Article   of  even though 
this appeared to have been adequately negotiated in the 
original agreement with the intervention of the Secretariat 
of Environment and Natural Resources and other federal 
authorities. The  decision left the agreement in 
an indeterminate state that ultimately led to its expiration 
without fulfillment. The problems caused by legal ambi-
guity are exacerbated in situations where bioprospecting 
agreements are associated with social controversy. This 
situation is typified by the two  projects, which were 
also encumbered by institutional complexity because of the 
involvement of different types of national and international 
organizations and the reliance on extramural financing.
Philippines. This nation’s response to the  provisions 
of the  is embedded in the  Executive Order No. 
 ( ), its  implementing rules and regulations, 
and the  Republic Act No. , also known as the 
Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection Act (here-
after, Wildlife Act). Prior to this legal framework, in  
the Philippines established an  for collecting biological 
specimens, although this framework was not specifically 
designed to facilitate  goals, it allowed the signing of 
an agreement (i.e., ) between the Philippine National 
Museum and the  National Cancer Institute that ac-
complished both access and benefit sharing to a degree 
(see Chapter ). In contrast, the framework established 
under   employs a contractual approach and entails 
two types of collecting agreements depending on whether 
they are Commercial Research Agreements () or 
Academic Research Agreements (), a centralized 
review process,  stipulations, and environmental pro-
tection requirements. The Wildlife Act modified this by 
freeing academic and scientific research from commercial 
bioprospecting requirements. The  draft Guidelines 
for Bioprospecting Activities in the Philippines, that will 
implement the Wildlife Act, require commercial biopros-
pectors to apply for a Biopropsecting Undertaking instead 
of a . According to the draft guidelines, commercial 
bioprospectors may have to pay a bioprospecting fee of 
,  for each Bioprospecting Undertaking and 
, per collection site annually during the collection 
period. Furthermore, commercial bioprospectors must be 
prepared to pay a minimum amount of % of the gross 
sales of products made or derived from collected samples, 
in addition to some minimum nonmonetary benefits (see 
Chapters  and ). A major issue in the Philippines’  
policies is to protect the interests of indigenous people and 
their traditional knowledge; the draft guidelines outline 
detailed  procedures to this effect. 
Two out of  projects presented between  and 
 have been approved under   (Chapter ). The 
fact that no projects have been presented since October 
 implies that the frameworks developed under  
 have discouraged collectors from initiating new ac-
tivities. Of the  projects presented between  and 
, eight were from foreign universities or companies, 
one was from an international agricultural center located 
in the Philippines, and  were submitted by Philippine 
institutions. The large majority of both foreign and national 
projects involved academic and research institutions rather 
than commercial interests. The only approved foreign ap-
plication came about with a  under   and appears 
to be nearing accomplishment. This is a collaboration be-
tween the University of Utah in the  and the University 
of the Philippines Marine Science Institute. None of the 
foreign projects that have moved successfully through the 
review process involve collection of biological specimens 
on land or involve indigenous people or traditional knowl-
edge. Six of the eight foreign projects and the project of 
the international agricultural research center have either 
been withdrawn, required to submit further material, or 
are pending, sometimes several years after the original ap-
plication date. The same low rate of approval characterizes 
projects submitted by Philippine institutions. Only one  
has been approved for the University of the Philippines. It 
should be noted that while the  was approved in a bit 
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more than a year, the  took two and a half years until 
the Technical Secretariat gave its approval.
It is difficult to know exactly why there is such a low 
approval rate and lengthy application procedure for bio-
prospecting projects in the Philippines. It may be related 
to the fact that  requirements under   involve a 
lengthy application process and the national framework 
presents a complex system of different types of applica-
tion procedures and levels of approval that feed into a 
centralized system. Although   and the Wildlife Act 
seek a contractual approach, the role of the centralized 
review and permitting process mean that the two parties 
interested in a contract are not acting alone. If adopted, 
the Guidelines for Bioprospecting Activities are likely to 
reduce transaction costs by streamlining application and 
negotiation requirements for commercial bioprospectors 
(see Chapter  for detailed access procedures).
Thwarted Implementation
Colombia. This nation has experienced great difficulty 
in launching bioprospecting projects since negotiation 
in  of the Common Regime on Access to Genetic 
Resources (Decision ) of the Andean Community. 
None of the projects that were submitted since Decision 
 came into force have been approved or implemented. 
Chapter  provides information on  bioprospecting proj-
ects submitted between February  and February . 
One was declined, three withdrawn, and  are still pend-
ing. Only one of the  projects submitted was commercial 
in nature and the rest were for academic and conservation 
purposes, predominantly by Colombian scientists. Only 
two of these projects involved the participation of inter-
national organizations. 
Several factors thwarted Colombia’s ability to move 
these projects forward, and among these, three stand out. 
First is the evident lack of knowledge and confusion on 
both the access and benefit side. Second was the transaction 
costs of obtaining information and negotiating agreements 
under Decision . Third was unreasonably high expecta-
tions about economic benefits, especially when most of 
the projects were academic rather than commercial. These 
problems were exacerbated by Colombia’s lack of techni-
cal capacity and expertise to handle access applications 
and interpret key provisions of Decision . Furthermore, 
there is confusion and uncertainty about policy and institu-
tional needs required to implement Decision . Perhaps 
the sharpest contrast between Colombia’s approach and 
the approach taken in the more successful efforts discussed 
above is centralization through Decision . The applica-
tion of this  law occurred before individual negotiations 
between potential partners could occur, and this deeply af-
fected negotiations. In contrast, the successful instances of 
negotiating and initiating bioprospecting projects discussed 
above occurred in contexts characterized by the presence 
of organizations with mutual interests and objectives that 
were able to operate under decentralized and flexible 
national policy frameworks. Examples of these are Costa 
Rica’s io agreements, the  Yellowstone–Diversa 
agreement, and Mexico’s –Sandoz agreement.
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Lessons
A decade after the promulgation of the , the prospects 
for creating successful national  policies are guarded. 
Although there are several cases of successful bioprospect-
ing projects, closer examination of these suggests that the 
actors and interests who join in them still face serious ob-
stacles to forming effective partnerships. Five lessons can 
be drawn from this review of Pacific Rim case studies.
First, agreements are most likely to succeed when the 
number of parties is minimized. Two immediate parties 
in projects are the collector and the agency or social en-
tity that is recognized as being the competent authority 
to grant access. For example, in Costa Rica, io was 
authorized to negotiate access to biological resources in 
certain areas, and in the , the National Park Service 
granted Yellowstone National Park authority to negotiate 
access to resources within the park. Likewise in Mexico, 
the –Sandoz agreement involved only local inter-
ests. Moving the locus of negotiation and agreement away 
from the immediate parties, for instance by setting up a 
complex national  framework with multiple participants 
and interests, tends to encumber negotiation, agreement, 
and accomplishment. The most successful bioprospect-
ing projects were established outside of focused national 
frameworks corresponding to the . A prime example 
of this are the numerous agreements signed in Costa Rica 
under the   and its  regulation but before the 
 Law of Biodiversity was enacted. In December  
the  program approved a planning grant for a project 
that will be carried out by Harvard University and io in 
Costa Rica. This project will test the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of the  provisions of the Law of Biodiversity. 
Colombia’s difficulties stem to some degree from the fact 
that this country not only had to address national inter-
ests and policies in reviewing access proposals, but it also 
had to harmonize its national policies with Decision . 
Furthermore, difficulties in regionwide implementation of 
Decision  have led Colombia and the other members of 
the Andean Community of Nations to a revision of this law 
(M. Ruiz, pers. comm. April ). In summary, simplicity 
and directness in negotiating and approving agreements 
under  laws and policies is a strong virtue.
Second, the determination of a competent authority 
or local focal point in granting access is critical, and 
ambiguity in this is problematic. The io, Yellowstone, 
and  agreements mentioned above illustrate this 
conclusion.
Third, the determination of clear access procedures and 
particularly  requirements are essential to expedite the 
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approval of applications and the negotiation of benefits. 
The tendency for successful projects in Costa Rica, the 
Philippines, and elsewhere to focus on biological resources 
that are not controlled or used by local people suggests 
that decisiveness in defining effective  requirements is 
crucial. The efforts of the Maya  project in Mexico 
to acquire  proved insufficient to ward off a challenge. 
B and B (), who were leading participants 
in the Maya  project, observed that  is inevitably 
ambiguous and open to challenge. 
Fourth, governments need to build local capacity to 
facilitate the effective and efficient implementation of  
laws and policies. Lack of trained evaluators and negotia-
tors result in delayed responses for project applications and 
missed opportunities for benefit sharing as demonstrated 
by the Philippines and Colombian experiences. This capac-
ity needs to be transferred to local organizations that may 
be involved in the negotiation of benefits.
Fifth, creating a forum for balanced discussion of con-
troversial  concepts and implications may facilitate the 
application process and accomplishment of bioprospecting 
projects. As demonstrated by the Mexican experience the 
novel, complex, controversial, and experimental nature of 
 concepts make bioprospecting projects particularly 
open to challenge. While some organizations may be 
against bioprospecting initiatives, other groups like the 
 may have a different perspective. Positive experi-
ences where the primary users and stewards of biological 
diversity are clear beneficiaries of bioprospecting projects 
are likely to create a favorable political and social environ-
ment for accomplishing them. 
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Endnotes
 1 In the ,  regulations are analogous to some of the provisions 
of  laws and policies that other countries have proposed and these 
 regulations facilitate  goals in  lands (see Chapter ).
 2 Consistent with our use in Chapters  and , we define bioprospect-
ing as the search for plants, animals, and microbial species for 
academic, pharmaceutical, biotechnological, agricultural, and 
industrial purposes.
 3 National  laws and policies have approved  projects in Costa 
Rica, three in Mexico, two in the Philippines, one in Samoa, and 
one in the . It must be noted that this account does not include 
projects that have been negotiated following a contractual approach 
in countries that lack national  laws or policies such as Chile, 
Laos, and Vietnam.
 4 Recently, however, several countries, such as Panama and 
Indonesia, have found guidance in the Bonn Guidelines on Access 
to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the 
Benefits Arising out of their Utilization (see Chapter ). These 
guidelines were adopted by the Sixth Conference of the Parties to 
the  in April .
 5 The s are an international bioprospecting approach initiated 
in  and financed by the  National Institutes of Health, 
National Science Foundation, and Department of Agriculture that is 
guided by the following objectives: ) to uncover new knowledge 
that will lead to improved therapies; ) to enhance scientific capac-
ity building in developing countries; and ) to ensure sustained 
economic growth and the conservation of genetic resources in the 
countries where collections of organisms are made. These groups 
are international partnerships composed of universities, NGOs, 
pharmaceutical companies, and other organizations from the  
and the countries that provide the genetic resources, and in some 
cases, traditional knowledge. The first five-year phase of the pro-
gram started in  and  with five groups. In , three new 
groups won awards and three of the previous groups were renewed 
for a second five-year period until . One of the new proj-
ects, the Maya  was terminated in  (see this chapter and 
Chapter ). In December , the new round of awards supported 
five-year-long projects for five groups (three of these were renew-
als) and two-year planning grants for seven groups (R et 
al. , http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/dec/fic-.htm).
 6 In November , the Environment Organic Law defined a more 
specific range of activities for  regarding the field of natu-
ral resources and  became the Ministry of Environment 
and Energy ().
 7 The  has been used as a vehicle to promote  goals in 
other bioprospecting projects. For example, in  a  was 
used by one of the s to facilitate the negotiation of benefit-
sharing provisions between the Walter Reed Army Institute of 
Research and other public and private organizations (C 
).
 8 This purpose applies to use of wild flora and fauna specimens in 
economic activities that involve their controlled reproduction or 
captivity and semi-captivity management.
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A. Countries with ABS laws and policies
. Colombia
Decision  has been in place since  and until February 
 not a single access contract has been approved under it. 
Also, the number of access applications has been extremely 
low. Between  and  the Ministry for the Environment 
received  access applications. One of them was denied and 
the rest are on hold (see Chapter ). The New York Botanical 
Garden, the University of Antioquia, University of Medellin, 
and the Botanical Garden Juan Marin Cespedos of Tulua col-
lected biological samples for the  National Cancer Institute 
() before Decision  became national law.
. Costa Rica
The  Law of Biodiversity is not operational yet. Access 
applications involving bioprospecting have been approved 
under the  Law of Wildlife Conservation No.  (and 
its  regulation) and in accordance with a cooperation 
agreement between the National Biodiversity Institute (io) 
and the Ministry of the Environment and Energy. Since , 
 bioprospecting projects have been granted access (see 
Chapter ). In December , the -based International 
Cooperative Biodiversity Group () program approved a 
planning grant for a new project that will be implemented by 
Harvard University and io. This project will be negotiated 
under the  Law of Biodiversity framework.
. Ecuador
No bioprospecting projects have been negotiated under 
Decision . 
. Mexico
Three bioprospecting projects were granted access under the 
Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection General 
Act. These are: ) The  Maya , ) The Latin American 
, and ) the Diversa/National Autonomous University 
project. However, these projects were terminated due to social 
protest and legal inconsistencies (see Chapter ). 
. Philippines
Two out of  proposed bioprospecting projects have been 
granted access under Executive Order . The University of 
Utah/University of the Philippines project, and the University 
of the Philippines system project. In late , the   
program approved a planning grant for a project coordinated 
by the  Michigan State University in collaboration with 
the University of the Philippines and local indigenous com-
munities. This project will be granted access under the  
Wildlife Resources and Conservation Act (see Chapter ). 
. Peru
No bioprospecting project has been negotiated under Decision 
. Between  and  the   program provided 
funding for bioprospecting activities in Peru. This project 
was coordinated by Washington University in collaboration 
with the Museum of Natural History and other organizations. 
The New York Botanical Garden, in collaboration with the 
Research Institute of the Peruvian Amazon Region, collected 
samples for the   before Decision  came into force. 
. Samoa
In , Nonu Samoa Enterprises began export of nonu 
(Morinda citrifolia), a tree with medicinal properties, to the 
. In  the administrative directive entitled “Conditions 
for access to and benefit sharing of Samoa’s biodiversity re-
sources” was invoked to negotiate a benefit-sharing agreement 
between the government of Samoa and the  Research 
Alliance for the use of a compound called prostratin derived 
from the mamala plant (Homalanthus nutans). This compound 
may be used together with other drugs for the treatment of 
. In late , the   program approved a planning 
grant for a project coordinated by the  National Tropical 
Botanical Garden in Hawaii in collaboration with the Samoan 
Ministry of Trade and Tourism and other organizations. It is 
uncertain what legal  framework will apply to this project 
as Samoa is currently developing an  framework.
. Thailand
So far no projects have been approved under the new access 
framework because the government is still developing lower 
level regulations to facilitate the implementation of  laws. 
However, the University of Illinois at Chicago in collabora-
tion with the Thailand Forest Herbarium has collected plant 
samples for the  . In the s, Chris Deren of the 
University of Florida announced plans to develop a  ver-
sion of Thailand’s Jasmine rice. Germplasm for this experi-
ment was obtained from the Philippines-based International 
Rice Research Institute through the  Department of 
Agriculture. In  Sankyo of Japan extracted the active 
ingredient (plaonotol) of the tree plaonoi (Croton sublyratus) 
to produce Kelnac, a tablet to treat ulcers. 
. United States of America ()
The owner of the land (public or private) where the genetic 
resource is found defines access and benefit-sharing issues. So, 
far the most public and documented bioprospecting initiative 
negotiated under federal regulations that are analogous to  
policies is the agreement signed between Yellowstone National 
Park and the pharmaceutical company Diversa Corporation 
(see Chapter ). In , Diversa also signed an agreement 
with the -based Arctos Pharmaceuticals, Inc. giving 
Diversa rights to bioprospect in Alaska and neighboring ter-
ritories. Through this agreement, Diversa obtains access to ge-
netic resources found in habitats covered by agreements Arctos 
has signed with Alaskan landholding native corporations, 
individuals and other entities. In , Diversa announced the 
signing of an access and benefit-sharing agreement with the 
Marine Bioproducts Engineering Center at the University of 
Hawaii in Honolulu. This agreement gives Diversa the right to 
study genes from existing collections and from environmental 
samples collected by the Hawaiian center. Pfizer has screened 
medicinal plants provided by the New York Botanical Garden 
and Phytera has carried out bioprospecting activities in Hawaii 
and the Virgin Islands.
B. Countries working towards the development of ABS 
laws and policies
. Australia
There is a long history of benefit-sharing agreements 
negotiated by bioprospectors in Australia. These include 
AstraZeneca R&D and Griffith University; the   and the 
Table . Bioprospecting in Pacific Rim countries. This table provides information about all bioprospecting 
projects approved under national access and benefit-sharing () laws and policies until January . 
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Australian Institute of Marine Science; Cerylid Biosciences 
Ltd. and Royal Botanic Gardens; and BioProspect Ltd. and 
the Department of Conservation and Land Management of 
Western Australia (see Chapter ).
. Cambodia
/
. Canada
Several bioprospecting projects have been implemented in the 
last few years in Canada. Researchers from universities such 
as the University of British Columbia and private companies 
such as Accutec Technologies (Vancouver, British Columbia), 
Semgen (St. Nicolas, Québec), and Ecopia Biosciences 
(Montréal, Québec) have carried out bioprospecting activities 
in marine and terrestrial environments. Cubist Pharmaceuticals 
is also bioprospecting in Western Canada.
. Chile
Some of the bioprospecting projects implemented in this 
country include a   project (–) coordinated 
by the  University of Arizona in collaboration with 
Catholic University of Chile and other organizations; the 
Institute for Agriculture Investigation () and the Royal 
Botanical Gardens, Kew bioprospecting project; and the 
 and C.M. Rick Tomato Genetics Resource Center of the 
University of California, Davis (see Chapter ).
. China
China’s extensive information about medicinal plants has 
been examined by many bioprospectors. These include 
American Biosciences, the  National Institutes of Health 
and New York University that have patents on several 
Chinese medicinal species. Also, the   has screened 
plants collected in collaboration with the Kunming Institute 
of Botany. Pfizer is also relying exclusively on traditional 
medical practices to identify potential pharmaceuticals.
. Cook Islands
Current bioprospecting initiatives include projects related 
to pharmaceutical research for marine products, marine 
toxins, whale research, and marine/terrestrial flora and fauna 
taxonomy (national heritage project).
. El Salvador
Some local universities and research centers extract chemical 
compounds from plants for pharmaceutical purposes. No 
major findings have been reported. 
. Fiji
The most documented bioprospecting agreement in Fiji is 
the one established between the University of South Pacific 
and the Strathclyde Institute of Drug Research in Scotland. 
Biological samples were collected in collaboration with the 
Verata community. The community was not a partner to the 
main agreement, but  was provided in a separate agreement 
signed between the university and the community. Kava 
(Piper methysticum), a medicinal plant native to the South 
Pacific region was traded and used widely before the  was 
adopted. The cultivation of the plant has brought economic 
benefits to Fiji and many other South Pacific countries. 
Kava extracts and active compounds have been patented by 
companies in Europe and the . However, no royalties 
have flowed to Pacific Island countries. In any case, the Kava 
market has declined in recent years in Europe and the  due 
to allegations that the plant causes liver damage. However, 
it should be noted that Fiji and other Pacific Island countries 
have enjoyed the benefits of this plant for generations and 
its consumption remains strong casting doubts over the 
alleged detrimental health effects. American Home Products 
also holds a patent on a Fijian sponge that has anti-tumor 
properties. In late , the   program approved a 
planning grant for a project coordinated by the  Georgia 
Institute of Technology in collaboration with the University of 
South Pacific and other organizations. 
. Guatemala
Local universities and research centers carry out several 
bioprospecting projects. But there is no information available 
about them.
. Honduras
There are no more than three projects involving local 
universities. But there is no information available about them.
. Indonesia
The -based pharmaceutical company Diversa 
Corporation and Bogor University have been implementing a 
bioprospecting project since . The project was renewed 
in . Also, the   has screened samples of marine 
and terrestrial organisms that have been collected by the Coral 
Reef Research Foundation, the University of Illinois, the 
Indonesia Herbarium Bogoriense, and the Indonesian Institute 
of Science. 
. Japan
Multiple Japanese biotechnology companies are engaged in 
many bioprospecting projects in Japan. However, there is no 
information available about these initiatives.
. Malaysia
In the late s and early s, the   discovered that 
two naturally occurring compounds (Calanolide A and B) 
were effective against . In , this discovery led to the 
establishment of a joint venture between the State Government 
of Sarawak and MediChem Research to develop and market 
Calanolide A as an anti- medicine. In , MediChem’s 
share in the company was transferred to Advanced Life 
Sciences, Inc. Other bioprospecting initiatives include: ) 
the Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia that tested  samples 
of marine sponges on human tumor cell lines in cytotoxic 
tests, and found  samples to be toxic to the tumors and ) 
the Universiti Sains Malaysia that tested sea cucumbers for 
bioactive compounds (see Chapter ).
. Marshall Islands
No bioprospecting projects are currently being implemented in 
the Marshall Islands. However, in the past, the Palauan-based 
Coral Reef Research Foundation has collected samples of 
marine organisms for the  .
. Micronesia 
The Coral Reef Research Foundation has collected samples of 
marine organisms for the  .
. New Zealand
The Coral Reef Research Foundation has collected samples 
of marine organisms for the  . The University of 
Canterbury (Christchurch) has also collaborated in the 
collection of biological samples for . The University also 
has collaborative links with the Danish Technical University 
and the School of Pharmacy, University of London, among 
others. Other local companies such as Global Technologies, 
and Biodiscovery New Zealand look for bioactive compounds 
from deer/sheep and bacteria respectively. Tairawhiti 
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Pharmaceuticals extracts manuka and kanuka oils. Phytomed 
Medicinal Herbs manufactures and supplies plant extracts 
and dried herbs to health practitioners and other herbal 
manufacturers.
. Nicaragua
/
. Niue
In , the Ministry of Tourism signed an agreement with the 
Zoological Parks Board of New South Wales based in Sydney, 
Australia. Under the agreement, three sea snakes (Laticauda 
schistorynchus) were given to the Taronga Zoo for display 
purposes only. The agreements states that the sea snake’s 
venom, skin, or any other genetic component will be protected 
during display and that no genetic material will be extracted 
from the sea snakes for scientific research or any other 
purpose. In , a project of the South Pacific Commission 
() collected samples of  varieties of taro (a root crop and 
staple of the Pacific diet). 
. Panama
In recent years this country has used a contractual approach to 
facilitate bioprospecting activities and this strategy has been 
supported by legislation that regulates the collection of natural 
resources. Since  a   project has been carrying 
out bioprospecting activities in Panama and funding for this 
project was renewed in late  for five additional years. This 
project is coordinated by the Smithsonian Tropical Research 
Institute in collaboration with the National Secretariat for 
Science, Technology, and Innovation and other organizations. 
Local academic and research centers also have carried out 
bioprospecting projects.
. Papua New Guinea
In late , the   program approved funding for a 
five-year project coordinated by the  University of Utah 
in collaboration with the University of Papua New Guinea 
and other organizations. The Australian National University 
and the Tillegerry Habitat Association, New South Wales, 
Australia have implemented projects in coordination with 
the Australian-based Cerylid Biosciences Ltd and the Kelam 
People of the Kaironk Valley in Papua New Guinea. Also, 
the Palauan-base Coral Reef Research Foundation and the 
University of Illinois have collected samples of marine and 
terrestrial organisms for the   in collaboration with 
the Papua New Guinea Forest Research Institute, the Lae 
Herbarium, and the Papua New Guinea Department of the 
Environment and Conservation, Boroko. Sponges growing on 
a coral reef off the coast of Papua New Guinea are the source 
of a powerful antifungal compound papuamine. The sponges 
yield only minute quantities of the compound. Therefore, 
Myco Pharmaceuticals () is now attempting to synthesize 
papuamine in the laboratory.
. Republic of Korea
/
. Russian Federation
In  the -based Diversa Corporation signed a 
biodiversity access agreement giving the company rights to 
obtain, identify, and commercialize genes collected in unique 
Russian habitats. Diverse will work with Russia through the 
 Department of Energy’s Idaho National Engineering and 
Environmental Laboratory to obtain samples from Russian 
habitats.
. Singapore
/
. Solomon Islands
In the s, marine collections were made for cancer 
research (pharmaceuticals). In the early s, the University 
of California made plant collections for pharmaceutical 
purposes. Collections of taro are being carried out by . 
In the early s, a human sample resulted in a patent 
application in the . The Research Committee denied 
two access applications of the Coral Reef Foundation that 
was planning to collect samples for the  . The Lauru 
Land Conference and communities opposed plant collection 
made by the University of Hawaii in Choiseul province for 
pharmaceuticals and other industrial purposes. Applications 
for native orchid exports by nationals have been turned down. 
Kava has been collected in the s and s and exported 
worldwide.
. Vanuatu
The Coral Reef Research Foundation has collected samples of 
marine organisms for the  . Kava has been collected in 
the s and s and exported worldwide.
. Vietnam
The   project of Vietnam has been carrying out 
bioprospecting activities since  and its funding was 
renewed in late . This project is coordinated by the  
University of Illinois at Chicago in collaboration with the 
Vietnam National Center for Natural Sciences and Technology 
and other organizations.
C. Countries not involved in any process leading to the 
development of ABS laws and policies
. Kiribati
Taro varieties have been collected by a project of .
. Laos
The   of Laos has been bioprospecting since  
and its funding was renewed in late . This project is 
coordinated by the  University of Illinois at Chicago and 
includes the participation of several local organizations.
. Nauru
/
. Palau
The Coral Reef Research Foundation has collected samples of 
marine organisms for the  .
. Tonga
The Coral Reef Research Foundation has collected samples of 
marine organisms for the  . In late , the   
program approved a planning grant for a project coordinated 
by the  National Tropical Botanical Garden in Hawaii 
in collaboration with the Tonga Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry and other organizations.
. Tuvalu
The Coral Reef Research Foundation has collected samples 
of marine organisms for the  . Taro varieties are been 
collected by a project of .
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Colombia: Access and
Exchange of Genetic Resources
Paola Ferreira-Miani
Colombia is characterized by high levels of biodiversity 
and endemism (C and A ,  ). 
Colombia has a land surface of ,, ha, which 
constitutes approximately .% of the earth’s continental 
area. This area contains % of the world’s biodiversity. 
This is why Colombia is considered among the megadi-
verse countries of the world.
Of the land surface of Colombia, . million ha 
are covered by natural forests: . million ha by other 
types of vegetation which include savanna, arid areas, 
and wetlands; . million ha by continental water, snow 
peaks, and human settlements; and at least . million 
ha are under agricultural use and colonization processes. 
These general categories of land cover and use host the 
ecosystem diversity typical of Colombia. The richness in 
ecosystem types has been attributed to a variety of factors 
including the following: the country’s localization between 
the two tropics, the variety of soil and climatic conditions 
that results in a wide array of geographic spaces, and the 
existence of areas that have been geographically isolated. 
The country’s ecosystem diversity is of such importance 
that only a few of the world’s ecosystems are not repre-
sented in Colombia.
Ecosystem diversity is related to species diversity, 
which is the most common way to refer to biodiversity. 
It represents the number of species in any given area. 
Approximately , vascular plants are known to be 
present in Colombia, a large number for the size of the 
country, especially considering that all Africa south of the 
Sahara contains in total , species, and that Brazil, 
which has a surface . times larger, has , species 
of vascular plants. Colombia has between , and , 
species of orchids that represent approximately % of 
the world’s total. Other extremely diverse plant families 
are Araceae, with one sixth of the world’s known spe-
cies; Heliconiaceae with approximately  species; and 
Ericaceae with  species. Studies in the Caribbean 
region regarding seaweeds have shown it is one of the 
richest areas of the Atlantic Coast with approximately  
species. The Pacific coast has a lower diversity with  
identified species of seaweeds.
Regarding vertebrates (excepting fish), Colombia holds 
third place with , species (Table ). Richness in mam-
mals, and in particular bats ( species) and rodents ( 
species) is noteworthy. There are  primate species, which 
represent one third of those found in tropical America, 
surpassed only by Brazil, which has  primate species. 
Colombia is commonly classified as the country with the 
largest number of birds. It contains % of all identified 
South American birds and approximately  of these spe-
cies are endemic to Colombia. Information on fish diversity 
is extremely scarce and large areas of the country have not 
Table . Number of vertebrate species (excluding fish) in 
Colombia compared to the number described worldwide
   Proportion in
Group Colombia World Colombia (%)
Mammals  , .
Birds , , .
Reptiles  , .
Amphibian  , .
Total , , .
Source: v  inédito, cited in F and F ().
 
been surveyed. Along the Caribbean coast, species rich-
ness in coral reefs is particularly noticeable, with  
species identified out of an estimated total of  marine 
species. Surveys have been less complete on the Pacific 
coast. Insects are also particularly relevant because of their 
endemism and rarity.
Biodiversity, and in particular genetic diversity, has 
been considered a potential source of wealth for the coun-
try. As a party to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(), Colombia has the responsibility of setting the con-
ditions for giving access to its genetic resources to other 
parties, upon mutually agreed terms, while respecting the 
sovereign rights of the state over these resources.
Colombia and the other countries of the Andean 
Community1, motivated by factors such as the need to 
comply with the , to support by regional integration, 
and to create opportunities for access activities, negotiated 
and approved legislation on access to genetic resources 
covering the five nations. As a result of this process, 
Colombia is now a participant in an Andean regional pol-
icy governing access to genetic resources and derivatives: 
“Decision  of the Cartagena Agreement” or “Common 
Regime on Access to Genetic Resources”. This legislation 
constitutes the main legal framework regarding access to 
genetic resources in Colombia.
It is important to understand this legislation in the con-
text of Colombia’s biological diversity and the larger pic-
ture of the country’s biodiversity policy. The threats to the 
country’s biodiversity are also very real (Box ). Following 
is a section regarding the country’s policy principles and 
goals that are relevant for understanding the access and 
benefit-sharing () policy framework.
A B  S  B
National Biodiversity Policy and
National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan
Colombia, as a party to the , has been committed to 
conservation and sustainable use of its biological resources. 
Therefore, in  the Colombian Government approved a 
National Biodiversity Policy () which determined the 
country’s policy priorities for the future ( ). The 
policy has three major goals:
• Conservation of the components of biodiversity; 
• Greater knowledge of biodiversity; and
• The promotion of sustainable use of biodiversity 
and the equal distribution of benefits of that use.
These three goals were further developed in ten strat-
egies. The guidelines for the development of the policy 
were approved by the National Environmental Council, 
which is the highest advisory authority to the Ministry of 
Environment (). These initial guidelines were further 
developed by the Instituto de Investigación en Recursos 
Biológicos “Alexander von Humboldt”2, (Research 
Institute on Biological Resources), the National Planning 
Department ()3, and the .
The  set forth eight principles that are relevant for 
its interpretation and orientation ( ):
. Biodiversity is a national patrimony and has a 
strategic value for the nation’s current and future 
development.
. Biological diversity has tangible components at the 
level of molecules, genes and populations, species 
and communities, and ecosystems and landscapes. 
There are also intangible components that include 
knowledge, innovation, and associated cultural 
practices.
. Biodiversity has a dynamic character both in space 
and time, and its components and evolutionary pro-
cesses must be preserved.
. The benefits derived from its use must be distributed 
in a fair and equitable manner and in an agreed-
upon fashion with the community.
. The importance of the protection of individual and 
collective property rights is recognized.
. The conservation and sustainable use of biodiver-
sity must be addressed globally. It thus requires 
international commitment between nations.
. The conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity 
requires a cross-sectoral approach and must be ad-
dressed in a decentralized manner, including the par-
ticipation of all levels of government and society.
. The precautionary principle must employed, 
especially with respect to genetic erosion and 
biosafety.
The  proposes the following ten strategies, aligned 
with the three basic goals described earlier (F and 
F ):
• Distribute the benefits derived from biodiversity 
equitably.
Knowledge
• Characterize the components of biological diversity.
• Recover, protect, and publicize traditional knowl-
edge.
Conservation
• Develop and consolidate the National System of 
Natural Protected Areas.
• Reduce the processes that deteriorate biodiversity.
• Restore ecosystems and species.
• Promote ex situ conservation.
Use
• Promote sustainable management systems of re-
newable natural resources.
• Promote sustainable development of the economic 
potential of biodiversity.
 
• Develop economic valuation systems of biodiver-
sity components.
Since the  proposes a set of strategies meant to 
provide a long term view of Colombia’s policy objec-
tives regarding biodiversity, it was necessary to develop 
a strategy to implement them. This strategy should de-
termine specific goals and objectives to be reached and 
identify those who should be involved in its implementa-
tion. Therefore, in  the  of Colombia formulated 
a project to finance such an endeavor and received a grant 
from the United Nations Environmental Program () 
to develop the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action 
Plan (). This project was initially comprised of two 
stages. In the first stage, a technical proposal of the  
was developed. This task was assigned to the Humboldt 
Institute and the , with the collaboration of the . 
C : C 
Direct Causes
The country has been under an accelerated rate of destruction 
of its habitats and natural ecosystems due to such causes as 
inadequate land use policies that lead to colonization and 
land clearing for agricultural use. Other causes of habitat 
destruction are the establishment of illicit crops, construction 
of infrastructure and service works, mining activities, land 
works to transform wetlands for pasture, firewood consump-
tion, occurrence of fires in natural ecosystems, and in some 
cases wood production. This transformation results in habitat 
reduction or fragmentation.
Between  and  the main causes of land use 
changes can be summarized as follows: there was a decrease 
in land for agricultural use from  million ha to . million; 
land under pasture increased from . million ha to . 
million ha; and there was a decrease in forest cover and other 
uses from . to . million ha. There is no consensus on 
what the country’s yearly deforestation rate is. Nevertheless, 
there are estimates that % of the cover of natural ecosys-
tems has disappeared, with some specific areas under more 
critical conditions. For example, the Andean Cordilleras have 
lost % of their forest cover, and dry tropical forests have 
only .% of their original surface.
Another main cause of biodiversity loss is due to intro-
duction of invasive species that have competed with and 
eventually displaced native species. This displacement has 
often imperiled the viability of populations or caused them 
to become extinct. Often the introduction of species is pro-
moted by government policies, particularly in the case of 
fisheries. For example, in the watersheds of the Amazon, 
Cauca, Orinoco, and Catatumbo rivers at least  species 
have been introduced, substantially reducing naturally oc-
curring populations.
On the other hand, the over-exploitation and unsustainable 
management of wild species of fauna and flora for domestic 
consumption or commercialization is also having important 
effects on biodiversity. In Colombia, fauna is under severe 
pressure due to hunting, mainly to provide specimens, skins, 
and products for the illegal international market. The fisher-
ies are also affected by over-exploitation and by the use of 
inadequate fishing practices. For example, the watershed of 
the Magdalena River has lost .% of its yearly production. 
Similar numbers have been reported for other watersheds.
Wood production by industry has also led to unsustainable 
forest use, affecting substantial forested areas. Additionally, 
wood provision comes from the most biodiverse areas in the 
country: the Amazonian and the Pacific Coast. Estimates for 
 accounted that between , and , ha of natural 
forests had been negatively affected because of wood extrac-
tion. Nevertheless, in the past years, wood industries have in-
creased their wood planting activities as well as their imports, 
decreasing their direct pressure over natural forests.
Another cause of biodiversity loss is domestic and in-
dustrial contamination. Contamination has affected natural 
environments when their carrying capacity has been sur-
passed. The damages due to contamination have not been 
quantified, but their impact can be foreseen by the following 
data. In , only % and % respectively of urban and 
rural areas had disposal systems. Also, solid waste production 
was estimated to be , tons per day, of which only % 
was disposed of in adequate waste facilities, % was buried, 
% was left without any treatment in open air spaces, and 
% went to water bodies. Contamination is also produced 
by insecticides and plague control substances.
Indirect Causes
Underlying the direct causes of biodiversity loss described 
above are a set of political, social, demographic, technologi-
cal, institutional, and economic factors that are indirect causes 
of biodiversity loss. The importance of biodiversity and its 
relevance in achieving development goals has traditionally 
being ignored by decision-makers and the mainstream de-
velopment policies of governments. Even though there is 
a growing consciousness of its importance, it is far from 
being seriously considered by leaders in government or the 
private sector. 
Another major indirect cause is land distribution that has 
often led to inappropriate land use patterns. Likewise, the lack 
of real land reform has led to the use of forest reserves by 
peasants in need of additional land. Further, policies regarding 
illicit crop eradication have induced their shift from one place 
to another, increasing land clearing to establish these crops, 
and having an enormous impact on the country’s biodiversity. 
The areas where these crops have been established coincide 
largely with the location of the more vulnerable ecosystems 
in the Andes and Amazonia.
Also, a major cause of biodiversity loss is the very low 
institutional capacity to reduce impacts. Even though there 
is a complex environmental system in place, with a Ministry 
of Environment,  regional corporations that act as environ-
mental authorities, and four research institutes, their respon-
sibilities surpass their capacity. Additionally, the government 
presence in remote areas of the country has traditionally been 
very low and the local empowerment weak, which has not 
contributed to biodiversity conservation.
Box 1. Causes of Biodiversity Loss (DNP 1997)
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The second stage required wide consultation at the national 
and state level, in order to discuss, modify and develop an 
strategy able to be implemented.
The first phase of the  developed the ten strategies 
of the , building upon the same principles of the policy. 
Nine working groups were established, which included 
more than  persons from different backgrounds, repre-
senting various interests and stakeholders. These groups 
worked for a period of eight months, and the final edited 
result was published in  (F and F 
).
The second phase (the consultation phase) of the 
project never occurred due to institutional and political 
circumstances. Since the technical proposal was developed 
during the final year of a government administration, it was 
finished just as a new government with a new Minister of 
the Environment and a new senior staff took office. Even 
though assigning the responsibility of further development 
of the proposal was decided by the same Ministry, it fi-
nally opted not to adopt it formally and not to undertake 
the required political consultations. The following are the 
main factors that may have led to this outcome:
• There was a new political establishment that in-
herited a process already under development, and 
the  was reluctant to undertake a consultation 
on a proposal that was developed “outside” the 
Ministry.
• Biodiversity was not a political priority. In fact, the 
environmental priority at the time was water, and 
all environmental policy was supposed to revolve 
around this topic, including biodiversity actions.
• There was a lack of understanding of the scope 
of the . At the time, the government did not 
perceive the need to develop and implement a strat-
egy and action plan focusing only in biodiversity. 
It preferred to put all of its environmental goals 
under a sole policy document, which is much more 
general than an action plan.
• There was lack of clarity of the role of different 
institutions. Unlike other countries (Peru, for 
example, which has an institution devoted to the 
implementation and development of a national bio-
diversity strategy and action plan), in Colombia 
there is confusion about institutional responsibili-
ties regarding biodiversity. Even though the law is 
clear that the  is in charge of approving envi-
ronmental policies and the Humboldt Institute is a 
research institution that cannot assume political re-
sponsibilities, the prominent role that Humboldt has 
played has created some confusion. Therefore, the 
Ministry does not perceive biodiversity as one of its 
main responsibilities, even though a large amount 
of its work pertains to biological resources.
As a result Colombia does not have to date an officially 
approved National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan. 
Neither does it have a governing body directing and fol-
lowing its implementation. Nevertheless the published 
document of the proposal has been de facto used by the 
government as a policy framework for several of its ac-
tions regarding biodiversity. Therefore, it is worthwhile to 
consider it in any policy analysis related to biodiversity 
in Colombia.
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Identification and Definition of Access Laws and Policies
Policies Related to Access to Genetic 
Resources4
On  July , the Andean Community adopted a 
Regional Biodiversity Strategy (Decision ) under the 
auspices of the Inter-American Development Bank. This 
strategy includes an  component that provides a brief 
assessment of the problems experienced by the Andean 
Community in implementing Decision  and proposes a 
course of action to facilitate its implementation. According 
to the strategy, Decision  presents ambiguities that have 
prevented not only its implementation at a national and 
regional level, but has also prevented the advancement of 
science and the involvement of traditional communities 
in access and benefit-sharing projects. Thus, the Regional 
Biodiversity Strategy encourages the Andean Community 
to develop a common strategy on access to genetic re-
sources that includes a better definition of the scope of 
Decision  and benefit-sharing issues, an increase in 
local scientific capacity, and the development of a regional 
communication system on national access and benefit-
sharing initiatives. The Andean Community is currently 
working on an action plan to facilitate the implementation 
of the Regional Biodiversity Strategy.5 
From  to  the main governmental environmen-
tal policy in Colombia was called the “Proyecto Colectivo 
Ambiental” (“Environmental Collective Project”). This 
policy’s Biodiversity Program did not consider the issue of 
 as a central aspect. This trend continues in the present 
(–) governmental environmental policy. In , 
the executive branch was partially reorganized and  
was assigned housing responsibilities (among other duties) 
that became a high priority for the Ministry. Furthermore, 
’s name was changed to Ministry of Environment, 
Housing, and Land Development.  issues continue 
to have a low priority within . The  and , 
however, provide more specific policy elements on the 
topic. The  and  contain five strategies related 
directly or indirectly to the issue of . These strategies, 
including a description of the policy objectives and goals 
pertaining to , and a brief qualitative assessment of 
their implementation, are as follows:6
• Promote sustainable development of the economic 
potential of biodiversity. This strategy directly ad-
 
dresses the issue of  as one of the nine possible 
areas of economic potential of biological resources. 
The strategy’s objective is to promote bioprospect-
ing for the development and sustainable use of ge-
netic resources. It sets the following goals:
− Increase the knowledge of wild flora, fauna, 
and microorganisms with current and potential 
uses as active principles in the development of 
drugs, plague and illness control agents, etc.
− Develop technologies, promote uses, and de-
velop national and international markets that 
allow for the maximization of added value to 
these resources locally and nationally.
− Promote a national industry for the development 
of products that require more sophisticated pro-
cesses.
− Improve the negotiation capacity of the  
and relevant agencies in issues related to  
and their derivatives.
− Consolidate a national industry of pharmaceuti-
cal products that originate from biodiversity to 
compete in national and international markets. 
− Develop and apply various techniques of eco-
nomic valuation of biodiversity to incorporate 
the results in frameworks for decision making. 
Main accomplishments: The development of the 
Colombian Biotrade Initiative (Biocomercio) has 
helped in developing markets and strengthening the 
entrepreneurial capacity to develop new biodiversity 
products (not limited to genetic resources). 
• Distribute benefits from biodiversity equitably. This 
strategy includes the equitable distribution of ben-
efits derived from biodiversity in general, including, 
but not limited to, genetic resources. Its approach 
aims at strengthening the negotiation capacity for 
a more equitable distribution of benefits. There are 
no specific indications of how fair and equitable 
distribution of benefits should be included in  
agreements.
Main accomplishments: There are few advances in 
this area.
• Characterize the components of biological diver-
sity. There is an important relationship between this 
strategy and  since it is oriented at improving 
the knowledge of Colombian biodiversity, includ-
ing genetic resources. Its goals include increasing 
biological inventories, organizing available and 
new information, and improving national research 
capacity for the characterization of biological 
resources. Its development will allow for a better 
understanding of what the country has to offer in 
terms of genetic resources.
Main accomplishments: This strategy has achieved 
more tangible results. The Humboldt Institute has 
a Program with the main task of undertaking the 
country’s biological inventory, which has substantially 
advanced implementation the strategy’s goals.
• Recover, protect, and publicize traditional knowl-
edge. This is a key policy strategy related to , 
even though the strategy’s scope goes beyond 
genetic resources. On the specific topic of access, 
the goal is to establish and implement norms and 
mechanisms for the protection of knowledge, wis-
dom, innovations, and traditional practices.
Main accomplishments: The debate over the way to 
protect and recover traditional knowledge is highly 
controversial, and substantial discussions are still re-
quired to reach a consensus at the national level. This 
is particularly true for knowledge related to genetic 
resources. The Humboldt Institute carried out a study 
specifically related to the protection of traditional 
knowledge in the context of , and outlined a pro-
posal on the topic: “Protección al conocimiento tradi-
cional. Elementos conceptuales para una propuesta de 
reglamentación—El caso de Colombia” (Protection of 
traditional knowledge. Conceptual elements for a norm 
proposal—Colombia’s case). This proposal provides 
a relevant first step in continuing the national debate, 
before entering negotiations at the Andean level.7 
• Promote ex situ conservation. This strategy is 
closely related to the topic of . Its goals in-
clude completing the inventory of existing taxa 
in ex situ collections; selectively incorporating 
into ex situ collections strategic components of 
biodiversity depending on their vulnerability or 
their cultural, economic, ecological or evolution-
ary importance; strengthening of ex situ conserva-
tion banks; strengthening human resources for ex 
situ conservation and related research; creating a 
national information system of ex situ collections 
and; obtaining verifiable economic, social and eco-
logical benefits from ex situ conservation banks. 
The development of this strategy will significantly 
affect the way access to genetic resources occurs 
in Colombia.
Main accomplishments: There are substantial results 
in the implementation of this strategy nationwide, 
mainly in terms of information management. There 
are still insufficient efforts to incorporate species of 
particular strategic importance in ex situ collections. 
Legislation on Access to Genetic 
Resources 
Identification of Relevant Access Laws
Although the most comprehensive piece of legislation 
for Colombia regarding  is Decision , there are 
several other key laws and statutes related to genetic re-
sources. Table  includes the names of the pertinent ones in 
chronological order. The more relevant aspects of laws and 
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statutes and their relationship to  will be highlighted 
in this section. Additional information on how these laws 
and decrees relate to genetic resources may be obtained 
from Instituto Humboldt (P a). 
The  is considered the central piece of legislation 
regarding biodiversity in Colombia. One of the objectives 
of the  is to promote the fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources. 
The  also encourages the transfer of relevant technolo-
gies, through appropriate funding, taking into account all 
rights over those resources and technologies (/ 
). Additionally, the  recognizes the sovereign 
rights of nations over their natural resources and their 
authority to determine access to genetic resources. It also 
establishes that each contracting party should endeavor to 
create conditions to facilitate such access by other con-
tracting parties and should not impose restrictions that 
run counter to the intentions of the Convention. It further 
states that when access is granted it should be given under 
mutually agreed upon terms. Additionally, it indicates that 
each contracting party shall endeavor to carry out scientific 
research based on genetic resources provided by another 
party with the providing party’s full participation, and, if 
possible, to conduct that research in the country of origin. 
Finally, it establishes that each party should take legisla-
tive, administrative, or policy measures, as appropriate, 
with the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable way the 
results of research and development. The agreement 
also requires that benefits arising from the commercial 
or other utilization of genetic resources shall be shared 
with the contracting party providing such resources and 
such sharing should be upon mutually agreed terms. The 
 thus sets a comprehensive policy framework for  
and requires countries to take the appropriate measures 
to facilitate it. 
Of the national legislation summarized in Table , 
it is worth highlighting the contents of the Colombian 
Political Constitution and of Law  of . The Political 
Constitution establishes in Article , second paragraph, 
that the State will regulate the entry and exit of genetic re-
sources and their use according to national interests. Since 
the Colombian State is sovereign over its genetic resources, 
it is entitled to legislate their conservation, use, import, 
export, and any other activity related to this resource. 
Law  of  also creates the  and organizes the 
National Environmental System. Two relevant provisions 
regarding  that develop the mandate of the Constitution 
are given to the . Article , numeral , gives the  
the function of regulating the securing, use, management, 
research, import, export, distribution, and commerce of 
species and genetic lineages of fauna and flora; regulat-
ing import/export and commerce of such genetic material; 
establishing the mechanisms and procedures of command 
and control; and arranging for the necessary claim of pay-
ments or acknowledgements of the rights or privileges be-
stowed on the Nation due to the use of genetic material. In 
numeral  of the same article, law / indicates that the 
 must ensure that the study, exploitation, and research, 
both national and foreign, relating to Colombia’s natural 
resources respects national sovereignty and the rights of 
the Colombian Nation over its genetic resources. This law 
gave the  major responsibilities regarding  before 
the adoption of Decision .
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Table . Laws and norms related to genetic resources
Norm Title
Decree Law  of  Natural Resources Code
Decree  of  Regulates the Natural Resources 
Code (Decree /)
Decree  of  Regulates the Natural Resources 
Code (Decree /) regarding 
wild fauna.
Law  of   Agreement
Decree  of  Regulates the Natural Resources 
Code (Decree /) regarding 
issues of natural protected areas 
(Integrated management districts).
Political Constitution
of 
Law  of  Convention No.  on Indigenous 
people and tribes in independent 
countries
Law  of  Develops the  transitory 
article of the Constitution (black 
communities)
Law  of  Creates the  and organizes the 
National Environmental System 
Decision  of  Common Regime for the 
Protection of Plant Variety 
Breeders’ Rights.
Law  of  Convention on Biological Diversity
Decree  of  Regulates the law of Afro-
Colombian communities
Decree  of  Creates the National Commission 
of Indigenous Territories and the 
permanent harmonization table 
with Indigenous Organizations. 
Decision  of  Common Regime on Access to 
Genetic Resources
Law  of  For the protection of Colombian 
flora, and regulates botanical 
gardens. 
Decree  of  Determines the National 
Competent Authority in the matter 
of access to genetic resources. 
Resolution  of  By which some functions of 
Decision  are delegated and 
the internal procedures for access 
to genetic resources and their 
derivatives requests are set. 
Decree  of   Regulates scientific research about 
biological diversity.
Decision  of  Common Regime on Industrial 
Property
Adopted from P () and updated.
 
Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources—
Decision 391
Decision  is a regional regime that was negotiated 
and adopted in  under the Cartagena Agreement of 
the Andean Community. Decisions adopted under the 
Cartagena Agreement are binding, and once approved, 
they are automatically integrated into national legislation 
for their execution, without requiring any approval by the 
legislative apparatus of the member states (//
 ). Therefore, their application does not necessarily 
require the establishment of a new law, and can be imple-
mented with only a few additional dispositions (C 
et al. ). Additionally, it is commonly understood as 
a general norm that establishes minimal rules applicable 
to all member states, which countries can individually de-
cide to develop further on their own or apply immediately 
(// ). Therefore, this agreement is bind-
ing for all countries of the Andean Community: Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.
By the end of , the Andean Community ap-
proved Decision  regarding a Common Regime for the 
Protection of Plant Variety Breeders’ Rights. This decision 
establishes that the member countries would adopt “a com-
mon regime on biogenetic resources, biosafety measures 
for the Sub region, in concordance with the Convention on 
Biological Diversity”. After the approval of Decision , 
the first steps for the development of an access decision 
were initiated. Decision  was adopted on  July , 
and became officially binding on  July , when it 
was published in the Official Gazette of the Cartagena 
Agreement. It is considered a major development of the 
 on . The following three major characteristics of 
this Decision make it noteworthy:
• Decision  regulates the access8 to genetic re-
sources9 as well as to their derivative products10. 
Therefore it is not limited to genetic resources per 
se, but also includes other molecules of biological 
origin produced by living beings, with a broader 
scope than the specific provisions of the .
• The agreement explicitly recognizes the importance 
of knowledge associated with the genetic resources 
by considering it a central part of access under the 
name “intangible component”.11 Here again it goes 
beyond the original scope of the .
• The Decision makes a reiterative separation be-
tween biological resources on one hand and the 
genetic resources and their derivative products on 
the other, by indicating that the former contains 
the latter.
The following are the objectives and goals of Decision 
:
• Provide conditions for a fair and equitable partici-
pation in the benefits derived from access.
• Establish the basis for the recognition and valuation 
of genetic resources, their derivative products, and 
their intangible associated components, especially 
when referring to indigenous, Afro-Colombian, and 
local communities.
• Promote the conservation of biological diversity 
and the sustainable use of biological resources that 
contain genetic resources.
• Promote the consolidation and development of 
scientific, technological, and technical capacities 
at the local, national, and subregional levels.
• Strengthen the negotiating capacity of member 
countries.
The Decision indicates the minimal requirements 
that must be taken into account when making an access 
application. It also stipulates the need to establish a con-
tract agreement between those interested in the access 
activities and the National Competent Authority () 
in order to guarantee the objectives of the decision. This 
contract should take into account the rights and interests 
of the providers of the genetic resources and its derivative 
products, the providers of the biological resources that 
contain them, and the providers of intangible components, 
if applicable (P a). The principal contract should 
be supplemented with an appendix when access to genetic 
resources or derivative products with an intangible com-
ponent are requested. This appendix should be signed by 
the provider of the intangible component and the applicant 
to access, even though it may also be signed by the  
(P a). Additionally, the Decision includes the 
need for an accessory contract to protect the rights of the 
owners of the biological resources and of the landowners 
where the resources are located. These aspects will be 
expanded upon later.
Legal Developments of Decision 391 and Norms that 
Contribute to its Implementation
In Colombia two main additional legal dispositions 
were adopted in order to facilitate the implementation of 
Decision  (Table ):
• Decision  establishes that every country must 
determine an  for  purposes. This author-
ity is a public entity authorized to provide genetic 
resources or their derivative products, to subscribe 
to and oversee the contracts on , and to comply 
with the provisions of the decision. Decree  
of  determined that the  is the , thus 
empowering the Ministry as the unique authority 
in all access issues in Colombia.12 
• Resolution  of  clarifies the internal pro-
cedures to be undertaken by the  to process ac-
cess applications. These procedures will be detailed 
later. 
Another legal development, adopted by Decree  
of  that regulates scientific research relating to bio-
diversity, contributes to the implementation of Decision 
 and was partially developed with this intent.13 This 
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Decree basically simplifies the permits, authorizations and 
safe conducts that were required to undertake scientific 
research regarding biological diversity in Colombia by 
establishing a unique “study permit with the purpose of 
scientific research”14. This permit is required for activi-
ties of collection, recollection, capture, hunting, fishing, 
manipulation of the biological resources, and their mobili-
zation through the national territory. It is worth noting that 
the decree explicitly excludes issues pertaining to health 
and agriculture except when these involve specimens or 
samples of wild fauna or flora (Article ). It also indicates 
that foreigners willing to undertake scientific research in 
Colombia must present a Colombian co-researcher(s) to 
participate in the research activities. The decree has spe-
cific provisions related to access to genetic resources, and 
the following should be highlighted:
• Any scientific research which requires obtaining 
and utilizing genetic resources, their derivative 
products, or their intangible components is subject 
to the decree and to all other norms pertaining to 
access to genetic resources (Article ).
• The granting of a study permit by an environmental 
authority does not require the  to authorize ac-
cess to genetic resources. 
The Autonomous Regional Corporations (i.e., regional 
environmental agencies) thus may have an indirect role 
in the application of Decision  when they grant a 
study permit that may involve  with respect to the 
activities regulated by Decree  of  or any other 
activity that the access project may require that may lie 
within the Corporation’s functions. However, the Regional 
Corporations do not have any major authority, nor do they 
take part in the evaluation of  or the granting of access 
contracts. Nevertheless, the  may consult the Regional 
Corporations if it considers this useful and may even in-
volve them in follow up and oversight activities of a given 
 contract, through specific agreements. 
No future legal reforms to implement the Decision have 
been proposed to date. Still required is the development 
of policies (as will be analyzed below) and of additional 
legislation for the protection of traditional knowledge. In 
fact, Decision  establishes that a special regime or 
harmonization norm should be established for the protec-
tion of knowledge, innovations, and traditional practices of 
indigenous, Afro-Colombian, and local communities. 
Ex Situ Conservation Entities, Industries, and 
Activities Regulated by Decision 391
Ex situ conservation organizations
The Common Regime on  clearly indicates that it is 
applicable to those countries that are countries of origin 
of genetic resources, their derivative products, and their 
intangible components. Additionally, access is defined as 
the obtainment and utilization of genetic resources in ex 
situ or in situ conditions, their derivatives, and, if it is the 
case, their intangible components, with the purpose of 
research, bioprospecting, conservation, industrial applica-
tion or commercial use, among other activities. Finally, the 
Decision explicitly indicates that ex situ conservation cen-
ters or other entities that undertake activities relating  or 
their derivative products or, if applicable, their intangible 
components associated must sign access contracts. 
Therefore, the Decision explicitly includes all genetic 
resources and derivative products under ex situ conditions, 
thus including botanical collections, seed banks, zoos, 
breeding centers, botanical gardens, aquariums, tissue 
banks, collections in natural history museums, herbaria, 
in vitro collections, and any other instance, center, or col-
lection that may possess genetic resources or derivative 
products that will be used for  purposes. This implies 
that Decision  is also applicable to The International 
Center for Tropical Agriculture, a research institution un-
der the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research located in Colombia. 
Industries and activities regulated by Decision 391
The access definition of Decision  is very broad. It 
refers to access as related to the intent of those who wish 
to use the genetic resources, derivative product, or intan-
gible component, in specifying that the purpose must be 
for “research, bioprospecting, conservation, industrial ap-
plication, or commercial profit, among others” (Article , 
Decision ). Therefore, a wide range of activities may lie 
within this definition, but exactly which activities should 
be regulated under the Decision is still unclear.
The Decision also makes a clear distinction between 
genetic resources and derivative products, and biological 
resources, thus limiting the scope of the Decision by ex-
cluding biological resources that are not used or acquired 
with the intent of access to genetic resources or their de-
rivative products. This exclusion is nonetheless difficult 
to understand as all biological material contains genetic 
material or derivative products.
However difficult the interpretation of the Decision 
may be regarding what activities are covered, it is neces-
sary to keep in mind both the intention of the Regime 
and the practical aspects of its application. It would be 
a mistake to require access contracts for a wide range of 
activities that require the use of biological material, un-
der the premise that biological materials contain genetic 
material.
An example to illustrate this point, even though con-
troversial, is the exchange of botanical collections for 
taxonomic identification. Botanical samples not intended 
for  purposes are frequently sent to experts for the 
purpose of taxonomic identification. Nevertheless, an 
 may believe that since a biological resource contain-
ing genetic resources is exchanged, an access contract is 
required. This is even more of an issue if the sample is 
exported to a foreign collection. The  is correct that 
access can occur, but it is mistaken in requiring an access 
contract, because the intent is taxonomic identification 
and not access to genetic resources. Nevertheless, the 
access definition of Decision  allows for this ample 
interpretation of the norm.
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Even more difficulties arise when other types of activi-
ties are analyzed. For example should biological resources 
from which botanical extracts are obtained, purified, or 
processed for commercial purposes be included? Under a 
strict interpretation of Decision  they can be included, 
but it is unclear whether this is the right policy choice.
The activities and industries that should definitely 
be covered by Decision  are thus difficult to identify. 
Therefore it is the duty of each of the countries of the 
Andean Community to reflect upon this complex subject 
in order to determine the appropriate interpretation of the 
Decision. Ideally, this interpretation should be agreed upon 
by all countries, and the appropriate forum to discuss this 
topic would be the Andean Committee on Access to Genetic 
Resources, which was created by Decision . In fact, 
within the Andean Regional Biodiversity Strategy, such 
discussions have already begun at a very general level.
In Colombia, the Humboldt Institute has begun to 
analyze the subject. One of its publications regarding 
Colombian legislation states:
It is important to acknowledge that there are practical dif-
ferences between using biological resources and access-
ing genetic resources, because the access to a biological 
resource implies the physical action of collecting, taking, 
hunting or cultivating. Biological resources can be used 
and profited as a whole. On the contrary, to access a 
genetic resource, the biological resource must undergo 
a transformation process that allows separating and 
isolating the genetic resources or derivative products, 
through technologies developed for that purpose. Thus, 
in order to access genetic resources it is necessary first 
to access the biological resource. Nevertheless, the ac-
cess to a biological resource does not necessarily imply 
the access to a genetic resource. In this sense, the object 
of the access is completely different and must be taken 
into account to determine the applicable legislation 
(P a).
Even though there is a relevant advancement in the 
analysis of the topic, this interpretation has not been 
officially adopted by the , nor has it been debated. 
This issue thus requires further analysis and development 
in Colombia, as well as in the other Andean nations. In 
Colombia the project “Design of a Policy on Access to 
Genetic Resources and their Derivatives for Colombia” 
which the Humboldt Institute will complete in , will 
likely address this central issue. The implications of the 
interpretation of the norm over scientific research should be 
carefully analyzed, in order to avoid creating unjustifiable 
obstacles to research efforts in the region.
Therefore, bioprospectors from the pharmaceutical, 
agricultural, botanical medicine, and biotechnology fields 
may be included in the scope of Decision , because 
it covers all access activities without particular consider-
ations or exclusions of any given sector. Nonetheless, until 
more specific guidelines are developed, these activities 
must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis based on the 
activity they will undertake in order to determine whether 
they are covered or not by Decision .
Regulation of Access Activities in a Given Place 
For the purpose of covering access activities in a given 
place, Decision  established the form of accessory con-
tracts. It indicates that accessory contracts are those that, 
for the completion of activities related to access to genetic 
resources or their derivative products, must be established 
between the applicant to such access and: 
• The owner, possessor, or administrator of the es-
tate where the biological resource containing the 
genetic resource is located;
• The ex situ conservation center;
• The owner, possessor, or administrator of the biologi-
cal resource containing the genetic resource; or
• The national support institution15 for activities that 
may be undertaken that are not part of the access 
contract.
Other characteristics of such accessory contracts are 
that their establishment does not grant the access to genetic 
resources or its derivative products, and their content is 
subject to whatever is established in the access contract. 
Also they do not enter into force unless the access contract 
is valid. Similarly, if the  judges that the accessory con-
tract is vital to obtaining access, it may terminate the access 
contract when the accessory contract is declared null.
These are the main provisions covering access activi-
ties in a given place or land. The purpose of the accessory 
contract is to protect the legally acquired rights and inter-
ests of the owners of the estates and biological resources 
that contain the desired genetic resources. Therefore, the 
Colombian state cannot disregard the rights of third par-
ties or interfere in the free exercise of the property rights 
of individuals (P a). Rarely, if national interest 
surpasses private interest, the government may decide to 
expropriate a given property and make it public in order 
to grant an access contract. Nevertheless, this would be an 
extreme situation and is very unlikely to occur.
The provisions of the accessory contract apply to ac-
cess activities on all types of properties, and identifying 
the appropriate parties to the contract depends on who is 
the owner, possessor, or administrator of the estate where 
the biological resource containing the genetic resource 
is located. In the case of public lands or marine areas, or 
national protected areas, for example, the owner is the 
State. The owners of private or community owned lands 
are the private individuals or the community; therefore, the 
applicant to access must enter into contracts with them.
In Colombia, the use of biological resources has a 
distinctive applicable legislation, and there are diverse 
laws over the use of wild resources. Additionally, it is 
now clear that genetic resources are State property by 
inalienable right and cannot be seized, or proscribed 
as stated by the Colombian State Court (Sentence  
of August ). Therefore, the access applicant must 
agree on a contract with the state as owner of the genetic 
resource. Additionally, it must enter into an agreement 
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with the owner of the biological resource if the resource 
is privately owned, and with the owner, administrator, or 
possessor of the land where the biological resource con-
taining the desired genetic resource is located. 
Enforcement of Decision 
Decision  gives the  a major role in its evaluation, 
monitoring and enforcement (Article , Decision ). It 
is the entity responsible for formulating the dispositions re-
quired to comply with the Decision at the national level. It 
must receive, evaluate, admit, or reject access applications; 
negotiate, subscribe to, and authorize access contracts and 
issue the corresponding access resolutions16; watch over 
the rights of the providers of biological resources that 
contain genetic resources and the intangible components; 
keep records of access applications and accompanying 
technical material; modify, suspend, resolve, or rescind 
access contracts and nullify them if necessary; decide on 
national support institutions and their suitability; supervise 
and control compliance with the conditions of the contracts 
and of the dispositions of the Decision, establishing the 
mechanisms of supervision and evaluation it considers 
necessary; review previously granted access contracts and 
adjust them as necessary; delegate supervision activities to 
other entities while maintaining control and responsibility 
over such supervision according to internal legislation; 
supervise the state of biological resources containing the 
genetic resource; carry out the national inventory on ge-
netic resources and its derivative products; and maintain 
appropriate communication and information exchange 
with intellectual property right () authorities at the 
national level. 
Decree  of  determines that the  of 
Colombia is the , thus giving this Ministry all of 
these responsibilities. Additionally, Law  of  had 
already given the  several major functions in related 
genetic resources topics.17 
Decision  also defines a set of parameters for 
infringement and sanctions. It states that anyone under-
taking access activities without due authorization will 
be sanctioned. This also applies to persons undertaking 
transactions related to derivative or synthesized products18 
from genetic resources or to their intangible associated 
components. The  must apply the sanctions accord-
ing to the country’s national laws and such sanctions will 
apply without affecting other sanctions such as access or 
payment of damages for harm caused.
Standards for Evaluation of Access Applications
Decision  does not establish any specific standards for 
the evaluation of access applications.19 It only establishes a 
set of prerequisites for an application to be accepted. It also 
indicates that compliance with environmental legislation 
must be considered when evaluating the request (Article 
, Decision ).
Nevertheless,  may provide some guidance in 
the type of access applications that the country may favor, 
even though this is by no means an evaluation standard. 
Similarly, Decision  in article  indicates that the 
access applications and contracts, and, if applicable, the 
appendices, should include parameters such as those speci-
fied in the Article. These are not evaluation standards, but 
they indicate the type of access applications that may be 
favored. Such parameters are:
• The participation of citizens from the region in re-
search activities of access to genetic resources, their 
derivative products, and intangible components;
• The support of research within a member country 
that is the country of origin of the genetic resource 
or any other country from the region that contrib-
utes to the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity;
• The strengthening of mechanisms of transfer of 
knowledge and technologies, including biotech-
nologies, that are culturally, socially, and environ-
mentally safe and healthy.
• The supply of background information and state 
of the art or science that may contribute to a bet-
ter knowledge of the situation of a given genetic 
resource, its derivative or synthesized product, and 
the associated intangible component that originates 
from a given member state;
• The strengthening and development of the institu-
tional national or sub regional capacity associated 
with genetic resources and its derivative products;
• The strengthening and development of the capacity 
of indigenous, Afro-Colombian, and local commu-
nities in relation to intangible knowledge associ-
ated with the genetic resources and their derivative 
products;
• The deposit of duplicates of all collected material 
in institutions determined by the ;
• The obligation of providing the  with the results 
of the research undertaken; and
• The terms of the transfer of the accessed material 
to third parties.
Even though the above parameters may help the access 
applicant develop its access proposal, they are insufficient 
from a policy point of view. The  needs to adopt policy 
guidelines with this in mind in order to facilitate the access 
process and to make it more clear and efficient. 
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Because there was no specific policy on  in Colombia 
as of July , this section will be completely devoted to 
a description of the relevant existing legislation.
Steps to Obtain Access to Genetic 
Resources
The steps required for an applicant interested in obtaining 
access to genetic resources, their derivative products, and 
the associate intangible components (i.e., knowledge) are 
clearly described in Decision . In this section these 
steps will be described, along with an analysis of the 
difficulties that may arise in their implementation and 
suggestions of how they could be improved. None of the 
suggestions require any legal reform of Decision ; most 
of them call for the development of policies defining key 
aspects of the access process. 
It is worth noting that the procedures of Decision  
are exactly the same for Colombians and for foreigners. 
Also, there are no differences between applications for 
scientific research and for commercial purposes.
Presentation of an Access Application 
The process to access genetic resources or their derivatives 
begins with the presentation by the applicant of a request 
to the , (i.e., the ). The request must include the 
prerequisites that are indicated in Decision , Article 
. There is no government fee for the presentation of the 
application.20 Of these prerequisites it is worth highlight-
ing the following: the identification of the provider of the 
genetic and biological resources, their derivative products, 
and intangible components; the identification of the person 
or national support institution; the identification and cur-
riculum vitae of the responsible leader of the project and 
of its working group; the access activity that is requested; 
and the locality or area where the access will take place, 
indicating its geographic coordinates. In addition, the re-
quest must be accompanied by a project proposal. 
If the proposal and all additional materials are com-
plete, the  will accept it, and the process will be 
officially initiated. If the application is incomplete, the 
applicant will be notified without delay and apprised 
of the missing items, in order for the application to be 
completed. If accepted, an abstract of the application will 
be published within five days in a media source of wide 
national circulation, as well as in a media source in the 
locality where the access is requested.
One major aspect of this access application may be 
unclear: the requirement to present a “project proposal”. 
This project proposal, along with the credentials of re-
search group, should be a key element in evaluating the 
access application. However there are no guidelines, either 
in the Decision or any other policy document, as to what 
its content and scope should be. The only references that 
may be used by the applicant are the parameters described 
in Article  of the Decision. Guidelines for the content 
and scope of this project proposal need to be defined by 
the  in an official policy document that can be used as a 
reference by applicants. The definition of such parameters 
would substantially facilitate the access process both for 
the applicant and for the . 
Evaluation of the Access Application and Project Proposal
Within  working days of its official acceptance, the  
will evaluate the proposal and will undertake the inspec-
tions it regards as necessary. The  will issue a legal 
and technical statement indicating whether the request is 
or is not approved. This time frame may be expanded up 
to  working days at the ’s discretion.
Taking into account the legal and technical statement, 
the compliance with the Decision, and other analysis, the 
 will accept or deny the request. Applicants will be 
notified of the acceptance of the application and project 
proposal within five working days of the ’s decision. 
If the request and project proposals are accepted, the  
will proceed to negotiate and elaborate the terms of the 
access contract. If the request and project proposals are 
not accepted, the  will communicate its decision to 
the applicant by resolution stating the reasons of such 
denial and will terminate the procedure. The applicant 
may appeal this decision through a process determined 
by national legislation.
Even though this step is straightforward, the difficulty 
lies in the fact that the evaluation criteria are not defined 
or even outlined in an officially adopted policy document. 
This makes it more difficult for the applicant to submit a 
successful proposal and for the  to evaluate it. Even 
though there is a learning curve in evaluating the access 
proposals on a case-by-case basis, the  must use this 
learning process in order to outline the basis for evalua-
tion criteria. 
Elaboration of the Access Contract
Decision  indicates that after the request has been 
officially accepted a period of negotiation between the 
 and the applicant will occur, after which an access 
contract is signed. The terms or other characteristics of the 
negotiation and the time frame in which it is to take place 
are not specified by the Decision. The negotiation stage 
is one of the major hurdles of the access process, again 
because of the lack of a government policy. Additionally, 
the scope of the negotiation is not completely clear, given 
that the request and project proposal have already been 
accepted. This aspect should be clarified and developed. 
It is implicit that the negotiation should address issues 
such as the distribution of benefits and take into account 
the compliance with the Decision and its intent, etc. 
Nevertheless, the parameters provided by the Decision in 
this respect are insufficient because they do not specify the 
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interests of the government of Colombia when entering 
into an access contract. These interests should be defined 
in a policy on .
The legislation indicates that a contract agreement must 
be entered into between the  and the applicant, and 
it also indicates the requirements for the appendix to the 
contract and the accessory contract already described in 
this paper. It is not clear whether these documents must 
precede or follow the signing of the access contract.
Enactment of the Contract 
Once the access contract has been adopted and signed, the 
 will issue and publish an access resolution, accompa-
nied by an abstract of the contract, in the official gazette or 
newspaper of wide national circulation. The contract will 
be considered as perfected once this step is taken.
The length of the whole procedure depends on the dura-
tion of the negotiation between the applicant and the . 
All other legal steps described above require a maximum 
of  working days.
Government Capacity to Negotiate ABS 
Agreements
The current capacity for evaluating, negotiating, and 
monitoring  proposals is very low, mainly because the 
 and other institutions have diverse responsibilities 
in many areas. In addition, there are no experts in the 
specific topics of  involved in the evaluation process. 
Resolution  of  establishes that the evaluation and 
negotiation stages must be coordinated with the Ministry of 
Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Commerce, the Ministry 
of Agriculture, and other entities related to the , as 
well as private and public universities, in particular the 
National University of Colombia (Universidad Nacional 
de Colombia) and the Amazonian University. 
Relationship between Decision 391 and 
International Laws and Policies
The issue of  is central to Colombian foreign policy 
regarding biodiversity. This policy is centered on three 
aspects: ) the application of the , ) restrictions on 
the application of s, and ) promotion of the sustain-
able use of genetic resources and equitable distribution of 
monetary and nonmonetary benefits.21 
There were two main motives for the development of 
an agreement on  at the Andean level: implementing 
the  and regional integration between Andean coun-
tries. Both are international policies of the Colombian 
government. Also, within the Andean Community, there 
has been a strong interest in environmental issues as a 
key element of the integration process. Environmental 
issues have been addressed in eight presidential Councils 
of the Cartagena Agreement, and the commission has de-
veloped at least six Decisions related to agricultural and 
biological resources. The agreement to develop an Andean 
Biodiversity Strategy is also a clear indication of the com-
mitment of Andean countries to strengthen their capacity 
to implement the .
Additionally, Decision  has supported the Colom-
bian government’s position in several international negotia-
tions and forums related to genetic resources. It provided 
the government with a solid political basis to construct the 
country’s position for the  International Undertaking,22 
the , World Trade Organization forums, as well as for 
the negotiation of Decision  or Common Regime on 
Industrial Property. Table  shows the laws that relate to 
. In this section, a brief reference to their relationship 
to Decision  will be provided.
The relationship between Decision  and Law  of 
 of  has already been established. Nevertheless, it 
is worth highlighting again that Decision  was basically 
adopted to comply with the provisions of the , and it 
follows the spirit of the Convention.
The  agreement shares a common purpose with 
the Decision because it has the objective of promoting the 
conservation and sustainable use of the tropical forests 
and of its genetic resources (Law  of , cited by 
P ()). The same is true of Convention No.  
on Indigenous People and Tribes in Independent Countries, 
which states that the rights of the people over the natural 
resources existing in their lands must be specially pro-
tected. These rights include the right to participate in the 
use, management, and conservation of these resources. It 
also indicates that when the state has ownership or rights 
over the resources existing in these lands, the govern-
ment must establish procedures for consulting with the 
interested communities before allowing any exploration 
on their lands. The people must always participate in the 
benefits that these activities produce and receive equitable 
indemnification for any harm they may suffer as the result 
of these activities (Law  of , cited by P a). 
Decision  embraces the intent of Law  by creating 
provisions protecting the rights of the people over their 
lands and protecting their knowledge through accessory 
contracts and the appendix to the contract.
Decision  or Common Regime for the Protection of 
Plant Variety Breeders’ rights is closely related to access to 
plant genetic resources, because it establishes a sui generis 
property rights regime regulating plant breeders’ rights, 
thus protecting the farmers and regulating ownership of 
newly developed plant varieties. The regime complies with 
the provisions of the International Union for the Protection 
of New Varieties of Plants.
Decision  or Common Regime on Industrial 
Property has the strongest relation to the topic of  and 
thus with Decision . There is a direct assertion that 
the elements of industrial property must safeguard and 
respect the genetic patrimony of the states, as well as the 
knowledge of indigenous, black, and local communities. 
Any patent granted using genetic material or knowledge 
from a country of the region requires the material to have 
been acquired according to international, regional, and 
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national norms (in the case of Colombia, according to 
Decision  and related regulations). Therefore, the ap-
plicant must present the access contract, appendix, and 
accessory contracts, if applicable; otherwise, the patent 
will be null. Additionally, the Decision explicitly excludes 
the granting of patents on parts of live resources as they 
exist in nature, including the genome or germplasm of any 
natural living organism. Therefore, it prohibits patents over 
accessed genetic material if it exists as such in a living 
organism. The relationship between access and Decision 
 will be analyzed later.
Provisions that Promote the Conservation 
of Biodiversity, its Sustainable Use and the 
Fair and Equitable Distribution of Benefits
The central spirit of Decision  is the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological and genetic resources, and 
the fair and equitable distribution of benefits. Two of its 
five goals are related to these concepts: “to provide the 
conditions for a fair and just participation in the benefits 
derived from access to genetic resources” and “to promote 
the conservation of biological diversity and the sustain-
able use of the biological resources containing genetic 
resources” (Decision  ).
Decision  states that the applicant for access must 
comply with the applicable environmental legislation. 
Additionally, it indicates that member states can estab-
lish limitations to access and their derivative products by 
a special legal norm, in the following cases:
• Endemism, rarity, or danger of extinction of spe-
cies, subspecies, varieties, or lineages;
• Conditions of vulnerability or fragility in the 
structure or function of ecosystems that may be 
aggravated because of access activities;
• Adverse effects over human health or over essential 
elements of the cultural identity of the people;
• Undesirable or uncontrollable environmental im-
pacts caused by access activities on ecosystems;
• Danger of genetic erosion due to access activities;
• Biosafety regulations; and
• Genetic resources or geographic areas determined 
as strategic.
Finally, in addition to these specific references, the 
access, appendix, and accessory contracts are the main 
instruments to promote the conservation and sustainable 
use of biodiversity and to seek the equitable and fair dis-
tribution of benefits. There are no specific indications on 
how these objectives should be reached, and they should 
be further developed by the Andean Committee on Genetic 
Resources and by national policies. 
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Process that Led to the Development of Decision 391
National discussions over  increased in Colombia soon 
after the Biodiversity Convention was ratified by the coun-
try. In particular there was a nongovernmental organiza-
tion () initiative named the “National Biodiversity 
Strategy” () which was important in these discussions. 
From a legal standpoint, by the end of  the Andean 
Community approved Decision  (Common Regime 
for the Protection of Plant Variety Breeders’ Rights). In 
this regime, the countries already indicated their interest 
in developing an Andean norm related to  and agreed 
to adopt a common regime on biogenetic resources and 
biosafety for the region. Soon after that, the formal discus-
sions of such a norm were initiated. 
An analysis of the process that led to the decision has 
identified two main motivations that resulted in the negotia-
tion of Decision  (C et al. ): ) The need to 
develop legislation to protect genetic resources in order to 
gain control over the inventions derived from them, given 
the increased strength of  regimes after Decision  
had been approved, and ) the fact that Andean countries 
share, in general terms, a great amount of their biodiversity. 
The countries thus wanted to avoid competition between 
themselves and opted for the adoption of a common set 
of rules and the promotion of cooperative mechanisms 
between countries. At the Andean level, the initial dis-
cussions on the  norm had the ample participation of 
various sectors of civil society. Moreover, the Secretariat 
of the Andean Community asked the World Conservation 
Union (), which lately involved Peruvian Society for 
Environmental Law ()23, to develop a first draft of the 
elements that should be considered in an access regime. 
This draft was presented to the countries in ctober  
under the title “Possible Elements for a Decision of the 
Andean pact about Access to Genetic Resources” (J 
A  C ). In September , there 
were already deep differences with the / pro-
posal, as well as resistance from some governments even 
to have such a document as a basis for discussion. Also, a 
number of other draft norms emerged from various groups. 
In Colombia, in August , the  produced an alterna-
tive draft, “Proyecto de Decisión Andina sobre Acceso a 
Recursos Genéticos—Propuesta de Colombia”.24 These 
various documents were discussed in a regional workshop 
in Villa de Leyva, Colombia. This workshop had wide 
participation (’s, academic institutions, private sector, 
intergovernmental institutions, and indigenous organiza-
tions) from the Andean countries. Nevertheless, there was 
increased tension in the debate between “conservation” 
and “commercialization”, which led government repre-
sentatives to decide to isolate themselves from the  
process (C et al. ). As a result, the s and 
others contributing to the debate lost their opportunity to 
participate in the development of the Decision (C 
et al. ).
 
Most governments felt uncomfortable discussing the 
development of an access norm based on an  draft 
proposal. In fact, after this phase of active civil society 
participation, a number of government proposals were 
put forth, and the formal instances of debate and negotia-
tion began to be called “government expert meetings”. In 
November , the Colombian and Venezuelan govern-
ments jointly presented a new draft Decision for discus-
sion. The next year, the governments of both Bolivia and 
Ecuador proposed two different texts of draft decisions. 
Finally, the discussions between government officials 
developed around these three governmental drafts. There 
were six expert meetings which led to the elaboration of a 
final proposal that was presented to the Commission of the 
Cartagena Agreement for its approval in July .
Analyses of the process indicate that the opportunity 
for wider participation in the debate and groundwork on 
a topic of such relevance as  was lost. Indeed, some 
argue that the conflicting attitude between s led the 
governments, and particularly the Colombian government, 
to shy away from the broad debate that characterized the 
early stages of the development of the decision. As a result, 
some feel that topics such as traditional knowledge and 
the equitable distribution of benefits were not developed 
enough. An additional perception is that not all participat-
ing experts had adequate legal, technical, scientific, and 
economic experience to develop an access regime, which 
is partially explained by the fact that there is no strong 
experience within Colombia in the biotechnology, phar-
maceutical, or agricultural industries either in research or 
business development (C et al. ).
From the reading of the official reports of these meet-
ings, it is possible to observe that there was a sense of 
urgency to approve a decision. There were also extensive 
proposals regarding the definition of access and what it 
should cover. The group finally adopted a wide-ranging 
definition based on a Colombian proposal, which is very 
close to the current access definition of Decision . It 
is worthwhile noting that the negotiators possessed much 
less information than we do now regarding the activities 
and opportunities that  offers. Therefore, they tried to 
do their best using a very wide definition that can cover all 
types of activities. Unfortunately, the result of the applica-
tion of this norm has been the opposite of its intent.
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Difficulties During the Design of Decision 391
A number of issues were controversial during the develop-
ment of Decision . The main ones will be highlighted:
• Conservation vs. Commercialization. The main 
controversial issue was the tension between a 
conservationist decision and a norm targeted at 
controlling the flow of genetic resources with a 
more “commercial” perspective (C et al. 
). Some s, in particular, wanted a broader 
norm aimed at the conservation and sustainable use 
of biodiversity from a larger perspective. The other 
group thought that there were other instruments to 
do this, including the . Finally, governments 
opted for a focused regime solely oriented at  
issues. 
• Scientific and Traditional Knowledge. The 
treatment of knowledge involves both scientific 
and traditional knowledge. There was the intent to 
protect traditional knowledge and to respect scien-
tific knowledge simultaneously. Some s wanted 
a special access process for the cases that involved 
traditional knowledge. Additionally, there was in-
terest in protecting traditional knowledge from a 
larger perspective, and there were not any other 
forums to do so. The governments opted for a mid-
point solution that treats both types of knowledge 
as intangible components associated with genetic 
resources and a weak definition of the protection of 
traditional knowledge. In fact the Decision creates 
the basic instruments to protect traditional knowl-
edge but delegates the solution to future negotia-
tions. It indicates that the Cartagena Board must 
elaborate a proposal of a special regime or harmoni-
zation norm oriented to the protection of traditional 
knowledge, innovations, and practices within three 
months of July . The issue is so controversial 
that such a proposal has not emerged, nor have the 
countries pursued all the steps indicated by the 
norm (i.e., to undertake national studies on the topic 
and carry out training workshops in communities) 
in order to develop such a proposal.
• The “green gold” perception. The other issue that 
was a cause of debate was the perception by some 
government officials that genetic resources were the 
“green gold” of the Andean countries. Some people 
gave genetic resources an extremely high economic 
value and expected an immediate high economic 
return from their use (C et al. ). This 
perception was not accepted by all participants and 
was a cause of tension in the debates. Finally, the 
governments opted for a norm aimed at strictly 
controlling the flow of genetic resources and their 
export to third countries, under the premise that 
important sums of money were at stake.25
 
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Implementation of Decision 391 in Colombia
Even though Decision  has been in place since , 
by February , not a single access contract had been 
signed in Colombia. Also, the number of access appli-
cations has been low: in total the  has received  
access applications, which are summarized in Table . 
Overall, a similar situation is occurring in the other Andean 
countries. Between July  and July , Venezuela, 
Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru received only  applications. 
Of these, one was approved, four were denied, two did 
not require access contracts, and the others are under 
evaluation (// ). Simply put, there 
has been very little implementation of Decision . The 
Decision has been useful to the subregion in setting up 
strong positions in international forums such as the  
International Undertaking negotiations, but it has not been 
particularly useful at the national level. It has served mainly 
as a framework to analyze the access proposals that have 
been presented. One must suspect that most access activi-
ties in Colombia, and in other Andean countries, both for 
research and commercial purposes, are currently conducted 
illegally. Potential applicants for access do not understand 
the decision, or they ignore it, perceiving it as an obstacle 
to research and development.
Table  summarizes the access proposals that have been 
submitted to the , and provides information about the 
applicant, the objective of the project, and its status. Most 
of the applications are solely for scientific research and do 
not have commercial purposes. It is worth noting that in 
several cases the applicant withdrew from the access pro-
cess. Box  summarizes the case of BioAndes, which has 
been the only application with commercial purposes.
Several of the implementing obstacles for Colombia 
have been identified already in this document. At the 
Andean level the main difficulty is the interpretation 
of the Decision  (// ) both by 
governments and access applicants. A summary of other 
implementing difficulties is the following (//
 ):
• Confusion over which activities require access 
contracts;
• Lack of knowledge of the norm by potential users;
• Lack of experienced and qualified personnel to 
inform the public;
• Insufficient information regarding access proce-
dures;
• Confusion over the most important terms of the 
norm and the role of different parties;
• Lack of interest by potential applicants to get in-
volved in a complicated, expensive, and uncertain 
procedure;
• Uncertainty regarding issues related to the protec-
tion of traditional knowledge and whether they will 
be defined or not;
• Expectations of high economic benefits on the part 
of governments and indigenous communities;
• Difficulties in the negotiations of accessory contracts 
with the providers of the biological resources (ex-
cessive expectations of economic remuneration);
• Lack of an appropriate information system;
• Lack of compliance with the terms and timetable 
established by Decision ; and
• Lack of sufficient economic resources for imple-
mentation. 
On the other hand, the Decision has not yet reached 
the main purposes for which it was developed. First of all, 
the countries do not have a unified access policy, one of 
the initial motivations of the norm (F and P 
), because they have given the Decision such a wide 
range of interpretations. Another main purpose was to be 
able to control the flow of genetic resources. This has not 
occurred due to the lack of implementation of the Decision. 
Finally, the norm could have provided favorable condi-
tions for promoting interesting access agreements. This 
has not happened because applicants do not feel sufficient 
legal certainty or clear negotiation conditions (F 
and P ). As was pointed out before, the Andean 
Committee on  provides a valuable forum to discuss 
and develop implementing solutions.
In the case of Colombia, there is the perception from 
the , the Ministry of Commerce, and research institu-
tions such as the Humboldt Institute that the norm can 
be successfully applied without legal reform. There is 
an agreement that the current legal framework can work, 
even to actively promote  activities in Colombia, if 
the appropriate procedures and policy developments are 
set in place. In fact, the lack of a clear and publicized 
government policy has had three grave results: the lack 
of application of the norm, leading to illegal access26, the 
insufficient active promotion of access activities, and a 
weak and unclear response to the few access applications 
that have been submitted. The result: a net loss of oppor-
tunities for the sustainable use of genetic resources. There 
are currently two major efforts to address these needed 
developments. First, the  hired a research institute of 
the National University of Colombia to develop key access 
concepts and procedures. Secondly, the Humboldt Institute 
is undertaking a research project that will lead to a policy 
proposal on .
 
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The Andean countries in general, and Colombia in particu-
lar, have comprehensive  legislation, some of which is 
specifically related to biodiversity. Table  summarizes the 
legal norms related to s and biodiversity in Colombia 
(P b).
Of this group of norms, two are particularly relevant in 
the context of  and bioprospecting. These are Decision 
 and Decision . Decision , Common Regime 
for the Protection of Plant Variety Breeders’ Rights, es-
tablishes the intent of Andean Community to develop a 
common regime on . This Decision has the following 
objectives (// ):
• Recognize and guarantee the protection of the 
rights of breeders of new plant varieties through a 
certificate.
• Encourage research activities in the Andean region.
• Promote technology transfer activities within and 
outside the subregion. 
Decision  of  is the newly approved Common 
Regime on Industrial Property. With this Decision, the 
Andean Community complied with the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
() requirements. In fact, this is why Decision  
was replaced. Furthermore, the process leading to the com-
mon regime on industrial property was largely promoted 
by the Colombian Government (M  C 
E ). 
Decision  has critical provisions related to :
• Article  establishes that member countries will 
guarantee that elements of industrial property be 
Intellectual Property Rights and Bioprospecting
Table . Access proposals presented to the  of Colombia between  and early 
 Project name  Applicant Project objective  Status
. Access application to 
all of Colombian genetic 
resources in all Colombian 
territory (February ). 
Revised proposal: Access 
to all of genetic resources 
in natural protected areas 
(May ). Second pro-
posal: access to all genetic 
resources excluding park 
areas contested by civil law 
or inhabited by indigenous 
or Afro-Colombian com-
munities.
Research of in vitro bioactive 
compounds for the treatment 
of cancer and other diseases. 
After several resolutions and 
new proposal by BioAndes 
the request was denied in 
December .
BioAndes de Colombia 
(Joint venture between 
Andes Pharmaceuticals Inc. 
–  and  Associates 
– Colombia).
. Identification of the 
importance of hibernating 
sites of four North America 
migrating bird species 
(Catharus ustulatus, Seiurus 
noveboracensis, Setophaga 
ruticilla, and Dendroica 
striata), by using genetic 
markers and census in the 
National Natural Park of 
Tinigua.
Research to identify hiber-
nating sites of migrating 
species.
The application was submit-
ted in July  and filed 
after the applicant withdrew.
Alejandro Calixto
. Genetic analysis of Fungi 
Ustilaginales from the col-
lection of the Colombian 
National Herbaria.
Determine phylogenetic 
relationships among the 
fungi analyzed. Research for 
academic purposes.
In February  the 
applicant withdrew and the 
application was filed.
Adriana Mercedes,
Gil Correa
. Analysis of the genetic 
variation and degree of 
genetic isolation in the popu-
lations of Inia geoffrencis 
in the Amazon and Orinoco 
basins.
Contribute to the taxonomic 
knowledge of this river 
dolphin species by using 
genetic markers. Provide 
information to contribute to 
the development of policies 
and conservation strategies 
for the dolphin populations.
The access request was ac-
cepted in . The process 
has not concluded and the 
negotiation phase and sign-
ing of the access contract are 
pending.
Eulalia Banguera Hinestroza
 
granted protection while respecting their biological 
and genetic patrimony, as well as the traditional 
knowledge of their indigenous, black, and local 
communities. It further states that patents for inven-
tions developed from material obtained from this 
patrimony or such knowledge will only be granted 
if this material has been acquired in conformity 
with the international, subregional, and national 
legal systems. It states that member countries 
recognize the rights and authority of indigenous, 
black, and local communities over their collective 
knowledge. It also indicates that Decision  will 
be applied and interpreted in such a manner that it 
should not contravene Decision .
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• Article  establishes restrictions to patents. In 
particular, it indicates that plants, animals, and 
essentially biological procedures for the produc-
tion of plants or animals that are not nonbiological 
procedures will not be subject to patents.
• Article  regarding the requirements for obtaining 
a patent establishes that the applicant must present: 
a) a copy of the access contract when the products 
or procedures of the patent requested have been 
obtained or developed from genetic resources or 
their derivatives of which any of the member coun-
tries are countries of origin and b) if applicable, a 
copy of the authorization for the use of traditional 
. Study of genetic diversity 
of the genus Cattleya of the 
Andean Region of Colombia 
using . Expedient No. 
.
Study of the genetic structure 
of the orchid genus Cattleya 
of the Colombian Andes, 
including the extraction of 
. The study would allow 
for a better understanding of 
the genus classification and 
provide strategies for its ex 
situ and in situ conservation.
The applicant withdrew its 
request in June .
María Eloisa Aldana
Table . Continued
 Project name  Applicant Project objective  Status
. Export permit of samples 
of tissue and blood from 
the marine turtles, genus 
Caretta. Expedient No. 
.
Genetic study for the con-
servation of the turtle in the 
Department of Magdalena. 
The objective is to determine 
the size and structure of the 
populations of the marine 
turtles.
Additional information and 
permits have been requested 
by  in .
Diego Amorocho
. Expedient . Not publicly available Under evaluationNot publicly available
. Access to genetic resourc-
es and their derivatives of 
the “Mono Titi” (Sanguinus 
oedipus). Expedient No. 
.
The access requested is 
aimed at determining the 
hormonal levels of several 
females, through sampling 
of feces. Additionally the 
genetic variability within a 
population will be deter-
mined, including paternity 
and relationships between 
the individuals of each con-
servation group through skin 
and hair samples. The main 
purpose of the research is the 
ecology and behavioral traits 
of the populations of the cot-
ton-top tamarin, Sanguinus 
oedipus, in their natural 
environment.
Under evaluation.Disney’s Animal Kingdom
. Analysis of the genus 
Trianopiper. Expedient No. 
.
Request for taxonomic 
scientific research. The 
objective was to pursue a 
taxonomic revision of the 
species of the Trianopiper 
genus using genetic tools.
Additional information 
was requested by  in 
December .
María Alejandra Jaramillo
 
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knowledge from indigenous, black, and local com-
munities, when the products for which the patent 
is requested have been obtained or developed from 
such knowledge of which any of the member coun-
tries is a country of origin, according to Decision 
 and its developments.
There is a very strong connection between the two 
regimes, as Decision  strengthens the relevance of 
 procedures. Therefore, it is extremely important for 
Andean countries to promptly implement Decision  in 
order not to block the  regulation.
As for other proposals made in terms of , the Latin 
American and Caribbean Group have proposed to include 
the issue of traditional knowledge in the negotiations of 
the Free Trade Area for the Americas and 27. These 
propositions are still under development and debate.
As was explained above, Colombia does not have 
in place a comprehensive system to protect traditional 
knowledge. In fact, this has been a major hurdle to access 
because most communities feel they do not have suffi-
cient protection of their rights. Decision  establishes 
that a norm to protect these rights has to be proposed at 
the Andean level, but this has not occurred. The issue is 
so controversial at the national, subregional, and interna-
tional levels that there is not a clear foreseeable outcome. 
In Colombia there has been some conceptual progress 
with the development of elements for the elaboration of a 
protection regime for traditional knowledge, innovations, 
and practices (S et al. ). Nevertheless, this 
is an academic proposal that may serve as an initial basis 
for discussion but that still requires wide opportunities 
for debate, discussion, and modification from Colombian 
traditional communities.
. Isolation and identifica-
tion of a microorganism with 
“levansacarasa” activity. 
Expedient No. 
Study of a microorganism 
with “levansacarasa” activ-
ity.
The application was filed in 
January .
Director, Institute of 
Biotechnology (National 
University of Colombia)
. Bird malaria in Colombia. 
Expedient No. .
Study of malaria present 
in the bird population of 
Colombia
Additional information was 
requested by the  on  
February .
Medicine Department, 
University of Antioquia
. Genetic diversity 
of three populations of 
Colombobalanus excelsa. 
Expedient No. 
Analysis of genetic diver-
sity of the endangered tree 
species, Colombobalanus 
excelsa (Fagaceae)
Additional information was 
requested by the  on  
November .
Eliana Gonzales Valencia
. Request for three research 
projects. Expedient No. has 
not been assigned yet.
Humboldt Institute Unknown, additional infor-
mation was requested by 
 on  August .
Director
. Genetic characterization 
of the South American dol-
phin. Expedient No. 
Analysis of the genetic 
diversity of the South 
American dolphin for 
scientific (noncommercial) 
purposes.
 should be making a 
decision in .
Susana Caballero
. Study of amphibians and 
reptiles in eastern Colombia
Analysis of the diversity of 
amphibians and reptiles in 
eastern Colombia
Additional information was 
requested by  on  
March .
Taran Grant, American 
Museum of Natural History
Table . Continued
 Project name  Applicant Project objective  Status
Recommendations to Facilitate Access to
Genetic Resources in other Countries
The most relevant recommendations to facilitate access 
in Colombia were outlined in previous sections of this 
paper. Some lessons can be derived from the Andean 
experience, and in fact developers of several of the new 
laws and policies worldwide regarding access have already 
benefited from these lessons. The recommendations that 
emerge from the Andean and Colombian process can be 
summarized as follows.
The main problem with Decision  is its lack of 
implementation. This problem has many origins, but two 
are outstanding:
• The country lacks the capacity to put the norm in 
place due to institutional limitations, insufficient 
budget, and lack of appropriate expertise.
• The scope of the norm is not clearly defined. After 
almost six years there is no consensus on what ac-
cess to genetic resources means and includes, what 
type of activities it covers, and what relationship it 
has to the use of biological resources. The defini-
 
C : C 
tion of access in the Decision is too wide, impeding 
its implementation and creating confusion both in 
the  and among persons interested in access 
activities. 
The lessons derived are straightforward:
• Put in place legislation that can effectively be im-
plemented, even if it is less ambitious in its scope 
than may be ideal: at least some of the access activi-
ties will be undertaken under legal terms, and the 
country can gradually learn from the process and 
advance to more complicated schemes if necessary. 
It is necessary to guarantee that the appropriate 
resources (institutional, human capacity, budget, 
etc.) are available to put the norm in place.
• Clearly define a reasonable scope of what the leg-
islation covers, thus minimizing confusion from 
government and the users. Also, it is necessary to 
define the relationship with other natural resource 
uses that very likely have their own legislation in 
place and should be dealt with separately. 
The Colombian experience also demonstrates that the 
lack of policy on  issues has exacerbated the low rate 
of implementation of Decision . If the Colombian 
government had a policy framework to implement the 
decision, most of its difficulties could be overcome. 
Within the definition of the policy the most important 
task is to identify the country’s policy objectives: Does 
the country want to control all flows of genetic resources? 
Does it want to promote technology transfer and increase 
its scientific and technical capacity through access activi-
ties? Does it want to promote foreign investment or does 
it want more stringent norms on foreigners to discourage 
their  activities? What is the role of the government? 
Should the government determine what technology transfer 
takes place? These policy choices have to be evaluated 
and properly debated. Once defined, they will provide 
a useful framework for the implementation of the norm 
and/or the promotion of access activities. As in the case 
of the Andean countries, it is clear that the existence of 
the decision alone is not enough. 
Another lesson that can be derived from the Andean 
process is that these governments rushed to have a decision 
in place, in their urgency to protect their genetic patri-
mony. The net result so far has been the opposite of what 
they intended. Even though the negotiations surrounding 
Decision  began with open debate, they ended with a 
very limited group of so called “government experts”.28 
Apparently not all “government experts” had sufficient 
expertise in access issues, and none of the countries had 
practical experience in pharmaceutical or other relevant 
areas. As a result, they developed a norm with their best 
knowledge and certainly with good intentions, but with 
considerable implementation difficulties. The negotiation 
process could have benefited from the following: 
• A wider consultation with experts from different 
fields, including international experts with practical 
experience on access activities;
• A more sustained discussion, not limited to s, 
with the different stakeholders, including academic 
interests and the private sector; and
The BioAndes case has been the only access application with 
commercial purposes that has taken place in Colombia. In 
February  BioAndes formally submitted an  request 
for drug discovery in all Colombian Territory. This initial 
request was later modified to focus on the National Natural 
Park System, excluding contested areas or areas inhabited by 
indigenous or black communities. The application was for the 
collection of random biological materials for the elaboration 
of extracts for the research of in vitro bioactive compounds 
for the treatment of cancer and other diseases. This first ap-
plication was denied by the  in November  arguing 
the following:
• Geographic inaccuracy: it was proposed to sample sites 
in all protected areas of the system.
• Taxonomic inaccuracy: the application included a request 
to sample all taxonomic groups in Colombia, both marine 
and terrestrial.
• Absence of strategic alliances with local partners for tech-
nology transfer and lack of a National Support Institution 
(BioAndes did not meet the requirements since it was the 
applicant to access).
• Absence of cash-sharing benefit schemes, although Bio-
Andes had asked for a principle of equitable treatment.
Later BioAndes appealed the  decision, arguing that 
the ample application scope was necessary to warrant the vi-
ability of the enterprise, and that the taxonomic breadth was 
justified by the bioassay method to be used. It also argued that 
strategic alliances were not required because the elaboration 
of the extracts was common practice. It also claimed that 
Decision  did not require monetary compensation as part 
of the application process.
Afterwards the  reiterated its decision, but it did 
emphasize some positive aspects of the initial application. 
BioAndes appealed, and in May  presented a second 
access application, this time limiting research to - pro-
tected areas, excluding all parks inhabited by traditional com-
munities. The taxonomic scope was still wide; and the group 
planned to “examine plants with known medicinal activity… 
purchased at market places” and to use “popular literature” to 
gather information about useful plants. This second request 
was again denied in November , and the  gave its 
final negative response in December .
Box 2. The case of BioAndes (Information from
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (1999) and from the MOE Public Expedients and Resolutions)
 
A B  S  B
• Lengthier discussions on the purpose and philo-
sophical intent of the Decision. Even though the 
negotiation process took two and a half years, op-
portunities for debate were not sufficient.29 
A related lesson is that the issue of traditional knowl-
edge was not properly addressed. As was stated before, this 
issue is so controversial and sensitive that the countries 
opted to postpone the discussions. This has, in practical 
terms, left the topic undeveloped, creating a major difficul-
ty for the implementation of the norm, not to mention the 
discomfort and discontent of traditional communities. 
Other more specific rescommendations to governments 
that arise from this analysis are the following:
• Provide legal certainty to all stakeholders.
• Do not put in place a law with an access model 
that is too rigid. Set a more flexible scheme that 
allows learning from the process and benefiting 
from technological innovations in biotechnology 
and molecular biology.
• In the access application, ask for detailed informa-
tion about the research project that is proposed. 
That will provide useful information for the evalu-
ation process and orient the applicant in developing 
a more appropriate access proposal. 
• Do not overestimate the economic benefits to the 
government that will arise from access activities. 
Rather, promote other non-economic benefits 
such as technology transfer and scientific devel-
opment. 
• Minimize the role of the government and promote 
more active participation from the private sector, 
s, and local communities. After a few initial 
basic steps, the role of the government should be 
to oversee the access activities, not to control every 
flow of genetic resources. 
Table . Legal norms that address  issues related to biodiversity in Colombia
Political Constitution
   of 30
Law  of  Convention No.  on Indigenous 
People and Tribes in Independent 
Countries (Articles  and )31
Decision  of  Common Regime on Industrial 
Property (substituted for by Decision 
).
Decision  of  Common Regime for the Protection 
of Plant Variety Breeders’ Rights
Law  of  Develops the th Transitory 
Article of the Constitution (black 
communities)
Law  of  Creates the  and Organizes the 
National Environmental System 
(Article  # ).33
Decree  of  Develops Decision .
Decree  of  Develops the Common Regime on 
the Protection of Plant Varieties.
Law  of  Convention on Biological Diversity.
Law  of  Adopts an Agreement related to  
issues related to Commerce.
Law  of  Approves the Paris Convention for 
the Protection of Industrial Property. 
Decree  of  Develops chapter  of Law  of 
, adopts the recognition of the 
collective property of the land of 
Afro-Colombian communities and 
other dispositions.
Law  of  Frontiers Law (Articles  and ).33
Law  of  International Convention for the 
Protection of Plant Varieties.
Decision  of  Common Regime on Access to 
Genetic Resources.
Decree  of  Creates the dNational Commission 
on Indigenous Territories and the 
Permanent Agreement table with the 
People and Indigenous Organizations 
(Article )34
Law  of  Approves the Cooperation Treaty in 
Patents.
Decision  of  Common Regime on Industrial 
Property.
Norm Title Norm Title
 
C : C 
 1 The Andean Community, a subregional organization endowed 
with an international legal status, is made up of Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Venezuela, Peru and Colombia.
 2 The institute is linked to the  and is in charge of promoting, 
coordinating and undertaking research leading to the conservation 
and sustainable use of Colombia’s biodiversity.
 3 The National Planning Department is the central government office 
responsible for designing and setting economic, social and environ-
mental policies in coordination with other ministries and territorial 
entities.
 4 Separate sections will be used to describe and analyze policies 
and laws related to  due to the different nature and intent of 
these two instruments. Biodiversity related policies in Colombia 
are aimed at providing an orientation and defining actions from 
government and also from civil society regarding the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological resources. One of their main pur-
poses is to group efforts from diverse societal interests regarding 
biodiversity. On the other hand, legislation defines rules that have 
the force of authority by virtue of their promulgation by an official 
branch of the state or other organizations. Even though laws and 
norms are set in a policy environment, they do not replace policies; 
they are mere policy instruments. 
 5 Further information is available in the Andean Community web 
page at: http://www.comunidadandina.org.
 6 Since there is no official follow up on the implementation of the 
 or the  a precise report on their accomplishments can-
not be provided. The information offered is largely based on the 
consultant’s assessment and knowledge of the latest developments.
 7 As will be explained below, the Andean Community has agreed 
to develop a special regime or norm to strengthen the protection 
of traditional knowledge, innovations, and practices, as a stated in 
Decision  on .
 8 Access is defined in Decision  as the obtainment and utilization 
of genetic resources conserved in ex situ or in situ conditions, of 
their derivatives, or, if it is the case, of its intangible components, 
with the purpose of research, bioprospecting, conservation, indus-
trial application, or commercial use, among others.
 9 Genetic resources are defined in Decision  as all material of 
biological nature that contains genetic information of real or poten-
tial value or usefulness.
 10 Derivative product is defined by Decision  as molecules or 
a combination of natural molecules, including crude extracts of 
living or dead organisms of biological origin, coming from the 
metabolism of living beings.
 11 Intangible component is defined by Decision  as every knowl-
edge, innovation, or practice, whether individual or collective, with 
real or potential value associated with the genetic resource, their 
derivative products, or the biological resource that contains them, 
whether protected or not by intellectual property regimes. 
 12 The  can not delegate any functions to the Regional 
Corporations, either on this or any other topic. Nevertheless, it can 
make agreements with the Corporations to undertake supervision 
responsibilities under Decision  Article  or to participate in 
the process as National Support Institutions.
 13 No other laws or regulations have been formulated to facilitate the 
implementation of Decision . Decree  of  modifies 
and renders null several previous regulations affecting scientific 
biodiversity research.
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Endnotes

A B  S  B
 14 Before promulgation of the Decree, separate permits were required 
for the activities that the decree regulates, often provided by 
diverse environmental authorities. The unification under a unique 
permit considerably simplifies the legal requirements for scientific 
research on biological resources.
 15 National support institution is defined by Decision  as a person 
or national legal entity dedicated to technical or scientific biologi-
cal research that accompanies the access applicant and participates 
in the access activities. All access contracts requests must include 
the identification of the person or national support institution. Also, 
national support institutions must be approved by the . 
 16 Access resolution is defined by Decision  as the administrative 
act issued by the  that perfects the access to genetic resources 
and their derivative products, after having complied with all the 
prerequisites and conditions established in the access procedure.
 17 Nevertheless, the  has not developed monitoring procedures.
 18 Synthesized products are defined by Decision  as substances 
obtained by means of an artificial procedure from genetic informa-
tion or from other biological molecules. It includes semi-processed 
extracts and substances obtained from a derivative product by an 
artificial process.
 19 It only indicates that the  will evaluate the request and will 
undertake the necessary inspections.
 20 Even though there is no government charge for the presentation of 
the access application, there are transaction costs involved due to 
the legal requirements and the length of the process. These transac-
tion costs have not been calculated.
 21 A.M. Hernández, , pers. comm.,  February .
 22 Colombian negotiators supported the  International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture and used the  
and Decision  to back up their negotiation position. Colombia 
has not signed the treaty yet, and it has not been debated yet what 
the relationship with Decision  will be. In fact the  and the 
Humboldt Institute are currently researching this issue, which is 
unclear due to the supra national nature of Decision .
 23 Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental, a Peruvian think tank. 
 24 This proposal was elaborated with the representation of indigenous 
organizations, Afro-Colombian communities, s, Academic 
Centers, and central and regional government institutions. 
 25 In fact, Law  of  states that Colombia has the right of eco-
nomic compensation for the use of its genetic resources.
 26 Decision  has not been necessarily an obstacle to access activi-
ties and research initiatives. They continue to take place without 
the required access contracts.
 27 A.M. Hernández, , pers. comm.  February .
 28 This problem is augmented in the Andean case due to the nature of 
Andean Decisions, which do not require going through congress 
before their adoption. This minimizes the debate, even though it 
may prevent a prolonged interest-oriented political debate.
 29 This difficulty may have appeared due to the nature of Andean 
negotiations that require the travel of numerous negotiators around 
the five Andean countries, increasing costs of meetings, etc. 
 30 Articles ,  # ,  # . These articles are about  in 
general; they are not specific to biodiversity.
 31 These articles relate to traditional arts, rural industries, and health 
issues related indirectly to s.
 32 This article is about the functions of the  regarding access to 
genetic resources, including the function given to the Ministry with 
respect to the rights of the nation over its genetic resources.
 33 These articles are about technology transfer to local, indigenous and 
Afro-Colombian communities (Article ), and about the protection 
of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources and the 
need to have prior informed consent before its use (Article ).
 34 This article indicates the functions of the “permanent agreement 
table”, including the adoption of principles, criteria, and proce-
dures concerning protection of indigenous collective knowledge 
related to biodiversity and genetic resources; it also discusses and 
develops 

Access to genetic resources and the distribution of benefits 
were two of the most controversial topics debated in the 
development of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(). The sustainable use of genetic resources by means 
of bioprospecting or other forms of economic utilization 
(R et al. ) represents for many an important prom-
ise to obtain economic benefits while insuring biodiversity 
conservation and the well being of local communities and 
indigenous peoples. Articles  and  of the  have 
reaffirmed countries’ sovereignty over their own genetic 
resources and the right to regulate and facilitate access to 
those resources for environmentally sound uses. This has 
imposed upon countries, especially suppliers, an enormous 
responsibility.
This chapter provides basic information on the Costa 
Rican experience in the matter of access to genetic re-
sources, distribution of benefits, and establishment of sui 
generis systems. In it I will examine and share the les-
sons and merits of the Costa Rican process of adoption 
and implementation of the Costa Rican national Law of 
Biodiversity.
The biological wealth in the tropical countries of our 
region and the alternatives for using genetic and bio-
chemical resources and traditional knowledge constitute 
a day-by-day reality. The advances achieved in relation 
to organism exploration techniques and the feasibility of 
‘new biotechnologies’ have opened the doors to a new 
vision of the ‘hidden’ values of our resources and tradi-
tional knowledge. Frequently, we hear about the interest 
of agrochemical, seed, and pharmaceutical companies 
in carrying out research using our natural wealth and 
traditional knowledge in their investigations. However, 
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based on the existing legal norms, access to Costa Rica’s 
resources and knowledge should comply with the follow-
ing requirements:
• Obtain prior informed consent () from the 
State and other stakeholders, including owners of 
traditional knowledge or biological, genetic, and 
biochemical resources.
• Include sharing of benefits generated from access 
to biodiversity and traditional knowledge by means 
of agreements or contracts that broadly embrace 
“mutually agreed terms”.
• Promote biodiversity conservation and capacity 
building aimed at adding value to each country’s 
natural resources.
These requirements do not deal only with control-
ling the access to biological, genetic, and biochemical 
resources. They deal with the fact that (in compliance 
with the prevailing regulatory standards) the traditional 
knowledge, innovations, and practices of local communi-
ties and indigenous peoples must also be protected in the 
countries of our region. Modern societies acknowledge 
that for centuries most indigenous peoples have developed 
their own agricultural systems, practices and knowledge, 
plague-fighting methods, handling of natural resources, 
and traditional medicine and that this knowledge is un-
doubtedly valuable and useful for those in other sectors of 
society who are not the intellectual creators and developers 
of those practices. 
For many years, biological diversity, traditional works 
aimed at improving animal life and cultivation, and in-
digenous knowledge involved in these activities were 

considered a public good and a “Common Heritage of 
Mankind”. Nevertheless, based on the genetic resources 
freely obtained, a great variety of natural products were 
developed such as new vegetable varieties, pharmaceutical 
products, and pesticides, which were classified as private 
property and subject to intellectual property rights (s) 
(basically, plant breeders’ rights, patents, and trade se-
crets). In this way, natural products based on free genetic 
resources were available at a high cost for developing 
countries. The asymmetry of this relationship between 
genetic resources that were freely provided by the South 
and the final products using those resources that could only 
be acquired at a certain price from the companies of the 
North should have been justified in some manner.
This asymmetry resulted from the application of a con-
cept that allows for the extraction of our countries’ genetic 
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wealth without granting any compensation. This concept 
stated that biological diversity was considered the common 
heritage of mankind; that is, it was declared a public good 
and no payment should be made for its use. Naturally, 
pesticides, medicines, and improved seeds belong to the 
private sector and were not affected by this concept.
Simultaneous with the rising international conscious-
ness rejecting the concept of the common heritage of man-
kind, the advance of modern biotechnology (such as the 
recombining of  and cellular fusion) are advances in 
the field of microelectronic technical screening of biologi-
cal materials that have strengthened the interest of many 
pharmaceutical, chemical, and biotechnology companies 
and seed producers in the wild or domesticated genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples 
and local communities. 
Identification of Relevant Access Laws and Policies 
Key Features of Laws and Policies and 
Current Status of Implementation.
The national legislation that regulates access to genetic 
material, biochemical resources, and traditional knowledge 
for the whole country is the Law of Biodiversity (), 
No.  of  April . Before the enactment of this 
law, there were some provisions in the Law of Wildlife 
Conservation () No.  of  October  regard-
ing flora and fauna collection permits. There were also 
some bylaws dealing with research, specifically referring 
to national parks. No modern regulations on agricultural 
materials existed at the time. Currently, there is a General 
Access Procedure () in place that will function as a 
bylaw of the . The  was approved on  December 
 by the Minister of Environment and Energy and the 
President through an executive decree. The  was pro-
posed by the National Commission for the Management of 
Biodiversity () in conformity with  Article  
with the participation of personnel of the National System 
of Conservation Areas ()1, universities, nongovern-
mental organizations (s), and industry.
In relation to access policies, there is a National 
Biodiversity Strategy that contemplates a set of actions 
to be taken in the area of access to genetic resources.2 
Additionally, there is a National Environmental Policy 
draft (Conservation and Sustainable Development 
Strategy) that includes biodiversity as one of its compo-
nents, in particular the topic of access to genetic resources 
and distribution of benefits. Finally,  concluded a 
National Research Strategy that would be applicable to 
its officials and to joint ventures between  officials 
and officials from other entities wishing to access genetic 
resources for research purposes.
During the development of the , a series of topics 
were considered for the formulation of the dispositions 
relative to access, distribution of benefits, and protection 
of traditional knowledge. These included basic definitions, 
scope, the procedure for prior informed consent (), 
mutually agreed terms, competent authority, distribution 
of benefits, and sanctions. Some relevant topics such as 
the need to distinguish between access with agricultural or 
pharmaceutical purposes or between research with com-
mercial or academic purposes and the need of prompt and 
special mechanisms for ex situ collections were scarcely 
considered. These areas constitute some of the deficiencies 
of the legislation that must be corrected with appropriate 
regulations.
The , whose application and interpretation still re-
mains uncertain in several areas, sets up the basis for access 
permits and contracts. The law contains clear definitions on 
crucial topics ( Article ) such as access to biochemical 
and genetic elements, bioprospecting, , innovation, and 
access permits. Likewise, it has clarified the genetic and 
biochemical resources property regime by stating that these 
resources belong in the public domain to be managed by 
the State ( Article ). Also, two types of properties were 
distinguished: that of the biological or organic resource 
and that of the genetic and biochemical resource.
According to  Article , the law has been fully 
in force since its publication in April . However, an 
action to declare this law unconstitutional was brought by 
the Attorney General’s Office. This claim was admitted for 
study by the Constitutional Chamber (Unconstitutionality 
Action Number ----, admitted by 
October  Resolution). According to Articles  and 
 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction No. , 
the suit does not suspend the execution of the . However, 
from the political point of view it has definitely delayed 
implementation of .
This action was brought specifically against  Articles 
 and . In relation to access, Article  is of supreme 
importance. It creates the , one purpose of 
which is to define the national policies for biodiversity, 
including access to genetic resources. The chapters dealing 
with access to genetic resources (procedural and substan-

tive aspects) have not been questioned. As a consequence, 
if the action succeeds it would only affect the legal com-
petencies of  in this matter, not the remainder 
of the applicable dispositions.
The Ministry of Environment and Energy () con-
sidered these legal competencies unconstitutional; thus 
the Ministry requested the Attorney General to submit a 
constitutional challenge. Fundamentally, the following 
powers have been questioned:
• ’s legal authority to formulate national 
policies and to coordinate them (clauses , , , , 
and  of  Article ) and its authority to exhaust 
the administrative route in case of challenges 
presented against the resolutions of the Technical 
Office () of the Commission (clause  of  
Article ). In both cases this would run counter 
to the exclusive power of the Executive Branch in 
these areas. 
• Independent management of public funds (as pro-
vided by  Articles  and ), running counter 
to Articles , , and  of the Constitution.
As indicated, the constitutional challenge, although not 
preventing the implementation of the regulations, has had 
the effect of slowing down many of the necessary decisions 
to make the law operational. For example, the  
was not put into effect until January , almost two years 
later than initially foreseen by the law. Equally, there is a 
legitimate concern that if the action succeeds, ’s 
role could turn out to be that of a simple adviser and not 
a public policy maker. To date, the action has not been 
resolved by the Constitutional Chamber.3
Scope of the LB, Exceptions and Specific 
Treatment for Some Sectors
The legislation is applied “…on the elements of the bio-
diversity under the State’s sovereignty, as well as on the 
processes and the activities carried out under its jurisdic-
tion or control, independently of whether the effects of 
the actions are manifested inside or outside the national 
jurisdiction”. The  will regulate specifically the use, 
management, associated knowledge, and distribution 
of benefits and costs derived from the utilization of the 
elements of the biodiversity ( Article ).  Article  
establishes that “The biochemical and genetic properties 
of the components of biodiversity, wild or domesticated, 
belong to the public domain. The State will authorize 
the exploration, research, bioprospecting, and use of the 
components of biodiversity which constitute part of the 
public domain, as well as the utilization of all the genetic 
and biochemical resources, by means of the rules of access 
established in chapter  of this law.” Also, in conformity 
with  Articles  and , every research program or bio-
prospecting effort on genetic material carried out in Costa 
Rican territory requires an access permit, unless covered 
by one of the exceptions foreseen by the .
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These exceptions ( Article ) refer fundamentally to 
access to human genetic resources and the exchange of ge-
netic and biochemical resources that are part of traditional 
practices of indigenous peoples and local communities and 
that have a commercial purpose. In addition, public univer-
sities were exempted from control for a term of one year 
(until  May ) in order for them to establish their own 
controls and regulations for noncommercial projects that 
require access. Apart from this, all the remaining sectors 
(pharmaceutical, agriculture, biotechnology, ornamental, 
and medicinal herbs) are subject to the  and must follow 
its access procedures. There is only one access procedure 
to be followed by all users. The  regulates access for 
commercial and noncommercial bioprospecting (including 
teaching), occasional economic utilization, constant use of 
genetic and biochemical resources, and traditional knowl-
edge. The law indicates that a concession will be required 
in case of access to genetic resources for commercial use, 
without defining steps or requirements. 
The  is applied equally to genetic agricultural re-
sources. It establishes the possibility of fixing, by means 
of a separate regulation, the procedures for access permits 
to the ex situ collections duly registered before the  of 
 ( Article ). To a great extent, access to ge-
netic agricultural resources is realized by means of ex situ 
collections, though in Costa Rica there are some requests 
to make use of agricultural resources found in situ.
The  foresees specifically that in the case of duly 
registered ex situ collections, the regulation of the law 
will set the authorization procedure for access permits 
( Article ). It would include any type of collection. 
The above-mentioned procedure was supposed to be de-
termined by means of the . However, the draft still 
does not have rules on this point. On the contrary, the 
 establishes a moratorium on the access to genetic 
resources found in ex situ conditions, unless the specific 
regulations are approved. The  provided six months 
for the drafting of these regulations. These regulations are 
especially complex due to the institutional structures that 
keep genetic resources in ex situ conditions. Furthermore, 
other applicable dispositions to ex situ collections can be 
found in different regulations, without direct relation to ac-
cess, but in relation to conservation and maintenance (e.g., 
see the decree of creation of the National Commission of 
Plant Genetic Resources, No. - of  September 
 and the Law of Seeds No.  of  December  
and its bylaw). There is no official record of the ex situ 
collections in the country.
As mentioned, the  applies to all the elements of 
biodiversity found under the sovereignty of the State ( 
Article ) and to all basic research and commercial bio-
prospecting projects conducted in Costa Rican territory ( 
Article ). In this respect, access regulations are applied 
to genetic resources in public or private land, terrestrial 
or marine environments, ex situ or in situ collections, and 
indigenous territories.4 Nevertheless, there are some omis-
sions relative to resources in marine areas. Hence, other 
 
legal rules can be applicable to obtain access to these bio-
logical resources. Specifically, the Costa Rican Institute of 
Fishing and Aquaculture () is the entity entrusted with 
granting fishing licenses, including research permits, but 
excluding permits for resources found in marine regions of 
wild protected areas (Law of Creation of  No.  of 
 March , Article  and Attorney General’s Opinion 
-- of  September ). In this case, access 
permits by the  are also required. Regarding access to 
indigenous land there are other applicable laws, besides 
the , such as the Convention on Indigenous Peoples of 
the International Labor Organization and the rules of the 
sui generis system of intellectual community rights that 
are being developed through a consultation process that 
began recently. 
Monitoring Mechanisms 
The  creates a self-governed  ( Article 
) as a separate legal entity, but belonging to the . 
’s duties include: To formulate the policies and 
responsibilities established in  chapters , , and . 
Furthermore, it has to coordinate these policies with the 
relevant institutions. Additionally, it has to formulate and 
coordinate the policy for access to elements of biodiversity 
and associated knowledge, ensuring a suitable transference 
of science and technology, as well as the distribution of 
benefits, which are general procedures under Title  of 
the . 
 will execute its agreements and resolutions 
and will design its internal procedures by means of its 
’s Executive Director ( Article ). The composition 
of  is set forth in  Article : , which 
presides over it, the Ministries of Agriculture, of Health, 
and of Foreign Trade, , , the National Small 
Farmers Board, the National Indigenous Peoples Board, 
National Council of Rectors, the Costa Rican Federation 
for the Conservation of the Environment (), and the 
Costa Rican Union of Chambers of Commerce. s are 
represented by . The National Biodiversity Institute 
(io) is not a member of the .
In addition,  must formulate policies on 
access and distribution of benefits. It can also revoke the 
’s resolutions regarding access matters ( Article ). 
In conformity with  Article ,  must propose 
policies on access to genetic and biochemical resources of 
ex situ and in situ biodiversity. It will also act as an obliga-
tory consultant in procedures related to the protection of 
s on biodiversity.
The Executive Director will appoint ’s , 
as well as other personnel indicated in the regulation of the 
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. The  will grant or deny access requests ( Article 
, clause a); coordinate access issues with conservation 
areas, the private sector, indigenous peoples, and rural 
communities ( Article , paragraph b); organize and 
keep an updated record of access requests and ex situ 
collections, as well as a record of the individuals and 
legal entities that devote themselves to genetic manipula-
tion (paragraph c); and compile and update regulations 
relative to the fulfillment of its agreements and directives 
(paragraph d). 
The  has not been established due to lack of bud-
get, personnel, constitutional action, and political will. 
Nevertheless, ’s budget in  was , 
, which allowed for the establishment of an Executive 
Director and some support personnel such as a secretary, 
a technician, an attorney, and a bookkeeper.
’s activities are regulated by means of 
 decree No. , published in The Gazette of 
 August , and its modifications. Its members are 
designated for a two-year period. The Commission’s 
responsibilities include granting of access permits and 
implementation of monitoring and evaluation procedures. 
To date, evaluation and monitoring procedures have not 
been carried out because of the lack of implementation 
of . Due to absence of human and technical resources, 
it is improbable that these monitoring procedures will be 
implemented in the short run. Probably, those who under-
take the access procedure will be subject to monitoring for 
the obligations assumed under the  agreement and the 
’s resolution approving their access permit.
Evaluation of Commercial and 
Noncommercial Bioprospecting Initiatives
According to  Article  (characteristics and condi-
tions of access permits), the access requirements will be 
determined differently depending on whether the research 
has or does not have a commercial purpose. In the latter 
case, the noncommercial purpose will have to be verified. 
Nevertheless, the  does not contemplate different re-
quirements for bioprospecting projects with commercial 
and noncommercial purposes in spite of the fact that  
Article  (permits for basic research) establishes that if 
a project has commercial purposes, the interested party 
will have to fulfill additional requirements. In general, 
there is no clarity on the form this distinction would take. 
This issue has been a constant in the critiques of diverse 
regulations and reports, as in the case of The Philippines’ 
Executive Order on Bioprospecting, as well as in the con-
clusions of the ’s Experts Panel on Access to Genetic 
Resources.
 
Main Steps Outlined by the LB
The  regulates the basic requirements for access, includ-
ing the , transfer of technology, equitable distribution 
of benefits, the protection of associated knowledge, and 
the definition of the ways in which the above-mentioned 
activities will contribute to the conservation of species 
and ecosystems. It also mandates the designation of a 
legal representative in the country, when the person or 
organization requesting access is domiciled abroad ( 
Article ). The procedure to follow is clearly outlined in 
 Article . It includes proof of the  of the owner of 
the property where the activity will be developed, whether 
it is an indigenous community, a private owner, or public 
entity. Other interesting provisions incorporate the right of 
cultural objection ( Article ), the registry of access ap-
plications, and the protection of confidential information, 
except in the case of biosafety concerns ( Article ).
The  also regulates in detail commercial and non-
commercial bioprospecting permits (Article ). These 
are valid for three years and can be renewed. They are 
given to specific persons or entities and are therefore not 
transferable. The permits are limited to the genetic and 
biochemical elements expressly authorized for specific 
areas or territories ( Article ). The permits will con-
tain a certificate of origin, permission or prohibition to 
extract samples, periodic reporting obligation, monitoring 
and control, conditions relative to resulting property, and 
any another applicable condition deemed relevant by the 
 ( Article ). 
The access request requirements are name and iden-
tification of the interested party, name and identification 
of the responsible researcher, exact location of the place, 
and the elements of biodiversity that will be the subject 
of the investigation, indicating the owner and manager 
or holder of the premises. The applicant will also have to 
submit a descriptive chronology of activities, aims, and 
purposes as well as place for legal notifications. The ap-
plication must be accompanied by the  ( Article ) 
and a record of individuals or legal entities who are to 
conduct the bioprospecting ( Article ). The  must 
also authorize those agreements contemplating access to 
genetic and biochemical elements ( Article ) signed 
between individuals, natives, or foreigners, or between 
them and the institutions registered for such purposes. 
There is also a possibility to establish framework agree-
ments with universities and other duly authorized centers 
( Article ). It is established that up to % of the 
research budget and % of royalties will have to go to the 
conservation area, the private owner, or indigenous com-
munity ( Article ). In cases in which the  authorizes 
the continuing use of genetic material or of biochemical 
extracts for commercial purposes, applicants are required 
to obtain a separate concession from the interested party 
( Article ). There are no further guidelines in the  
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about the process, requirements, and length of time needed 
to obtain this concession (Figure ).
First, in conformity with access procedure norms, in-
terested parties must register with the  using a specific 
form ( Article ). Later, the  must be negotiated 
in conformity with a guide which stipulates the minimal 
points for discussion ( Article ) between the appli-
cant and owner of the conservation area or indigenous 
land, resources, or ex situ collections. This would include 
not only individuals, but other government entities such 
as municipal governments, the Agrarian Development 
Institute, and the . 
The  is supposed to contain mutually agreed-upon 
terms that represent the fair and equitable distribution of 
benefits. Once obtained, this agreement must be endorsed 
by the . Even though the legislation is not clear, it is 
assumed that the  will be formalized in a private con-
tract. The  limits itself to endorsing the contract rather 
than negotiating it. The ’s approval authorizes three 
fundamental aspects: the ’s fulfillment of the require-
ments established in the Technical Guide, the number of 
samples to be taken, and the time frame for the reports to 
be presented ( Article ).
A request form and completed Technical Guide ( 
Article ) must be submitted to the . In both cases there 
are requirements and documents that must be presented 
jointly. Additionally, the documents established in  
Article  must be attached. Additional requirements 
are established for those who request permits for basic 
research or bioprospecting ( Article .) and for those 
who need access permits for occasional or continuing eco-
nomic utilization ( Article .).
 Article  requires a determination of the admin-
istrative fee. The  also refers to this payment ( 
Article  on administrative rates). After the  extends a 
certificate of origin ( Article ), it proceeds to publish 
the requests and final resolutions on its website within eight 
calendar days ( Article ).
Once access is authorized, the monitoring and control 
phase begins ( Article ) at the expense of the  
and in coordination with the authorized representatives 
of the place where access to the resources is taking place. 
Applicants will have to follow applicable sanitary and 
phytosanitary rules for the exportation of the materials.5 
In case of ex situ collections, special rules may be es-
tablished allowing framework agreements that authorize 
the transfer of multiple materials. In such cases Material 
Transfer Agreements would have to be duly standardized 
and approved by the . The ’s resolutions can be re-
voked or appealed by the  ( Article ).
Finally an environmental impact assessment () can 
be requested by the  based on some general provisions 
of the  related to , but not specific to bioprospecting 
activities ( Article ). The evaluation is the responsibil-
ity of the National Technical Secretariat (a body of ). 
 
To date no  has been requested of io or any other 
bioprospector.
At this early stage the approximate duration of the 
above procedures is unknown. The current system is 
based on the  No.  of  October  and its 
regulation No. - of  December , as well 
as permits for flora and wildlife collection ( Article 
 and subsequent articles). These collection permits are 
granted by  after the submission of an administrative 
form and a consultation in the conservation area where the 
research and collection will take place. This procedure is 
relatively simple and takes approximately one month for 
processing.
Up to now,  has had only five full-time employ-
ees, untrained in the topic of the bioprospecting agree-
ment negotiations. Research permits are being granted 
by the  Director.  Article  establishes that the 
Executive Director of the  must be a suitable profes-
Figure . Access procedure.
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sional, without any further specifications and  Article 
 allows  to name ad hoc expert committees 
in complex cases.
In any case, the current scheme would leave the ne-
gotiation of contracts (by means of the ), in the hands 
of the managers of conservation areas and eventually of 
other public authorities, insofar as they are the owners of 
the lands or of the biological resources.
Characteristics of the Access 
Requirements 
The procedures for access are not completely clear, espe-
cially under the . On the other hand, the requirements 
are clearly established in Articles  and  of the , 
as well as in the ’s Articles  to . Only the  and 
eventually the  shall grant access permits. A 
separate  should be obtained from other entities such 
 
as conservation areas, indigenous territories or public au-
thorities who are owners of lands, or, in the case of marine 
resources, other authorities such as .
In this respect, access to flora and fauna found on 
private lands would eventually need other authorizations 
from state entities like the , particularly in cases of 
species in danger of extinction or with reduced popula-
tions. Access would be granted in conformity with the 
technical and scientific arrangements stated by . 
Thus, even if the flora were in private lands (e.g., orchids), 
the  would give the permits for the manipulation of 
the resource ( No. , Articles , , and  and 
its regulation No. , Article .). In such a case it is 
not clear whether there should be a double authorization: 
from the  for the genetic resource and from the  
for the biological one, as well as the landlord’s consent 
regarding private property.
In cases where collections are made in conservation 
areas, the  and the respective agreement are enough to 
obtain the access permit. The main difficulties arise when 
there is a question of privately owned wild, threatened 
flora.
All interested parties can access genetic and biochemi-
cal resources. Nevertheless, ’s Article  establishes 
the following “Criteria for the evaluation or approval of 
the request” based on the public environmental interest 
criteria embodied in the  (Article .):
• Development options for future generations; 
• Food safety and sovereignty;
• Conservation of ecosystems;
• Protection of human health;
• Improvement of citizens’ quality of life;
• Gender issues; and 
• s not affecting key agricultural products and 
processes for the nourishment and health of the 
country’s inhabitants. This criterion also includes 
protection for the resources of local communities 
and indigenous populations.
Also, ’s Article  allows the imposition of total 
or partial restrictions on access to the resources to ensure 
their conservation and sustainable use. These restrictions 
are issued by the  in the resolution approving access. 
In this way, it can prohibit access, set limits, and regulate 
the methods of collection, in application of the precaution-
ary principle mentioned in ’s Article .. To establish 
complete or partial restrictions some of the elements that 
will be considered are: 
• The danger of extinction of the species, subspecies, 
races, and varieties.
• Reasons of scarcity and endemic conditions.
• Vulnerability or fragility conditions in the structure 
or function of the ecosystems. 
• Adverse effects on human health, the species, 
and the ecosystems or on essential elements of 
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the autonomy or cultural identity of peoples and 
communities.
• Strategic genetic resources or geographical areas 
qualified as such.
• The prohibition of access for military purposes or 
for denaturalization of the resources.
Relationship to Other Laws
In theory it is possible to foresee some reforms to other 
national laws as a result of new access regulations. Reforms 
to the Patent Law may be made to include the presenta-
tion of the certificate of origin in cases where an invention 
using genetic resources or traditional knowledge is being 
patented. Some similar regulations may be necessary in 
the Plant Breeders’ Rights draft that is currently being 
discussed in the Legislative Assembly. Eventually, the ’s 
dispositions on patentability exclusions (Article ) might 
be integrated with the Law of Patents (see below).
Some laws that govern asssccess to biological resourc-
es, such as  or Law of the , might be reformed to 
establish the necessary coordination between the access 
permit to genetic resources and the access permit to bio-
logical resources (wild flora and fauna are in some cases 
marine resources), with the intention of simplifying the 
steps and respective procedures to obtain access.
The laws relative to customs control (General Customs 
Law No.  of  November ) and the export of sani-
tary or phytosanitary material (Phytosanitary Protection 
Law), could be reformed to include a clause like the one 
stated by Decision  (Common Regime on Access to 
Genetic Resources of the Andean Community), which 
expressly mentions that the authorization to export bio-
logical material does not imply the authorization for the 
use of the genetic component (Fourth Complementary 
Disposition). There could be a need to reform the 
Phytosanitary Protection Law as it deals with other top-
ics such as biosafety. 
Provisions that Promote the Conservation 
of Biodiversity, its Sustainable Use, and 
the Fair Sharing of Benefits Derived from 
Biodiversity
The  was designed to implement the  in Costa Rica. 
 Articles , , and  are of paramount importance 
in access to genetic resources. The  established that, 
without prejudice to the fulfillment of regulations rela-
tive to the trade of endangered species of flora and fauna, 
the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
and technical procedures and biosafety, the disposition 
on access to genetic resources will constitute neither a 
concealed restriction nor an obstacle to trade ( Article 
, general rule of interpretation). There are also similari-
ties between  and other laws such as the , the Law 
of the , the Law of Phytosanitary Protection No.  
and its regulation No. -, and the Convention on 
 
International Trade of Endangered Species, Law No.  
of  October .
The general goal of the  is to promote the conser-
vation and sustainable use of biodiversity and to ensure 
the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from it 
(Article ). The entire  responds to this goal as put forth 
by the . For example, it establishes the environmental 
function of the land (Article ), general principles of the 
law (Article ), objectives (Article ), criteria for apply-
ing the law (Article ), ’s administrative structure 
(including the administration of the national wild protected 
areas, Articles  to ), the guarantee of environmental 
safety (biosafety and exotic organisms, Articles  to ), 
the conservation and the sustainable use of the ecosystems 
and species (Articles  to ), the regulations on access 
to genetic resources (Articles  to ), s (Articles  
to ), education and public awareness and research and 
transfer of technology (Articles  to ), environmental 
impact assessment (Articles  to ), incentives (Articles 
 to ), and procedures and sanctions (Articles  
to ). All of these elements are in accordance with the 
three objectives of the .
Specifically relating to access,  Article  also men-
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tions the transfer of technology and equitable distribution 
of benefits, the protection of associated knowledge, and the 
definition of the ways in which the project’s activities will 
contribute to the conservation of species and ecosystems. 
Other regulations mentioned in  Article  also contain 
parameters for distribution of benefits. All monetary and 
nonmonetary benefits to be distributed are not listed but 
a generic rule is set forth with some specific indications 
regarding royalties, operation budget (Article ), and 
technology transfer (Articles  and ).
There are no binding requirements that benefits must 
go towards the conservation of the resources. It is per-
fectly possible that a private owner, public institution, or 
indigenous territory could grant the  without allocating 
benefits towards conservation since the legal authority of 
the  is limited to endorsement. In these circumstances, it 
is valid to ask whether the  would have the legal authority 
to revoke a previous consent because of a lack of benefits 
towards conservation derived from the access (Article ). 
As one might expect, in those cases in which a conservation 
area grants the permits, it is assumed that the benefit will 
go in its entirety towards biodiversity conservation.
Analysis of the Process that Led to the Development of the LB
The formulation process of the  and the discussion of 
matters related to access, the protection of associated 
knowledge, and s are particularly relevant. The first 
draft of the  was developed in . It generated a nega-
tive reaction from different stakeholders that considered it 
to be especially restrictive and opposed to both the public 
good and scientific research. Multiple suggestions were 
made to the Legislative Assembly, including a complete 
new draft prepared by the Advisory Commission on 
Biodiversity which was never formally incorporated by 
the legislative course (C M ).
The second draft of the law appeared in January . 
Even though this draft considered several of the objec-
tions made to the first draft, it also repeated several of the 
concepts and dispositions stated by the first version of the 
document. Therefore, it met with the same opposition. This 
situation led to the creation of a Special Commission in 
the Legislative Assembly. Its mandate was to create a new 
draft, taking into consideration the old one. The Assembly 
promised to respect the outcome. 
The Commission, led by the National University, 
was installed in April . It included the main political 
parties (National Liberation and Social Christian Unity), 
the Advisory Commission on Biodiversity (), the 
National Small Farmers Forum, the National Indigenous 
Forum, the Union of Chambers for Private Business, the 
University of Costa Rica (with two representatives), the 
National University (with two representatives), , 
and io. The group was composed of twelve represen-
tatives and their alternates, named by sectors including 
the nongovernmental sector, representatives of indigenous 
peoples and farmers, the private sector, the academic 
sector, and the government (by means of the Advisory 
Commission on Biodiversity). The Special Commission 
met until December  when the new draft was sent to 
the Parliament. It received the favorable opinion of the 
Parliament’s Commission on Environment, and after minor 
modifications, the text was finally adopted as law. It was 
published in The Gazette, the Official Diary, in May  
and entered into force as law of the republic the same year. 
As mentioned before this was comprehensive legislation 
and access was only one of the topics covered. No foreign 
consultants participated in this process.
 
Main Difficulties and Successes Experienced During the Design of the LB
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The most controversial aspects of the process can be sum-
marized in the following points:
• There was disagreement about the access process 
and the entity entrusted with granting the permits 
and authorizations. Diverse sectors thought that the 
current system, with authorizations granted by the 
, was inappropriate and should have had a 
wider representation. It was alleged that the ’s 
close relationship to io might put the permits 
into question. These groups argued that the creation 
of a wider Commission to deal with access and 
related topics (e.g., National Biodiversity Strategy 
and  negotiations), integrated with diverse sec-
tors, would propitiate a more suitable space and 
greater credibility concerning the control of the 
state over genetic resources.
• The public character of the genetic resources made 
them subject to a public property regime, indepen-
dent of private ownership of the land where they 
were located, and created legal consequences to 
the rights of applicants of access.
• ’s approval of contracts and agreements that 
io had previously signed with national and 
foreign companies created problems which will 
be described later in this report.
• The integration of procedures regarding intellec-
tual property with the procedures of the , since 
diverse exclusions have been established (Article 
), needs to be accomplished. The compatibility 
of some of these exclusions with the Agreement 
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights () is debatable. 
• There was opposition between those who consid-
ered access as a way of legitimizing biopiracy and 
those who, on the contrary, were defending the 
mechanism as a way to promote the sustainable 
use of the genetic and biochemical resources.
• The  involved wide public participation in its 
design process, a necessity in a matter affecting 
the activities and interests of many sectors. The 
law functioned as a comprehensive initiative to deal 
with different challenges imposed by the , such 
as access, technology transfer, ex situ and in situ 
conservation, biosafety, environmental impact as-
sessment, education, and public awareness.
• There was a lack of information and participation 
by some groups such as indigenous communities, 
peasants, and private sectors, who were only able 
to express their points of view in relation to cer-
tain specific issues. It became clear that capacity 
building in the design of these legal frameworks 
is critical. The lack of sufficient information on 
comparable international experiences also pre-
vented an understanding of real difficulties found 
elsewhere. 
• There was a need for both open discussion on topics 
of national interest that affect many different inter-
ested parties and eliminating the habit of deciding 
these issues by a small group. 
• Due to the fact that the main policy aspects of 
the negotiation were included in the law, while 
the operative aspects were deferred to the by-
laws (due to the representative character of the 
Legislative Assembly versus the regulatory duty 
of the Executive Power), the drafting process dealt 
with the main topics and their complexities without 
reference to a discussion of the regulations.
The most troubling points were solved through a 
process of negotiation, but due to time constraints to 
achieve an agreement, many of the points were sent to 
the Parliament’s Plenary without a final resolution. On 
the other hand, some of the most controversial aspects, 
such as s, were strongly debated by the business and 
academic representatives in a Special Subcommittee in 
charge of drafting the law. Other aspects, such as the 
public character of genetic resources and the existence of 
a , were accepted, under different proposals. 
For example, the  would work through a  
composed of government employees who would make the 
legal decisions, with power of review at the expense of the 
Commission. In order to ensure the TO’s independence, a 
maximum self-government statute was granted to it.
Some of the patentability exclusions were eliminated 
and others remained, in spite of warnings on their pos-
sible unconstitutionality. Finally, the public character 
of the resources was accepted. This point still provoked 
protest and review by representatives of the farmers’ sec-
tor, who even considered the possibility of asking for a 
hearing by the Department of Technical Services of the 
Parliament. Eventually, this Department decided to reject 
this submission.
Although the access process was simplified in relation 
to the first proposal, some of the most controversial dis-
positions were kept, such as the ’s power of reviewing 
contracts with third parties ( Article ). Some of the 
difficulties and incongruities that became apparent after 
approval, were problems that had been pointed out by the 
members of the  during the drafting process 
of the .
Main Obstacles to the Completion of the LB
There was a lack of information on access. In spite of the 
fact that some members of the Commission had experience 
in the matter, several of the interested sectors were only 
able to formulate very general positions that did not include 
the range of topics that access entails. Some academic, 
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indigenous, rural, and entrepreneurial sectors, as well as 
political party representatives, made general statements, 
but when the moment for deeper technical debates arose, 
these stakeholders were not prepared to make concrete 
propositions.
There were time limitations for completing the draft 
of law and sending it to the Legislative Assembly. Due to 
time constraints imposed by Parliamentary procedures for 
approval of laws and the need to submit a final text, topics 
were sent to the Parliament’s Plenary. This prevented a 
real discussion of the some of the most controversial and 
relevant aspects. 
The legislation needed to be comprehensive. Since the 
 covered the multiple mandates expressed by the , the 
possibility of dedicating sufficient time and effort to access 
to genetic resources was diminished due to the need to 
finalize a comprehensive draft (more than  articles).
Stakeholder involvement was of primary importance. 
Probably one of the most relevant elements of the elabo-
ration process was the opportunity granted to different 
interested groups, such as the indigenous populations and 
farmers, to take part in the negotiating process. It was 
an exercise on how processes work in reality, especially 
in those cases in which opposite points of view exist. 
Additionally, this procedure allowed a real exercise of 
environmental democracy in a strategic area of national 
development.
There were internal difficulties within participating 
stakeholder groups. During the negotiation several propos-
als and issues arose on which representatives had to consult 
their constituencies. For example, the representatives of the 
industry sector stated that they would not vote for any of 
the proposals but would limit themselves to taking part in 
the debates of the Commission, since they were incapable 
of negotiating on behalf of all their associates.
In spite of the fact that the  was adopted in , it has 
not been implemented due to the action of unconstitutional-
ity filed against it. Neither have the positions within the  
nor access procedures that would function as regulations 
of the law been created. For this reason there have been 
no requests. Informally, several access requests have been 
submitted, but none have been processed or resolved. 
The informal requests made to date are: 
• University of Wisconsin, Madison requested the 
right to gather wild potato material in some areas 
of the Bi-National Park “La Amistad”. This group 
withdrew their request since they could not get any 
response from Panama where they also wanted to 
collect.
• The Firenze Institute, Italy requested access to 
“Cyanobacterias”. Only a preliminary document 
was submitted and no follow-up communications 
were obtained.
• The National University requested access to wild 
material of the Sechium genus in some protected 
areas and in an ex situ collection. The response is 
pending.
To date, the requests involving bioprospecting, namely 
those of io, are dealt with in accordance with the coop-
eration agreement between io and the , and with 
regard to conservation areas, by means of the .
Bioprospecting Projects
INBio’s Biodiversity Prospecting Program6
io was created in  as a nongovernmental and 
nonprofit association. Its mission is to promote a new 
awareness of the value of biodiversity in order to achieve 
its conservation and use it to improve the quality of life.
In , io developed the concept and practice of 
“bioprospecting” as one of the answers to the need for 
the sustainable use of Costa Rican biodiversity to benefit 
society. This concept, which refers to the systematic search 
for new biological sources of chemical compounds, genes, 
proteins, microorganisms, and other products that pos-
sess a current economic value or potential, continues to 
gain acceptance in government, scientific, academic, and 
managerial circles. The use of the biodiversity presents 
opportunities and challenges to promote and to organize 
the infrastructure investments and human resources that 
add value and contribute to its conservation. 
io has a formal agreement with , which allows 
carrying out specific activities related to the identification 
and use of biodiversity in the government’s protected areas. 
io actively develops biodiversity prospecting in the pro-
tected wild areas of the country under that agreement, with 
the participation of the national and international academic 
and private sector. Research is carried out in collabora-
tion with research centers, universities, and national and 
international private companies, by means of research 
agreements that include key elements, such as:
• Access that is limited in time and quantity.
• Equity and compensation.
• Research budget. 
• Benefit sharing. 
• Technology transfer.
• Nondestructive activities.
The agreements also called for up-front payment 
for conservation. They specify that % of the research 
budgets and % of the future royalties shall be donated 
to  to be reinvested in conservation (Table ). The 
research budget supports the scientific infrastructure in 
the country, as well as activities of added value aimed at 
 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. Until now 
no royalties have been paid nor has any product reached the 
market, but there are some products under development, 
particularly in the ornamental and herbal areas.
INBio Agreements with Industry
A brief summary of the most outstanding research agree-
ments to date including the benefits accrued to io is 
as follows:
INBio-Merck Agreement: Search for Sustainable Uses of 
the Costa Rican Biodiversity. Signed in October , this 
was the first agreement with a commercial company to 
search for sustainable uses of Costa Rican biodiversity with 
potential for the pharmaceutical industry and veterinary 
science. It was renewed in , , and  upon 
similar terms and expired in . The agreement covered 
the study of a limited number of extracts of plants, insects, 
and environmental samples to determine their potential 
use. The agreement has given io access to technology, 
technical expertise, and training. 
Chemical Prospecting in a Costa Rican Conservation 
Area. This project began in  and ended in September 
. It is one of the five International Cooperative 
Biodiversity Groups (s) financed by three units in the 
: the National Institutes of Health (), the National 
Science Foundation, and the Department of Agriculture. 
It was located in the Guanacaste Conservation Area and 
was carried out in collaboration with the University of 
Costa Rica, Cornell University, and Bristol Myers Squibb. 
Its objectives were to incorporate tropical insects in the 
search for new pharmaceutical products and to increase 
the capacity of human resources in the fields of ecology, 
taxonomy, and ecochemistry. 
INBio-Givaudan Roure Agreement: Fragrances and 
Aromas. In , as a result of the constant search for 
new options, io began an association with the com-
pany Givaudan Roure to explore potential fragrances and 
aromas from Costa Rican biodiversity. These fragrances 
and aromas were taken directly from the air surround-
ing fragrant objects in the forest. The objective was to 
determine the feasibility of new products from volatile 
compounds in Costa Rican biodiversity and to promote 
technology transfer in this area. A royalty rate was estab-
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lished. This project concluded its activities in Costa Rica 
by the middle of .
INBio-British Technology Group (BTG)-Ecos La Pacífica 
Agreement. In the agricultural area, io seeks to integrate 
the result of bioprospecting activity with the economic 
development of the country. This process began with the 
signing of the io- agreement in  that allowed 
io to begin the research into characterization of and 
production of a chemical compound with nematicidal 
activity known as  that was derived from a tree of 
the Costa Rican dry tropical forest (Lonchocarpus felipei). 
Parallel investigations have been developed jointly with 
the corporation Ecos La Pacífica, aimed at determining the 
growing conditions of the species and the production of 
the , as well as the effectiveness of this nematicide 
in tropical crops. The greenhouse and field trials began in 
 and continue being carried out to date with satisfac-
tory results.  has paid a small amount of money to both 
io and Ecos La Pacifica due to the licensing of a patent 
related to the  use.
INBio-Diversa Agreement: Search for Enzymes from 
Extremophilic Organisms with Applications to the 
Chemical Industry. For the exploration of new enzymes 
in aquatic or terrestrial microorganisms of Costa Rican 
biodiversity under extreme conditions, io signed a 
research agreement with Diversa Corporation in . 
This agreement was renewed in  and , and it 
will expire in . It involves the gathering of bacteria 
in different conservation areas of Costa Rica that will be 
studied for the identification and isolation of new enzymes 
useful in industry. The agreement also guarantees the 
training of Costa Rican scientists in collection methods, 
isolation, and molecular biology, specifically in cloning 
and characterization of genes associated with enzymes. A 
third negotiation is currently being carried out.
INBio-Indena S.p.A. Agreement: Search for Compounds 
with Antimicrobial and Antiviral Activity. With the objec-
tive of obtaining compounds with antimicrobial potential 
to be used as active ingredients in cosmetics, io and 
the phytopharmaceutical company Indena S.p.A., with 
headquarters in Milan, Italy signed a collaboration agree-
ment in , with a second phase that started in  
and concluded in . Extracts of selected plants were 
Table . Contributions made to biodiversity conservation in Costa Rica as a result of bioprospecting agreements signed 
by io with various organizations from  until . All values in $ .
Organization *        Total
 by % , , , , , , , , ,
Conservation areas , , , , , ,   ,
Costa Rican , , , , , , , , ,
   public universities
Other groups in io , , , , ,    ,
Total , , , , , , , , ,,
*Estimated amounts since .
 
evaluated in bioassays to determine their antimicrobial 
activity. The final process is carried out by Indena. 
INBio-Phytera Inc. Agreement. Traditionally, drugs have 
been developed from extracts of leaves, roots, bark, and 
other parts of plants. Today, with the advances in biotech-
nology, medicines can be derived from cell cultures, and 
new techniques can create a variety of chemical substances 
from these cultures. In , io signed an agreement 
with this company, which continued in effect until the 
year .
INBio-Eli Lilly Agreement: Search for New Compounds. 
This project started in  and concluded in . It was 
carried out in collaboration with the pharmaceutical com-
pany Eli Lilly and Co. with an objective of searching for 
botanical compounds with pharmaceutical application. 
INBio-Akkadix Corporation Agreement: Search for 
Compounds with Nematicidal Activity. This project was 
carried out with the company Akkadix Corporation from 
 to . Its main objective was the search for alterna-
tives for the control of nematodes.
INBio Agreements with Academia
These research agreements of an academic nature with 
national and international universities vary considerably 
in their focus, but they are all guided toward the solution 
of problems and the search for knowledge and products. 
INBio-University of Strathclyde Agreement. This agree-
ment allows access to new technologies and methodolo-
gies. The University of Strathclyde, UK also facilitates 
interaction between io and the Japanese private sector. 
io provided a limited number of extracts of plants that 
were evaluated during a limited time by several industries 
of that country. This agreement was implemented between 
 and . 
INBio-University of Massachusetts Agreement: Search for 
Potential Insecticides. Through a collaboration with the 
University of Massachusetts, USA, with the support of , 
this joint venture carried out research to find compounds 
with insecticidal activity. This project began in October of 
 and concluded in . Its objective was the devel-
opment of enzymatic bioassays of extracts derived from 
plants, insects, bryophytes, and mollusks. 
INBio-University of Guelph Agreement: Development 
of New Technologies for Medicines Based on Plants, an 
International Interdisciplinary Initiative. This agreement 
is being carried out with the University of Guelph, Canada. 
It was signed in  and will conclude in . Its main 
objective is the search for new pharmaceutical products 
through techniques such as plant tissue culture.
Other Agreements
Validation of Promising Plants. This project was financed 
by the Costa Rican  Foundation. It contemplated three 
subprojects that allowed obtaining information to improve 
the quality of life of Costa Ricans. In collaboration with the 
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University of Costa Rica Research Center of Parasitology, 
two plants were studied to isolate active components 
against malaria. This project built upon the encouraging 
results of the  project. 
Also, in collaboration with the Unit of Electronic 
Microscopy, the Laboratory of Biological Assays, and the 
National Children’s Hospital, these plants were validated 
for gastritis treatment by their anti-Helicobacter pylori 
activity. Finally, some species were validated by their al-
kaloid content to explore their economic feasibility. This 
project was implemented between  and .
The Chagas Project. io, together with , the 
National University of Costa Rica, other Latin American 
institutions of Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, 
and  in the United States, are part of “The Chagas 
Space Project”, a research project that is looking for a so-
lution to one of the most serious health problems of Latin 
America: the Chagas disease or American Tripanosomiasis. 
io carried out some research activities on plants with 
inhibitory activity towards the disease in . In , 
the  Congress approved a fund dedicated to refinance 
this project which has allowed resumption of the bioassays. 
The project was renewed in .
INBio-Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
Agreement: Program for Support of the Development of 
the Use of Biodiversity by Small Enterprises. In February 
, io signed an agreement with the  with the 
purpose of formalizing the terms of a technical cooperation 
grant to support the development of the use of biodiversity 
by small companies. The project is likely to expire in ; 
however, in the first phase of the project, six projects were 
approved: 
• Agrobiot S.A: Propagation of Costa Rican tropi-
cal plants to be commercialized as eco-educational 
souvenirs (started in );
• Laboratorios Lisan S.A: Pharmaceutical products 
based on medicinal plants (started in );
• La Gavilana: Development of a model of eco-
friendly practices for vanilla production (started 
in );
• Industrias Caraito S.A: Generation of added value 
on the carao agro-industry;
• Bougainvillea S.A: Research for development and 
production of a biocide from Quassia amara wood; 
and 
• Follajes Ticos S.A: Native ornamental plants with 
market potential. 
Negotiation of Selected Access Requests. 
In access negotiations with companies, io has taken the 
most active role, so it has learned a great deal from the 
process. The State has limited its participation to granting 
collection permits through the  in accordance with 
the  and the Cooperation Agreements with io. 
 
In this section I would like to establish the lessons 
learned from the process of negotiating agreements and 
contracts, based on the experiences of io. Several 
publications have been written (G and S 
) concerning the structure, policies, and programs of 
io. In general, significant experiences in benefit shar-
ing have been obtained since the signing of the agreement 
with Merck and Co. in . These, and other contractual 
relationships, have resulted in the following benefits: 
• Monetary benefits by means of direct payments;
• Payment for specific samples;
• Coverage of research budgets;
• Transfer of important technology that has allowed 
the development of infrastructure in io is the 
laboratory of biotechnology, which has been used 
for research and development of local products;
• Capacity-training for scientists and technicians, in 
relation to state-of-the-art technologies;
• Experience in market negotiations, knowledge, 
and research for finding more intelligent uses of 
biodiversity resources;
• Support of conservation efforts by means of pay-
ments to  to strengthen the National System 
of Conservation Areas;
• Transfer of equipment to other institutions, such as 
the University of Costa Rica;
• Future royalties and milestone payments, which 
will be shared on a - basis with ; and
• Creation of national skills in order to add value to 
biodiversity resources.
According to my experience as io’s legal adviser, the 
lessons learned by io in access negotiations are as 
follows:
• It is essential to have a defined institutional policy 
on the requirements and criteria to be included in 
the biodiversity prospecting agreements.
• The national scientific capacity facilitates adding 
value to biodiversity resources and enhances the 
country’s position in the negotiation of benefits to 
be incorporated in the contract (e.g., higher royalty 
rates).
• It is necessary to develop a good understanding of 
the operation and evolution of biodiversity mar-
kets and to be aware of the technical and scientific 
changes that support them.
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• The existence or the development of institutional 
capacity for the negotiations in legal, scientific, 
and business areas) is a necessity. The terms of the 
agreements are often challenging and complex.
• Innovation and creativity add considerable weight 
to compensation and benefit-sharing negotia-
tions.
• Mastering of key issues is crucial: s, warranties, 
determination of royalty rates, transfer of materials 
to third parties, definitions (products and extracts), 
ownership of s, joint research, confidentiality, 
dispute resolution, and the survival of obligations. 
These are some of the key issues that are negotiated 
with bioprospectors.
• Proactive approaches to business development 
according to the needs of the country and a de-
fined institutional policy (biodiversity prospecting 
strategy) enhance the opportunities for new and 
innovative agreements. The existence of a Business 
Development Office at io with a highly qualified 
expert staff; attending seminars and activities with 
the industry the distribution or sharing of informa-
tion and material, and direct contacts all enable an 
answer to be given, to a larger or smaller extent, 
to institutional challenges. The current policy is 
based on the idea that it is not enough to wait to 
be contacted, or to be available at the behest of 
the company, but one must assertively have and 
maintain one’s own approach. Even if no formal 
market survey has been made, the identification of 
potential partners in the field of biotechnology has 
been developed.
• Coordination with other national and international 
institutions devoted to biodiversity R&D and under-
standing of technology transfer needs and capacity 
building at the country level are important require-
ments in the process.
• Good political support, an appropriate legal frame-
work, and legal certainty (e.g., who is entitled to 
grant permits) create a positive environment for 
success. 
• The development of macro-policies such as national 
biodiversity inventories, information management 
systems, investment in science and technology, and 
well-defined protected areas provide a smoother 
scenario for biodiversity prospecting. 
 
The Role of the LB in Hampering or Facilitating
Access to the Country’s Genetic Resources
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Although this role cannot be precisely defined due to the 
lack of application of the , several difficulties, includ-
ing the lack of clarity of certain clauses, the obscure and 
complex system proposed by the , the lack of qualified 
personnel versed in the functioning of the genetic resources 
market, the terms of the contracts and agreements, the 
absence of practical experience in the applicability of the 
law and the time it will take to enforce it, and certain sec-
tors’ resistance to new rules for the academy and research, 
suggest a difficult future for bioprospectors. For instance, 
some provisions of the  may actually prevent access.
The legislation is not clear in relation to the ’s pow-
ers. The  has to endorse the  and, according to the , 
some other functions are bestowed upon it ( Article , 
authorization of the number of samples to obtain or export 
and the periodicity of the activity reports;  Article , 
control and follow-up activities, etc.). Notwithstanding this 
fact, the  does not have the power to negotiate access 
terms with the applicant, since it can only endorse them 
without the possibility of modifying them. This literal read-
ing of the  creates some difficulties. For example, what 
happens if there is no third party from whom to obtain 
physical access? If a university possesses its own ex situ 
resources and wants to make use of those resources in 
bioprospecting7 the  prescribed in articles , , and 
 of the law and in the  would not be necessary. In 
this case, should the  grant the ? Apart from this, ac-
cess to genetic resources does not overrule existing norms 
on access to biological resources. In this case, even if an 
access permit is granted by the , would an additional 
permit under the  be required? 
Article  governs the cases in which once the former 
conditions are met, % of the research budget and up to 
% of the royalties are given to the conservation area or 
private or indigenous owner. This terminology excludes 
other relevant actors since the phrase “private owner” is 
even more restrictive than, for example, “landlord” or 
“tenants”. Nevertheless, aren’t the latter supposed to be 
included in the ? In this case, the phrase can be disre-
garded. Or, we can also interpret that when these monetary 
benefits have not been considered in the prior informed 
consent, the  can demand their inclusion. This implies 
that the  could interfere in the negotiation process. But 
the parties could have excluded a monetary provision on 
purpose, since, for example they could have stipulated 
different benefits to be shared. In this connection, it is not 
clear whether these two stipulations have to be included 
in both the contracts () and the  resolutions. This is 
aggravated by the fact that according to  Article , and 
in conformity with rules issued by , the  has 
to dictate the deposit of up to % of the research budget 
and % of the royalties. This detail seems to make this 
requirement mandatory in all cases. This generates some 
complications since there will not always be a research 
budget or controversies may arise in relation to the scope 
of the language. For example, does the budget include 
sampling and export costs?8
The approval of third-party contracts also raises 
several doubts. In this case we would be in the presence 
of intermediaries or joint research agreements involving 
foreign counterparts. In this example, the contracts have 
been previously signed. Should the  limit itself to en-
dorsement, given its inability to examine the negotiation 
process? In this state of affairs, under which criteria can 
the  disapprove the contract, perhaps an insufficient 
technology transfer?9 
Should the authorization process be initiated before the 
procedure for getting the prior informed consent is started? 
Or, which seems more logical, should both procedures be 
initiated at the same time? It is obvious that the applicant 
negotiates its relationship with the owner based on the 
fact that the ’s approval is pending. This can create 
uncertainties for the negotiators since the  can eventu-
ally request further requirements that would have to be 
distributed between the applicant and the company. 
Confidentiality is a little obscure. Article  states 
that the procedure should follow Articles , , and . 
(This is another argument in favor of the simultaneity in 
the third-party contract approval and the presentation of 
the .) On the contrary, it would be senseless to apply 
these articles to third-party contract authorizations. Yet, 
the only reference to confidentiality is found in article . 
This article mandates confidentiality for all the information 
submitted to the , unless biosafety concerns override 
this norm. Confidentiality is one of the main protections 
companies seek. (See paragraph  of the  Expert 
Panel’s First Report.) Furthermore, the recently approved 
Non-Disclosed Information Law establishes criminal 
sanctions for those who reveal confidential information. 
In spite of this, ’s multi-sector character can 
create confidentiality for companies. 
The rights granted to those who perform bioprospect-
ing are crucial. There is a tendency to grant to the term 
“public domain” a scope difficult to sustain. Some think 
that when the State grants an access permit this only 
implies custody of the material for research purposes. 
Which are the recipient-user’s rights? In particular, are 
there any transforming or protection rights such as the ones 
embodied in the intellectual property rules? Can the user 
patent an improved material or an invention derived from 
a given genetic material? Can a gene be isolated, char-
acterized, and patented? This is linked to the discussion 
under the aegis of the  in relation to the Multilateral 
Access System for Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture. According to it, delivered genetic resources, 
parts, and components cannot be protected under intellec-
tual property. From a commercial point of view, this kind 
of restriction can be very important in the determination of 
 
whether a company will conduct bioprospecting or not. 
A reasonable solution would be to give free access 
to the genetic material but without the possibility of pro-
tecting it, if there is no modification. In such a case, we 
would be in the presence of an invention and protection 
would be requested over a whole organism (obviously 
including the genetic component associated with the rest 
of the organism). 
In the same way, can microorganisms, genes, enzymes, 
and diagnostic agents obtained from genetic material by 
means of incorporating new genes obtained elsewhere 
be patented? It must be remembered that some material 
transfer agreements from the Centers of the Consultative 
Group on Agriculture Research include a clause preventing 
patentability of transferred material and related informa-
tion. This is also the case in the transfer agreements of the 
 project (Micro-Organism Sustainable Use and 
Access Regulation International Code of Conduct) and 
other equivalent agreements. This point deserves a detailed 
analysis linked to the next topic to be discussed.
What are the implications of considering genetic 
resources in the public domain if this means s cannot 
be acquired, since applicants will be considered as hold-
ers? Would a company agree to be granted custody only? 
The use restriction over the material should be clarified. 
Normally the materials (dry samples, etc.) are not sent 
as such. Instead bioprospectors send extracts, stock with 
genetic resources, isolated genetic sequences, etc. The 
degree of restrictions over these materials is another 
important point.
The framework agreements constitute an adequate 
mechanism to regulate access. Nevertheless, their real 
dimension is still to be assessed, since they are limited to 
basic research, excluding bioprospecting. Maybe in the 
present state of affairs this makes sense, since universities 
can conduct their teaching activities (molecular taxonomy, 
etc.) without requiring individual permits for each project. 
Would a similar approach be valid for the io? Apart 
from this, since according to the access procedure each 
sampling has to be approved by the respective conserva-
tion area, perhaps the best option would be to negotiate 
a framework agreement. This possibility is not contem-
plated in the present draft. Also, a framework agreement 
could be a possible way out for third-party access to ex 
situ collections. 
The proposed  distinguishes four related situa-
tions: basic research access (including teaching, since 
the molecular taxonomy courses require access permits), 
bioprospecting (commercial exploration), and occasional 
and constant economic use. The last two are differentiated 
from bioprospecting (related to the idea of exploration). 
For the occasional or constant economic use situations, 
the user tries to access a genetic resource because of its 
demonstrated commercial utility. For instance, taxol and 
 provide good examples. 
Taxol is the active ingredient with anticancer properties 
isolated from the bark of the Pacific yew (Taxus brevifolia, 
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a tree). Large amounts of the bark were needed for small 
yields of taxol and, initially, the demonstrated efficacy 
of the drug in the absence of being able to synthesize it 
or domesticate the tree, meant that the only source was 
extraction from the native genetic resource. Fortunately, 
synthesis of the chemical became possible, removing the 
need for extractive harvest. In the Costa Rican case, due 
to the necessity of extracting more , attempts at do-
mesticating Lonchocarpus felipei were made on a private 
farm. If this experiment is successful, the interpretation of 
the norms prompts at least three questions:
. When does commercial usage begin? In the  
case, the decision to domesticate the tree on a farm 
was made to avoid one of the common allegations 
against bioprospecting: over-exploitation due to 
market pressures. Nevertheless, this action does 
not imply the presence of a commercial phase. 
The planting serves an initial research purpose 
with no certain economic benefits. According to the 
proposed regulation, would this imply a constant 
economic use, thus requiring a public concession? 
It is my belief that this is not the case. Even in the 
case in which genetic material is required for clini-
cal tests (a provision that is often included in bio-
prospecting contracts), it is only in the exploratory 
phase. Commercial use takes place only when it is 
in the presence of a final commercialized product. 
This would require a grant or concession following 
the dispositions of the Law.
. Some regulators believe that the bioprospecting 
permit and the permit for economic use should be 
separate. This is derived from the oral explanation 
from the members of  about the  
National Cancer Institute’s experience in Africa. In 
this view, whenever a product is achieved, a new 
negotiation process leading to an “economic use 
approval” should be started. This implies that the 
research phase requires one permit and the com-
mercialization another one. This interpretation 
artificially divides bioprospecting, since from the 
beginning it looks for economic gains. Obviously 
this point of view is incorrect, and the placement 
in the market of derived products should be con-
sidered in the initial agreement where the sharing 
of benefits rules was agreed upon.10
. Which is the concession procedure and how it is 
differentiated from the access permit? For example, 
in the case of , once its commercial potential is 
identified, does the supplier have to obtain a conces-
sion to send the material? It must be acknowledged 
that inappropriate rules could lead interested parties 
to look for the materials elsewhere. In this case, the 
communities and local entrepreneurs could lose the 
possibility of profiting from their genetic materi-
als, and scientists could lose the chance to conduct 
certain scientific procedures in the country. Finally, 
 
there is a thin line between constant and occasional 
economic use. The initial phase of resource extrac-
tion should guarantee the rational exploitation of 
the biological diversity.
Finally, as in every process of change, new regulations 
bring uncertainties about the interpretation and application 
of the law, as well as for the duration of the process. This 
could produce delays due to the absence of experience and 
current capacities in the field.
Based on my own experience, bioprospectors and other ac-
cess applicants (for basic research, teaching, etc.) can have 
the following concerns in relation to the legislation: 
• It is a subject matter where regulation is new. 
Besides, the main focus of this regulation is to con-
trol the flow of information, something complex 
and full of difficulties. The first national regula-
tions were put forward in the Philippines in . 
After this, several norms have been designed at the 
national or regional level achieving different levels 
of success in their implementation. However, with 
only nine years since the first legislation, there are 
few examples related to achievements and failures 
that could be used as a guide.
• Because of historical inequalities in access and 
benefit sharing, the regulatory authorities tend 
to be suspicious and try to impose strong control 
mechanisms in order to avoid past injustices. 
Suspicion and mistrust appear to be the main mo-
tivators behind this tendency. The bioprospector 
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is not regarded as an ally but as a suspect. As with 
any partner, bioprospectors should be governed by 
legal and contractual mechanisms, without omit-
ting good faith in the negotiations. The tendency 
in some of the existing access regulations is to 
control rather than to promote, an aspect that will 
be dealt with properly later on. I should also point 
out the emotional aspect embodied in terms such as 
“National Patrimony” and “Sovereignty”, an aspect 
that transcends any juridical consideration. 
• In general, there is uncertainty over the application 
of new rules, the control character of the , the will 
to promote access or not, authorities’ expertise on 
genetic research topics, the excessive bureaucratic 
procedure, the high transaction costs, etc. 
Due to the difficulties explained above it is probable 
that basic research and teaching will be affected as, for 
example, in the molecular taxonomy technique, which is 
useful for national inventories. 
The economic cost of applying for access is imprecise. 
Article  indicates that the  will determine the amount 
to be paid on a case-by-case basis. However, it is unlikely 
that it will be an important amount (probably less than 
 ). Other costs would depend on the hiring of a 
lawyer (not mandatory). 
Finally, there are no specific conditions and costs for 
national and international bioprospectors. In practice, the 
existence of national bioprospectors as individuals or part-
ners with foreign entities would enable access, since there 
would be a responsible party in the country. 
Intellectual Property Rights
The list below documents Costa Rica’s comprehensive 
legislation related to s. In addition, new laws have been 
enacted on integrated circuits, trademarks, and industrial 
drawings, and there is an amended Copyrights Law.
• The Patent, Drawings and Utility Models Law No. 
 was reformed by Law No.  of  January 
 to make it compatible with . Supposedly, 
there are not exclusions for microorganisms, bio-
logical processes, genes, and genetic sequences as 
long as the patentability requirements are met. Yet, 
there is no administrative or judicial practice in the 
field. 
• The Non-Disclosed Information Law No.  was 
passed on  January .
• The Plant Breeders’ Rights Draft was published 
in The Gazette on  August , but is yet to be 
approved. 
• The Intellectual Property Rights Compliance Procedure 
No.  was passed on  October . 
• A draft has been completed on plant breeders’ 
rights in accordance with the model law of the 
International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants () and its  Act reform. 
In that area an important group composed of s 
supported by local politicians has expressed their 
disagreement with the legislative draft on the impli-
cations for farmers’ seed reutilization. In the same 
way, the scheme for community rights protection 
should make some references to plant breeders’ 
rights in order to guarantee compatibility between 
the texts. However, the specificities of the proposal 
are still unknown since the participatory process 
that will determine those community rights has only 
recently begun. No concrete proposals have been 
made to the  Council.
Articles  and subsequent articles of  are related to 
the sui generis community intellectual rights. A participa-
tory process mandated in the law is working on the sui 
generis community s. The consultations are expected 
to be completed by .
In general, the Costa Rican System for the Protection of 
Traditional Knowledge is based on the following items:
 
• A legal structure on access that guarantees prior 
informed consent and benefit sharing in relation 
to traditional knowledge. The  and, eventually, 
the  are granted with powers of control, 
authorization, and supervision ( Articles , , 
, and , among others).
• A combination of specific mechanisms for access-
ing, contracting, and licensing processes and sui 
generis structures based on registries.
• Different forms of knowledge and innovation such 
as patents, commercial secrets, copyrights, plant 
breeders’ rights, sui generis community intellectual 
rights, etc. (Article ) protected through the use 
of appropriate mechanisms ( Article ).
• Legislation focused on the protection of knowledge 
using a system of registration. This aspect is sup-
ported by the doctrine itself, which, in practical 
terms, has been implemented in India (K 
, D ), and in Venezuela. It was 
also included in the draft of the Peruvian Regime 
Proposal for the Protection of the Collective 
Knowledge of the Indigenous Peoples and Access 
to Genetic Resources, among others. Therefore, it 
promotes the protection of the sui generis commu-
nity intellectual property and inventions of the com-
munities that request such protection ( Article 
). Nevertheless, these guidelines for registration 
have been criticized due to some adverse effects 
they may produce (D and L , R 
). Some of the adverse judgments expressed 
are: the need to define access to information, the 
control required thereto, the possibility that com-
munities not involved in the access will grant prior 
informed consent, registering knowledge in the 
name of third parties, etc.
To define the scope, nature and requirements of these 
rights, a participatory process should begin to consult in-
digenous communities and peasants ( Article ) on the 
subject. Likewise, the process will determine the form in 
which the intellectual community right will be used, who 
will be vested with powers of representation, and who the 
corresponding beneficiaries are ( Article ). Based on 
the aforementioned, and concerning the assignment of 
rights and responsibilities, either collective or private, the 
following items must be explained: 
• The object of protection;
• The protection process;
• The rights granted and the party responsible for 
compliance thereof; and
• Monitoring systems.
Definitely, the success of the proposed scheme will 
depend to a great extent on the existence of the bylaw 
and the outcome of the participatory process called to 
examine it.
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Impact of IPRs on Biodiversity and 
Traditional Knowledge
During the process of drafting the  and, as part of the 
definition of regulations on access and benefit sharing, 
the topic of s and their relationship with biodiversity 
inevitably arose. Article  of the  states that these rights 
should support, and should not be opposed to, the objec-
tives of the agreement.
Thus, the  establishes that s shall be congruent 
with its objectives by virtue of the principle of integration 
(Article ). The  excludes the following:  sequences 
from patent processes, plants and animals, unmodified 
microorganisms, essential biological processes for plant 
and animal production, the processes of nature or natural 
cycles, inventions essentially derived from the knowledge 
of biological traditional practices or in the public domain, 
inventions that are produced monopolistically that may af-
fect the processes, and basic agricultural products used for 
food and health purposes (Article ).11 Authorities should 
consult the  before granting protection of intellectual 
or industrial property-related innovations that involve 
biodiversity elements. The submission of the certificate 
of origin and prior informed consent shall be required. A 
well-grounded opposition by the  shall prevent protec-
tion from being granted (Article ). It has been stated that 
particular beneficiaries granted protection of intellectual 
or industrial property rights regarding biodiversity must 
cede to the State a legal obligatory license. In the event of a 
justified emergency, this license will allow the use of such 
rights for the benefit of the community. This provision is 
aimed at solving an emergency, without involving com-
pensation or royalty payment (Article ). Some have af-
firmed that there are contradictions in certain clauses with 
respect to  (C ) and therefore, based 
on the Costa Rican structures, with the Constitution itself; 
pursuant to our judicial system, Treaties have a superior 
value over ordinary law and shall not be disregarded by 
the law. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize certain 
questions that are fundamental because, to some extent, 
they were the express or implicit cause of these regula-
tions (C M , C M 
and A ):
• Are traditional  systems insufficient in relation 
to the protection of knowledge, innovations, and 
practices, such as it is affirmed by the doctrine? 
Or, on the contrary, could they be used in order to 
protect important sectors involved, for example, in 
using trademarks and denominations of origin? 
• What possibilities exist for  to add value to 
biodiversity and the associated knowledge, in an 
indirect manner, by protecting a market of protected 
products? If there are possibilities, how could such 
mechanisms be useful to claim such value (L 
)?
 
• Is it possible and viable to establish the so-called 
Certificate of Origin (T ) so that it is a 
requirement to present a record or document on 
the legality of the access and benefit sharing? This 
requirement is contemplated in the Peruvian regu-
lation on Plant Breeders’ Rights, in Decision  
of the Andean Community Common Regime on 
Access to Genetic Resources, in Decision  of 
the same regional entity on a Regime of Industrial 
Property, and in the  of Costa Rica (Article 
), among others. This topic has been discussed 
in the World Trade Organization, mainly in the 
Council of  and the Committee for Trade 
and Environment, where different countries and 
groups have presented proposals to include this 
requirement in the revised text of these proposals. 
Furthermore, other forums like the Patent Treaty 
of  and its Working Group on Biotechnology, 
have touched upon the topic. Different objections 
have been presented from incompatibility with the 
fixed patent requirements of the  (Article  
of ) to practical criticisms (difficulties with 
respect to plant varieties originating in different 
countries, or from crosses and retro-crosses; the fact 
that a product or patent process does not necessar-
ily reach the market; the additional workload for 
the Intellectual Property Offices; and the lack of 
patents of multiple products derived from tropical 
biota, etc.).
• In what way do s impact biodiversity, for 
example, through restrictions on the exchange 
of seeds through patents, plant breeders’ rights, 
contracts or technology to control the expression 
of genes? Up to what point can impediments be 
produced in traditional practices given patents and 
other awarded rights on inventions that claim the 
use of genetic resources even when, from a legal 
point of view, these rights, many of which have 
been revoked in the United States or Europe, never 
should have been granted because the processes 
weren’t new or because they lacked invention char-
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acteristics (as has been the argument with respect 
to the neem, turmeric, and ayahuasca plants). Can 
s restrict the exportation of traditional products 
(beans in Mexico, for example), claiming the ex-
istence of plant breeders’ rights or patents granted 
in the importation market to third parties on the 
characteristics of these products?
• Up to what point do s have a direct impact on 
the environment and on the conservation and sus-
tainable use of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge? For example, up to what point do they 
facilitate or hinder the transfer of safe environmen-
tal technologies or create undesirable effects such 
as genetic erosion? To what extent do they increase 
the use of synthesis chemicals (especially given the 
sale of seeds that are transgenic and resistant to 
herbicides) or orient research and development to 
areas that are not desired and create a homogenous 
agriculture that is not adapted to local needs?
• The sui generis system for plant variety can be 
used, which was foreseen in  Article .b 
that protects traditional knowledge and stipulates 
benefit sharing, despite the fact that, in the  
framework, this statement takes on a singular mean-
ing (L and F ). 
• Does the stipulation of s in access contracts guar-
anteeing larger returns to the countries of origin or 
local contractors, including communities, actually 
entail greater returns for the companies involved, 
given the lack of competition and copies? Are they 
a marketing mechanism that allows greater royalty 
payments for the company and therefore contrib-
utes even more to benefit sharing?
• Finally, has the International Undertaking had any 
influence on national access laws? The  does not 
mention the possibility of including a clause on 
genetic and biochemical resources used for food 
and agriculture, subject to easy access as prescribed 
by the recently approved International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(that substitutes for the Undertaking).
Lessons Learned and Recommendations 
The Costa Rican experience has provided some of the 
most relevant examples in terms of obstacles as well as 
achievements with respect to the regulation on access to 
genetic resources, intellectual property, and traditional 
knowledge. We must indicate that there are two views, to 
some extent opposed, with respect to the underlying idea 
behind regulation of access (C et al. ). On the 
one hand, protection of traditional knowledge and access 
to genetic resources is seen as a conservation strategy and 
as a way to avoid the theft and inappropriate use of these 
resources, especially through the system of s. On the 
other hand, access is seen as a mechanism that, besides 
offering such protection, plays an important role in ben-
efit sharing and compensation for the commercial use of 
the knowledge and resources. In the first view, registries 
would be enough to conserve and safeguard the informa-
tion, publications, and other mechanisms and to avoid its 
inappropriate use (destruction of the novelty requirement 
of the patents, nondisclosed information laws, etc.). The 
other view, although recognizing this reality, seeks to cre-
ate or provide mechanisms for the distribution of benefits. 
The following sections summarize the main lessons and 
recommendations that are provided by the Costa Rican 
experience.
 
The Myth of Biodiversity Prospecting 
Programs and the Expected Values in 
Return 
For years, prospecting was associated with the exploration 
for ore and hydrocarbons. In the early nineties, Thomas 
Eisner is credited with using the term, or at least popular-
izing it, for the exploration for biodiversity. Both types 
of exploration present different levels of risk; therefore, 
distribution of benefits will depend on the understanding 
of how these activities operate. The bioprospector, despite 
different studies that show the existing potential benefits, 
is unaware of what exactly he will find in the rich tropi-
cal jungles. The wealth in terms of biodiversity does not 
necessarily translate into marketable products such as new 
medicines and seeds.
In this sense, those who believed that bioprospecting 
would become a “green mine of gold” have had to modify 
or moderate their observations. In Costa Rica the income 
contributed by the biodiversity prospecting program 
reaches several million  overall and makes important 
contributions to technology, capacity training, equipment, 
the National System of Conservation Areas, and, most 
importantly, to the creation of national capacities and ne-
gotiation capacities. Although this last aspect stands out 
as the most important in relation to acquired benefits, it is 
important to point out that ecological tourism contributed 
 million  in just one year, making bioprospecting’s 
return seem relatively small with respect to the amount 
of money obtained. From this perspective, biodiversity 
prospecting is a component of a much larger strategy of 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity rather than 
a solution for the immediate needs of conservation. 
Without Access There is no Benefit 
Sharing
Our historical background on this matter has shown that 
there was a perceived need for stricter controls on access 
to avoid so-called biopiracy. Some regulations to date have 
concentrated more on controlling than on promoting ac-
cess. Such a regulatory focus can inadvertently result in 
the ignoring of the objectives of the  and individual 
national laws, despite the good intentions of those who pro-
posed the regulations. Such regulations are creating high 
transaction costs and complicated bureaucratic procedures 
leading to an absence of access applications without which 
it is not possible to speak about benefit sharing. If the idea 
persists that access represents a form of colonialism, in-
stead of a mechanism to generate joint initiatives adequate 
for all participants, the possibility of generating reasonable 
experiences will be limited. Besides the necessary legal 
guarantees, it is important to foresee regimes that are suf-
ficiently flexible and transparent. Furthermore, there must 
be a balance between confidentiality and transparency and 
the access of third parties to the results of negotiations.
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Linking Access with National Biodiversity 
Strategies for Conservation and 
Sustainable Use
Unfortunately, the evolution of legal regulations on access 
to genetic resources has been separate from the definition 
of national policies on conservation and sustainable use of 
biological diversity. As a result, the contribution of mon-
etary as well as nonmonetary benefits barely touches upon 
the conservation process. When nations, through mecha-
nisms that are highly participatory, establish public poli-
cies on this matter, concrete negotiations to allow access 
could reach wider objectives. Ultimately, these National 
Strategies must serve the development and strengthening 
of the national and institutional capacities that give the 
resources added value.
Definition of Property Rights 
It is urgent that property rights on genetic and biochemi-
cal resources be defined. The  only mentions the sov-
ereignty of the State over them without considering the 
existing property rights. With this in mind, the clear dif-
ferentiation among the concepts of property, sovereignty, 
and national patrimony is necessary for legal certainty. 
The uncertainty over who owns the genetic resources 
leads to difficulties in the process of obtaining the  
and in determining who should participate in the access 
negotiations. In turn, this creates difficulties in reaching 
agreements on access that are appropriate given the exist-
ing doubts and companies’ requirements to have adequate 
guarantees on the legality of the procedures and to avoid 
public and judicial problems.
Access and Technological Change
According to R () we can affirm that technology 
plays a relevant and contradictory role in the process of 
access. On one hand, new screening techniques and re-
combinant biotechnology have opened doors to the use of 
biodiversity elements never known before and have greatly 
increased the value of these resources and knowledge. But 
on the other hand, the reduction of operational costs and the 
ability facilities to work with fewer samples have reduced 
the concrete value of each resource and have facilitated 
the illegal trade of resources.
It is essential to follow the changes in technology. 
Eventually, technological advances such as combinatory 
chemistry could result in a reduction of interest in biodi-
versity, access, and the use of traditional knowledge. It is 
important to be aware of these transformations. 
Impact of Access on National Basic 
Research
The regulations on access are based on the idea of conserv-
ing biological diversity, its sustainable use, and the fair 
distribution of its benefits. An indispensable component 
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to reach these objectives lies in basic research, especially 
when there is no essential information on ecosystems and 
species. Research conducted by universities and research 
centers represents in itself an element that contributes 
to this process. The rules on access could interfere with 
this research, for example, by controlling nonscientific 
activities in order to regulate the resulting commercial 
benefits and thereby affecting the attainment of the ’s 
objectives. This negative impact must be avoided through 
adequate procedures that favor basic research.
Participatory Processes
Participatory processes are important in an area of 
great national importance such as biological diversity. 
Notwithstanding this fact, participation requires enough 
information to avoid an “observer only” role for certain 
stakeholders. This need is increased by the complex na-
ture of the topics. At the same time, greater participation 
involves transactions, internal negotiations, and compro-
mises that could result in weaker legislation.
The Costa Rican experience has shown interesting details 
that are worthy of mention, although it does not necessarily 
constitute an example to follow in other countries. Peculiar 
circumstances of the national reality (read about these par-
ticular situations in M ), the size of the country, 
a central government, and its political, educational, and 
social situation have led it to establish its own terms. It 
is the example of a nation that decided to choose a path 
instead of arguing about existing problems that impeded 
advancement. From this point of view, the practical experi-
ence on access and benefit sharing presented at the level 
of contracts and collaboration agreements with the public, 
private, national, and international sectors, the formula-
tion of a Law on Biodiversity that seeks answers to the 
challenges proposed by the , and the regulation of the 
main principles of the sui generis model are elements that 
provide valuable information for future debate on access 
laws and policies. This is, possibly, the most valuable 
aspect of the Costa Rican experience. 
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Endnotes
 1 The  is a department of the Ministry of Energy and 
Environment.
 2 The Strategy proposes thirteen strategic elements. The last one is 
called “Establishment of the mechanisms needed to facilitate ac-
cess to genetic resources of biodiversity and the fair and equitable 
distribution of the benefits derived from them.” It establishes the 
technical, normative, and organizational frame to guarantee the just 
and equitable access to the elements of biodiversity, along with a 
set of strategies and concrete actions.
 3 The Unconstitutionality Action was presented against other dispo-
sitions of the Law related to the managing and specific destiny of 
public funds, as well as to the juridical status of the . These 
issues will not be commented upon since they deal with matters 
foreign to this report. Nevertheless, it must be indicated that the 
action presented against the National System has contributed to the 
lack of implementation of the Legislation in its entirety.
 4 Article  (Area of Application) of the  establishes that it will 
apply to in situ and ex situ genetic and biochemical elements of 
wild or domesticated biodiversity that are under the sovereignty of 
the State, whether in public or private property.
 5 See the Law of Phytosanitary Protection and diverse decrees ap-
plicable to the exportation of materials.
 6 Information provided by the Bioprospecting Program of io.
 7 An article of the  establishes that the public universities have one 
year to design internal procedures and internal controls only ap-
plicable to academic and research activities, when this implies not-
for-profit access to biodiversity. The universities that fail to do this 
in the elapsed time will have to abide by the ordinary procedure 
embodied in the law. Up to now only the University of Costa Rica 
has submitted its internal rules, but according to the  
these are too general. Consequently, the Commission’s rules will 
still be applicable for specific matters not contemplated in the 
general norms. Without wanting to go in deep in the discussion, I 
have to say that the meaning of “not-for-profit” is not always clear. 
The  has not provided any guideline to the universities 
on the content and conditions of these internal procedures.
 8 These articles have as background the cooperation agreement 
between  and io, which established this percentage of 
the budget and royalties to the transferred to the . However, 
the agreement mentions that when the budget cannot be used as a 
basis for calculations, other formula for the distribution of benefits 
should be designed. 
 9 The Access Norms contemplate a series of restrictions (Article 
), some of which are found in comparative law (e.g., danger of 
extinction, endemism, fragility or ecosystem vulnerability, access 
for military ends, etc). Other restrictions are not so clear like 
“denaturalization of the resources”. It is not clear which additional 
limitations can be used by the  for nonendorsement of a contract. 
 10 The fact that this is the thesis of the  proponents is even more 
evident in Article ., “Additional requirements for requesting an 
occasional or constant economic use permit”. It establishes the ob-
ligation to pay to the conservation area, landowner, or indigenous 
community where access took place up to % of the royalties 
obtained by the interested party.
 11 One thesis holds that reforms to the Patent Law of  tacitly 
derogated the exclusions of the Law of Biodiversity since they 
were promulgated later on; it excludes some, but not all, of the 
aspects provided in  Article  from the patent process.
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Mexico: Between Legality and Legitimacy
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José Carlos Fernández-Ugalde and Jorge Soberón
Should access to genetic resources be regulated differently 
from other biological resources? Yes, because the objective 
of appropriation is different. The essence of the difference 
is that once the information in the genetic resource has been 
accessed, once the key value is outside the hands of the 
owner of the land or the genetic resource (be it a farmer, 
an ethnic group, or a country), there is no need for further 
access. The biological material or individual accessed has 
been used or transformed, and the value is beyond the 
control of the provider. On the other hand, to hunt deer, 
cut trees, or fish tuna implies the harvesting of individuals 
again and again. In contrast, the main source of value from 
genetic materials is the “information” contained in the 
genetic resource; once it has been accessed there is rarely 
a need for additional extractions, and the information can 
be shared with others without necessarily requiring more 
genetic material. In addition, the degree of redundancy 
found in genetic information across taxa implies that us-
ers may need to prospect only a small subset of Earth’s 
species before finding most of the information they need. 
This does not imply that genetic resources are valuable 
only because of the information they contain; in fact, we 
think they are much more than that. But we cannot hide 
the fact that much of the debates related to bioprospect-
ing and biopiracy implicitly view genetic resources as 
valuable information. In Mexico, the conventional use of 
biological resources is now regulated more precisely and 
with sustainability criteria by the Ecological Equilibrium 
and Environmental Protection General Act (), the 
Wildlife General Act (, M C ) 
and the Sustainable Forestry Development General Act 
() and within the complex institutions of fisher-
ies and plant health1. Relevant regulation designating 
certain species as strategic2 was passed in the  Rural 
Sustainable Development Act (). However, genetic 
resources lack a specific and comprehensive regulatory 
framework. Currently, there are two formal legal initiatives 
in Congress that purport to fill this gap. Their content will 
be addressed later, but it is fair to say that that they have 
not been widely discussed and they are not a priority in 
the legislative agenda. 
The process of extracting genetic resources from spe-
cies with the aim of developing an industrial application, 
either within or outside the jurisdiction in which access 
took place, must be regulated through specific provisions 
for legal use within access and benefit-sharing agree-
ments and in compliance with Convention on Biological 
Diversity () obligations. Access and benefit sharing 
() requires regulating a complex set of actions and inter-
ests whose legal, institutional, and commercial framework 
has been well described by  K and L (). 
Once access to a genetic resource has occurred the steps 
between appropriation and industrial innovation may be 
complicated and difficult to follow. This is the basic reason 
why there should be legally binding agreements that should 
clearly state the rules of the game and explicitly include 
present and future benefits for all those involved. 
Adding to this complexity is the use of traditional 
knowledge () in the development of products that may 
be patented. If the contribution of the genetic resource 
itself to a biotechnological invention is not yet fully rec-
ognized, then a respectful development of new products 
involving  seems even more difficult to implement. The 
so-called nontangible component of the genetic resource 
 
may be even more important culturally and ethically to 
local communities than the genetic resource itself. Thus, 
 in cases where  is a component of the agreement 
tends to be much more complicated. Inequity between the 
recognition given to collective and diffuse knowledge and 
that given to individual invention property rights (H 
and L ) is often an additional complication. 
Therefore, this added complexity stresses the importance 
to analyze  and  issues in a separate way but always 
keeping in mind its close interdependence (F 
et al. ). 
These are some of the fundamental reasons why ac-
cess to genetic resources should be differentiated from 
the simple use of biological resources. This difference is 
clearly recognized in the  objectives: “the conservation 
of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its compo-
nents4, and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits 
arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, including 
by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropri-
ate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account 
all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by 
appropriate funding”.
Despite the apparent clarity and simplicity of the stated 
objective, institutions have been slow in responding to this 
new reality. The potential economic value of a genetic 
resource depends substantially on further investments in 
research and development. Of course the genetic resource 
itself must be paid for, but this accounts only for part of 
the value that a product or production process can gen-
erate. Translating the conceptual notion of evolutionary 
value into a concrete rule to estimate a fair share of the 
benefits for the genetic resource is not easy (S 
). Developing a drug and obtaining a legitimate patent 
requires time and resources. As a result, ensuring that a 
share of the benefits is received by the provider of genetic 
resources and/or associated traditional knowledge requires 
complex institutional designs. Thus, legitimate and legal 
bioprospecting projects usually have high transaction 
costs. The cases described in this chapter will reveal some 
of the many forms that these costs can take. 
Seeds, vegetative parts, and other reproductive ma-
terials including larvae or sperm, have been collected 
systematically and exchanged under the aegis of the 
Food and Agriculture Organization () as common 
heritage resources or, in other words, as biodiversity in 
trust (F et al. ). Until a decade ago these 
resources were rarely subject to patent claims, but with 
the advent of modern biotechnology there is a need to 
update and clarify the legal situation of these resources. 
The recently adopted5 International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture () 
is a step forward in this direction. This is one of the most 
important multilateral events taking place after Rio and 
before Johannesburg and it endorses the  principles. 
The implications of  for bioprospecting in the food 
and agriculture sector are hard to evaluate yet, but there is 
an opportunity for greater coordination among ministries 
of different sectors. Surprisingly, while our country played 
an important role since the negotiations started ten years 
ago it has not signed the treaty yet. 
Most genetic resources have not been collected yet, 
as is the case for most -related crops, and this is a 
relevant difference in terms of the negotiating position of 
megadiverse countries with respect to . If we harvest 
a biological resource, the territory or land ownership can 
be a logical criterion for property rights, but when genetic 
resources are separated from their territory, land property 
as a criterion is clearly limited. If someone sells a permit 
for deer hunting, he does not necessarily invade the rights 
of others. But if he offers access to the genes of a plant 
living on his land and on his neighbors’ land, he faces the 
possibility of incurring moral or patrimonial damage to 
third parties. This fact clearly justifies the need of State 
involvement in these processes6. By analogy, Mexico’s 
Constitution, like many other legal frameworks around the 
world, takes an approach that justifies State intervention 
when dealing with the issue of water sources emanating 
from a property the use of which impacts the availability 
of water downstream. It is very important to have a clear 
solution to this issue of wider interest in the case of genetic 
resources and to have in mind that it involves complex in-
stitutional designs and the need to face difficult and diverse 
social and cultural realities. Developing countries tend to 
have weak law enforcement in general, particularly within 
natural resource use and conservation. Thus, it is naïve to 
think that the solution is only legal. The development of 
policies regarding genetic resources has to include careful 
consideration of diffuse property rights, common goods, 
and collective rights and innovations.
Prior to the , genetic resources flowed freely among 
countries, but also biotechnology inventions such as genes 
were rarely protected by patents. After the  came into 
force, there has been a slow adjustment to the new regime. 
Since the appropriation processes for different natural re-
sources are different, the rights and obligations related to 
them are also different (Figure ).
Since legal change is not usually retroactive, we have to 
face the situation of materials collected pre- and depos-
ited in ex situ collections. Whether public or private, their 
legal status has not been fully clarified. This is also an area 
where the  will have important consequences. On 
the other hand, there has been further collecting post-  
without prior informed consent () and benefit-sharing 
agreements. When, in addition to that, those possessing 
the materials claim intellectual property rights on dubious 
inventive and industrial application grounds, the result is 
what we call biopiracy. Biopiracy, is probably one of the 
major threats to the viability of legitimate bioprospecting 
agreements. Thus, although this report deals mainly with 
, we firmly believe that illegitimate and/or illegal pat-
enting practices, particularly in the United States, remain 
a fundamental obstacle to the legitimacy of bioprospect-
ing. Such patenting practices have to stop. Otherwise, 
those who see biopiracy and bioprospecting as the same 
A B  S  B
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thing will have a relevant point. As an example, consider 
the case of the  patent granted on the Enola bean in 
which initial access was from a public market in Mexico. 
The biological materials were taken into the United States 
without permission. In addition, the patent lacks innova-
tion worthy of qualifying as invention. A definitive legal 
decision will not be reached until after the request to re-
examine posed by the Center for International Tropical 
Agriculture is settled. The ayahuasca case is another ex-
ample of this issue, because a clearly illegitimate patent 
was re-examined and finally reinstated by the  Patent 
and Trademark Office (), after a costly process.7 
This is worrying precedent that should alert academics 
and civil society within the .
There are many other patents in the United States and 
Europe that involve Mexican genetic resources and/or 
traditional knowledge or make use of them in their devel-
opment. Some of them are clearly illegal and illegitimate, 
but the picture is far from being black and white. Box  
presents examples of patents to illustrate some of these is-
sues. S et al. () recognized that the issue of 
genetic resources is the «subject of debate since it involves 
intellectual property rights, strong economic interests, the 
ethics of human legacy and the limits to the commercial-
ization of life». These debates are far from being settled 
and current activities within the , , the World Trade 
Organization (), and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization () will have to deal with the full extent of 
these issues in a comprehensive manner in order to achieve 
coherence at the multilateral level. Interesting work is be-
ing developed by  in relation to traditional knowledge 
and genetic resources ( ). 
For the authors of this report, biopiracy means the 
appropriation of genetic resources through noninventive 
patents, without the prior informed consent of the owners 
of the resource or knowledge involved, and without effec-
tive distribution of contractually agreed benefit sharing. 
Bioprospecting, on the other hand, may be composed of a 
superficially similar set of actions, but it declares its inten-
tion, it registers patents with clear inventive steps, claims, 
and industrial applications, and it seeks and obtains previ-
ous informed consent and proposes specific schemes for 
benefit sharing. There are those who assume that biopiracy 
and bioprospecting are the same thing (see C 
A , a volume fully dedicated to the issue that 
reflects part of the social perception on bioprospecting 
in Mexico). This sets a complex political scene for  
projects, not only in our country but in other regions of 
the world as well. 
To begin with, we will briefly describe the national 
legal landscape and comment on the social and cultural 
context of  projects in Mexico. We will then review 
three projects implemented in Mexico. Finally, we describe 
current legal initiatives on access to genetic resources, 
followed by conclusions and recommendations. 
C : M 
Legal Basis for Access and Benefit Sharing in Mexican Law
The Constitution8
The basic Constitutional framework related to  is 
found in four articles, because the issue crosses sector 
boundaries. It is important to note that in Mexico,  
obligations are above sector-specific federal laws but 
below the Constitution (Supreme Court ). The most 
relevant Constitutional article in this context is , which 
establishes the basis of land tenure and natural resource 
use (M C ). This article regulates land 
property rights, be they private or collective, and it defines 
public interest over specific elements. In its third paragraph 
it states that “the nation shall have at anytime the authority 
to impose upon private property the conditions dictated by 
public interest, and to regulate, for social benefit, the use 
of the natural elements susceptible of appropriation, with 
the aim of distributing fairly public assets, [and] care for its 
conservation…. Therefore, the necessary measures will be 
dictated to …preserve and restore ecological equilibrium… 
and to avoid the destruction of the natural elements.”9
Despite the fact that this article indeed explains the 
sovereignty of the State over certain natural resources, 
such as oil or water, for example, it is far from clear that 
this includes all natural resources. The concept of eminent 
domain over property on behalf of the State (the concept 
of original public property) is not sufficient to determine 
Appropriation processes are different,
as are rights and obligations.
Natural
Biological
Genetic
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jurisdiction
Figure . Natural, biological and genetic resources. 
Although genetic resources are a part of biological 
resources and these are a central component of natural 
resources, the fact remains that the processes of appro-
priation are different and so are the rights and obligations 
related to them.
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a priori public property over any natural resource10. When 
not explicitly stated, Article  delegates such decisions to 
ordinary legislation (see Figure ). If, in turn, subsidiary 
instruments do not make an explicit decision, then there 
is an “apparent gap” that is solved by going back to the 
concept of original property of the State. Thus, there are 
two complementary arguments to affirm that genetic re-
sources are public property but private individuals have the 
right to use them. One is the applicability of the  that 
recognizes the right to make a sustainable use. The other 
is a constitutional interpretation relating to the concept of 
original public property. 
Article  regulates antitrust rules, one of the exemp-
tions being intellectual property rights: “The privileges 
that, for a certain period of time, are granted to ...inven-
tors and innovators of any addition shall not constitute 
a monopoly” (M C ). This article, 
along with article  (M C ) indi-
cates three ways in which an activity can be affected by 
a special public regimen. These are the strategic areas, 
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In most biotechnological development with an industrial 
purpose, the usual final step in the appropriation process is 
the granting of a patent. Problems in this important link of the 
chain weaken the whole structure of bioprospecting practices 
proposed by the  framework. The issuing of patents on 
living organisms,  sequences, enzymes, etc., with doubt-
ful invention involved and broad industrial application claims 
is one of the facets that polarize and confuse discussions on 
bioprospecting. 
Both recent and older patents involving Mexican genetic 
resources or traditional knowledge show some of the gray 
areas in which we have to deepen our understanding and 
enhance and tighten the criteria of novelty and invention in 
patent evaluation related to life systems. Following are three 
examples that illustrate important issues. Regretfully, they 
are only a part of the picture of a much wider, more complex 
process of granting temporal privileges to so-called inventions 
that only redistribute capital investment or simulate creativity 
through ideological discourse and technical jargon. Although 
living resource-related patents are particularly problematic 
in this regard, S () has nicely described other 
“absurdities” that should also worry  society (civil, in-
dustrial, and academic). 
The comments on the patents reflect our opinion, and the 
examples are intended to illustrate some of the issues and 
represent a spectrum of patenting practices. At least one of 
the patents, the so-called Enola bean, is currently in review in 
response to an objection. Regretfully, examples such as this 
abound, but this is not the place to suggest a thorough revi-
sion. It is, in fact, one of our recommendations to establish 
an interdisciplinary and intersectorial group to evaluate the 
extent of this situation regarding Mexican genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge in the patent offices of several 
countries. Collaboration among countries on this issue would 
certainly reduce the costs of monitoring.
These examples show that we need to ask if it makes sense 
to recognize patents at all. Invention is hard to distinguish 
from discovery, and many patents have unclear industrial 
applications, use genetic resources without recognizing third-
party rights over them, or fail to recognize the contribution 
of genetic resources and traditional knowledge.
USPTO   ,  April . Field bean cultivar named 
Enola. Larry Proctor.
This patent “relates to a new field bean variety that produces 
distinctly colored yellow seed which remain relatively 
unchanged by season”. Seeds were bought in a Mexican 
market and belong to a local landrace named Mayocoba of 
common bean (Phaseolus vulgaris). Two generations of self 
pollination fixed the yellow color but inbreeding produced 
problems of pod shattering or adherence to the plants. 
Selection was directed to eliminate this problem rather than 
to produce a bean of different color. However, the claims of 
the patent are only related to the germplasm deposited and 
to the color of the bean. This patent is being re-examined in 
response to an official request by the International Center for 
Tropical Agriculture, a member of the Consultative Group 
on International Agricultural Research. More information is 
available at http://www.ciat/cgiar/org.
USPTO   ,  May . Method and materials 
for conferring Tripsacum genes in maize. Mary Wilkes 
Eubanks.
This patent shows inventive steps that seem original and 
non-obvious but which are impossible to achieve without the 
germplasm of an endemic species from Manantlán, Mexico 
that is at the core of the germplasm of maize. Setting aside the 
validity of the invention, access to the genetic resource ocurred 
prior to  and relatively independent of the use of traditional 
knowledge and practices. This patent raises the issue of the 
legal situation of biological materials collected before the entry 
into force of the  and the possibilities of negotiating benefit 
sharing even after a patent has been granted. 
USPTO Plant Patent ,  August . Camote plant. 
Steven Pollock. 
The abstract speaks by itself: “A new and distinct camote 
plant has been discovered. The novel psychotropic plant is a 
variety of the subtropical terricolous Basidiomycete fungus 
Psylocibe tampanensis”, and it shows the subtleties of the use 
of traditional knowledge as a guide. The description recog-
nizes existing Mazatec knowledge and practices relating to the 
“derrumbe” fungus and builds upon Pollock’s own knowledge 
as a mycologist. He also refers to collaboration with Mexican 
mycologist Guzman. It is important to note that germplasm 
involved with the patent was not collected in Mexico, but in 
Tampa, Florida. Thus this patent did not involve access to 
Mexican genetic resources but involved Mazatec traditional 
knowledge. The question is whether it really constitutes an 
invention or a discovery (as the abstracts indicates) and if 
the description and isolation of a plant (fungus) constitute 
inventive steps. This patent has expired already, and we are 
not aware of further inventive developments deriving from it, 
nor do we know if it gained its owner economic benefits. 
Box 1. Examples of USA patents related to Mexican genetic resources or traditional knowledge
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the priority areas and the public services. The areas con-
sidered strategic and of exclusive State participation are 
oil extraction, postal services, and extraction and use of 
radioactive minerals. On the other hand, some priority 
areas are satellite communications and train transport. 
These priority areas are given special public scrutiny, but 
private individuals can join in their commercial exploita-
tion. The use of genetic resources is not affected by any 
of these public regimes. Although many people think that 
genetic resources should be considered a priority area by 
Mexico, this is not yet reflected in the legal framework. 
We agree that genetic resources should be regarded at least 
as a priority. Furthermore, these resources, after careful 
thought and debate, could be regarded as strategic, be-
cause our megadiversity indicates that there is important 
“wealth” involved, because of the fundamental role that 
genetic resources has played in our survival as cultures, 
peoples, and a nation, and because of their enormous value 
for biotechnology development. However, Article  of the 
Constitution recognizes that such consideration may be 
included in ordinary legislation. The rights of indigenous 
peoples over their knowledge and natural resources add 
complexity to this issue. Rights relating to them should 
recognize at least four nested levels of autonomy: com-
munity, municipality, people, and multiethnic region 
(S ). These rights should also recog-
nize the specific characteristics of traditional medicine and 
traditional ecological knowledge, among others. Ongoing 
work is taking place on issues derived from Article j of the 
 and the International Labor Organization Agreement 
 related to tribal and indigenous peoples in indepen-
dent countries. In Mexico, the indigenous uprising of  
confronted the nation’s conscience, and subsequent nego-
tiations and mobilization led to the recent amendments of 
Article  of the Constitution in the year . According to 
C-D () the amendment recognized two new 
categories of subjects of the law: indigenous “peoples” 
and “communities” (M C ). This 
type of community is different from that established in 
Article  as an agrarian community, which refers to a 
collective land-ownership regime, in which decisions 
have to be taken by the Assembly. Under the amendment, 
section A of this article establishes that “this Constitution 
recognizes and warrants the right of indigenous peoples 
and communities to self determination and therefore 
the autonomy to ...preserve and enrich their languages, 
knowledge, and all the elements that constitute their culture 
and identity”. Section B of this same article adds that the 
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Figure . Allocation of property rights and natural resources. a) Sectorial legislation uses three basic techniques 
to allocate property rights, each of them set forth by different Acts. b) Property rights are comprised of three basic 
components, which can be separated, therefore, it is possible to allocate to private individuals the rights of the lower 
category. c) Decision schemes to determine the rights that exist over a natural resource: If the Constitution yields no 
explicit decision, then Federal legislation is applied; if that still does not resolve the issue, then we face an apparent 
gap, but legal hermeneutics resolves it by relying on the concept of original public property. 
 
Federation, the States and the Municipalities11 “in order 
to reduce the needs that affect the indigenous peoples and 
communities, shall have the obligation to …support the 
productive activities and sustainable development of the 
indigenous communities through actions that will enable 
them to reach the sufficiency of their economic incomes; 
the application of incentives for private and public invest-
ment that would foster job source creation; the introduction 
of technologies for raising their own productive capacity; 
as well as to ensure the equitable access to distribution 
and commercialization systems”. Despite the fact that the 
amendment is a step forward, the reform will be merely a 
programmatic list if it is not properly defined in secondary 
legislation. Although the reforms superficially indicate a 
move towards recognition of collective rights to indigenous 
peoples in Mexico, the fact remains that part of the benefi-
ciaries oppose to this reform and are currently demanding 
cancellation of the amendments and respect for the original 
reform proposed after the peace talks with the Zapatistas.12 
The outcome of these legal and political objections might 
have important implications for  in Mexico, particularly 
when it involves genetic resources related to traditional 
knowledge or indigenous lands and territories.
Thus, the Constitution establishes a set of general 
rules regarding land property, natural resource manage-
ment, indigenous peoples, and intellectual property rights 
that must be elaborated further since new realities need to 
be faced. Although in many cases practical decisions can 
be made in ordinary legislation, there are some issues that 
are too important to be dealt with in secondary legislation, 
such as the clarification of property rights over genetic 
resources and the recognition of the collective rights of 
indigenous peoples. 
Federal Legislation
In Mexican legislation,  only began to be explicitly 
regulated in . Article   of the  was the 
first step in this direction (M C b), 
setting the principles but still lacking specific guidelines, 
regulations, or standards. 
Currently there are three federal environmental laws 
that regulate access to genetic resources (Table ): the 
, the , and  (M C ). 
In addition, there are three relevant federal laws that relate 
directly to this issue: the Industrial Property Act, the Plant 
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Constitution
Article . Recognizes legal standing for two new categories: 
indigenous “peoples” and “communities”.
Article . Defines scope of strategic and priority areas and 
public services, in which genetic resources are not included.
Article . Grants and regulates the right to private property 
and defines public property over certain natural resources. 
Does not explicitly define proprietary rights over genetic 
resources. 
Article . States the antitrust rule and intellectual property 
rights as an exemption.
Article  (-). Empowers the State to regulate the use 
of natural elements and empowers the Federal Congress 
regarding Environmental Legislation.
Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection 
General Act ()
Article  (). Use of genetic resources is recognized as “of 
public interest”. Scope includes all species, but regarding 
aquatic species, coordination with other sectors is ordered.
Article . Scientific collection requires authorization, not 
extended to biotechnological purposes. Economic use of 
biological resources requires authorization and the explicit 
consent of the owner of the land has to be obtained.
Article -. Biotechnological use requires authorization, 
subject to the explicit prior informed consent of the owner of 
the land, who has the right to an equal share of benefits.
Wildlife General Act ()
This law regulates collecting activities for scientific purposes. 
Its scope limited to wild flora and fauna, excluding aquatic 
and domesticated species. It also excludes access to genetic 
resources for biotechnological development and refers this 
kind of use to other national or international legal instruments.
Sustainable Forestry Development General Act ()
Scope related to forest resources. Regulates collecting 
for scientific, commercial and biotechnological purposes. 
Requires an authorization or a notification, both subject to the 
 of the owner of the land. It declares void any registration 
including patents that do not acknowledge the rights of 
indigenous people on the ownership, knowledge or use of local 
varieties. If traditional knowledge is to be used there must be 
recognition of the ownership on behalf of the communities, an 
access agreement and proof of . It calls for the promotion 
and respect of biological traditional knowledge and gives 
special protection to endemic and threatened species.
Industrial Property Act ()
Article  (). Establishes the positive requirements for 
patenting (novelty, inventive step, and industrial application), 
and states an exclusion of patenting over biological and 
genetic material “as found in nature”.
Article . Excludes from patenting any discovery.
Plant Varieties Federal Act
Grants rights to plant breeders for varieties that are new, 
stable, distinct, and homogeneous. Does not address .
---
Regulates scientific collecting. Follows  and  
with technical detail, explicitly excludes forestry related 
germplasm, and contemplates possible change of purpose from 
scientific to biotechnological applications.
Criminal Code
Article  of the code punishes with prison and a fine 
any individual who illegally “executes any activity with 
traffic purposes, or captures, possesses, transports, gathers, 
introduces to the country or extracts from it, any specimen 
…and other genetic resources …regulated by any international 
treaty of which Mexico (is) Party”. Furthermore, “additional 
punishment will be applied …when the …described activities 
…are executed with commercial purpose”.
Table . Overview of existing laws and regulations with relevance to  issues
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Variety Federal Act, and the Criminal Code (M 
C ). Furthermore, there are dispositions in the 
 that are relevant to traditional knowledge. Likewise, 
most of the novel provisions of the  are related to 
traditional knowledge rather than to  in general (see 
Table ).
In the , the use of genetic resources is consid-
ered of public interest,13 which means that the State can 
exercise an authority that supersedes any individual interest 
on behalf of the higher interest of society. This public inter-
est must be protected and exercise of individuals’ rights 
prejudicial to it must be avoided. This translates into an 
area of State discretion in which the authority can affect a 
specific activity, as the State does when declaring a Natural 
Protected Area over private or collectively owned land. 
Thus, the regulation of access to genetic resources is 
within the jurisdiction of Federal authorities. However, 
some transfer of faculties to regulate these resources could 
be agreed upon between federal and state governments 
through coordination agreements, which would have to 
meet certain requirements. There are no current examples 
of such agreements regarding . 
The scope of the  includes the use of all spe-
cies, but aquatic species are also regulated by the Fisheries 
Act, the National Water Act, and relevant international 
treaties. The few provisions of the  related to  in 
general (and not to traditional knowledge) do not change 
the basic scheme of access stated by the  and the 
. Likewise, an authorization is required as well as the 
 of the owner of the land14. It only adds a simplified 
procedure in case of collections done by the owner of 
the land or by public agencies where only a notification 
and the  are required. There is however, an interesting 
feature of the . By means of definitions it includes 
in its scope the  for biotechnological purposes of wild 
animals and microorganisms found in forest ecosystems 
which include a significant proportion of Mexico’s ter-
restrial biodiversity. 
General Regulation of Collecting Activities15
Collection activity can have three main application pur-
poses: scientific, economic, and biotechnological16. In 
particular, the  (M C ) contem-
plates a wider and more explicit classification of objec-
tives or purposes that exclude biotechnology.17 Collection 
with economic purposes is regulated in Article  of the 
, which states that the use of wild flora and fauna 
specimens in economic activities will be authorized when 
the individuals guarantee their controlled reproduction or 
captivity and semi-captivity management, or, in the case 
of wild populations, the extraction rate should be less than 
the natural increase (a simple definition of sustainable use). 
Such use requires the explicit consent of the proprietor or 
legitimate possessor of the land where the individuals of 
a species or population are located. Thus, this regulation 
clearly intends biological resource use.
Collecting for Scientific Purposes
Scientific collection is also regulated in Article  of 
, which states that collection of wild flora and 
fauna specimens, as well as other biological resources 
(which by definition include genetic resources), requires 
an authorization. This authorization cannot be extended 
to biotechnological purposes, and it shall be ensured that 
research results will be available to the public, a provi-
sion that needs to be evaluated with regard to intellectual 
property. 
As for the  article  states that before any col-
lecting can be carried out the explicit  of the owner of 
the land (where the resources is located) must be obtained. 
Scientific collection authorizations shall not include bio-
technology applications, nor commercial purposes and will 
be granted only when the viability of the populations, spe-
cies, habitats, and ecosystems is not compromised. These 
authorizations are granted in two modalities: a permit by 
specific project or a license for a researcher with a specific 
line of research. Both require report submissions and de-
posit of at least one duplicate of the collected material in 
a Mexican institution or scientific collection.
Complementing Article  there is an Official Mexican 
Standard that regulates scientific collection (--
-). It basically follows the regulations of the  
(with technical detail that it is not relevant here), with the 
exception that it contemplates a change of purpose from 
scientific to biotechnological applications, recognizing 
that scientific collections can later be used for industrial 
applications. In this case it mandates a new declaration 
stating a change of purpose, thus setting the stage for 
new  and  agreements. It is interesting to note that 
this simple measure may prove to have a low transaction 
cost because the change in the  and the negotiation 
of the  agreement would happen only after a finding 
that merited further development of the genetic resource. 
Thus, scientific collection is regulated and differentiated 
from collecting with biotechnological or economic pur-
poses, but the distinction is not always easy to follow. 
The possibility of a future change of purpose is realistic, 
but it could create a sort of loophole in which  and  
are not faced at the onset but are postponed. This Official 
Mexican Standard also confirms that for collecting aquatic 
species a special fishery permit is required, pursuant to 
other applicable legislation.
Collecting for Biotechnological 
Development Purposes
Biotechnological purposes are regulated in Article   
of the , which states that “the use of flora and fauna 
specimens, as well as other biological resources, requires 
an authorization, which can only be issued if the explicit 
 is granted by the owner or legitimate possessor of the 
land where the resources are located who shall have the 
right to the equal sharing of the benefits arising from the 
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use of the resources”. It is important to note that until re-
cently this was the only article within the entire Mexican 
legal framework that directly regulated bioprospecting. 
Despite the fact that it comprises two elements stated by 
the  (the  and the benefit- sharing provisions), there 
are many aspects of  that at the national level are left to 
the authorities for interpretation and effective implementa-
tion. This article does not make any reference to the third 
fundamental element of access outlined in the , the 
“mutually agreed terms” which is commonly understood to 
have a contractual nature. Due to this lack of reference the 
law reserves this element for private development which 
constitutes an important signal to the market. This feature 
of the current legal framework has been criticized and can 
be read in contrast with the proposed initiatives of law.
It is worth noting that while the  establishes rights 
and obligations among parties, Article   also gives the 
right to grant  (and therefore to receive the benefits) to 
the owners of land. This transfer of benefits has intrinsic 
problems, because it amplifies the consequences of own-
ership of the resource, which is resolved in Mexico by 
granting rights of use. However, the problem of the trans-
boundary nature of genetic resources is not acknowledged. 
Under such conditions, when the owners of the land grant a 
, they may be affecting rights over genetic resources also 
found in neighboring fields. Furthermore, with regard to 
the distribution of benefits, attaching them to the granting 
of  has exclusion implications, since benefit-sharing ar-
rangements compensate only the person(s) granting the  
and not other custodians of genetic resources. It could be 
argued that this means that in Mexican Law there are two 
PICs, one given by the Mexican Government in the form 
of a collecting permit and another given by the owners of 
the land. In the first case the interest of society is protected 
and in the second, the interest of the owner(s) of the land. 
Thus, it is fundamental to address this situation in depth 
for any future comprehensive legislative effort. 
As already indicated, the other environmental law regu-
lating access to genetic resources is the . It establishes 
that the right to make a sustainable use of the wildlife 
specimens found within the boundaries of a property is 
granted to the owner of the land.18 This is important re-
garding the property status of genetic resources because 
the Constitution does not define them as private or public 
and ordinary legislation does not take a classic or strict 
property decision but assigns a right to sustainable use on 
behalf of landowners.
The  requires proof of legal provenance for regis-
tration and authorizations related to biological materials 
of wild species outside their habitat.19 This disposition 
exemplifies the use of legal provenance as an instrument to 
regulate possession of biological materials such as wildlife 
cargo or hunting trophies. By analogy, a similar approach 
could be taken in the process to obtain intellectual property 
rights such as patents: including proof of having complied 
with the  conditions of the provider country or region. 
It is interesting to note in this regard the emergence of pro-
posals to extend the disclosure requirements in intellectual 
property right applications, such as the one proposed by 
the Swiss, which calls for a requirement to disclose the 
origin, if known, of the genetic materials and traditional 
knowledge used in the inventions. These amendments are 
fully compatible with existing intellectual property rights 
principles since they constitute part of the description of 
the invention. However, these proposals stop short of re-
quiring evidence of prior informed consent, which tends 
to be considered too complex and costly to be feasible. 
The development of a certificate of legal provenance 
would aid in this regard, facilitating the implementation 
of stricter and more comprehensive disclosure require-
ments in a more cost effective way. The decisions adopted 
by the Seventh Conference of the Parties () to the  
in Kuala Lumpur in  indicate the political willing-
ness to start development of some sort of international 
certificate for genetic resources which could facilitate the 
proof of legal acquisition of genetic materials at various 
stages of their use.
Ex Situ Collections
The  does not regulate ex situ collections. Regarding 
the , a few articles regulate access to ex situ collections 
indirectly: any scientific and museum collection, whether 
private or public, must be registered and permanently 
updated in an official record. Once registered, they can 
be exempted, under specific circumstances, from certain 
obligations regulating proof of legal provenance as long 
as they do not have any biotechnological or commercial 
purposes. In addition to severe punishments outlined by 
the Criminal Code in the next section, article  of  
punishes as an administrative infringement the lack of due 
permits for the use of biological material for biotechno-
logical applications. 
The Criminal Code
The Criminal Code (M C ) punishes 
with prison from one to ten years and a fine of  to , 
minimum daily wages to those who “illegally execute any 
activity with traffic purposes, or capture, possess, transport, 
gather, introduce to the country, or extract from it, any 
specimen, its products, its subproducts, and other genetic 
resources, of any wild flora and fauna species, terrestrial 
species, or aquatic species on temporary prohibition, con-
sidered endemic, threatened, endangered, subject to spe-
cial protection, or regulated by any international treaty of 
which Mexico has become a Party”.20 Furthermore, “an 
additional punishment will be applied when the described 
activities are executed in or affect a natural protected area, 
or when they are executed with commercial purpose”.
Considering the models of criminal behavior proposed 
by Economic Analysis of Law (P ) a person is 
assumed to act rationally on the basis of costs and ben-
efits of legal and illegal opportunities. Particularly, most 
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studies corroborate the hypothesis that the probability of 
punishment is more important than its severity as a deter-
rent effect on crime. Therefore, in theory, this regulation 
should promote compliance with current legal obligations. 
However, collecting seeds or microorganisms is almost 
impossible to control (a tourist can take samples back to 
his country with almost no difficulty). If caught in Mexico, 
he would face the aforementioned punishment, but the 
likelihood of such an event happening is so slim that his 
chances are good of taking the material without complying 
with our regulation.
On the other hand, and as will be seen below, if those 
who try to comply with the law face social objections, 
legal confusions, and high transaction costs, then the mes-
sage that Mexico is sending to the world is that to ask for 
permission can be much more costly than simply taking 
the material. The punishment in the Criminal Code should 
help prevent such actions, but the reality of the distribu-
tion of living species and the ease with which they can 
be collected makes it unlikely that it will be an effective 
measure by itself. 
Plant Breeders’ Rights and Patents 
The Plant Variety Protection Act (M C 
a) gives property rights to plant breeders for a plant 
variety that is new, stable, distinct, and homogeneous. This 
is relevant in the  context because it is possible to obtain 
plant breeders rights without requiring an “inventive step” 
and under a more relative standard of “novelty”. Thus, 
obtaining these rights may be easier and more flexible 
than obtaining a patent and the issue of access regula-
tion becomes much more important. In most cases there 
are traditional and time consuming collective practices 
involved in the domestication or initial selection of wild 
germplasm. In Mexico this Intellectual Property Rights 
() approach is particularly undeveloped, but it will be 
important to monitor the granting of plant breeders’ rights 
in other countries that use Mexican germplasm.
The Industrial Property Act () (M C 
) in Mexico is relevant because it includes the pos-
sibility of obtaining patents over genetic resources. In 
any case, patents should comply with the requirements 
of novelty, inventive step, and industrial application, and 
there is an exception to patenting of biological and genetic 
material “as it is found in nature”. The criterion with which 
this exception is applied is highly relevant: the current 
practice by the patent office in Mexico is to consider that 
once biological or genetic material has been isolated and 
characterized, it is no longer “as it is found in nature”.21 
Such interpretation is not shared by the authors of this work 
nor do we think that it should be a common practice (this 
position is also found in C () and  ()), 
because isolating and characterizing biological materials 
is not an activity directly relevant to the creativity of the 
invention and such protections really recognize capital 
investment rather than invention. Therefore if a patent is 
granted on isolated and characterized materials then pro-
tection is being granted to discoveries, which are expressly 
excluded by Article  of the . This is an issue of the 
in-depth patent review process that has to be resolved. 
What needs to be clearly defined is that a product 
derived from isolating and describing the functions of 
biological materials does not comply with the inventive 
step requirement, and that inventions worthy of patents 
should involve modifications to the original material that 
are novel, nonobvious, and contribute decisively to the 
claimed industrial application.22 This is a complex mat-
ter in itself. In Box , three examples are given of patents 
related to “Mexican” genetic resources or traditional 
knowledge.
The legal principles and regulations described are those 
in force at the time this paper was written. However, it 
should be kept in mind that the different  experiences 
described occurred when some of these regulations did 
not even exist. This has to be taken into account when 
reading the cases because not all legal aspects described 
above were already in place when the bioprospecting 
projects developed.
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Social and Cultural Context for ABS 
Compliance with laws and regulations is only a part of 
what is needed to achieve the general objectives of : 
contributing to sustainable development and in situ conser-
vation of biodiversity. Institutionality in a wide sense is the 
framework in which  can contribute to these objectives. 
When the genetic components of biodiversity are seen as 
resources, the question of value creation and recognition 
becomes fundamental, and the social and cultural realities 
in which this happens are of high importance. 
Mexico faces severe social and political contradictions 
and tensions in rural areas. This is part of the institu-
tional context that has to be considered when evaluat-
ing the potential contribution of  to development 
and conservation in our country. For instance, between 
 and , there were close to , documented 
human rights violations of different degrees in rural and 
indigenous Mexico; % of them were related to agrarian 
conflict (R-C ). This shows the degree 
of polarization present in rural and indigenous land in 
Mexico in regard to land tenure and natural resource use. 
Furthermore, half of the agrarian-related human rights 
violations mentioned above happened in Chiapas in the 
years before the Zapatista uprising. Although Mexico is in 
a process of democratic change, this does not mean that we 
have solved the agenda of poverty and land and resource 
use or created mechanisms to solve conflict in rural areas. 
This is a reality that has to be taken into account when 
thinking of bioprospecting in rural Mexico.
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An additional issue to consider is that a contract that 
involves transferring biological materials to another coun-
try is seen by many sectors as a violation of the country’s 
sovereign rights over its resources. This is a fundamental 
point in terms of political legitimacy for bioprospecting. 
Although we think that the experiences described below are 
proposals that precisely indicate a sovereign way in which 
to implement , others see them as another form of piracy 
or as the ongoing sale of the country’s resources. In fact, the 
National Indigenous Congress, one of the two main indig-
enous peoples coalitions in Mexico, has called for a total 
moratorium on all prospecting (including minerals, water, 
and biodiversity) in their territories (H ).
In many of these discussions and conflicts the main 
issue is one of value: neglected, appropriated, built, or 
recognized. Value creation and recognition is a complex 
process that involves many different activities. With the 
risk of oversimplifying, Figure  shows some of the 
important components. On top of the value creation and 
recognition arrow are the “informal” contributions made 
collectively and through generations by peasants and 
indigenous peoples that we are only beginning to fully 
recognize. Below the arrow are the contributions made 
by “formal” institutions, which are commonly recognized 
through State support or even by granting intellectual 
property rights to guarantee a return of the investment in 
innovation. This inequality between forms of innovation 
that have been valued since the industrial revolution and 
the contributions, both past and present, that we are just be-
ginning to recognize is one of reason that  institutional 
designs tend to be so complex. Leveling the playing field 
among all stakeholders can be very difficult; consequently, 
short-term, nonmonetary benefits are very important when 
future benefits are, in a sense, meaningless to rural soci-
eties that are dealing with basic survival and subsistence 
issues. Indigenous and peasant communities own most 
of the land where biodiversity is distributed in Mexico. 
Contributions by rural population have been historically 
neglected. Bioprospecting seeks to recognize these con-
tributions and to generate mechanisms to reward them. 
To do so with legitimacy requires a social and cultural 
context in which peasants and indigenous communities 
have already begun the full appropriation of the values of 
their own resources.
The objective of  is to design institutional collabora-
tion schemes that can address the recognition of the values 
that each part contributes in the development of a com-
mercially viable product and to distribute the benefits that 
may be obtained according to their relative contributions. 
Thus, most  proposals include components of both the 
“formal” and the “informal” component of value creation 
and recognition. A strict definition of bioprospecting fo-
cuses on the value of “formal” components and speaks of 
retribution and benefit sharing from the value created by 
industrial development and commercialization. However, 
a wider definition of bioprospecting, such as the one used 
below in describing the activities of an indigenous organi-
zation in Oaxaca, is useful in leveling the ground because it 
recognizes the contribution of less intense biotechnological 
activities to value creation.
In general, the principal parties in  are the owners 
of the biological resource (the State and the landowners, 
be they private or collective), those intending to access 
the resource for technological development (researchers, 
research centers, and private companies), and a number 
of third parties involved in the  activities (in country 
collaborators). These third parties may probe to have a 
primary role in terms of technology transfer due to the 
need to have a suitable recipient in order for the transfer to 
occur (G ). Hence, the roles each of the parties 
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Figure . Recognizing and adding value. In the end, the value of a product in the market is a reflection of multiple 
processes that involve traditional or “informal” innovation and labor (above the arrow) and “formal” contributions to 
the value of the product (below).
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play changes significantly from case to case, but the basic 
issue to be addressed is that each transaction among them 
must be known and fully understood by all parties and 
must involve a full recognition of the contribution of each. 
The knowledge, understanding, and trust that is needed 
to reach this level of communication between parties is 
not easy to achieve in a polarized political environment, 
and the transaction costs can be very high. The follow-
ing examples will show that Mexico is far from reaching 
such a level of understanding and trust between sectors. 
Thus, as they were ten years ago, awareness raising and 
capacity building are still at the top of the agenda in order 
to enhance the social and cultural environment for  
projects in rural Mexico.
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Table . General aspects of the mutually agreed terms 
between the  of  and Diversa
  of  Diversa
Obtain the  from the 
owner of the land.
Collect and provide samples. 
Ensure that monetary 
benefits are deposited in the 
Biodiversity Trust Fund, on 
behalf of the owner of the 
land, and channeled to the 
National Protected Areas.
Provide technical 
assistance to establish a 
Mexican collection of wild 
microorganisms and  
sequences.
Provide equipment and 
training to collect and 
process samples.
Provide technology and 
“know-how.” 
Pay fee for samples. 
Provide corresponding 
benefits depending on the 
activities developed by 
.
Receive technology and 
“know-how”, technical 
assistance, fee for samples, 
monetary benefits, and s.
Intellectual property rights 
and property rights over 
the components depending 
on the innovation activities 
developed.
Obligations
Rights
Three Bioprospecting Projects in Mexico
The following sections deal with three projects imple-
mented in Mexico during the nineties. They are not the 
only ones that occurred, but they are by far the ones bet-
ter documented and in which the authors had first-hand 
experience and information. Other experiences involve 
early attempts by Shaman Pharmaceuticals (C 
), a company that evolved into Shaman Botanicals, 
and also an International Cooperative Biodiversity Group 
()23 related to arid zones and implemented through 
coordinated activities in several Latin American countries 
(T et al. ).24
Of the three cases selected, the first one, based on 
ecological and evolutionary knowledge, excluded bio-
prospecting in socially owned land. It precipitated a 
“popular denunciation” that was presented before the 
Federal Attorney for the Protection of the Environment 
() and triggered a set of recommendations that 
effectively suspended the bioprospecting activities. The 
second one included indigenous territories in Northern 
Oaxaca, but excluded traditional resources and knowledge. 
This project was completed successfully. The third case 
involved plants and traditional knowledge in the complex 
region of the Chiapas Mayan Highlands. This project was 
cancelled, proving that the basic issues surrounding bio-
prospecting have not been resolved in Mexico.
UNAM-Diversa: Bioprospecting in Extreme 
Environments
Brief Overview
This was the first  project in Mexico that went through 
a legal administrative process; it is rich in legal documen-
tation and also underwent academic and press scrutiny. 
Therefore, it reflects the legal issues as well as the multiple 
conflicting views of different sectors on these matters. The 
project is also less complex than others in that it excludes 
traditional knowledge and collecting was designed to be 
made only on Federal Public Land, a fact that brought into 
one legal entity, the roles of the landowner subject of  
and of the authority granting the permits.25 
Institutional Context
On October , , the Biotechnology Institute () of 
the National Autonomous University of Mexico () 
and the United States-based Diversa Corporation Inc. 
(Diversa) signed a bioprospecting agreement whose 
purpose was the “collection, isolation, and extraction 
of nucleic acids from biological samples obtained from 
lands owned by the Federation and located within Natural 
Protected Areas”. The major benefits shared were “tech-
nologies and know-how transfer related to the extraction 
and cloning of ”, plus “equipment transfer, payment 
of fees, and payment of royalties on products patented and 
sold by Diversa”. While the royalties attracted most of 
the attention, the main dispositions of the bioprospecting 
agreement are shown in Table , which reveals the sym-
metry of the institutions involved regarding activities and 
benefits shown in Table . The aim was to obtain micro-
organisms and nucleic acids from samples from extreme 
environments and to seek subcomponents of industrial 
interest (P ).
It is worth noting that the relationship between  
and Diversa in no way included the potential asymmetries 
involved in agreements between indigenous communities 
and international organizations. Thus, the mutually agreed 
terms were fully understood by both parties. Particularly, 
the  was a suitable recipient of the negotiated technol-
ogy transfer. An example of ’s existing capacities to 
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produce useful drugs is the development of a product for 
noncoagulation of blood derived from the saliva of the 
common bat (Desmodus rotundus) in a biotechnological 
project with plenty of innovation and with clear industrial 
applications (A-C ).  was basically 
playing on a level field. Furthermore, a search in the 
 internet database on patents shows that Diversa is 
the assignee of  patents as of  May , and a brief 
review of these patents shows that Diversa’s intellectual 
property policy involves inventions with clear industrial 
applications. Both of these factors are important in evaluat-
ing this agreement between two strong biotechnological 
institutions, one private and one public. 
One of the objectives of collecting on public lands 
inside natural protected areas was that this contract would 
be carried out in a setting of clear property rights for the 
State. This contributed to the Mexican experience in nego-
tiating access agreements without the complexity inherent 
in diffuse settings of property and traditional knowledge 
of indigenous peoples.
On  November , the Secretariat of Environment 
and Natural Resources (), through the National 
Institute of Ecology (), the National Commission for 
the Knowledge and Use of Biodiversity (), and 
, through , signed a Collaboration Agreement to 
facilitate the execution of ’s obligations under the 
bioprospecting agreement. The main dispositions of this 
agreement were that:
•  would select the collection sites located within 
Federal Public Land and within the boundaries of 
Federal Natural Protected Areas. 
•  would be responsible for ensuring that 
monetary benefits arising from the bioprospecting 
agreement would be deposited in ’s Trust 
Fund for Biodiversity26, according to the guidelines 
jointly issued by the  and .
• To implement the above,  would keep a re-
cord of collection sites, collected samples, materials 
transferred to Diversa, and the derived products. 
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Table . -Diversa agreement: joint and separate activities, intellectual property, and benefit sharing. 
Diversa does not collect material in any of the four different scenarios recognized by the agreement.
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•  and  would take adequate measures 
to ensure that income from this source would be 
used in the same Natural Protected Areas where 
the materials had been collected.
Social Controversy
This bioprospecting project was seeing as a capacity-
building experience to establish minimums for this type of 
contract. Press coverage showed that some saw this con-
tract as a genetic resources “sale” and failed to recognize 
the value of the agreement as an important “know-how” 
transfer between parties with similar scientific and techni-
cal capabilities. On  September , in La Jornada, a 
Mexico City newspaper, Alberto Székely and Alejandro 
Nadal each wrote articles about the /Diversa project. 
While Székely’s article (“First effective effort to stop the 
plundering of the genetic resources”) supported the project, 
Nadal’s article (“The plundering of genetic resources”) 
argued that the project had several legal and conceptual 
problems. If both of these authors are reasonable analysts, 
why do they have totally opposite positions in this mat-
ter? The answer probably lies in the fact that multiple as-
sumptions are being made by each of them. For example, 
Székely values the “know-how” transfer, while Nadal 
disregards it and even calls it “a mask”.
The main arguments in the press against the agreement 
ran as follows: legal gaps must be attended to before any 
agreement is signed; the agreement infringed national leg-
islation, as well as the ;  had no rights over the 
genetic material to be transferred to Diversa; the benefits 
shared were ludicrous, and the contractual obligation to 
share benefits was ambiguous and difficult to enforce. 
Another of the main opposing arguments stated that 
industrial property legislation excluded discoveries of 
natural phenomena, such as the discovery of the informa-
tion merely hidden in genetic material, from patent pro-
tection. Thus, all of the agreement’s clauses regarding the 
possibility of obtaining patents were void. This argument 
is important because it shows the perception that patents 
on discoveries are being granted, and although they are 
not the general rule, they undermine the very grounds of 
bioprospecting agreements in which genetic resource value 
is recognized and innovation is protected. 
As a result of the -Diversa controversy in 
Mexico, some provisions of international agreements, 
such as Article ..b of the Agreement on Trade Related 
Intellectual Property Rights () which recognizes pat-
ents on microorganisms, were brought into the public arena 
as a vehicle for protesting the international expropriation of 
genetic resources. Thus, a long-postponed debate started. 
Despite the legal and technical inaccuracies and inconsis-
tencies found in its coverage, the press did reflect social 
concerns that must be fully considered to create legislation 
that has legitimacy. 
Press scrutiny raised doubts regarding the legality 
of the -Diversa agreement, and on  June  a 
group of individuals and nongovernmental organizations27 
submitted a “popular denunciation”28 against , , 
and , for activities derived from the agreement 
( ). Figure  describes the parties to the 
controversy and gives an overview of the project. 
The “popular denunciation” sought that the compe-
tent authority, , should declare the nullity of the 
agreement and should also declare a general moratorium 
on any bioprospecting activities in the country, based on 
the following arguments:
• Genetic resources rest within the sovereignty of 
the Mexican State; therefore  cannot carry 
out acts of disposition of such resources.
• Collecting would take place in Federal Land, and 
the bioprospecting agreement did not take into ac-
count the Federation’s interests since it was not a 
party to the agreement.
• The collection was done in Natural Protected Areas 
subject to several property regimens, social or 
private, and the  of all right holders had not 
been obtained.
• Benefit sharing was not equal due to the insignifi-
cant monetary fees.
• Some authorizations were issued for scientific pur-
poses; therefore, some activities could have been 
done without authorization for biotechnological 
purposes. 
• On the date of signature there was no proof of the 
 by the owner of the land.
After a thorough review of the documents and facts, 
on  November ,  issued recommendation 
/ on Access to Genetic Resources, in which it 
reasoned that it did not have the authority to declare the 
agreement void. Further reasoning for the  deci-
sion is described in Table . 
Current Situation
As a consequence of this line of reasoning,  recom-
mended to the issuing authority () that it should take 
the necessary measures to ensure that Diversa requested 
the adequate authorizations, that if so determined, the 
president of  issue the  separately from the autho-
rization. Finally, it recommended that a wide public con-
sultation should be undertaken regarding access to genetic 
resources. As a result of the above recommendations and 
of the uncertainties surrounding access conditions, all 
bioprospecting activities were stopped, but collaboration 
between the two institutions continued in capacity build-
ing, training and technology transfer. Since the contract 
was not declared void, the  agreement finally expired 
on October . 
Mexico had no prior experience in negotiating a con-
tract with so many advantages in “know-how” transfer. 
If even these forms of benefit distribution are regarded as 
lacking value by those objecting to bioprospecting, the 
road to legitimate bioprospecting in Mexico will still be 
a long one.
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UZACHI-Sandoz: A Bioprospecting 
Experience in Indigenous Territories 
without Providing Traditional Knowledge
For the purpose of this section we will use “bioprospecting” 
in a broad sense as in “the process of developing new uses 
for living organisms or their derivatives” and not only for 
using genetic resources (C ). Bioprospecting 
also includes the learning of new processing techniques or 
uses, or more sophisticated biotechnologies29, including 
fermentations and plant tissue culture or genetic manipula-
tion techniques.
 is the Spanish acronym for “Zapotec and 
Chinantec Communities Union”. It includes a Chinantec 
community of three settlements with , inhabitants 
(Comaltepec, La Esperanza, and Soyolapan) and three 
Zapotec communities (Xiacuí, Capulalpam, and Trinidad) 
with a population of ,. The area is recognized for its 
world-level biological importance, an example being the 
presence of Papilio esperanza, a microendemic swallow-
tail butterfly species named after the community mentioned 
above (T et al. ). These and other Zapotec com-
munities were the cradle of nineteenth century progressive 
and liberal thinking. Benito Juarez, the only self-conscious 
indigenous president that Mexico has had in its national 
history, was born in this region. Progressive Chinantec 
and Zapotec minds have led these communities in sev-
eral social movements throughout their history. In recent 
times they have claimed legal rights to manage their own 
forests. During the s they filed a lawsuit against the 
Minister of Agriculture and the President and recovered 
forest management and use rights that were previously 
under concession to a decentralized government paper 
company. Since then sawn wood has become their main 
source of income.
 has developed several initiatives to protect 
“their natural endowment” and to develop their customary 
stewardship institutions, using updated technologies when 
possible. They developed the first computerized forest pro-
duction control systems in the area, started a microbiology 
laboratory, and were the first indigenous organization in 
Oaxaca connected to the Internet. Recently, they set up 
their own plant tissue culture and  analysis facilities. 
These processes were fostered by their traditional govern-
ing bodies. Their view is that the natural endowment within 
their territories is to be responsibly used and developed to 
improve their living standards and to assure the well being 
of their children and grandchildren.
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Figure . Overview of the -Diversa controversy. The bioprospecting agreement signed between Diversa and the 
 of  was followed by a Collaboration Agreement between , , and . After months of press 
scrutiny, a “Popular Denunciation” was submitted to  with the demands indicated. The process concluded with 
a set of recommendations to .
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The prevalence of traditional governance structures 
and a strong sense of the territory do not mean physical 
or cultural isolation in this case. Apparently, the use of 
modern technologies is not seen as a threat to their cus-
tomary management systems, but rather as tools to control 
their resources under traditional governance and steward-
ship structures.  had fully appropriated its territory 
before bioprospecting was even considered. This approach 
was, in a sense, wise management of its resources, as long 
as  had the cultural capacity to control them and to 
get tangible benefits from them. For instance, in  they 
contacted matzutake mushroom brokers to benefit from a 
valuable market. Matzutake, meaning “pine mushroom” 
in Japanese, is an interesting delicatessen item. One fresh 
kilogram is worth about  to  . Brokers were 
given the following conditions: buyers would have no ac-
cess to ’s forests; they would go to a community 
delivery point and purchase from community-authorized 
collectors; and they would pay them a previously publicly 
agreed price and pay an extra % fee to the community 
for control and protection activities. As matzutake had 
no previous use for these communities, these contracts 
enabled them to benefit from a “new” biological resource. 
This is a simple but effective way to bioprospect, develop-
ing a component of biodiversity into a biological resource 
and its derived products. After this experience, ’s 
bioprospecting activities expanded. In , they started 
their own studies on local edible mushrooms and on their 
traditional knowledge, which was vanishing. One year 
later, they started to train their own personnel in ecology 
and plant tissue culture.
With its “ethno-oriented sustainable development” 
approach,  tried to contact pharmaceutical indus-
tries to develop other biological resources. Their previous 
matzutake success gave them confidence to explore a new 
area. After considering several options, and after a three-
year negotiating process (–), they finally signed 
a three-year (–) contract with the Switzerland-
based Sandoz-Pharma.30 A local nongovernmental orga-
nization, Estudios Rurales y Asesoría Campesina (), 
assisted them in the negotiation process, mainly as transla-
tors and as technical advisors. As the negotiating process 
took place at the same time as the  was discussed, this 
contract was one of the first in the world to test and set 
in practice the main principles of this new international 
framework.
It is very important to underline that the signatories 
from the biological resources supply side were the indig-
enous communities. A Sandoz-Pharma high-level officer 
and the president of the indigenous organization signed the 
contract (see Figure  for an overview of the agreement). 
In recent times, this component of ’s activities has 
received public attention, so we will address the issue, but it 
must be kept in mind that the -Sandoz contract was 
only part of a more comprehensive strategy of indigenous 
communities to control their resources, develop new uses 
for them, and expand their own knowledge and resource 
transformation capacities.
Institutional Context
An interesting feature of the property system in 
Mexico is the right of rural and indigenous communities 
recognized by the Constitution to own land collectively. 
However, communities have struggled to exercise this 
property right. For their bioprospecting activities, they 
claimed in a sense, this full or broad property right.
In fact, environmental law was the only legislation 
available to regulate rights over biological resources. It 
used basically the same framework: the landowner has 
the right to develop the biological resources, as long as 
he/she does not threaten biodiversity, vegetation or the soil. 
This legal framework made it possible for an indigenous 
organization to sign a legally binding contract with an 
international firm.
Building on experience,  negotiated with 
Sandoz carefully considering the following hierarchi-
cally structured items:
• Minimize potential risks to their common natural 
endowment. Under no circumstance would access 
to communal lands be granted to Sandoz collec-
tors, and no herbal traditional knowledge would be 
provided under any agreement.
• Maximize their own ability to manage biodiversity-
related transactions and to capture as much as pos-
Table . ’s analysis of the -Diversa agreement regarding the authorization, the collecting role, the , 
and the benefit-sharing issue
Diversa must obtain the 
authorization because it has 
the biotechnology purpose 
(not the )31.
Although they were based 
on Article  , they 
were specifically issued 
“for scientific purposes”. 
Thus, no authorizations for 
bioprospecting existed.
The intermediary role of the 
collector must be exercised 
through a previous and 
explicit mandate of the 
Federation.
The  must be explicit and 
cannot be confused with the 
authorization, nor with the 
collaboration agreement. 
It must be included in the 
bioprospecting agreement. 
Thus, the bioprospecting 
agreement was not the final 
agreement, but merely part 
of the negotiations.
This could only be evalu-
ated once the joint guide-
lines for making deposits 
were clearly defined.
 Authorization Collecting role  Benefit sharing
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sible the benefits from their biological resources.
• Maximize collective benefits in the medium 
term.
• Maximize short-term benefits.
The institutional framework to negotiate the agreement 
within  was a nested scheme where each com-
munity discussed the issues related to their biological 
resources in a general assembly. Then, the communities 
gathered and let the organization know their concerns and 
interests through three delegates. The delegates assembly 
set their priorities as explained above, and a negotiating 
team was then formed to contact Sandoz. This multi-lay-
ered process included technical and information support 
provided by , which in turn had a formal agreement 
to collaborate with .
 also served as a communication path between the 
 negotiating team and Sandoz, translating messages 
to Switzerland and back to the communities. This transla-
tion function was not merely changing words from one 
language to other, but making the messages understandable 
to both Sandoz officers and the Zapotec and Chinantec 
communities. To do this work,  had financial support 
from private foundations and was not a contracting party. It 
had no benefit from the contract besides previously agreed 
upon honoraria.
Access
One of ’s goals for the negotiation was to develop 
as far as possible the communities’ capacities to add value 
to their resources and products. This goal is consistent 
with the priorities outlined above, and it made the issues 
of infrastructure and social capital building more important 
to the negotiations than the royalties issue. This contrasts 
with most  initiatives, where royalties play a central 
role in the contractual design. 
Another negotiating goal was to retain any right of ac-
cess to the community lands. Thus, access for Sandoz was 
only indirect, and  offered value-added products. 
This approach gave them room to receive benefits other 
than royalties and enable them to demand infrastructure 
investments, training, collection fees, laboratory work, 
and collaboration fees. Of course, a share of the benefits 
in case a new product would be developed and marketed 
was also negotiated. 
From the Sandoz perspective, the main interest was not 
pharmacological but a more strategic one. They wanted 
to understand how they could engage in long-term bio-
prospecting activities. They were also exploring the 
potential risks and benefits of the ’s new legal frame-
work. In contrast with other bioprospecting firms, Sandoz 
is not a natural products business and is not interested 
in traditional knowledge. Their approach is not to find 
“active principles” in medicinal herbs and convert them 
into drugs. Most of their products come from chemical 
synthesis and their expertise relies in combinatory chem-
istry. However they had observed competitors, such as 
Merck or Schering, investing in bioprospecting, and their 
administration wanted to have first-hand understanding 
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Figure . Overview of -Sandoz Agreement. The private party in the agreement received isolated and character-
ized samples and did not have access to the territory. On the other hand, the organization and its communities received 
upfront short-term benefits in the form of capacity building and direct financing of prospecting activities.
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of the opportunities and risks involved in this emerging 
area. The main interest for Sandoz in bioprospecting was 
that if the chemists in Switzerland had hints from ecolo-
gists collaborating with in-field organizations in tropical 
areas these chemists might find strategic paths for their 
combinatory chemistry capacities.
On the other hand, for a high-tech industry like Sandoz, 
the most interesting taxonomic groups are not plants or ani-
mals, where knowledge has accumulated for centuries and 
the most interesting compounds are already in the market, 
but instead: the microscopic world, which only began to be 
explored at the end of nineteenth century and which is one 
of the most promising field for future discoveries.
Under the agreement,  took care of all field 
operations, under mutually agreed standards and under 
precise and stringent field and laboratory protocols. This 
ensured useful results for Sandoz at their chemistry labs 
in Switzerland.  sent their people to Basel to 
be trained on the protocols, and then started collecting 
forest debris samples which they processed in their lab, 
isolating and characterizing microscopic mushrooms and 
actinomycetes, selecting those that seemed to be involved 
in ecological relationships such as commensalism, sym-
biosis, or parasitism, filing strains into their collection, and 
mailing duplicates to Basel for chemical analysis without 
disclosing the biological identity of the samples.
Benefit Sharing
From the start it was evident that the asymmetry between 
Sandoz and  was huge. Hence, the scheme of a 
partnership based on a percentage of net earnings as 
royalties seemed very unlikely to benefit , whose 
strategy was not to include sensitive information, such as 
traditional knowledge, in the agreement and to take, as 
soon as possible, their benefits: increased human, social, 
and physical capital.
Hence they ensured that most benefits would material-
ize in the short term. This proved wise, because near the 
end of the contract Sandoz merged with Ciba, the lead 
research laboratory in Basel was restructured, and the 
new administration did not give high priority to long-
term chemical innovation processes. This decision has 
unpredictable consequences to the competitiveness of 
Novartis-Pharma, but in any case  accomplished 
its main short-term objectives.
This case is also peculiar in terms of  because 
they did not need a long chain of intermediaries. The in-
frastructure was owned by Sandoz during the three-year 
contract and then passed to  ownership.  
has since used the lab for its own activities. Payments for 
sampling and laboratory jobs were deposited directly into 
’s account, and were first used to cover operational 
expenses. Three years after the contract expired, the earn-
ings that remained were used to finance further prospecting 
activities. Payments to communities were transferred from 
’s bank account to each community’s account on 
a revolving basis after they had their own administrative 
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system to use these funds to finance small projects. In this 
way each community’s financial assets increased a little, 
and  increased its capacities.
Although the contract was basically a research endeav-
or, in which Sandoz tried to understand how bioprospect-
ing could help its own pharmaceutical research, there is a 
chance that some compounds, within the thousands that 
the project yielded, may be interesting and lead to the 
development of novel pharmaceutical products. In that 
case,  would receive a previously agreed-upon 
fixed royalty. The amount negotiated was an endowment 
big enough to finance their technical staff in perpetuity. It 
will take years to see if any compound or molecule will 
yield such a result, but at present,  feels that the 
benefits it received were fair.
Social Controversies
Social objections to this project have to be placed into 
context at the local, regional, and national/international 
levels. Locally, the project had wide support from ’s 
communities because they proposed it. Their basic concerns 
were met: control over access to their lands and resources 
and benefits from their biological resources. However, con-
troversies did arise. There was a tendency to give more jobs 
to youth from the south (Zapotec) area, and the Chinantec 
people asked for a more equitable job policy. Unfortunately, 
the project did not expand enough to provide more employ-
ment. Two communities had problems agreeing on how to 
manage the community fund and set the priorities for using 
it, which delayed the transfer of funds to one community 
for a couple of months, and to the second one for a couple 
of years. This situation provoked tensions, but finally all 
community funds were transferred.
At the regional level, the project had little or no at-
tention despite efforts made. Two regional information 
meetings had a very weak response from neighboring 
communities, and  also asked the local radio 
station to broadcast information about the project. The 
people in charge said the issue had insufficient interest 
to expend airtime on it. Much later, two years after the 
contract expired and Sandoz disappeared as such, some 
people at the radio station realized the importance of the 
-Sandoz project. Indigenous communities directly 
prospecting on their own lands and receiving Swiss Francs 
to their bank account now seemed unusual and interesting. 
Unfortunately, the door for more bioprospecting activities 
was already closed, at least for the moment, because ne-
gotiations with Switzerland were suspended until a clear 
legal access framework was available in Mexico.
This situation upset the people at the radio station, who 
then used their airtime to discuss ’s selfish attitude. 
They also charged  with “biopiracy”, because, as 
they understood the contract,  gave Sandoz seeds, 
herbs, and traditional knowledge that was not their prop-
erty, but a natural and cultural endowment that belonged 
to the Zapotec and Chinantec peoples. However, these 
components had been explicitly excluded from the very 
 
A B  S  B
beginning and for the same reasons.
At the national and international level, the claims 
from the local radio were magnified through the newspa-
per “La Jornada” with aid from the Rural Advancement 
International Foundation () (known today as the 
action group on Erosion Technology and Concentration 
()).  posted the “biopiracy” accusation on the 
Internet and circulated it via many international email 
networks. These claims were stopped by  leaders, 
who asked representatives of neighboring communities 
to clarify things.  publicly showed that they were 
using their legitimate rights over their territories, and that 
they did not commit to the project any plant, animal, or 
any traditional knowledge. Regarding other communities’ 
interest in benefiting from bioprospecting,  let them 
know that they hoped more communities would benefit 
from their biological resources, and that they would be 
willing to develop a new bioprospecting contract along 
with other communities whenever that might be possible. 
In response, two dozen community representatives from 
the region signed a letter of support of  and pub-
lished it in the state newspapers. They did not have the 
money (, ) to publish it in a national journal so it 
was never known at the national or international levels.
An interesting fact is that indigenous communities in 
Oaxaca’s Sierra Norte are deeply interested in gaining 
control over their biological resources and in obtaining tan-
gible benefits from them on their tables and their pockets. 
Bioprospecting projects in their broadest sense, including 
“soft” biotechnology, are only one of several ways in which 
to achieve these aims.
Current Situation
’s international activities are on stand-by because 
there is legal confusion regarding the current  legal 
framework in Mexico. Under current circumstances, both 
the industry and the communities’ organization cannot 
commit to long-term  contracts. However, the interest 
of local communities in bioprospecting is high, and they 
would be willing to negotiate a new contract under the ba-
sic principles outlined above and within a comprehensive 
regulatory framework. 
On the “internal front”  is still developing its 
biological resources potential. It has become the main 
supplier of mushroom “seeds” to other communities in 
the region, concentrating on the saprophytes Pleurotus 
ostreatus and Lentinus edodes.  does not seek to 
profit from the mushrooms themselves, but from the tech-
nical advice they can give to other communities to set up 
their own rustic mushroom production units. This initiative 
has helped recover mushroom traditional knowledge that 
was very fragmented and had nearly vanished; this reap-
propriation process is helping mushrooms to reappear on 
Oaxacan tables.
In the near future,  may expand its local bio-
prospecting activities aimed at regional consumption and 
self-sufficiency. The organization has collected the main 
edible mushrooms found in its communities and can de-
velop the technological package to cultivate them. Again, 
the main approach is not to profit from supplying biomass, 
but from technical services.
Another bioprospecting area being developed by -
 is tissue culture for the reproduction of ornamental 
plants with two purposes: The first is to commercialize 
orchids, cycads, ferns, and bromeliads, internalizing in 
the price the tissue culture costs and a fee to support the 
conservation areas. Hence, plants obtained through “soft” 
biotechnologies may help pay the costs of stewardship 
of mother plants and their natural habitat. Technical as-
sistance contracts with other communities could be the 
second purpose. In the long run, this activity may support 
the development of a market for sustainably produced 
ornamental plants and a network of indigenous com-
munities producing and marketing these “exotic” plants 
internationally. Regarding plant variety protection the 
visualized strategy could be to publish the characteristics 
of the varieties so the materials may be regarded as “previ-
ous art” and not subject to patent or plant variety claims. 
This could help prevent biopiracy. The benefits from these 
activities will come directly from marketing plants and not 
from proprietary claims over germplasm or the royalties 
produced by such rights.
Among many other lessons, this experience shows 
that bioprospecting agreements can reach legitimacy if 
they are a part of a much wider process of social and cul-
tural appropriation of territories and resources. Thus, full 
implementation of  objectives at the local and national 
level is a precondition for the development of locally and 
regionally legitimate  projects in Mexico.
The Maya International Cooperative 
Biodiversity Group (ECOSUR-University 
of Georgia-Molecular Nature Limited): 
Bioprospecting Resources and their 
Associated Traditional Knowledge
Brief Overview
The Maya International Cooperative Biodiversity Group 
was one of the s approved in . The Maya  
was created on the premise that biological resources and 
traditional knowledge can be effective motivators for com-
munity development and resource conservation through the 
development of natural products such as phytomedicines 
and agroecological programs, as well as through the de-
velopment of patentable pharmaceuticals (R et 
al. ). The participating institutions in this  were 
El Colegio de la Frontera Sur () in Mexico, the 
University of Georgia () in the , and a small United 
Kingdom based biotechnology company named Molecular 
Nature Limited () that was funded in . The study 
area for the project was the Chiapas highlands, in southeast 
Mexico, a region with political conflict, extreme poverty, 
and cultural erosion. For an overview of the agreement, 
see Figure .
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In terms of access to genetic resources, the Maya  
undertook an important effort to obtain  from the com-
munities, both in terms of time and resources dedicated to 
the task. The benefit-sharing provisions in the Maya  
contained some of the most comprehensive packages, in-
cluding co-ownership of patents, technology transfer, and 
dissemination of “science-validated” traditional knowl-
edge (B et al. ). Unfortunately, these were 
not enough to give the project viability in the Chiapas’ 
highlands. Early in its development, opposing regional 
organizations of traditional healers coupled with radical 
organizations at the international level rendered the project 
politically infeasible, forcing the definitive shut down of 
the project in October . Thus, this section outlines the 
proposal and the process, but does not describe a finished 
and implemented bioprospecting project. 
Institutional Context
The traditional medicine of the Chiapas’ highlands is un-
usual in that the communities do not systematically culti-
vate medicinal plants. The Tzotzil and Tzeltal typically use 
fresh plants to produce remedies and do not use cultivated 
species dried or bought in local markets. Communities 
obtain the most common plants at the sides of roads and 
paths or in secondary forests, and, although some species 
are found in restricted habitats, the system appears to have 
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Figure . Overview of Maya . The complexity of the institutional design is self evident from the figure. Although 
, , and  agreed on the terms of the collaboration, and on the side of the Mayan collaborators there was 
agreement with individual communities, second and third level social organizations (such as  and ) 
objected to the agreement.
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worked well until recently, when population growth and its 
ecological impact affected the availability and distribution 
of some species. In addition, the poverty in which most of 
the population of the region lives has created great pressure 
on their cultures and traditions, leading to cultural erosion 
and loss of knowledge. Preventing the irreversible loss of 
traditional knowledge is one of the greatest challenges for 
the region. The Maya  was an attempt to advance in 
this area in the field of ethnomedicine and ethnobotanical 
knowledge. The Maya ’s choice of Chiapas for the 
project could be considered risky, but given the social 
needs, it was definitely worthwhile.
Poverty, culture, and indigenous rights are issues 
of great social and political relevance in contemporary 
Chiapas and Mexico. The Zapatista movement uprising 
began in  and after a decade no profound and peaceful 
solution has been found. 
In terms of the academic context, this project had an 
ideal platform, with more than three decades of work on 
ethnobotanical knowledge by Drs. Brent and Eloise Berlin 
and with , a regional research center well equipped 
and committed to make science one of the driving forces 
towards sustainable development in the region. Many of 
the communities where the project was promoted had done 
previous work with .
Access
The Maya  sought to respect the rights of the com-
munities over their plants and knowledge. To that end, the 
 of the communities was essential before collecting with 
biotechnological development purposes could take place. 
All channels available were used to transmit the project’s 
aims: leaflets in Mayan languages, meetings in community 
assemblies, radio broadcasts, and plays. By “community”, 
the project meant the paraje, a sub-unit of agrarian com-
munities that traditionally maintained a high degree of in-
dependence in their decisions. The high number of parajes 
within agrarian communities has rendered them unable to 
handle a number of issues relevant for communal life, but 
the paraje seemed like the right choice as the basic unit of 
social involvement with the project. Eventually, to comply 
with national legislation that does not recognize this legal 
unit, the permits would have to be revalidated before the 
general communal assembly, which in most cases respects 
the decisions of the individual parajes. However, the politi-
cal turmoil generated by the project prevented its efforts 
and the validation of the individual community decisions 
before the general assemblies did not take place.
Benefit Sharing
Equitable benefit sharing is one of the objectives of the 
, and the Maya  attempted to implement it fully. 
Of particular importance was to provide short-term as 
well as long-term benefits, recognizing that communi-
ties could not adjust to the timeframes typically found in 
pharmaceutical research. Proposed benefits in different 
time frames included:
Short term
• Assistance in developing medicinal plant gardens 
and information leaflets about medicinal plants in 
local languages;
• Production of documents and databases on tradi-
tional knowledge that, if desired by local communi-
ties, could be used to defend traditional knowledge 
against misappropriations;
• Generation of a sound biological and ethnobotani-
cal information base, including a dissemination 
strategy at the local level and among academic 
centers in Mexico, thus directing research efforts 
to the region and making them more efficient;
• Work on agroecological experiments directed at 
exploring the potential of medicinal plants for the 
control of disease in local crops, which if success-
ful, could reduce the damage caused by disease and 
by mitigation practices, since these technologies 
would be freely available;
• Dissemination of traditional knowledge among the 
communities in the highlands through workshops 
and other means;
Mid-term
• Studies on the biological activity of traditional 
remedies aimed at identifying the most active and 
effective and creating a constructive bridge between 
formal and traditional health systems, increasing 
the interest of the former in the latter;
• Evaluation of the technical and economic potential 
of species as phytomedicines in national and in-
ternational markets, as well as assistance for small 
local cooperatives interested in the sustainable pro-
duction of these species and remedies;
Long term
• Assessment of chemical compounds found in plants 
with the potential to become commercial products, 
with communities benefiting from a share in the net 
revenue obtained. In case a biotechnological prod-
uct was developed as part of the Maya ; and
• Explicit agreements to split the net revenue 
equally among the partners (, , , 
and a Chiapas Highlands Development Fund). to 
guarantee that % of direct net revenue would be 
invested in the region, and both  and  
commiting their share, an additional %, to eth-
nobotanical research in the region.
Moreover, with a view to safeguarding the rights of 
communities, the Maya  considered the creation of a 
participation mechanism for the communities as partners 
in the project. Promaya was conceived as a social organi-
zation with representatives from the communities in the 
Chiapas highlands to help them coordinate their participa-
tion in the Maya . This organization would not only 
participate in the Maya ’s decisions, but would also 
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be co-owner of any intellectual property arising from the 
project, with the right to propose and veto proposed uses 
and to negotiate licenses on the products of the project. 
This aspect represents one of the most significant in-
novations of the Maya  in comparison with other 
bioprospecting projects.
Social Controversy
Representatives from the  approached 32 in 
January , before the response to the request for ap-
plications was submitted to the  National Institutes 
of Health, to assess their interest in participating. At that 
meeting, they showed little interest and expressed some 
opposition to the involvement of a private commercial 
partner and to Dr. Berlin, as a leader of the group, with 
whom there was some pre-existing antagonism. This first 
encounter was intended to invite them to participate as one 
of many organizations in Chiapas. The  believed that 
, 33 and other organizations could benefit 
from the natural products laboratory to improve quality 
control, production processes and marketing.34 In addition, 
these organizations could assist in disseminating the results 
of the Maya  in the region. Assurances were given 
that the project would not start without the proper legal 
framework in place, either contractual or legislative.
No further contact was made until after the grant was 
awarded and the Maya  organized a workshop and 
forum on Mexican experiences on  in March  as 
one of their initial activities. Representatives of nongovern-
ment organizations, government, the Senate and academic 
institutions attended the forum where discussions centered 
around Mexican experiences that could help both the legis-
lative and regulatory process in Mexico and also contribute 
in the design of the Maya .  participated at that 
forum as an observer, sending two representatives from 
their board of directors. The presence of representatives of 
different sectors was intended to enhance understanding 
and communication regarding . However, these efforts 
did not achieve specific commitments by legislative or 
government representatives. On the legislative front, ad-
vances were slow. However, the initiatives mentioned in 
the following section are, in a general sense, a response to 
this and other efforts, including the  Senate Seminar 
and social and legal objections to other bioprospecting 
projects that have altogether raised the level of this discus-
sion in Mexico. 
Other project activities did not start immediately for 
various reasons. Of fundamental importance was that 
bioprospecting activities could not start before  was 
obtained from the communities and the permit for col-
lecting under Article   of the  was issued. 
However, activities that could start without delay included 
training of research assistants, information and negotiation 
meetings with the communities from which consent was 
sought, setting up of the natural products laboratory at 
, establishment of medicinal plant gardens at the 
community level, and scientific collecting for ’s 
herbarium as well as the associated taxonomic work as part 
of the biodiversity survey. By May , the decision was 
taken to initiate plant collecting for scientific purposes and 
the trainees started work that summer. Since no bioassays 
were involved and no extracts were to be derived from the 
collected plants, this part of the work fell within what is 
commonly referred to as scientific research, which was 
already authorized by the government under the respon-
sibility of the herbarium’s principal researcher. Also in 
May , an agreement on minimal principles regarding 
Intellectual Property Rights was signed between , 
, and .
Work on the legal framework of the project also con-
tinued, including the design of Promaya as a fund and 
as an organization.  was also invited to provide 
comments and to be involved in Promaya, and a meeting 
was set for mid-September with them. Unfortunately, the 
meeting never took place, since ’s first press re-
lease opposing the project was published on  September 
. This first attack on the project was followed by a 
series of letters between  and ; however, 
no formal meeting could be arranged. To avoid any mis-
understandings regarding the activities of the Maya , 
the project halted all plant collecting activities in early 
November . 
From that moment on, the conflict escalated on several 
fronts:  started to distribute communiqués to the 
municipalities and communities as well as to transmit 
radio broadcasts, seeking to halt the project.  also 
got involved, and a campaign opposing the project was 
launched at the national and international level. While 
the local campaign did not change the minds of the com-
munities who had granted consent, it did start to cause 
problems for other projects at . At the same time, 
’s campaign put pressure on . Meetings at 
 and in the communities were organized by the 
Maya  as a strategy to clarify the project’s intent and 
activities. 
The situation did not improve during the following year, 
despite efforts by  to serve as mediator in the 
conflict and two meetings of a negotiating committee that 
were held in mid-. The institutional efforts naturally 
slowed down towards the end of the federal administration 
in December , without resolving the conflict. 
Current Situation
During its efforts to obtain  from the communities, the 
Maya  obtained written consent from  parajes in  
of the  municipalities in the study area. Eight medicinal 
plant gardens were established upon community request 
and some ,  had been secured in funds towards 
the Chiapas’ Highland Maya Fund. The ethnobotanical 
collection database contains almost , records rep-
resenting , species. Numerous academic exchanges 
and workshops were held. Scientific work was carried 
out on a number of related issues, including propagation 
of native species, pest damage to medicinal plants, po-
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tential of medicinal plants as a means to control cabbage 
pests, cultural transmission of ethnobotanical knowledge, 
Maya soil classification, and veterinary ethnomedicine. Of 
course, no results from bioassays exist since those activi-
ties never took place. 
An example taken from a leaflet shows the kind of 
information being disseminated in Chiapas during the dis-
cussions. Under the heading “What is a patent?” is this 
explanation: “A patent is when a person, industry, business, 
university, research center, or government becomes owner 
of cultural heritage, biodiversity, ecosystems, and genetic 
resources, saying it discovered something in them and it 
is the only one that can use them. A patent is taking away 
the sacred and the spiritual in our lands, plants, animals, 
and lives.” The level that discussions in the press and in-
ternet reached is beyond description and shows the risks 
of unaccountability in “communications”.
During , the  government suspended fund-
ing for a year, giving time for the conflict to be resolved 
and the permits obtained. However, the application for a 
plant-collecting permit for biotechnological purposes was 
finally denied in the midst of political pressures.  
decided to withdraw from the Maya  indefinitely in 
October .
Lack of clarity and inadequate adaptation of the prin-
ciples set out by the  into Mexican national legislation 
are part of the reason for the suspension of the project. An 
alternative solution would have been the recognition of the 
customary rules of these traditional communities which is a 
constant call in all the forums where traditional knowledge 
is discussed. As mentioned above, the granted consent of 
the local communities would in time have to be reflected in 
the mechanisms of formal agrarian law which is currently 
the only means to canalize  issues, despite the fact that 
the decisions of the parajes are generally recognized by 
the legally defined agrarian community. However, due to 
political pressures the process towards obtaining the formal 
document of  was interrupted and the formal applica-
tion was prematurely submitted to the authority. In the 
absence of such formal document the authority had clear 
technical grounds to deny the authorization and thereby 
finally burry the controversy. While it may seem that the 
project was therefore halted due to a technical deficiency, 
it seems clear that the lack of enforceability of a federal 
decision to upheld the validity of the consent of some 
of the communities or parajes meant that the granting 
of the collection permits for biotechnological purposes 
could lead to a deepening of the social conflict. Behind 
the technical deficiency there was rather an attempt to halt 
confrontation and alleviate the political tensions generated 
by the project.
Beyond the particularities of the social conditions 
in Chiapas that led to the heated controversy around the 
project and that could not have happened in other parts of 
the country, the project also highlighted the fact that the 
existing regulatory framework did not consider the  tradi-
tional knowledge associated to genetic resources nor the 
rights of their holders, an issue that  needs to be addressed 
at the national level. 
Future Access and Benefit-Sharing Regulatory Framework
Regarding future legislation there are at least two ini-
tiatives in Federal Congress: one submitted by Federal 
Representative Alejandro Cruz Gutierrez (Institutional 
Revolutionary Party ()) and the other by Federal Senator 
Jorge Nordhausen (National Action Party). Both initiatives 
are undergoing evaluation by the corresponding Congress 
Committees35 and have not yet been discussed in the ple-
nary, but they have been published in the Parliamentary 
Gazette36. The Nordhausen initiative has been partially dis-
cussed both by the legislative and some executive branches 
of government. Since a Committee already discussed a 
draft of the law, Congress is likely to consider this initia-
tive during the  parliamentary sessions.
Although these initiatives may never become laws, 
briefly describing and commenting on them is useful to 
show some of the issues that must be dealt with in order 
to achieve a comprehensive framework and a legitimate 
environment in which to comply with  rights and ob-
ligations at the national level. 
The PRI Initiative
This text is an attempt to gather into one comprehensive 
regulatory framework both access to genetic resources and 
biosafety.  regulation is comprised of eleven articles 
related to access conditions and intellectual property, 
which are summarized in the following paragraphs. The 
law initiative is of federal jurisdiction and proposes the cre-
ation of two competent authorities: a Biosafety Technical 
Counsel comprised of scientists and technicians and a 
Biosafety Mixed Committee including representatives of 
the Ministries of Agriculture, Environment and Health, 
as well as representatives of consumers, industry, and 
professional associations. Thus, it emphasizes biosafety 
and not . 
The initiative defines the property issue by declaring 
genetic resources as a Patrimony of the Nation, and it reaf-
firms that biodiversity conservation and the sustainable use 
of genetic resources are of public interest. These principles 
could help clarify and simplify State participation in  
agreements. The scope of the law explicitly includes both 
wild and domesticated species, but no reference to aquatic 
species is made. Under this law, access to genetic resources 
would require an authorization from the Biosafety Mixed 
Committee. A minor contradictory disposition states that 
bioprospecting requires authorization from the Biosafety 
Technical Counsel. Access pursued in collectively owned 
land (communities and ejidos) would require the previ-
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ous consent of the General Assembly, notwithstanding the 
fact that this approach still does not solve the resource 
distribution problem. The applicants must sign an Access 
Agreement, which must contain: a) the identification of 
the resource, its use, and any risks derived from its use; 
b) the material transfer agreement; c) the participation of 
national researchers; d) the obligation to share the results 
of the research; and e) a fee to guarantee compliance. 
The Committee shall publish in the Official Federation 
Gazette any resolution regarding access applications and 
will manage a record of related activities. This principle 
of information and public registry is important and should 
remain in any future legislation on . 
The authorizations could be denied whenever: a) there 
may be adverse effects on human health or on the essential 
elements of peoples’ and communities’ cultural identity; 
b) the species or geographic areas involved are considered 
strategic for national security; c) an uncontrollable impact 
on the environment may occur; d) the species involved are 
endemic, rare, or endangered; e) ecosystem vulnerability 
conditions might increase; and f) there is a risk of genetic 
erosion. The proposed regulation of intellectual property 
is confusing because it excludes from protection any liv-
ing form and any genetic material (while allowing for 
process patents) but later gives protection to discoveries. 
It also confuses patents with plant breeders’ rights when 
referring to patenting requirements (new, homogeneous, 
stable, distinct, and generic designation). Thus, the regu-
lation will need technical clarification. It excludes from 
protection the genetic sequence information of a gene in 
order to eliminate barriers to biotechnological research. If 
not well defined and delimited, this proposal may, in turn, 
be in violation of trade-related obligations that Mexico has 
acquired. It mandates that no rights will be recognized 
whenever the collected samples were illegally acquired or 
whenever collective knowledge of indigenous communi-
ties or peoples was used. This last principle may seem a 
reasonable protection but on closer inspection it raises the 
question of whether prohibition is valid or if indigenous 
communities and peoples should be granted the right to 
say yes or no to such forms of protection. 
The regulation mandates the Biosafety Mixed 
Committee to review patents or any other intellectual 
property right granted outside the country but based upon 
national genetic resources in order to allow claims for 
royalties or nullity. The exercise of patent review will be 
useful, and it is needed input for future legislation; how-
ever, it is not easy to see how this is a matter of biosafety 
(at least in the way the concept is implemented in the 
context of the ).
The Nordhausen Initiative 
This initiative has a better structure, reflecting a more 
careful discussion developed by an interdisciplinary group 
before submitting it to the Senate, although information 
on the extent of consultations is not available.
The proposed law is meant to be federal to achieve co-
herence and certainty, but implementation can be executed 
locally. Once a law has allocated jurisdiction, transfer of 
some power can be coordinated between federal and state 
governments. The industries the law is to regulate are not 
listed but it is likely to regulate commercial activity as a 
whole. Certain provisions could affect specific industries; 
for instance, the biotechnology industry is affected both 
by  provisions and access provisions of the initiative. 
The proposed law is not likely to modify the current 
segregated agricultural framework, but since it includes 
domesticated species, it will fill many gaps and standardize 
regulation over different species. Simultaneously, however, 
it ignores its relationship with the International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, signed 
in November .
With regard to ex situ collections, the proposed law 
states the types of authorizations required. Germplasm 
banks seeking to pursue collection in Mexican territory 
must obtain a specific authorization. On the other hand, 
“Ex Situ Conservation Centers” are recognized by the 
law and must notify  of all Material Transfer 
Agreements related to Mexican resources. However, many 
aspects are not regulated and therefore  provisions and 
the --- regarding scientific collections 
would be applicable.
The enforcement authorities are meant to be  
and its dependent and related agencies ( and ), 
, the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural 
Development, Fisheries, and Food (regarding plant breeders’ 
rights), and the Mexican Industrial Property Institute.
The differences between commercial and noncom-
mercial purposes are defined by exclusion. Furthermore, 
differences are only evident regarding ex situ regulation; 
the proposed law does not regulate scientific collection 
since its scope is determined by the definition of “access” 
which only comprises commercial and economic activities. 
If properly developed, this initiative would regulate only 
commercial activities, leaving scientific applications to the 
current regulatory framework. The main characteristics of 
the access procedure would run as follows:
• The applicant must obtain an authorization from a 
Federal Executive Authority ().
• An “access agreement” must be signed with the 
Federal Government (, which has juris-
diction), the resource provider, and the intangible 
component (traditional knowledge) provider, if 
any.
• If relevant, an authorization must be obtained either 
for collection done by a germplasm bank, transport 
to any area not specified in the access agreement, 
export of the material collected, or transfer of the 
rights and obligations given by the access autho-
rization.
The issue of State participation in  activities is a 
grey area. Particularly, having the State as a party to the 
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access agreement is an example where the justification is 
somewhat blurry and might prove to be counterproductive. 
Despite the fact that the initiative is carefully designed, 
there are some issues that should be addressed in order to 
obtain greater clarity and coherence. These elements also 
show the complexities involved in reaching a harmonious 
transectorial regulation: the procedure and requirements 
for authorization are not defined for germplasm banks; for 
general-access authorization, the environmental impacts 
requirement is not clearly regulated; and the participa-
tion of Mexicans in research and development is required 
but not defined. Regarding s, a provision involves the 
evaluation of the proportion of “relevant knowledge” 
given by each party in order to distribute the resulting 
s. This obligation will be difficult to estimate and may 
overemphasize the role of patents over short-term ben-
efits. It also undermines the intrinsic value of the genetic 
resource in the overall  scheme because it attends only 
to the added value.
The proposed law does not resolve the issue of own-
ership of the genetic resource because its provisions 
concerning consent are sometimes based upon the owner 
of the land and sometimes upon the federal government 
(probably assuming that it is the owner of the resource). 
The initiative should outline the issue more carefully.
One provision states that any protection of derived 
technologies must be shared between the parties. This 
could represent a form of compulsory license that might 
be contrary to international agreements (such as ). 
Another provision requires that intellectual property 
authorities verify the presentation of documentation prov-
ing legal access, prior to the granting of any right. This 
does constitute an incentive for sustainable use, but unfor-
tunately, as phrased this measure allocates the burden of 
proof to the intellectual property authority and not to the 
applicant, as it should in order to be effective. 
Also, giving burden of proof to the victims of an al-
leged infringement through “conducting acts contrary to 
the usage and customs of indigenous people, ejidos, and 
communities that affect their cultural rights” eliminates 
any advantage the measure could have in promoting access 
to justice. This kind of inequity will have to be dealt with. 
Furthermore, regarding traditional knowledge (referred to 
as “intangible component”), the stated public record does 
not grant any specific positive right to its holders and the 
stated certification system is not regulated. Thus, the 
overview of this initiative shows that it has a chance of 
being reviewed and transformed into a workable law if it 
is enhanced technically and if its proponents manage to 
overcome the current impasse into which it has fallen. 
The three cases of bioprospecting projects and agree-
ments described above showed that it is urgent to develop a 
comprehensive regulatory framework. As this latest section 
shows, the task is far from complete, and it is not only a 
matter of legislation. The law has to be built in a coherent 
manner relating to the institutional framework that will 
enforce it, and this is not an easy task in Mexico. Even if 
these institutional problems can be properly addressed by 
the proposed law, there is still the issue of legitimacy. This 
can only be achieved if the process of building a regula-
tion involves wide public consultation and addresses some 
basic concerns: the privatization of common and/or sacred 
resources and knowledge and the patenting of discoveries, 
among the most obvious and deeply felt social demands. 
If limits and criteria can be clearly set, both in access and 
intellectual property regulation, then the framework for 
bioprospecting activities can be built on a more rational, 
simple, and legitimate fashion. If patents continue to be 
granted around the world on sequences and organisms with 
no clear inventive steps, then the whole of bioprospecting 
is put on the stand and accused of biopiracy. The differ-
ence between discovery and invention has to be clear cut 
if social legitimacy is to be gained for bioprospecting in 
the medium term.
It is difficult to assess at this point what will emerge 
from the current analysis and discussion of the initiative 
within the Senate and the executive branch, but it is most 
likely that substantive changes will be made before it is 
passed to the lower chamber. Needless to say, the process 
of public consultation involved in a law of this nature may 
also be time consuming. Both of these factors may imply 
that it will yet take some time for Mexico to have specific 
access legislation
Multilateral Level
At this level, there are relevant initiatives related to . 
In particular, a group of countries met in Mexico in  
and jointly issued The Cancun Declaration of Like-Minded 
Megadiversity Countries, hereby they created the “Group 
of Like-Minded Megadiverse Countries” with the follow-
ing objective: “to jointly explore ways to ...harmonize our 
respective national laws and regulations on the protec-
tion of biological diversity, including related knowledge 
as well as access to biological and genetic resources, and 
the sharing of benefits arising from their sustainable use”.37 
Furthermore, these countries targeted  specific objectives 
that broaden the agenda beyond access to genetic resources 
and benefit sharing to include coordination in international 
forums, promotion of in situ and ex situ conservation and 
investment in endogenous technologies, food safety, cul-
tural integrity, regulatory harmonization, traditional knowl-
edge and innovation, and trade and intellectual property 
rights (including patents, a sui generis system, trademarks 
and geographical indications). In direct relation to  and 
“modern” biotechnological development, the Declaration 
moves forward in relation to patents when it states the 
intent to “Seek the creation of an international regime to 
effectively promote and safeguard the fair and equitable 
sharing of benefits arising from the use of biodiversity and 
its components. This regime should contemplate, inter alia, 
the following elements: certification of legal provenance 
of biological materials, prior informed consent and mutu-
ally agreed terms for the transfer of genetic material, as 
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requirements for the application and granting of patents, 
strictly in accordance with the conditions of access agreed 
by the countries of origin.” 
Such a regime might be declared incompatible with 
some international trade agreements, such as , but 
it is precisely in these forums, where the presence and 
common understanding between these countries must be 
consolidated. The group of “Like-minded Megadiverse 
Countries” was formally presented at the Sixth  of the 
, on April . The effect among other countries and 
regional groups was significant, because it modified the 
ongoing block negotiation scheme and was perceived as 
strong and innovative. 
The most significant contribution of the group was the 
introduction of a call for action to “negotiate within the 
framework of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
bearing in mind the Bonn Guidelines, an international 
regime to promote and safeguard the fair and equitable 
sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic 
resources” within the Plan of Implementation adopted 
by the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
Johannesburg. These efforts culminated recently in the 
decision of the Conference of the Parties of the  to 
start negotiation of an international regime on  of ge-
netic resources, at the heart of which are the development 
of user measures and coordination mechanisms among 
legal systems, primarily through the development of the 
Certificate of origin/source/legal provenance of genetic 
resources.
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The transboundary nature of the distribution of genetic 
resources and its implications for  can be summarized 
in the following question: in what role does the owner 
of the land grant any  if the genetic resources are also 
found in other regions? Furthermore, attaching the benefit 
distribution to the granting of  has exclusion implica-
tions, since it would only compensate the person granting 
 and not other custodians of the resource. Thus, the ap-
proach of the landowner as the only relevant right holder 
may create more problems than benefits.
A good solution may be the concept of mutually agreed 
terms, once it has been clearly distinguished from the  
in the national legislation and provided that the owner of 
the resource (the State) is given the right to grant it. This 
is one of the justifications for the ’s demand for  
from the providing country, and it should remain the same 
when translated to national legislation. In turn, the right to 
negotiate the mutually agreed terms of the specific access 
agreement could be the right granted to the owner of the 
land which could be justified as a right to make a sustain-
able use of the genetic resources found in his property. 
Obviously, this proposal implies a deep change in the 
perception of the role of the landowner and will require 
some other adjustments.
The only articles directly regulating biotechnological 
bioprospecting in Mexico are Article   of  
and articles  and  of . Despite the fact that 
the  does make the ’s comprehensive recogni-
tion of the undeniable relationship between environmental 
regulation, rural development, traditional knowledge and 
practices, industrial applications, trade, and intellectual 
property, it has a limited scope. Therefore, even though 
both instruments incorporate the two main principles stated 
in the : (prior informed consent and benefit sharing), 
the  legal framework as a whole lacks that important 
recognition. Since access to genetic resources is differ-
ent from other processes of appropriation of biological 
resources, it seems reasonable to continue the efforts 
to develop a comprehensive Law on Access to Genetic 
Resources and Benefit Sharing that contributes clarifica-
tion, principles, and operative mechanisms, including de-
rived standards for specific sectors and material transfer 
agreement models. 
The use of genetic resources is considered of public 
utility in Mexico, and this simple statement is of great 
importance because it empowers the State to defend a 
public interest. It also has the advantage that the concept 
of public interest has been properly defined in courts and 
literature; thus, it is not a new concept to regulate and 
control. Whereas there is a common understanding that 
genetic resources belong to the State, the “fragmentation of 
the property right” into a right of disposition (on behalf of 
the State) and right of use (on behalf on private individuals) 
is helpful in considering different levels of legal interest 
in the resource. Such an approach, taken by the  is of 
great importance (D y D ) because it allows 
for an evaluation based on both the requirements of the 
owner (the State) and those of the holder of the right to a 
sustainable use of the resource. Furthermore, it provides 
the basis for having the owner of the land as negotiator of 
the mutually agreed terms.
We must consider if a sector-specific approach is more 
convenient than a comprehensive approach. Due to the 
importance of the issue, an initial comprehensive regula-
tion, comprising all species, is necessary in order to achieve 
coherence, and then continuing with a sector-by-sector 
specific regulation through official standards. 
The development of policies regarding genetic re-
sources has to consider scenarios of diffuse property, of 
common goods, and of collective innovation. To address 
these issues, profound changes in legal principles have to 
be considered, since most property rights are recognized 
for individuals and not for collective entities. Many legal 
concepts whose validity is taken for granted may be in 
serious contradiction with collective rights. Traditional 
knowledge and genetic resources are some of the areas in 
which collective rights have a clear and positive contribu-
tion to make in the development of the rights of farmers 
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and indigenous peoples. 
The discussions of biopiracy and bioprospecting have 
taken place and found their way into regulation in many 
countries for more than a decade now (e.g., India). In the 
Pacific region, countries like the Philippines and Malaysia 
(see Chapters  and ) have made strong steps forward 
in regulating access, as has the Andes region (see Chapter 
) with its debates and common regulation. Mexico is lag-
ging behind in the participation in these debates. Mexico’s 
megadiversity is principally distributed in indigenous and 
peasant lands, and the political perception these sectors 
have of bioprospecting is fundamental for its future 
legitimacy. Appropriate access and transfer of relevant 
technologies are tied together and by definition need an 
actor to give or receive the technology.
Further discussions on the use of genetic resources 
in Mexico may well lead to the consideration of these 
resources as a priority area for the nation. If such an ap-
proach reaches a consensus, it will probably prove useful 
to consolidate a public policy on these issues, setting the 
stage for a deeper discussion on the path Mexico will take 
in terms of biotechnological development and the prospect-
ing and appropriation of our own biological and genetic 
resources. Such an approach need not affect private invest-
ment or property. The  is an international agreement, 
but countries adhering to it need to adjust to local condi-
tions. The contradictions implicit in this process touch the 
fibers of nationalism and radicalize reactions against the 
commodification of life (G and B ).
It is interesting to note that many of the social de-
mands against bioprospecting can be read as demands for 
a stronger State involvement. In Mexico, in the last three 
decades, we have seen the systematic withdrawal of the 
State from the rural sector and the costs are visible. The 
lack of presence in terms of support and technical advice 
for development in these areas is a central component of 
The barriers:
Geographical: Access, research, and development occur in different locations
Temporal: Ten or more years to get benefits
Legal: Different jurisdictions
Ethical: Divergent views on property and ethical uses
Capacity: Different relative costs of access to legal advice and to justice
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understood. Social participation is perceived as difficult and costly.
Issues of market, intellectual property, and third party transfers are poorly
understood, uncertain, and costly to monitor. They are perceived as piracy.
Peoples
Diffuse
Actors
Concrete
Intent
Commercial Academic
In
di
vi
du
al
C
ol
le
ct
iv
e
P
ub
lic
P
ri
va
teTraditional healer
Peasant
Figure . The barriers between providers and developers. Two differing paradigms that fail to understand each other’s 
realities and concerns are divided by their own views on genetic resources, innovation, and commercial development. 
Strong efforts in capacity building and awareness are needed to breach the gap that is currently being widened mostly 
by misunderstandings.
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the perception of social sectors towards bioprospecting, in 
a sense, saying to the State, “you have not been here for 
 years and now you are here to sell our resources”. In 
a general sense they are right, and Mexico needs to face 
its own contradictions. However, the implementation of 
the  in all its components, particularly Articles , , 
and  may help alleviate some of them. Thus, the extent 
of the State involvement is a difficult issue. Having the 
State involved in all  activities might create excessive 
inefficiency in the  management and might be read as 
a system that does not facilitates access but hinders it.
The implications of property rights and commercial 
privileges implicit in patent rights must be fully compre-
hended in order to achieve a wider understanding that the 
part of knowledge being “taken” from the public domain 
(the part related to innovation) is only a small fraction of 
the whole, is only for a limited period of time, and is sub-
ject to several exceptions or limitations. This emphasis on 
the temporal limitation of the privileges of patents is much 
too often overlooked. Besides this temporal limitation to 
the appropriation process, it is also important to consider 
carefully the patenting criteria in specific innovation and 
industrial sectors, particularly in discussions of the revision 
of Article ..b of the  Agreement within the . 
This review, and the adoption of more stringent criteria 
for inventions, is a key factor in resolving adverse public 
perception to patent practices and in developing respon-
sible practices in biotech-related .
The approach of demanding proof of legal provenance 
of the biological material in applications for patents has 
been discussed for many years now (D ) and 
has been examined in working groups of the . In fact, 
decision / of the th  to the  mandates further 
study of the “feasibility of an internationally recognized 
certificate of origin system as evidence of prior informed 
consent and mutually agreed terms”. The same decision 
states that “Parties are invited to encourage the disclosure 
of the origin of genetic resources and traditional knowledge 
in application for intellectual property rights”.
This articulation between intellectual property rights 
and  can only be resolved with legitimacy if the process 
of building a regulation involves wide consultation and 
limits and criteria can be clearly set, both in access and 
intellectual property regulation. If so, the framework for 
bioprospecting activities can be built in a more rational, 
simple, and legitimate fashion.
A future law on access has to face the situation of 
ex situ collections and develop a creative solution to the 
problem; the legal situation of these collections bears di-
rectly on the issue of  and cannot be overlooked during 
the consultation process. This includes the legal status of 
material collected prior to the ’s entry into force, of 
intellectual property rights, and of biosafety, since refer-
ence collections can be used to monitor and develop policy 
related to these issues. Ex situ collections are costly, and 
it is important to develop them as institutions that serve 
at the same time the purposes of conservation, access to 
genetic resources, and reference material for monitoring 
genetically modified organisms and s. 
The development of a comprehensive legal framework 
is urgently needed. The single most important issue to 
consider is that these frameworks have to be achieved 
through wide consultation and discussions if they are to be 
legitimate; in particular, there must be consultation with in-
digenous peoples, peasant organizations, and civil society. 
The temptation of legal reform without social legitimacy 
has dominated many processes in Mexico. Such a process 
may be complex but it has to be undertaken seriously by 
the different political parties in Congress and by execu-
tive authorities working on these issues. A former official 
of  (–) declared to Nature magazine 
that “Mexico lacks a legal framework for bioprospect-
ing. I would not advise undertaking one of these projects 
now” (D ). Is such a recommendation still 
valid? Probably yes, particularly if the project involves 
indigenous territories or traditional knowledge. The main 
issues to be addressed are not technical or regulatory, 
and we cannot afford to be politically naïve about these 
processes. Figure  delineates the barriers that polarize 
positions on  projects. Breaching these barriers is a 
priority. As simple as they may seem, capacity building 
and awareness raising on the issue of genetic resource 
conservation, access, and prospecting has to be taken seri-
ously so that a policy that deals with these problems with 
legitimacy can be built.
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Endnotes
 1 Although this sector has provisions vaguely related to genetic 
resources and biotechnology, they were not developed in response 
to a changing legal framework in access and benefit sharing.
 2 Nonetheless, the regulatory meaning of characterizing species as 
“strategic” is still unknown.
 3 This is evident from the recently agreed upon text of the 
Bonn Guidelines on Access and Benefit Sharing. The Bonn 
Guidelines, document ////, is available at http:
//www.biodiv.org, as are other  documents referred to in the 
text.
 4 The components of biological diversity that we use are, in a simple 
interpretation, biological resources. For the complete definition 
see , Article . Within the objectives, biological resources are 
differentiated from genetic resources.
 5 Adopted by Resolution /of the  Conference on  
November .
 6 The extent of such involvement is a contentious issue. It could be 
argued that the degree of participation currently covered in the 
legislation is sufficient. However, some would like to see a stronger 
presence of the State in the  process. An example of this has 
been found in the recent discussion regarding the Nordhausen 
initiative.
 7 See the web site of the group on Erosion Technology and 
Concentration () for further information.
  The text of the Constitution and other legal references are 
available at http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/infjur/ and http:
//www.cddhcu.gob.mx.
 9 Latest amendment published in the Official Federal Gazette.
 10 In fact it is something different. This concept of eminent domain 
derives from the notion of sovereignty of a State over its territory 
and has traditionally rendered thus some confusion between the 
concepts of sovereignty and property (T-R ). This 
also justifies the understanding that the  does not take any deci-
sion on property rights.
 11 Municipios are the lower or primary category of state organiza-
tional authority in Mexico that reproduces the three branches of 
government, with some restrictions.
 12 The San Andrés Agreements and the legal reform proposed by the 
Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación.
 13 According to article , subsection III. 
 14 There is a key difference regarding the relationship between the 
 and the authorization. The  requires having the  as a 
prior condition to grant the authorization for both biotechnological 
and scientific purposes. The  regulation on scientific collection 
does not have that precedence requirement and the  only 
has the requirement for biotechnological purposes, but not for 
scientific ones.
 15 The definition of bioprospecting is problematic: two activities are 
confused. Biotechnological use assumes economic objectives, 
and the presence of intellectual property considerations usually is 
perceived in association with biotechnological purposes. Regarding 
scientific collection regulation,  and the --- 
explicitly exclude economic and biotechnological purposes.
 16 Biotechnology is defined in article  of the , incorporating 
the text of the . 
 17 Article  includes three activities: collection, capture, and hunt-
ing; it classifies purposes in economic, reproduction, restoration, 
repopulation, reintroduction, translocation, and environmental 
education (although the economic purposes are not defined).
 18 According to articles ,  and .
 19 According to articles  to . 
 20 Article  of the Criminal Code.
 21 The interpretation of the Mexican Institute of Industrial Property is 
stated in the document responding to a consultation made by -
 (..,  September ).
 22 Isolation and description of gene sequences complicates the issue 
further since some see them as an inventive step and some would 
still view them as insufficient steps.
 23 In , the Latin American  suspended collecting activities in 
Mexico. Access to this project was granted under article  of the 
 that authorizes the collection of organisms for scientific 
purposes. However, because of the commercial and biotechnologi-
cal nature of the project, access should have been granted under 
article   that regulates the collection of samples for biotechno-
logical purposes. When this contradiction became clear the project 
suspended activities and no collections have occurred in recent 
years.
 24 The director of the Latin American  in Mexico, Robert Bye, 
presented, in the  Latin American Botanical Congress in , 
a round table called “The Convention on Biological Diversity: 
Opportunity or Limitation for the Use of Germplasm”, reflecting 
the sentiment of the complications that the new framework imposes 
upon scientists.
 25 The applicable legislation states that the National Institute of 
Ecology () has the authority to act, upon delegation of -
’s faculties, as representative of the Federation where Federal 
Land is involved. On the other hand, the applicable legislation 
also stated (bearing in mind that administrative regulations have 
changed since then) that the responsibility to issue authorizations 
to use wild flora and fauna fell within  faculties.
 26 For which  acts as trustee. This was envisioned as a means 
to exercise the right to benefit sharing by the owner of the land 
where the genetic resource is located.
C : M

 27 Signed by the National Association of Trading Enterprises of Rural 
Producers, the National Union of Regional Autonomous Peasant 
Organizations, the National Association of Democratic Lawyers, 
the Group of Environmental Studies, Greenpeace Mexico, the 
Studies Center for Change in Rural Mexico, the Permaculture 
Network (Red de Permacultura), the Citizen Committee for the 
Defense of Mexico’s Cultural and Natural Heritage, and four indi-
viduals belonging to research institutions.
 28 This legal procedure, analogous to a suit, recognizes that protecting 
the environment with society’s participation requires the widening 
of the concept of legal interest and extends it to any individual.
 29 As stated in the , “biotechnology” is any technological ap-
plication that uses biological systems and living organisms or their 
derivatives to create or modify production processes or for specific 
uses. This includes a wide set of technologies, such as tissue cul-
ture, genetic engineering, and fermentations, among others.
 30 Sandoz-Pharma does not exist anymore as such; in , it merged 
with Ciba to form Novartis. A couple of years later, the agriculture 
branch of Novartis was sold to other firms in order to concentrate 
their business in the pharmaceutical area. The -Sandoz con-
tract ended in , almost at the same time that Sandoz merged 
with Ciba.
 31 The authority neglected proper consideration of the  as an es-
sential part of the bioprospecting agreement which has an impact 
upon the existence of a suitable recipient of possible technology 
transfers.
 32  is the Organization of Indigenous Healers of the State of 
Chiapas. 
 33  is the Council of Indigenous and Traditional Medicine 
Men and Parteros (Birth supervisors) of Chiapas.
 34  currently markets a limited number of herbal remedies 
and nutritional supplements.
 35 For the Senate there are two relevant committees: the Committee 
of Health, Social Security, Environment, Natural Resources, and 
Fishery and Committee of Legislative Studies. For the House of 
Representatives, it is the Committee of Rural Development.
 36 In the Senate on  April . Available at : http://
www.senado.gob.mx/gaceta//index.html. In the House on  
April . Available at : http://camaradediputados.gob.mx/
gaceta/.
 37 According to Decision , subsection d) of the Cancun Declaration, 
issued by Ministers in charge of the Environment and Delegates 
from Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, India, 
Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, and Venezuela, who 
convened in Cancun, Mexico, on  February .
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Philippines: Evolving Access
and Benefit-Sharing Regulations
Paz J. Benavidez II
Biological and genetic resources are precious commodi-
ties which have long been accessed and exchanged by 
individuals and States, sometimes under government 
restrictions or regulations, and often “freely shared and 
given”. However, the continuous, unbridled utilization and 
exploitation of these resources, the rapid advances in sci-
ence and technology, the economic value of potential cures 
and applications from these resources, and the inequitable 
sharing of benefits derived from them have put increasing 
pressure on resource-rich countries to rethink their policies 
on access to and exchange of these resources.
The Philippines is one of the richest countries in the 
world in terms of wildlife species. It is home to a very 
impressive biological and genetic diversity and endemicity. 
The plants in Philippine forests consist of at least , 
species which represent % of the world’s flora. There are 
 species of Philippine terrestrial mammals ( or % 
of which are endemic). About  species of birds have 
been found of which  (%) are endemic. There are 
 amphibian species, % of which are endemic. Over 
, species of mollusks,  species of millipedes,  
species of centipedes, and more than , insect species 
are found in the Philippines (- ).
There are , species of flora and , species of 
fauna in Philippine freshwaters, a record considered im-
pressive. Inventories are yet to be made on the  lakes, 
 major rivers, four major swamps/marshes, and the 
many bays, estuaries, and mudflats of the country. From 
the FishBase () data of the International Center for 
Living Aquatic Resources Management, the Philippines 
has a total of  freshwater fish species. Of these  are 
reportedly threatened species,  are endemic, while  are 
used in fisheries. There are , species of invertebrates 
and , species of insects, of which , are endemic 
(- ).
In the Philippine coastal and marine ecosystems, there 
are at least , species of marine plants and animals. 
In terms of distribution among the ecosystems along the 
Philippine coasts, coral reefs are the most diverse with 
, species. Next to these are seagrass beds with  
species. Its  taxa of seagrasses make the Philippines 
the second highest in seagrass species in the world. The 
diversity of mangroves is also high, with  species 
(- ).
Studies show that there are , plant species im-
portant to agriculture populations of domesticated exotic 
animal species. In  these totaled ,, cara-
baos, ,, cattle, , horses, ,, hogs, 
,, goats, and , other domesticated exotic 
animal species. The aggregate poultry population reached 
,, head (- ).
The rate of biodiversity loss in the Philippines has been 
rapid due to the high rate of population growth; economic 
systems and policies that fail to put value on the environ-
ment and its resources; inequity in the ownership, manage-
ment, and flow of benefits from the use and conservation 
of biological resources; deficiencies in knowledge and its 
applications; and legal and institutional deficiencies and 
constraints (B and L V ). Philippine for-
est cover has been reduced from more than % to less 
than % over a period of  years; only about % of the 
country’s coral reefs remains in excellent condition;  to 
% of its seagrass beds have been lost in the last  years; 
and about % of its mangrove areas have been lost in the 
 
last  years. About % of national parks is estimated 
to be no longer biologically important (B and L 
V ). As of ,  species of birds and  spe-
cies of terrestrial mammals are either extinct in the wild, 
critical, or endangered, and three species of reptiles and 
two species of amphibians are internationally recognized 
as threatened (D L ).
This increasing threat to biodiversity has led both the 
government and nongovernmental organizations (s) to 
seriously take up the challenge of conserving and protect-
ing biodiversity, developing these resources, and utilizing 
them in a sustainable manner for the benefit of present and 
future Filipinos.
Pursuant to Executive Order No. , the Department 
of Environment and Natural Resources () formulated 
the Philippine Strategy for Sustainable Development 
which aims to balance economic growth and biodiver-
sity conservation. In , the Philippine Council for 
Sustainable Development () was established with a 
Sub-Committee on Biodiversity (- ).
On  June , Republic Act No. , otherwise 
known as the National Integrated Protected Areas System 
() Law, was enacted. It provides for the establish-
ment and management of a comprehensive protected 
area system encompassing areas that are habitats of rare 
and endangered species of plants and animals, biogeo-
graphic zones, and related ecosystems in order to secure 
the perpetual existence of all native plants and animals.1 
The law recognizes that effective administration of these 
areas is possible only through cooperation among national 
government, local government, and concerned private or-
ganizations. The use and enjoyment of the same must be 
consistent with the principles of biological diversity and 
sustainable development.2 
In , the Philippines ratified the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (). In response to the , 
Executive Order No.  ( )3 was signed into law 
on  May . Its implementing rules and regulations,4 
 Administrative Order No.  ( ) was issued on 
 June 5. On  July , the Philippine Legislature 
enacted Republic Act No. , otherwise known as the 
“Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection Act” 
(hereafter Wildlife Act) which provides for new measures 
relative to bioprospecting in the Philippines. 
This paper will discuss the legal regime for access to 
and exchange of biological and genetic resources in the 
Philippines. It will analyze Philippine access regulations 
in the context of the goals of the , the standards set by 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights () and other relevant international 
agreements, and the promises of the Wildlife Act as a 
relatively new access regulation and conclude with recom-
mendations for the enhancement of regulations for access 
to and exchange of biological and genetic resources.
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Prior to , the National Museum of the Philippines 
was the primary government agency regulating collection 
of biological samples pursuant to Republic Act No. , 
as amended by Presidential Decree  (B and L 
V ). In , the Protected Areas and Wildlife 
Bureau () under the  was given a bigger role 
in regulating collection activities. Requests for collection 
involving endangered species of fauna became the respon-
sibility of . Collection of marine species was handled 
by the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, while 
requests for collection involving animals needed the ap-
proval of the Bureau of Animal Industry. Plant collection 
is within the mandate of the Bureau of Plant Industry. The 
National Museum, however, continued to be the “official 
clearinghouse for all requests to collect biological speci-
mens” (B and L V ).
In , a memorandum of agreement () was 
executed by various government agencies, which con-
tained the “Guidelines for the Collection of Biological 
Specimens in the Philippines” for both local and foreign 
collectors of biological specimens, including materials 
for bioprospecting. It aimed to provide restriction and 
control mechanisms for the entry and exit of biological 
specimens to prevent technical smuggling under the guise 
of educational, scientific, or research purposes.6 Among its 
salient features were: approval of collection was obtained 
from the Director of the National Museum or the head of 
a collaborating local research institution or university; a 
complete set of voucher specimens was deposited at the 
Museum and collaborating local institution; and a local 
counterpart had to accompany every field visit/collection. 
It also contained a code of ethics for collectors of biologi-
cal specimens in the country. Other relevant provisions of 
the  included: protection from wanton exploitation of 
biological resources by limiting collections to the mini-
mum possible number ( Subsection .a); recognition 
and respect for indigenous communities, including their 
customs, traditions, and folk knowledge (Subsection .b); 
participation of local counterparts in the collection and 
sharing of authorship in publications arising from these 
activities (M ). 
The , however, proved to be inadequate in terms of 
compliance with the provisions of the , because it was 
primarily an administrative coordination and permitting 
system and not a regulatory framework for bioprospect-
ing. It is “not explicit in aspects such as equitable return of 
benefits to the country and to the local community in case 
a drug is developed from a local plant or animal, transfer of 
technology, and protection of Intellectual Property Rights 
of the indigenous communities” (M ). Thus, 
the bioprospecting agreement between the  National 
Cancer Institute ()7 and the National Museum only 
vaguely touched the issue of indigenous rights. Binding 
provisions for concrete compensation to communities and 
 
for their active participation in the collecting activities 
are lacking. The agreement was also inadequate regarding 
provisions on compensation to the government (B 
and L V ). Nevertheless, immediate benefits 
such as technology transfer, research collaboration, and 
complete sample collections have been obtained by the 
country through this agreement.8
In February , the Seventh Asian Symposium on 
Medicinal Plants, Species and Other Natural Products 
(), which was held in the Philippines, issued The 
Manila Declaration concerning “The Ethical Utilization 
of Asian Biological Resources”, together with the Code of 
Ethics for Foreign Collectors of Biological Samples and 
Contract Guidelines.  “was largely instrumental in 
heightening awareness among Asian scientists on the issue 
of bioprospecting” (L V et al. ).
After the Manila Declaration and the , the Philippine 
Network for the Chemistry of Natural Products, with fund-
ing support from the  Regional Network for the 
Chemistry of Natural Products in Southeast Asia, took the 
initiative to draft the executive order. In October , 
Atty. Antonio G.M. La Viña was commissioned to draft  
 with input from members of the Philippine Network 
nationwide and representatives of key government depart-
ments. Academic groups were also consulted on the draft 
before it was submitted to the Department of Science 
and Technology () for further consultation meetings 
with other sectoral groups including the Sub-Committee 
on Biodiversity of the Committee on the Conservation and 
Management of Resources for Development of the  
(L V et al. ). The level of participation in the 
development of   was said to be unprecedented for an 
executive order in the Philippines, which usually requires 
only limited consultation. In this case, representatives of 
government, scientists, s, community organizations, 
and the business community were actively involved in 
the drafting of   through a number of consultative 
meetings. “The process ensured that the capacity building 
priorities of scientists were addressed in the provisions on 
benefit sharing, and that the interests of local communities 
were taken into account in the provisions on local prior 
informed consent ()” (S ).
In , the implementing rules and regulations of  
 were drafted by a small group composed of the legal 
staff of , , , and scientists. This draft was 
circulated for comment to the , scientific organizations, 
industry groups, and national pharmaceutical companies 
before its approval in June  (S ).
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  was issued on the basis of the  Philippine 
Constitution and the . Specifically, section , Article 
II of the  Philippine Constitution vests in the State the 
ultimate responsibility to preserve and protect the environ-
ment. Section , Article XII of the Constitution provides 
that plants and animals are owned by the State, and the 
disposition, development, and utilization thereof are under 
its full control and supervision. The , on the other hand, 
calls for member countries to take appropriate measures 
with the aim that countries providing genetic resources are 
given access to and transfer of technology that uses those 
resources, on mutually agreed terms.
It was the perceived urgency for a comprehensive 
regulatory framework for access to biological and genetic 
resources, along with the slow pace of congressional legis-
lation, which led policy makers to come up with an execu-
tive order (B and L V ). Executive Orders 
are “acts of the President providing for rules of a general 
or permanent character in implementation or execution 
of constitutional or statutory powers” (A ). 
Although a law passed by Congress is more permanent, 
may be broader in scope, and may appropriate funds and 
impose penalties, it may take longer to enact, amend, or 
repeal. On the other hand, an executive action is limited in 
scope because it covers only matters delegated by Congress 
to the President under a particular law, the Constitution, 
or international conventions, but it is faster and easier to 
promulgate. It can also be modified immediately in case 
of serious flaws.
The basic State policy set out in   is “to regulate 
the prospecting of biological and genetic resources to the 
end that these resources are protected and conserved, are 
developed and put to the sustainable use and benefit of the 
national interest. Further, it shall promote the development 
of local capability in science and technology to achieve 
technological self-reliance in selected areas”.9
  has four basic elements (B and L V 
):
• A system of mandatory research agreements be-
tween the collectors and the government containing 
minimum terms concerning provision of informa-
tion and samples, technology cooperation, and 
benefit sharing;
• An interagency committee to consider, grant, moni-
tor and enforce compliance with research agree-
ments, as well as to coordinate further institutional, 
policy, and technology development;
• A requirement and minimum process standards for 
obtaining  from local and indigenous commu-
nities where collection of materials is carried out; 
and
• Minimum requirements to conform with environ-
mental protection laws and regulations.
Scope of Application
  covers prospecting of all biological and genetic 
resources, their by-products and derivatives, in the public 
 
domain10, including natural growths in private lands, which 
is intended to be utilized by both foreign and local prospec-
tors.11 “Bioprospecting” is defined as “the research, collec-
tion, and utilization of biological and genetic resources, for 
the purpose of applying the knowledge derived therefrom 
for scientific and/or commercial purposes”.12 Traditional 
uses13 are excluded. This definition was severely criticized 
by the academic and scientific sectors for being too broad 
and vague. As defined in  , bioprospecting refers 
to all kinds of collection and sampling of biological and 
genetic resources which, for some sectors, was not really 
the intention. This prompted policy makers to attempt 
to clarify in   the scope of   by stating that 
the term refers only to “activities aimed at discovering, 
exploring, or using these resources for pharmaceutical de-
velopment, agricultural, and commercial applications”.14 
The Inter-Agency Committee on Biological and Genetic 
Resources () members agreed that research and col-
lection activities associated with pure conservation work, 
biodiversity inventory, taxonomic studies, and the like shall 
not be processed under   but should follow an exist-
ing permitting system.15 However, no further guidelines 
were issued and the  will decide the matter on a 
case-to-case basis. For example, collections of resources 
made for taxonomic studies are generally excluded, but 
if the study goes beyond studying the morphology of 
specimens,   would apply depending on the meth-
ods being used by the researcher. Also, internal guidelines 
were formulated to guide the Technical Secretariat () in 
processing applications. 
It is not clear if   covers ex situ collections and 
other domesticated resources because of the qualification 
placed in the implementing rules and regulations that 
it covers “only natural growths in private lands”.16 The 
implication of this provision is that such collections and 
resources are not covered by  . It is interesting to 
note, however, that among the applications for research 
agreements pending before the , one involves col-
lection of resources in the commercial plantations of the 
proponent.17 It appears, thus, that, though not stated in  
, the  regulates all biological resources in the 
country whether or not outside their natural environment, 
domesticated or wild.
Although the introductory clause of   mentions 
traditional knowledge, nowhere in the text of the order has 
it been discussed. However, traditional knowledge of local 
and indigenous communities is very much linked with the 
 of the communities where the resources are taken.
Administrative Mechanism
The administrative body charged with implementing  
 is the . Its membership consists of the follow-
ing: a) an Undersecretary of  as chairperson; b) an 
Undersecretary of  as co-chairperson; c) a permanent 
representative of the Department of Agriculture, who must 
be knowledgeable about biodiversity or biotechnology; 
d) two representatives of the local scientific community 
from the academy who must be experts in biodiversity, 
biotechnology, genetics, natural products chemistry, 
or similar disciplines; e) a permanent representative of 
the Department of Health who is knowledgeable about 
pharmaceutical research and development with empha-
sis on medicinal plant/herbal pharmaceudynamics; f) a 
permanent representative of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs who has to facilitate international linkage relative 
to bioprospecting; g) a permanent representative of the 
National Museum who has expertise on natural history 
and/or biodiversity; h) a representative from the s ac-
tive in biodiversity protection; and i) a representative from 
a People’s Organization with membership consisting of 
indigenous cultural communities, indigenous peoples,18 
and/or their organizations.19 The members serve for three 
years and a term may be renewed for another three years.20 
Among the functions of the committee are: to process 
applications for research agreements and recommend 
their approval/denial; to ensure strict compliance with 
the agreements; to determine the quantity of collection; 
to ensure protection of the rights of indigenous peoples 
(s)/indigenous cultural communities (s) where bio-
prospecting is undertaken.21 The  meets at least 
once every quarter, but the chairperson/co-chairperson 
may call special meetings as she/he deems necessary. All 
decisions must be by a majority of its members.22 The final 
approval, however, rests with the head of the government 
department that has jurisdiction over the resources and/or 
activity.23
Mandatory Research Agreements
One conducts bioprospecting by applying for a research 
agreement with the . The research agreement 
may be an Academic Research Agreement () or a 
Commercial Research Agreement ().
An  covers research undertaken by duly recognized 
Philippine universities and academic institutions, domes-
tic governmental entities, and intergovernmental entities 
and their affiliates24 intended primarily for academic and 
scientific purposes.25 It may be comprehensive in scope 
and cover as many areas as the applicant proposes to work 
in.26 Local academic institutions and intergovernmental 
research agencies with an  are given flexibility and 
allowed to exercise self-regulation. Any local scientist/
researcher who is an affiliate of any of these institutions27 
with a valid  is allowed to conduct research under the 
aegis of the said . However, before conducting any 
actual bioprospecting activity in the site, the researcher 
must secure the required  certificate. Compliance with 
the requirements of the , including the , is the re-
sponsibility of the institution.28 These institutions are also 
mandated to enforce a Code of Conduct for researchers. 
Failure by the principal to monitor compliance with the 
 by their affiliates may result in the cancellation of the 
.29 An  is valid for a period of five years, renewable 
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upon recommendation of the .30 
Research and/or collection intended, directly or indi-
rectly, for commercial use requires a  that is valid for 
a period of three years, renewable for a period as may be 
determined by the .31 Under  , all research 
agreements with private persons, including foreign inter-
national entities, shall conform to the minimum require-
ments of a  even if the bioprospecting activity is purely 
scientific.32 In addition to the bioprospecting fees, the col-
lector under a  is also required to pay a performance, 
compensation, or ecological bond to be determined by 
the .33
Since , the  has processed eight34 applica-
tions for  and 35 for . Only one 36 and one 
37 have been approved so far (Boxes  and ). 
Application Process
  requires the applicant to satisfy certain require-
ments and to undergo an application process.   does 
not provide for a specific time within which to process 
applications. It is estimated to be at least five months. 
However, the process takes longer because the  is 
required to meet only quarterly, although the chair can 
call for special meetings. It is also difficult to secure a 
common schedule for  meetings. Also, the process 
is often stalled because the applicant cannot immediately 
submit the . Under  , action on the  can only 
be taken after the lapse of  days from the submission 
of a research proposal to the community (Box ). This 
-day requirement has been removed in the Wildlife Act, 
and the law provides that action on the proposal shall be 
made within a reasonable period from submission of all 
requirements.
Considering the varying nature of the  and , 
certain distinctions are incorporated in the application 
process corresponding to the characteristics of the  or 
 (Table ). A new application procedure, however, is 
being drafted and will be enforced upon the approval of the 
implementing rules and regulations of the Wildlife Act. 
Prior Informed Consent
Pursuant to Article  of the ,   mandates that 
prospecting, under either an  or a , can be allowed 
only upon the prior informed consent of the community 
from which the resources are taken.38 Unlike the , the 
concept of  under   refers not only to the consent 
of the State but extends to the s, the local community, the 
Protected Area Management Board (), and the land-
owner concerned.  is defined as “the consent obtained by 
the applicant from the local community, indigenous people, 
the , or private land owner concerned, after disclosing 
fully the intent and scope of the bioprospecting activity, in 
a language and process understandable to the community, 
and before any bioprospecting activity is undertaken”.39 It 
is through the  process that s and local communities 
are given the opportunity to negotiate for benefits with the 
applicants. Although representatives of  are present 
during negotiations for a , the decision is left entirely 
to the community and its leaders.
Where the prospecting of biological and genetic re-
sources and the indigenous knowledge related to their use, 
preservation, and promotion is done in ancestral domain40 
or ancestral land41, the applicant must obtain the free and 
prior informed consent () of the s in accordance 
with their customary laws.42 In this case,  means the 
consensus of all members of the s/s, arrived at through 
customary law, free from external manipulation or interfer-
ence. The process should involve disclosure of intention 
and extent of the activity in a transparent manner and in 
understandable language.43
Under  , the process for securing a  certificate 
shall be as follows:
• Submit copies of the research proposal to the recog-
nized head of the , City or Municipal Mayor of the 
local government unit, , or private landowner 
concerned.44
• Inform the local community, , , or the private 
landowner concerned of the intention to conduct 
bioprospecting activity within the area through 
various media advertisements or direct commu-
nication.
• Post a notice45 in a conspicuous place one week 
prior to the holding of a community assembly.
• Hold community consultation.46
• Recognized head of the , Municipal or City 
Mayor, , or private landowner issues cer-
tificate upon determination that applicant has 
undergone the process required by law, but only 
after the lapse of  days from submission of the 
proposal.
• Submit  certificate to the  together with 
proofs of compliance with the  process.
Subsequent recanting by the community of the  
shall not cause rescission of the agreement. However, if 
it was obtained through fraud, stealth, false promises, or 
intimidation, or if the continuance of the agreement shall 
impair the rights of the s to the traditional uses of the 
resources, the research agreement may be rescinded.
Minimum Terms and Conditions of 
Research Agreements
The following terms and conditions are incorporated in 
the  and :
Ownership, Transfer, and Use of Materials.
The research agreement states that ownership of materials 
used and/or taken remains with the State48 and complete 
access to specimens deposited abroad shall be allowed 
to all Filipino citizens and the government.49 A report of 
C : P 
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collections made, listing all depositories that have used or 
are currently using Philippine species and their database 
and information, shall be submitted to the  by the 
principal.50 Transport of materials shall be subject to exist-
ing laws, rules and regulations, treaties, and international 
conventions.51 For , the researcher shall collect only the 
kind and quantity of resources originally listed in the agree-
ment and only within the designated collection sites.52 
Terms of Collaboration
Transfer of technology is encouraged by requiring com-
pliance with certain conditions, namely: a complete set 
of voucher specimens for the collected material must be 
deposited at the National Museum or duly designated de-
pository; holotypes must be labeled properly and retained 
at the National Museum; a complete set of all living speci-
mens collected must be deposited in mutually agreed and 
duly designated depositories;53 there must be collaboration 
with a Philippine scientist in all bioprospecting research by 
foreign persons, including technological development of 
a product derived from the collected resources;54 and, for 
a , a donation must be made by the principal of some 
of the equipment used in the conduct of the research to the 
Philippine government agency, institutions, or universities 
concerned.55
Subsequent Transfers
Where the collector is merely an agent, the agreement 
between the collector and the principal must be reviewed 
by the .56 A Material Transfer Agreement () 
shall accompany every transfer for the purpose of retaining 
control over materials.57
Prior Informed Consent of Communities
No bioprospecting activity shall be conducted without the 
prior informed consent of the local community, , and 
the landowner concerned and the free and prior informed 
consent of s. 
Environmental Protection
  provides that bioprospecting activities and their 
results must not directly or indirectly harm the biologi-
A B  S  B
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Dr. Gerard L. Penecilla 
Biological Sciences 
Dept., West Visayas 
State University, Iloilo 
City
Collaborator: Univ. of 
Ghent, Belgium
“Collaborative Exploitation of Phyto-
chemical Resources”: This will involve 
collection of  species of flowering 
plants and bryophytes for purposes of:
a) bioassay of medicinal plants with
anti-cancer potential and other pharma-
ceutical properties, and b) bioprospect-
ing of different plant species for 
pharmaceutical, pesticidal and other 
industrial purposes.
// Application was 
withdrawn.
Philippine National 
Museum, Department 
of Agriculture (), 
Bureau of Fisheries 
and Aquatic Resources 
(), National 
Cancer Institute, 
and the Coral Reef 
Research Foundation
“Investigations of Marine Species 
Diversity of the Philippines and the 
Search for New Anti-cancer Drugs 
from the Sea”: This will involve 
collection of marine invertebrates and 
marine plant samples with potential 
cancer and anti- activity for 
extraction and isolation by the  
National Cancer Institute of Marine 
Natural Products.
// Gratuitous Permit 
No. - issued 
by  expired 
on //.
Documents for  
application referred to 
 to draft the .
University of 
California-Silliman 
University
c/o William Fenical
“Research on Marine Organisms as 
Possible Sources of Novel Natural 
Products Including New Drugs 
Projects”
// Documents were referred 
to .
 Marine Science 
Institute-Utah 
University, 
“Anti-Cancer Agents from Unique 
Natural Products Sources”: This 
Project will involve collection 
of funicates, sponges and other 
invertebrate samples for biological 
assays to screen for potential bioactive 
compounds.
// Approved/signed 
on // by 
 Secretary 
Salvador 
Escudero III.
Collection report 
submitted to  on 
//.
Box 1. Commercial Research Agreement applications
(Information provided by the Technical Secretariat)
 
cal diversity, ecological balance, or the inhabitants of the 
area where collection is undertaken. Also, collection un-
der a research agreement must comply with all applicable 
environmental laws, regulations, and procedures such as 
the Environmental Impact Assessment Law and the  
Act.58
Benefit Sharing
  provides for minimum benefit-sharing arrange-
ments that must be met by the bioprospector. It mandates 
that all discoveries of commercial products derived from 
the resources shall be made available to the Philippine 
government and the local community concerned.59 
Likewise, all benefits resulting directly or indirectly from 
the bioprospecting activities conducted shall be shared 
equitably and upon mutual consent among the government, 
the communities concerned, and the principal.60 The use of 
technologies, commercially or locally, developed from re-
search on Philippine endemic species must be made avail-
able to the Philippine government without paying royalty 
to the principal unless other agreements may be negotiated 
by the parties, where appropriate and applicable.61 Under 
a , regarding technology or a commercial product 
developed and marketed any equity or remittance, in the 
amount to be mutually agreed upon by the parties, shall 
be equitably shared with either of the following parties: 
a) the Philippine government, b) the Integrated Protected 
Areas Fund (), c) the concerned s or local communi-
ties, or d) the individual who modified such resource that 
came from private property.62 A separate agreement shall 
be made for the transfer of royalty, benefits, technology, 
and agreements.63
Penalties and Sanctions
As an executive issuance,   does not provide for penal 
sanctions against violators of the law. However, activities 
undertaken without the required research agreement and 
 certificate shall be subject to criminal prosecution un-
der relevant statutes such as the  Act.64 Also, adminis-
trative sanctions are imposed, such as immediate termina-
tion of the agreement and a perpetual ban on undertaking 
prospecting in the Philippines in cases of noncompliance 
with the provisions of the research agreement.65
Implementation and Monitoring
The respective member agencies of the  shall 
conduct monitoring of research agreements based on a 
standard monitoring scheme to be devised by the  
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Mr. Tim M.A. 
Utteridge, Department 
of Ecology and 
Biodiversity, The 
University of Hong 
Kong, Pokfulam Road, 
Hong Kong
“Systematics of the Genus Maesa 
(Myrsinaceae) in the Philippines”
// Pending. Awaiting submission of 
necessary documents,
e.g., .
Dr. Lourdes J. Cruz, 
Marine Science 
Institute University 
of the Philippines, 
Diliman, Quezon City
“Neuroactive Peptides from Venomous 
Gastropods”: This project aims to 
make use of animals that would 
otherwise be discarded by the shell 
craft industry. Selected gastropods 
(Conus and related groups of turrids 
and terribrids) will be studied.
// Pending. Submitted on  March 
 original and 
notarized copies of the 
 certificates issued by 
Mun. Mayor of Mabini, 
Batangas and other 
documents required 
under  - and 
by the  not yet 
received.
“Man and the Environment in Palawan, 
Philippines”: Aims to conduct research 
expedition and collection of biological 
specimens in Palawan.
Kagoshima University 
Research Center for 
the South Pacific 
Kagoshima, Japan
/ Application was 
withdrawn.
Rizal Technological 
Colleges c/o José 
Macabbalug
“Development/Establishment of Center 
for the Conservation of Philippine 
Native Orchids”: Establishment of 
in-vitro culture bank for research, 
production, and commercialization of 
Philippine orchids.
// Forwarded letter dated 
// requesting 
documents for the  
application. No response 
yet.
 Applicant Research title/Activity Date Status Remarks
 
for that purpose.66 There shall be an  monitoring 
team responsible for establishing a mechanism to ensure 
the integration and dissemination of the information gener-
ated from research, collection, and utilization activities.67 
Another monitoring team headed by  and Department 
of Foreign Affairs representatives monitors the progress of 
the research, utilization, and commercialization outside the 
country.68 A draft guideline on monitoring is now under 
review by the .
Issues and Concerns
Since the issuance of   in , several issues have 
been brought up which, in a way, affected the full imple-
mentation of the law. The issues and concerns that have 
confronted   are as follows:
Scope and Coverage
Two relevant points were raised at the workshops70 held 
in :
A B  S  B
 Applicant Research title/Activity Date Description Status
Box 2. Academic Research Agreement applications
(Information provided by the Technical Secretariat)
 System // Conservation-related re-
search, including studies as 
part of thesis requirements.
Approved
International Rice 
Research Institute
c/o Ronald Cantrell 
and Dr. Mew
// Conduct scientific research 
on rice varieties and wild 
species, rice-associated vege-
tation, fauna, and microor-
ganisms.
For further 
evaluation/review 
by the TS and 
.
— " — S. japonicum reinfection after 
treatment in domestic animals and 
impact of animal chemotherapy on 
transmission.
— " — Collection of snails and 
stools, blood, and urine of 
animals and human to moni-
tor S. japonicum infection in 
animals and man before and 
after treatment.
— " —
Research Institute 
for Tropical 
Medicine ()
c/o Dr. R.M. 
Olveda
Development of an immunodot 
dipstick for the detection of circulating 
Schistosoma japonicum antigens 
in the urine using locally produced 
monocional antibodies.
// Collection of snails’ urine 
samples for S. japonicum an-
tigen production. Evaluation 
of test assay.
Recommended 
for  between 
 and . 
Additional 
requirements/
information sub-
mitted to 
 August .
— " — Biased short-term surveillance for Bat 
Lyssavirus.
— " — Collection of blood and brain 
samples from species of bats 
to determine the presence of 
virus variants in bat popula-
tions.
— " —
— " — Molecular epidemiology of canine 
rabies in the Philippines.
— " — Collection of dog brain 
samples to describe the 
epidemiology of canine 
rabies virus variants.
— " —
— " — Expanded surveillance of Ebola Reston 
Virus in the Philippines: Investigation 
of possible natural hosts.
— " — Collection of blood, liver 
and other tissue samples 
from monkeys to describe 
the epidemiology of Ebola 
Reston Virus in indigenous 
macaque populations.
— " —
— " — Epidemiologic survey of Hantavirus 
infection among rodent populations in 
the Philippines.
— " — Collection of urban & rice 
field rats (Rattus spp.) to 
determine the presence of 
extent of transmission of 
Hantivirus infection.
— " —
 
• The scope of   is too broad due mainly to a 
vague definition of the term “bioprospecting”. The 
term “prospecting” means to explore or to look for, 
but   covers not only just “looking for”. The 
law regulates the act of collecting and sampling. 
As such, the definition appears to cover almost all 
kinds of collection, research, and utilization of 
biological and genetic resources, including con-
servation research that many scientists, academic 
institutions, and s undertake and which have 
nothing to do with prospecting. This stifles and 
discourages all kinds of research in the country.
•   is ambiguous as far as ex situ collections are 
concerned, but the  regulates them.   
further muddles the issue by explicitly stating that 
only natural growths in private lands are covered by 
the law, thus implying that domesticated resources 
are not regulated. This ambiguity may be used to 
circumvent the law. Similarly, some people are not 
comfortable with the exclusion of traditional uses 
from the law’s coverage. There is apprehension that 
bioprospectors can simply obtain resources from 
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 continued Specimen banking for future reference 
of other unknown or emerging 
zoonotic pathogens.
// Collection of monkey and rat 
specimens for identification 
of other possible emerg-
ing zoonotic diseases from 
primates and rodents.
Recommended 
for  between 
 and . 
Additional 
requirements/
information sub-
mitted to 
 August .
— " — Agusan del Sur Malaria Control 
Program.
— " — Collection of mosquito adults 
and larvae to identify the vec-
tor breeding sites, to deter-
mine peak biting time, to test 
susceptibility to insecticides.
— " —
— " — Application of radio nuclide technique 
in the detection of Wuchereria 
bancrofti infected mosquitoes for 
assessing filarial transmission.
— " — Collection of mosquitoes to 
detect W. bancrofti infection 
in mosquitoes.
— " —
Aurora State 
College of 
Technology
Aurora Biodiversity Assessment 
Conservation Program.
/ Collection of certain species 
of birds, mammals and 
plants to assess biodiversity 
resources of Aurora, and 
establish a database and 
knowledge-base for its 
conservation.
Recommended 
for  by  
during the
// meeting.
Emilio Aguinaldo 
College c/o Dr. 
Cecilia P. Reyes
Destructiveness and Potential to 
Transmit Microbial Diseases by 
Scirtothrips dorsalin.
// Collection of both male and 
female insects to determine 
the degree of destructiveness 
of adults on larval instars of 
S. dorsalis, and to determine 
the role of adults and larval 
instars of S. dorsalis in 
transmitting microbial 
diseases.
— " — Identification of insect scavengers 
and their potential as biological agent 
of reclamation and management of 
organic household garbage.
— " — Collection of 0.5 kg of 
garbage for arthropod 
extraction to identify 
different species on insect 
scavengers associated with 
household garbage, and to 
determine the preference 
& rate of consumption of 
garbage by insect scavengers.
 Applicant Research title/Activity Date Description Status
 
public markets or gather them under the guise of 
traditional use.
Application Process
The period from filing of the application to final approval of 
the agreement is estimated to require at least five months. 
For most local scientists and researchers, the process is 
cumbersome, costly, and considered a deterrent to research 
growth and development (  W ).
At the initial stage of the application process, the re-
searcher is required to pay a minimal amount of ,P 
for Filipinos or ,P for foreign nationals as an applica-
tion fee. As soon as the research agreement is approved, a 
bioprospecting fee is remitted to the national government. 
For a , the collector also posts a bond.71 However, it is 
the cost of securing the  certificate that is the source of 
most complaints. For example, if the research would re-
quire utilization or collection of resources from  regions 
of the Philippines, the collector will have to go to  sites 
to secure  / certificates. Each community will 
have different demands, terms, and conditions that must 
be complied with. Also, because negotiations for  are 
left entirely to the community and the applicant, collectors 
are worried that communities, s, politicians, and others 
who must give consent will hold the bioprospector and 
the activity hostage by asking outrageous and excessive 
demands (  W ). Because of the dire 
A B  S  B
Pamantasan 
ng Lungsod ng 
Maynila ()
// Conduct of conservation-
related studies as part of 
thesis requirements, etc.
The  had been 
requested to sub-
mit the require-
ments for ; 
The Gratuitous 
Permit for the 
studies to be con-
ducted by the  
students for thesis 
requirements will 
be prepared by 
.
Central Mindanao 
University c/o Prof. 
Joel Almeror
Diversity of Vascular Plants in Mt. 
Kinasalapi, Kitanglad Range Natural 
Park.
Recommended 
for  by the  
during the
// meeting.
Central Mindanao 
University c/o Mr. 
Jaime Gellor
Institute for Terrestrial Biodiversity 
and Conservation Studies in Mindanao.
// Collection of endemic/
endangered flora and fauna 
in Mindanao for research and 
instruction purposes.
Submitted in 
/ copies of 
the research pro-
posals on the on-
going, as well as 
future studies to 
 for  and 
 review.
New Samar 
Aquatic Resources 
Development Corp.
Scientific Study for the Protection and 
Preservation of Corals.
Experimental gathering 
of precious corals in the 
Philippines waters through 
the use of  manned 
vehicle. After one year, the 
development of processing 
plant.
Referred to .
Miami University 
c/o Alycia 
Baybayan
An investigation of plant utilization 
(medicinal and home gardens) on the 
island of Igbayat, Batanes.
Collection of plants in pursuit 
of master’s thesis.
Requested to 
submit the 
requirements 
for  between 
 and Miami 
University.
Central Luzon 
State Univ. c/o 
Annie Paz-Alberto
Institutional research. Requested to sub-
mit the require-
ments for .
Box 2. Continued
 Applicant Research title/Activity Date Description Status
 
economic situation,   is seen as the solution to the 
communities’ socio-economic difficulties, leading them 
to focus on short-term and immediate benefits (P 
). Local scientists and researchers who normally 
rely only on financial grants consider this unreasonable, 
and the economic costs involved stifle their research. This 
is especially true for scientists who are not affiliated with 
any Philippine scientific, academic, governmental, or 
intergovermental institution which would only have to 
comply with the minimum terms and conditions of a  
under  .
Prior Informed Consent
The  requirement under   is seen as adminis-
tratively tedious and burdensome, especially the -day 
period requirement before  is issued. As earlier stated, 
most collectors also dread the  requirement due to 
economic costs. Identifying which community should 
give consent is often problematic, especially in the case 
of pelagic or migratory species.
Another issue raised concerning  deals with full 
disclosure of the intended activity and its impact on intel-
lectual property rights (T ). There are some 
who propose that disclosure should be limited to collection 
activity only rather than the entire process, so as not to 
prejudice patent rights and the confidentiality of informa-
tion (  W ).
Nevertheless, many still believe that the  require-
ment should not be discarded because it is the only means 
for the inclusion of the communities’ concerns in the re-
search agreement. Also, it is the only opportunity for the 
community to negotiate equitable sharing of benefits with 
the proponent. The process for securing the , however, 
should be properly studied (P ).
Institutional Mechanism
An interagency body consisting of representatives of 
various agencies of the government and other sectors is 
advantageous because of the multidisciplinary nature of the 
issues relating to bioprospecting. Expertise and logistics 
are shared. However, an interagency approach has many 
inherent problems as well. It is difficult to get a quorum 
of the members; resolution or decision-making takes a 
long time because of irregular attendance of members; and 
coordination between member agencies is difficult. Also, 
responsibilities of the member agencies are not clearly 
delineated in   (  W ). Funding 
requirements have always haunted the implementers of  
 because there is no specific source of funds provided, 
except from the savings of the concerned government agen-
cies and the fees collected by the .
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Municipal Govern-
ment of Lopez 
Jaena, Misamis 
Occ. c/o Mayor 
Melquirades 
Azcuna Jr.
Proposed Community-based 
Biodiversity Conservation and 
Management Program for Lopez Jaena 
Mis. Occ.
// A collaborative pilot research 
and development program.
Required to sub-
mit requirements 
for .
Ms. Julie Tan
c/o , Leyte
// Referred to Dept. 
of Health on 
//.
 Marine Science 
Institute c/o Dr. 
Suzanne Licuanan
Marine Biodiversity Enhancement and 
Sustainable Livelihood Program for 
the Hundred Islands Natural Park in 
the Lingayen Gulf.
// Conservation oriented 
activities.
Referred to  
on 01/02/98.
Zambasul 
Mercantile Exotic 
Skins Tannery c/o 
Mr. Reynaldo Chua
Utilization of Bufo marinus for leather 
products.
// Collection of Cane Toad for 
utilization-leather products 
for direct trade and biological 
control to cull toad popula-
tion.
Referred to  
on 10/09/97.
Conservation 
International 
Philippines
c/o Mr. Antonio de 
Castro
Marine Rapid Assessment in Western 
Busuanga, Palawan.
// Collection of marine speci-
mens for taxonomic/proper 
identification purposes and 
inventory of marine biologi-
cal resources in the area.
Referred to .
St. Paul University
c/o Mr. Maximo 
Roger Pua
Studies as part of thesis 
requirements.
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. Project title
_____________________________________________________________________________________
. Project/Research objectives
. _________________________________________________________________________________
. _________________________________________________________________________________
. _________________________________________________________________________________
. Places of collection
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Projected date of implementation and reason
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
. Bioresources and quantity (if possible) (indicate live or dead specimen, specify if by-products or deriva-
tives)
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
. Methodology (use separate sheet if necessary)
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
. Manner data to be gathered (recorded, photographed, video, collected, observed, etc.) and format (notes,
specimens, photographs, etc.)
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
. Anticipated intermediate and final destination of bioresources, etc.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
. How bioresources obtained are to be used initially (i.e., national collection) subsequently (e.g., drug exploration,
field guide preparation, etc.)
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
. Description of funding support with budget (use separate sheet if necessary)
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
. Analysis of the research of foreseen impact on biological diversity
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
. Detailed description of immediate compensation anticipated
_____________________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________________
. Detailed description of long-term compensation anticipated
_____________________________________________________________________________________
. List of in-country entities likely to receive compensation enumerated in # and reasons (logical and legal)
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Box 3. Research proposal format
 
Benefit sharing
Local scientists view the benefit-sharing requirements 
under   as too demanding. They also worry about 
the involvement of local scientists in research which 
may invade the confidentiality of information and may 
jeopardize the chances for intellectual property rights 
protection on commercially viable products (T 
S ).
There are others, however, who believe that the ben-
efit-sharing provisions of   are not enough. Other 
questions posed which they feel should be answered in-
clude: How do we ensure equitable sharing, who should 
get what, how much, and for how long, what are the forms 
of benefit sharing, and will the community benefit? ( 
 W ). Some believe that the community 
should be given a bigger role in negotiating benefit sharing 
(P ).   merely provides for the minimum 
terms and conditions so as to give the parties enough lee-
way to negotiate. The problem is that effective bargaining 
and negotiation have not yet been given much attention 
by the implementers. 
Biodiversity Conservation
Some also raise the issue that   does not provide for 
a mechanism to ensure that its goal to protect and conserve 
biological and genetic resources is achieved. The functions 
of the  do not even include resource protection, and 
conservation and technology transfer are merely second-
ary as a form of benefit sharing. There is no financing 
mechanism or trust fund in place to support biodiversity 
conservation objectives (O ). Although   
allows the proponent and the government and/or local 
community to agree on possible arrangements that would 
ensure protection and conservation of biological diversity 
as part of the benefit-sharing agreement or tied with the 
, this is not always guaranteed because there are no 
concrete programs or mechanisms in place.
In response to the clamor for modification or revision of 
 , new measures relative to bioprospecting were 
incorporated into the Wildlife Act.
The Wildlife Act
On  July , the Philippine Legislature enacted the 
Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection Act. As 
a legislative act of the Philippine Congress, it passed 
through the regular process of enacting a statute in the 
Philippines. The act was initiated in the th Congress 
(–) but it was not passed into law at that time. 
In , five House bills were filed and consolidated into 
one House bill. A similar bill was filed in the Senate of 
the Philippines. The bills passed through several com-
mittee meetings before they were discussed and voted 
on in the plenary sessions of both houses of Congress. 
Subsequently, the Lower House version was used as a 
working draft during the bicameral committee sessions. 
During the various committee meetings the following sec-
tors were represented: government (Bureau of Customs, 
Philippine National Museum, Department of Science 
and Technology, Bureau of Aquatic Resources, National 
Bureau of Investigation, Protected Areas and Wildlife 
Bureau, Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau, 
Department of Trade and Industry, National Committee 
on Biosafety in the Philippines,  Regional Center 
for Biodiversity Conservation); the academy (University 
of the Philippines () Marine Science Institute, Institute 
of Plant Breeding- Los Baños); business (Floratrade/
Philippine Horticultural Society, Southeast Asian Fisheries 
Development Corp); and s (Kalikasan Mindoro 
Foundation and Conservation International).
Based on the congressional records, there was a con-
sensus that the passage of the Wildlife Act had been long 
overdue. All participants (both congressmen and resource 
persons) were in full support of the legislation, because 
existing laws on wildlife protection and conservation are 
outmoded and the penalties contained therein are very 
minimal. The new law will also enable the Philippines to 
meet its commitments to the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
() (Spot Report on the Meeting of the Committee 
on Ecology,  December ). The Wildlife Act is actu-
ally a codification of existing laws on the protection and 
conservation of wildlife resources. As such, experiences 
in the implementation of existing laws helped a great deal 
in the design of the Wildlife Act. Concerns and issues 
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Table . Application process for research agreements. 
Requirements for s and s differ in steps  and .
Steps
. Submission of Letter of Intent and three copies of research 
proposal to the Technical Secretariat
. Initial screening by  whether or not activity is covered by 
 72
.  Submission of additional requirements 
: Application form; Institution profile; Code of 
conduct; Environmental Impact Assessment,73 if 
necessary; Processing fee74
: Application form; Company/institution/organization 
profile; Environmental Impact Assessment, if necessary; 
Processing fee;  certificate75
. Initial evaluation by  of application 
. Submission of evaluation result to  within  days 
from receipt of all requirements76
. Final evaluation by 
. Submission of ’s recommendation to the Agency 
concerned77
. Approval/Disapproval by the head of the Agency 
. Payment of fee and/or posting of bonds, if approved
: Bioprospecting fee
: Bioprospecting fee and Performance, compensation, 
ecological rehabilitation bond78
. Transmittal of copies of agreement to applicant, , local 
community, Protected Areas Management Board (), 
or private landowner concerned
 
that have been plaguing lawmakers and that were raised 
against the old laws were responded to in the law, such as 
minimal penalties and unclear provisions relative to . 
As far as bioprospecting is concerned, the act addressed 
most of the concerns or criticisms made against  . 
Thus, the discussions of the draft act in the committee 
level were not too heated. There were also no controversial 
provisions or issues. It would appear that the participants 
who were the implementers of existing laws shared their 
experiences and offered solutions to the problems that they 
encountered in the enforcement of these laws.79 The provi-
sions on bioprospecting were drafted by the Department 
of Environment and Natural Resources–Protected Areas 
and Wildlife Bureau which is the same agency primarily 
in charge of implementing  .
The basic policy of the State in the Wildlife Act is “to 
conserve the country’s wildlife resources and their habitats 
for sustainability”. In the pursuit of said policy, the law 
has the following objectives:80 
• Conserve and protect wildlife species and their 
habitats to promote ecological balance and enhance 
biological diversity.
• Regulate the collection and trade of wildlife.
• Pursue, with due regard to national interest, the 
Philippine commitment to international conventions 
on the protection of wildlife and their habitats.
• Initiate or support scientific studies on the conserva-
tion of biological diversity.
The law covers all wildlife species found in all areas 
of the country, including protected areas and critical habi-
tats. It also governs “exotic species which are subject to 
trade, are cultured, maintained, and/or bred in captivity or 
propagated in the country”.81
Although there are only two provisions in the Wildlife 
Act dealing with bioprospecting82, these provisions modi-
fied   considerably. Most of the changes that were 
introduced try to address the issues and concerns that were 
raised against  . These are as follows:
• Bioprospecting for purposes of scientific or aca-
demic research is no longer subject to the require-
ments of the law for commercial bioprospecting. 
Under the Wildlife Act, “bioprospecting” is now 
defined as “the research, collection and utilization 
of biological and genetic resources for purposes of 
applying the knowledge derived therefrom solely 
for commercial purposes”.83 Collection and utiliza-
tion of biological resources for scientific research 
is covered by a gratuitous permit84 issued upon 
securing prior clearance85 from concerned bodies. 
This is a welcome development for local scientists 
and researchers who have longed for the exclusion 
of academic/scientific research from  ’s cov-
erage.
• The law governs all wildlife species found in all 
areas in the country. “Wildlife” is defined as “wild 
forms and varieties of flora and fauna, in all devel-
opmental stages, including those which are in cap-
tivity or are being bred or propagated”.86 Under the 
proposed “Guidelines for Bioprospecting Activities 
in the Philippines”, wildlife, microorganisms, do-
mesticated or propagated species, and exotic spe-
cies are covered (Section , .).87
• An undertaking signed by the applicant binds him/
her to comply with certain terms and conditions 
as may be imposed.88 The proposed Guidelines re-
quire the applicant to apply for a Bioprospecting 
Undertaking () before access to biological 
resources for bioprospecting purposes is allowed 
(Section , ., see endnote ).
• The Secretary or its representative, in consultation 
with the concerned agencies, grants a permit to 
conduct prospecting. This responds to the problems 
inherent in the interagency approach established 
under  . However, consultations with con-
cerned agencies are still necessary before any grant 
for bioprospecting is allowed.
• Prior informed consent from concerned s, local 
communities, , or a private individual entity 
is still required in accordance with existing laws, 
but the -day requirement, which had been widely 
criticized, has been removed.89
• In case the applicant is a foreign entity or indi-
vidual, a local institution shall actively participate 
in the research, collection, and, if applicable and 
appropriate, the technological development of the 
products derived from the resources.90
• A wildlife management fund is created which shall 
finance rehabilitation or restoration of habitats af-
fected by acts committed in violation of the law 
and support scientific research, enforcement and 
monitoring activities, and enhancement of capabili-
ties of relevant agencies.91 This answers the need 
for a funding mechanism specifically intended 
for the conservation and protection of biological 
resources.
• Unauthorized collection, hunting, and possession of 
wildlife is punishable with imprisonment of up to 
four () years and a fine of up to ,P depend-
ing on the species illegally collected, hunted, or pos-
sessed.92 The law, however, is silent on the liability 
of a person illegally conducting bioprospecting.
With the passage of the Wildlife Act,   has been 
repealed by implication or amended accordingly93 and a 
new set of implementing rules and regulations on bio-
prospecting is currently being formulated by the .94 
Thus, provisions in   which are clearly contradictory 
to and irreconcilable with the Wildlife Act are now deemed 
repealed.95 However, the question as to what provisions of 
  will remain in force and effect will be answered 
only after the implementing rules and regulations have 
A B  S  B
 
C : P 
been issued, inasmuch as the administrative interpretation 
of the law will have to be considered. New guidelines in 
accordance with the Wildlife Act and, perhaps, some of 
the still-effective provisions of   will be formulated 
to replace  . Until such time, applications for a  
will continue to be processed under  .
Undoubtedly, the intention of the Wildlife Act is to 
simplify and facilitate access to biological and genetic 
resources. This is apparent in the very definition it has 
provided for “bioprospecting”. Since one of the complaints 
against   is that it stifles scientific research, the 
scope of bioprospecting has been limited to commercial 
purposes only. Also, the minimum terms and conditions 
found in   were not legislated; instead, the Secretary 
is given the option to impose reasonable terms and con-
ditions which are necessary to protect biodiversity. This 
gives the Secretary of said agencies great flexibility in 
the conditions to be imposed. This clearly responds to 
the claim of local scientists that the minimum terms and 
conditions of   are unreasonable. 
Equitable sharing of benefits derived from the utiliza-
tion of biological and genetic resources is not mentioned in 
the law. It is unclear if the government, as a pre-condition 
for the approval of the application, shall still require the 
adoption of benefit-sharing arrangements. It is possible, 
though, that any benefit-sharing option will now be tied 
up with the  certificate.
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs): Protection for Biological and Genetic 
Resources and Traditional Knowledge
The present intellectual property law in the Philippines 
is Republic Act No. , also known as the Intellectual 
Property Code of the Philippines (). It took effect on 
 January  and was enacted in compliance with the 
minimum standards set under .96
Among the “intellectual property rights” under the , 
the patent is more relevant to the protection of biological 
and genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated 
with these resources. Section  of the  provides that 
“patentable invention” refers to “any technical solution 
of a problem in any field of human activity which is new, 
involves an inventive step, and is industrially applicable. 
It may be, or may relate to, a product, or process, or an 
improvement of any of the foregoing.” Plant varieties or 
animal breeds or essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants or animals, except microorganisms97 
and nonbiological and microbiological processes cannot be 
the subject of a patent. However, the Philippine legislature 
may consider the enactment of a law providing sui generis 
protection for plant varieties or animal breeds and a system 
of community s protection.98 In short, the  chooses 
to categorically exclude from patent protection plant va-
rieties and animal breeds. It also does not give protection 
to traditional knowledge but allows the creation of a sui 
generis protection for community s.
Patent protection over life forms, including microor-
ganisms, remains a controversial issue in the Philippines. It 
is argued that life forms are not eligible for patents because 
nothing new is created, and the process merely involves 
reorganizing something that already exists (B 
). Some civil society groups clamor for total exclusion 
of any life form from patenting or even from sui generis 
protection due to moral and ethical issues. They consider 
it intrinsically wrong to patent any living organism. For 
them, it violates the belief that only the divine creator can 
bring forth life (B ). 
Other reasons given for distrust, if not rejection, of the 
patent system as applied to life forms are the following: 
a) the Philippines suffers from a serious lack of visible 
science culture; b) patent law applied to genetic resources 
represents a fusion of two fields, law and science, which 
people, generally, do not understand; c) patent law is an-
other imposition of the developed countries on the develop-
ing countries, a view held by a number of s which has 
some basis in history; and, d) the wide chasm separating 
the scientific and legal communities in the Philippines has 
caused even some scientists and technologists to have some 
aversion toward patent law (O ).
There is also a growing concern that  systems under 
 as applied to life forms run counter to the goals of the 
 in the following aspects: a) s hinder full realization 
of Art.  on national sovereignty and Article j on Farmers’ 
Rights99; b) conservation of biodiversity is not compatible 
with a global regime of private monopoly rights; and c) 
 undermines the implementation of access and ben-
efit-sharing provisions because the resource will be under 
the control of the -holder (M ). In particular, 
Article . (b) is said to be in conflict with goals of the 
 and the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic 
Resources insofar as conservation of biological diversity, 
specifically plant varieties, and equitable sharing of ben-
efits are concerned. Granting exclusive s to breeders 
will prevent certain established practices among farmers 
and indigenous communities, including common access 
to seeds and varieties, and most probably will be subject 
to infringement sanctions (C ).
Nonetheless, others believe that the conflict is not 
between the  and  but arises only from the legis-
lation of individual member States, as in the case of plant 
varieties’ protection. It is said that under , s need 
not involve exclusive rights. Both international agree-
ments require member States “to provide protection to 
plant varieties consistent with their obligation to conserve 
biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, 
and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out 
of the utilization of genetic resources”. (C ). 
What is relevant for any plant protection law is the need 
to balance the protection of the s of breeders and the 
 
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interests and s of farmers and local indigenous com-
munities. To interpret ’s Article .b as not requiring 
balancing of rights will run counter to the objectives of the 
 (C ).
And yet, this so-called “balancing of rights” may be 
easier said than done. It would be very difficult to bal-
ance rights that are not equal to begin with. -holders 
are usually moneyed and backed by powerful and rich 
governments while most farmers and s are not. In fact, 
even in their own countries, s and farmers’ rights are, 
more often than not, not recognized or protected. Even if 
some balancing of rights is established through national 
legislation, the problem of asserting their rights will still 
persist because s and farmers have fewer resources or 
none at all.
The aversion to patenting life forms or even provid-
ing sui generis protection that grants proprietary rights 
over these resources to a single individual or corporation 
has been evident in how civil society and other interest 
groups view the  Philippine Plant Variety Protection 
() law. In compliance with the country’s obligations 
under , the Philippine legislature passed a law which 
gives protection to new plant varieties.100 Republic Act 
No. , entitled “An Act to Provide Protection to New 
Plant Varieties, Establishing a National Plant Protection 
Board and for other purposes”101, recognizes that “an 
effective intellectual property system in general and the 
development of new plant variety in particular is vital in 
attaining food security for the country”. As such, the law 
aims to protect and secure the exclusive rights of breeders 
with respect to their new plant variety.102
Protection under Republic Act No.  is patterned 
after the International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants () plant breeders’ rights. The law 
provides that any breeder may be granted a Certificate of 
Plant Variety Protection for a particular plant variety upon 
showing that said variety is new, distinct, uniform, and sta-
ble. A variety covered by a  certificate is protected for 
 years, or  years in case of vines and trees, from date 
of issuance of the certificate.103 The holder of the certifi-
cate has the right to authorize production or reproduction; 
conditioning for the purpose of propagation; offering for 
sale; selling or other marketing; exporting; importing; and 
stocking for any purpose mentioned above. Also, he may 
make his authorization subject to conditions and limita-
tions.104 Protection under the act extends to varieties which 
are essentially derived from the protected variety, where 
the protected variety is not itself an essentially derived vari-
ety; those which are not clearly distinct from the protected 
variety; and those whose production requires the repeated 
use of the protected variety.105 It does not, however, extend 
to acts done for noncommercial, or experimental purposes; 
the purpose of breeding other varieties; and to traditional 
right of small farmers to save, use, exchange, share, or sell 
their farm produce of a protected variety, except when a 
sale is for the purpose of reproduction under a commercial 
marketing agreement. The act also exempts the exchange 
and sale of seeds among and between small farmers, but 
only for purposes of reproduction and replanting in their 
own land.106
The law also allows compulsory licensing at any time 
after two years from the grant of the  when it is for 
public interest and the reasonable requirements of the 
public, overseas market for sale of any part of the variety 
are not met or when the variety relates to or is required in 
the production of medicine and/or any food preparation. 
The duration of the compulsory license ends when the 
ground for its issuance no longer exists as determined by 
the government.107
Any of the following acts constitutes infringement of 
the plant breeders’ plant variety protection: a) sell, offer, 
expose for sale, deliver, ship, consign, exchange, solicit an 
offer to buy, or any other transfer of title or possession of 
the novel variety; b) import into or export from the country 
of the novel variety; c) sexually multiply the variety as a 
step in marketing (for growing purposes); d) use the novel 
variety in producing (as distinguished from developing) 
a hybrid or different variety therefrom; e) use seed which 
had been marked “unauthorized propagation prohibited” or 
“unauthorized seed multiplication prohibited” or progeny 
thereof to propagate the novel variety; f) dispense the novel 
variety to another, in a form which can be propagated, 
without notice as to being a protected variety under which 
it was received; g) fails to use a variety denomination, the 
use of which is obligatory under the act; h) perform any 
of the foregoing acts even in instances in which the novel 
variety is multiplied other than sexually; and i) instigate or 
actively induce performance of any foregoing acts.108
The passage of Republic Act No.  has been criti-
cized by civil societies and farmer groups. They believe 
that the law highlights multinational corporations’ control 
over the course of the Philippines’ agriculture. Concern 
about the survival of small farmers has been rising because 
the law “prohibits them to continue with their traditional 
practices of seed utilization”. Farmers have always been 
engaged in the art and science of plant breeding and selec-
tion long before scientists and agribusiness corporations 
came into being. They also freely store and exchange seeds 
among themselves, a process which played a major role in 
development of new varieties (M ). All these 
practices are now being endangered by the act.
Also, although  is not strictly patent protection, 
many consider the -kind of protection as a “soft” 
kind of patent regime which should likewise be rejected 
because it is just as “threatening as industrial patents on 
biodiversity and also represent an attack on the rights of 
farming and other communities at the local level”. Anti-
 groups have listed the following reasons why  
should be opposed: a)  denies farmers’ rights; b) rich 
Northern countries will take over national breeding sys-
tems in poor Southern countries and get ownership of the 
latter’s biodiversity with no obligation to share benefits; 
c)  criteria for protection will exacerbate erosion of 
biodiversity; d) privatization of genetic resources affects 
 
research negatively; e) moves to keep biodiversity under 
negotiated access systems will be undermined as  
laws grant private ownership of resources that fall under 
national and community sovereignty; and f) joining  
means accepting a questionable system that supports the 
rights of industrial breeders and disregards farmers and 
communities (D ).
Furthermore,  systems under , specifically pat-
ent laws and even , are inadequate to protect traditional 
and community knowledge as well as inappropriate for de-
fending the rights and resources of local communities and 
indigenous peoples. Traditional knowledge associated with 
biological resources may not meet all the requirements 
under traditional  regimes such as novelty, inventive 
step, and industrial applicability (    
     ). The innovations, 
practices, and knowledge systems of s “were developed 
collectively, accretionally over time, and inter-genera-
tionally” (D ). Thus, the conditions of novelty 
and innovative steps for the granting of patent may be 
questionable. Also, knowledge is often held by different 
independent communities (     
    ). It does not belong 
exclusively to one individual which is what a patent is all 
about (D ).  is an embodiment of western 
legal philosophy: norms, values, and mindset that are con-
trary to many s’ cosmologies and values (T-C 
). Moreover, the existing  system “promotes the 
misappropriation of indigenous knowledge, with the result 
that the benefits derived from the commercialization of this 
knowledge do not flow back to the source communities 
who freely shared the knowledge with outsiders” (T-
C ).
Other reasons cited for the inadequacy and inappro-
priateness of  systems under  for the protection of 
traditional knowledge associated with biological resources 
are the following (C ,     
     ):
• Patents do not provide incentives for innovations 
generated at the community level. The recognition 
of value added through the  regime appears lim-
ited to the input of formal innovation (made by 
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scientists/academics) even if the end product or 
process was arrived at through informal innovation 
of the community.
•  systems do not compensate the custodians of 
biological resources even when these resources 
are used for commercially profitable and legally 
protected inventions and end products.
•  protection is said to favor those with ready 
access to economic and legal resources that local 
communities often find hard to obtain.
  and the Wildlife Act, and even the Republic Act 
No.  also known as the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
Act (), however, are not dependent on  protection 
of biological resources, traditional knowledge, and benefit 
sharing. Access to traditional knowledge associated with 
biological and genetic resources is not conditioned upon 
recognition of  rights of the source community (C 
). While the benefit-sharing provisions of   for 
the utilization of biological and genetic resources mandate 
payment of royalties,   does not require that s be 
shared. In this sense, the regulation merely requires shar-
ing a portion of the proceeds (e.g., licensing fees). The 
emerging view is that local counterparts should share in 
s only if they have actual participation in the innovations 
developed (- ). 
Moreover, many believe that patent ownership is not 
the only form of benefit sharing and that contract law, not 
patent law, is the key to ensuring that source countries or 
communities share in whatever benefits are derived from 
the use of genetic resources. Thus, as correctly pointed 
out by José Maria A. Ochave, “if source countries or com-
munities are to capture some of the benefits resulting from 
the utilization of their genetic resources, they should focus 
their attention not on the patent system, but on the nature 
and content of their contractual relations with prospective 
bioprospectors” ( ).
What is important for us is that any access to our 
resources and traditional knowledge must have the ap-
proval of the government through research agreements or 
undertakings, and the prior informed consent of the local 
and indigenous communities obtained under existing laws, 
rules, and regulations.
Access to Indigenous Peoples’ Biological Resources
and Traditional Knowledge
Access to biological resources within ancestral lands and 
ancestral domain is allowed under  . Under , 
the free and prior informed consent of the s is required 
prior to any access to these resources and their traditional 
knowledge. Moreover, under , the rights of the s 
to their ancestral domains and lands, to self-governance 
and empowerment, to self-justice and human rights, and 
to cultural integrity have been recognized.109 The law 
also acknowledges the rights of the s to full ownership, 
control, and protection of their cultural and intellectual 
property rights. Included under this is the “right to special 
measures to control, develop, and protect their sciences, 
technologies, and cultural manifestations, including human 
and other genetic resources, seeds, including derivatives of 
these resources, traditional medicines and health practices, 
vital medicinal plants, animals and minerals, indigenous 
knowledge systems and practices, knowledge of the prop-
erties of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literature, designs, 
and visual and performing arts”.110 Further, Sec.  of 
said law provides that “access to biological and genetic 
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resources and to indigenous knowledge related to the con-
servation, utilization, and enhancement of these resources, 
shall be allowed within ancestral lands and domains of the 
s/s only with a free and prior informed consent of such 
communities, obtained in accordance with customary laws 
of the concerned community”. Under these provisions, a 
form of community s of the s has been recognized. 
s have the right of restitution if these property rights are 
taken without their free and prior informed consent and 
in violation of their customary laws. 
To safeguard the indigenous knowledge systems and 
practices, the following guidelines have also been adopted 
pursuant to the law: a) researchers and research institu-
tions, etc. shall secure the free and prior informed consent 
of the /s before access to indigenous peoples and 
resources can be allowed; b) a written agreement shall be 
entered into with the /s concerned regarding the re-
search, including its purpose, design and expected output; 
c) all data provided by the /s shall be acknowledged 
in whatever writings, publications, or journals produced 
as a result of such research and the /s will be named 
as sources in all such papers; d) copies of outputs of all 
such research shall be freely provided to the /s com-
munity; and e) /s shall be entitled to royalty from 
income derived from any research conducted and resulting 
publications (D ).
Also in , Republic Act No. , also known 
as the Traditional Alternative Medicine Act was passed 
which, in a very limited way, protects traditional knowl-
edge of traditional medicine. The law sets out the policy 
of, among others, seeking a “legally workable basis by 
which indigenous societies would own their knowledge 
of traditional medicine. When knowledge of traditional 
medicine is used by outsiders, the indigenous societies 
can require the permitted users to acknowledge its source 
and can demand a share of any financial return that may 
come from its authorized commercial use.”111 To date, 
however, the Philippines has yet to pass a sui generis  
system that will cover traditional knowledge associated 
with biological and genetic resources of local and indig-
enous communities.
Equitable Sharing of Benefits
The Wildlife Act is silent on benefit sharing. Therefore, 
the provisions of   on sharing of benefits are still 
relevant and effective.   employs a contractual ap-
proach in ensuring equitable sharing of benefits. This gives 
it flexibility. Benefit sharing is required at two stages: at 
the time of collection and at the time of commercialization. 
At the time of collection, the minimum benefits that must 
be obtained are explicitly provided for in  , while 
benefit sharing at the time of commercialization is not 
expressly stated. However, the parties are free to negoti-
ate on the kind of benefit-sharing arrangement/option that 
will be established.
The proposed Guidelines for Bioprospecting Activities 
also employ negotiation for benefits where the resource 
user negotiates with the resource providers for the benefit-
sharing arrangements that will govern them. However, the 
Guidelines impose minimum benefits that must be obtained 
from the resource user. These are as follows (Secs.  and 
, see endnote ):
• Bioprospecting fee of ,  for each , 
which may be increased or tempered based on 
certain criteria;
• Minimum amount of % of total global gross sales 
of the products made or derived from collected 
samples to be paid annually; and
• ,  per collection site annually for the 
duration of the collection period.
Nonmonetary benefits, which may be agreed upon in 
addition to the minimum benefits, may include (Sec. , 
see endnote ):
• Equipment for biodiversity inventory and monitor-
ing;
• Supplies and equipment for resource conservation 
activities;
• Technology transfer;
• Formal training including educational facilities;
• Infrastructure directly related to the management 
of the area;
• Health care; and
• Other capacity building and support for in-situ 
conservation and development activities.
Under the -Utah- 112, the parties agreed to the 
“equitable sharing of benefits, direct or indirect, short or long 
term, including, but not limited to direct assistance, technol-
ogy transfer, profit sharing, co-ownership of intellectual prop-
erty”.113 Aside from the minimum terms and conditions on 
benefit sharing stipulated in   and  , the following 
arrangements have been agreed upon by the parties: 114
• Utah- shall share % of the net revenue received 
and derived from any invention such as licensing 
fee, milestone payments, or royalty from the com-
mercialization of any material to the  (or the , 
if material was taken from the protected area) and 
the concerned community who gave the .
• All materials and products derived therefrom, all 
data, documents, and publications shall contain a 
compulsory attribution recognizing the country and 
community of the origin of the materials used. 
•  shall develop an information/education module 
on resource conservation and environmental protec-
tion especially geared for the community where 
the collections are to be made.
•  shall provide technical expertise to enable the 
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 to develop/implement a monitoring scheme 
for marine bioprospecting.
•  shall help train at least one government repre-
sentative in sponge/ascidian taxonomy or natural 
products chemistry through short-term internship/
observation programs.
•  shall conduct an information campaign on the 
protection/conservation of coastal resources and 
the value of coastal resources.
• In case inventions are derived from the use of ma-
terials, Utah- shall provide training in a marine-
related discipline if there is a qualified candidate 
from the community.
There are a lot of possible benefit-sharing options, but 
under a contractual scheme, everything will depend on ef-
fective bargaining. How much, how long, how many, and 
who will benefit will rely heavily on the negotiating teams 
for the community and the government, on one hand, and 
the bioprospector, on the other. The following proposals 
(O ) may be considered in strengthening the 
bargaining position of the source country: 
• Alternative ways for protecting community re-
sources should be explored.
• The scientific and legal communities should work 
together to increase understanding of each other’s 
field. Contract negotiations should not be left to 
lawyers who know nothing about genes, or to sci-
entists who may not appreciate the ramifications 
of seemingly innocuous contract terms.
• Regional cooperation, in various forms, will en-
able the entire region to present a common front 
in negotiations.
ASEAN Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources
Regional cooperation has long been the call of s, 
government agencies, and scientists. Such cooperation is 
necessary because, it is not only the Philippines that has 
endemic species; there are species endemic to the entire 
southeast Asian region as well.
During the eighth meeting of the 114 Senior 
Officials on Environment () in September , 
the Philippine delegation proposed the formulation of 
a common protocol among  member countries on 
access to genetic resources and s. Thereafter,  
asked the  Working Group on Nature Conservation 
and Biodiversity to spearhead the drafting of said protocol. 
The Philippines was given the lead role in formulating a 
legal framework to regulate access to genetic resources 
for . The first Technical Expert’s Meeting was held 
in December  to discuss and draft the framework. 
It was composed of technical experts from the member 
countries, s from the region and representative of the 
 Secretariat. The second Technical Expert’s Meeting 
was held in February  (M ). 
Although the  Framework on Access to 
Biological and Genetic Resources is still being developed, 
it may already have created the regional cooperation that 
has long been desired in the region. In the  February 
 draft of the Framework115, the objectives include, 
among others, ensuring the conservation and sustainable 
use of these resources and equitable sharing of benefits 
consistent with the principle of , giving recognition 
and protection to traditional knowledge, promotion of 
regional cooperation in the utilization of and access to 
these resources, ensuring uniform and consistent access 
regulations within the region, the setting of “minimum 
standards in regulating access to genetic resources and 
strengthening national initiatives towards this objective”, 
promotion of technology transfer and capacity building, 
and establishment of “effective and participatory measures 
for the grant of ”.116
The Framework covers all genetic and biological re-
sources, including associated traditional knowledge. Ex 
situ materials collected prior to the  are considered held 
in trust and  shall not be allowed.117 Patenting of life 
forms and traditional knowledge as well as  on genetic 
materials of human origin shall not be allowed.118 Prior 
informed consent of member countries is necessary before 
access to these resources shall be allowed. Countries shall 
establish a legal process to ensure that fair and equitable 
sharing of benefits shall accrue to s and local communi-
ties who are considered as the legitimate users and custodi-
ans of biological and genetic resources.119The negotiation 
of benefit-sharing arrangements is left to the discretion of 
member States and may come in the form of technology 
transfer, capacity building, and monetary or nonmonetary 
benefits subject to certain requirements.120
The Framework also establishes a Common Fund 
for Biodiversity Conservation consisting of a share in 
the revenues derived from any commercialization of the 
use of common and shared resources among the member 
States as well as from a portion of the fees and charges 
imposed by the member States. Additional support shall be 
derived from other benefit-sharing arrangements that may 
be negotiated.121 According to the  Ha Noi Action 
Plan (–) the  Protocol was scheduled to 
be adopted in .
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Ultimately, the legislative and institutional framework 
for access to genetic resources that any country devel-
ops will only be as good as the process through which 
it is developed. To actually work once established, the 
legislative framework must have the broad support of all 
relevant sectors of government and society; fit within the 
country’s larger strategy for conserving and sustainably 
using biodiversity; and must be supported by institu-
tional processes and capabilities sufficient to implement 
it (M et al. ).
Executive Order  has been faithful to the provisions of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity on access regula-
tion. It is the world’s first comprehensive policy framework 
that provides for access to biological resources on mutu-
ally agreed terms, subject to prior informed consent, and 
the equitable sharing of benefits. Since its issuance, the 
Philippines has approved only one commercial research 
agreement and one academic research agreement. The 
fees and bonds are still undetermined and a monitoring 
scheme is not yet in place. However, for the only  
that has been approved so far, bioprospectors are asked 
to submit a quarterly report and a government representa-
tive joins them during every field visit. At present, a draft 
administrative regulation on collection and monitoring of 
bioprospecting activities is being reviewed by . 
Benefit-sharing arrangements are yet to be tried. The 
other terms and conditions are still to be threshed out. All 
these have been compounded by a new law (the Wildlife 
Act) radically modifying  .
This does not mean, however, that   has failed 
in its purpose. It only shows that the road towards the 
establishment of an ideal framework for access to and 
exchange of biological and genetic resources is long and 
tedious. However, the Philippines is learning a lot along 
the way. In fact, the passage of the Wildlife Act confirms 
that the process is dynamic, and the country intends to 
succeed in finding a better legislative and institutional 
framework on the subject.
Derived from the years of Philippine experience on 
access regulation under  , the following recommen-
dations may help other countries in their quest for the 
best and most suitable mode of regulating access to and 
exchange of biological and genetic resources:
There is a need to be clear as to the scope of the access 
regulation. States should know what they want to regulate 
in order to avoid over-regulation. They should conduct 
assessments of their genetic resources and their capacities 
to regulate access to their resources and make a realistic 
decision on the coverage of their regulation.
The prior informed consent () of communities should 
be nonnegotiable and measures that would guarantee com-
pliance with the  process must be established. The  
of communities and s, and the process of obtaining the 
, is a must in any access regulation, because it is the only 
way for States to help and support the s’ capacities and 
efforts to protect their indigenous/traditional knowledge 
and resources. “Effective, on-the-ground mechanisms to 
ensure the  and protection of the rights of affected 
communities” are necessary (B and L V ). 
Nevertheless, the  process should be simple and fast.
There is a need for an effective and efficient implement-
ing mechanism and monitoring scheme. A single but effec-
tive, efficient, and well-funded implementing agency must 
be established. Lack of funds and personnel to implement 
the access regulation will surely mean failure of whatever 
system that is implemented.
The procedure must be simple and fast. A straightfor-
ward application procedure will lessen the transaction cost 
for the collector. Documentary requirements should be 
minimal and only that information necessary for evaluation 
purposes should be required. “If requests for access are 
poorly administered—too bureaucratic, confusing, involv-
ing too many steps, too slow or too onerous—or based on 
benefit-sharing policies that seem unreasonable to the user, 
partnership will seem unattractive, and providers will price 
themselves out of the market” ( K ).
Biodiversity conservation and access must go hand-in-
hand. The access regulation should provide for measures 
to guarantee that bioprospecting activities will not be 
detrimental to biodiversity conservation. Benefit-sharing 
arrangements should also include benefits accruing to en-
vironmental protection and conservation programs.
There must be regional cooperation among countries 
sharing the same resource. This will help create a united 
and strong position during negotiations for optimum ben-
efits. “A consortium of suppliers could pool their expertise 
and equipment, offer a greater quantity and diversity of 
resources and services and agree to share among them-
selves, in proportion to the samples supplied, the royalties 
derived from any single marketed product. Others suggest 
that regional cooperatives could provide a mechanism for 
sharing the benefits from access to species common to the 
region” ( K ).
Effective guidelines or mechanisms to attain equitable 
benefit sharing and technology transfer must be developed. 
Identification and implementation of benefit sharing and 
technology transfer options must be incorporated. If the 
State decides to adopt contractual relations, it has to cre-
ate an effective bargaining program in order to ensure 
optimum benefits for its people. Also, in the long run, 
the market for raw genetic material will be increasingly 
competitive (made more so by a growing black market) 
as a result of technological changes in the field of bio-
technology. It is imperative, therefore, to develop stable, 
long-term partnerships with product development firms 
and institutions ( K ).
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The United States of America:
The National Park Service Experience
Preston T. Scott
The biological diversity and related genetic resources 
existing in the United States of America () is vast. 
The  spans a continent bordered by two oceans, and 
includes territory stretching from the Arctic Circle to the 
tropics. While much of the country has been industrialized 
and developed, the wide range of ecosystems found in the 
 contributes to an equally wide range of representative 
samples of diverse life forms.
In light of the great diversity of life found in the various 
ecosystems that exist throughout the , scientists have 
begun to study the nation’s biodiversity in more systematic 
ways. Such studies have begun to result in new appreciation 
for the value of biodiversity to environmental and social 
well being, as well as to the potential economic value that 
can result from important discoveries rooted in biological 
material. The value of biological material (particularly at 
a molecular and genetic level) is increasingly recognized, 
and the value of related discoveries and product inventions 
is growing rapidly (primarily as a result of the application 
of intellectual property rights and other research-related 
laws). While there are no reliable nationwide statistics on 
the number of so-called “bioprospecting” projects cur-
rently underway in the , reports suggest that the number 
is growing but affected by many different factors.
Access to genetic resources in the  is governed by 
a dizzying array of laws, regulations, and policies that ap-
ply at various different local, state, regional, and national 
levels. Although the recognition and refinement of the prin-
ciples related to access, sustainable use, and the equitable 
sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of biologi-
cal resources has become increasingly sophisticated since 
adoption of the Convention on Biological Diversity () 
in Rio de Janeiro in , efforts to deal with some of the 
same issues have been part of the legal landscape in the  
for decades (albeit in a less systematic way). For example, 
formalized regulations relating to access to biological re-
sources found in  national parks for scientific research 
purposes date back to the s. Since the s, the  
Public Health Service (led by the National Institutes of 
Health and other major research agencies) has developed 
and implemented standardized approaches concerning the 
management of biological material for research purposes. 
These particular examples arose from perceived needs for 
new management tools to be applied in specific contexts 
and to respond to specific sets of circumstances.
Accordingly, much of the experience in the  
concerning the regulation of access to genetic resources 
actually pre-dates much of the international discussion as 
it has evolved in connection with the . However, the 
 experience has not been characterized by the “top-
down” central-government approach often reflected in 
-related texts. It also has evolved independently from 
the non-self-implementing framework agreement ap-
proach reflected most notably in the . Instead, it has 
developed in response to various specialized sets of needs 
and circumstances often existing at very local or specific 
institutional levels.
The fundamental issues relating to access to natural 
resources in the  are ordinarily managed by the owner 
of the resource (whether private or public). In the , such 
fundamental issues relating to ownership of property and 
resources are typically managed at very local and individu-
alized levels. For example, in cases of wild biodiversity 
living on private lands, access is subject to the approval 
 
of the individual landowner. Where areas are managed 
by governmental authorities, access is usually subject to 
regulation (whether local, state, or federal). Marine areas 
may be subject to special regulations and laws enforced 
by both federal and state authorities. In addition, access 
to tribal lands in the  are subject to tribal authorities 
and associated federal and state laws relating specifically 
to Native Americans.
All of this complexity is amplified by the fact that ju-
risdictional authority is divided not only within the federal 
(national) government, but also among the  individual 
states. Within the federal government alone, lands and 
associated biological resources may be managed by any 
one of a wide range of departments (such as Interior, 
Agriculture, and Energy) and separate agencies within 
departments (such as the Bureau of Land Management, 
the Fish and Wildlife Service, the  Geological Survey, 
and the National Park Service—all within the Department 
of the Interior). In addition, access to genetic resources that 
have been isolated by a laboratory or other institutional 
research entity may be subject to certain contractual ar-
rangements such as biological material transfer agreements 
or commercial use licenses, which may or may not be 
standardized. There also are several ex situ culture col-
lections located in the  (including the American Type 
Culture Collection (), which is often described as 
the world’s largest).1 In all cases, however, the first step 
is to determine who is in charge of the resources and to 
ascertain precisely what is expected or required to obtain 
legitimate access.2
In light of this complexity—and in order to present an 
illustrative example of genetic resource management in the 
 that takes a more national approach—this chapter will 
focus on perhaps the most instructive case study arising in 
the  concerning both access and benefit-sharing issues. 
Specifically, the case study provides a detailed overview 
of the background, experience, and status of genetic 
resource management in  national parks, with focus 
on the particularly illustrative experience at Yellowstone 
National Park ().
The chapter begins with an overview of the diversity 
of ecosystems protected by the  National Park Service 
() and the fundamental natural resource management 
principles they use. The  experience has important na-
tionwide relevance inasmuch as  protects and manages 
representative samples—and in many cases the best ex-
amples—of virtually every type of ecosystem found in the 
. The chapter continues with a look back at the history 
of scientific research at Yellowstone, including a descrip-
tion of the natural resources that have attracted scientists 
to the park for more than a century. This is followed by an 
overview of the development and status of the laws and 
regulations that relate to the value of biological research 
in the , and that now govern access to the  genetic 
resources for scientific purposes. The chapter includes a 
discussion of the development of the first bioprospecting 
benefit-sharing agreement in the , which involved 
Yellowstone and the Diversa Corporation of San Diego, 
California, and concludes with information about possible 
future developments relating to genetic resource manage-
ment issues at Yellowstone and other  units.
While the  still has not ratified the , much of 
the biological resource management experience reflected 
in the  is very consistent with the main conservation 
principles provided in the . In April , the Sixth 
Conference of the Parties to the  meeting in The 
Hague adopted a set of voluntary guidelines specifically 
concerning access and benefit-sharing issues.3 Much of 
the voluntary guidelines concern pragmatic approaches 
to issues relating to prior informed consent () and mu-
tually agreed terms as they pertain to access and benefit 
sharing.
While a section-by-section analysis is beyond the 
scope and purpose of this chapter,4 it should be noted 
that the research specimen collection permit require-
ments developed and implemented by the  provide 
an excellent example of how many of the concerns as-
sociated with  can be very pragmatically addressed. 
Likewise, although  is currently conducting a study 
of the potential environmental impacts of implementing 
various benefit-sharing approaches throughout the , 
the issues under study also reflect many of the concerns 
associated with “mutually agreed terms” that are included 
in the voluntary guidelines. While no single national expe-
rience can respond to or satisfy the interests and needs of a 
very diverse world, the  experience may provide some 
instructive examples about ways to implement many of the 
biodiversity conservation management principles that the 
international community is continuing to refine—a very 
long-term work-in-progress.
A B  S  B
National Parks as Living Laboratories
Background
The  National Park Service comprises more than  
separate protected areas in every state of the  (except 
Delaware) plus the District of Columbia, American Samoa, 
Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, and encompass-
es approximately . million ha. Taken together, these 
areas protect examples of virtually every type of ecosystem 
found in North America, even though these areas cover less 
than two percent of the total land area of the . Because 
of the importance attached to their relatively intact repre-
sentative diversity, the ecosystems protected and managed 
by the  are of increasing interest to researchers and are 
often described as living laboratories.5
Access to genetic resources found in  national 
parks is managed by , a federal agency within the  
Department of the Interior.  was created by the  
Congress in  specifically to
 
promote and regulate the use of the federal areas known 
as national parks, monuments, and reservations… by 
such means and measures as conform to the fundamental 
purpose of the said parks, monuments, and reservations, 
which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natu-
ral and historic objects and the wild life therein and to 
provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner 
and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the 
enjoyment of future generations.6
In order to understand how  approaches the issues 
of access to and use of  national parks, it is important 
to understand ’ overall natural resource management 
standard. While the  Congress has given  broad 
management discretion to allow certain impacts within 
parks, that discretion is limited by the statutory require-
ment that  must leave park resources and values unim-
paired to ensure they will continue to exist in a condition 
that will allow present and future generations opportunities 
to enjoy them.
The enjoyment of national park resources contemplated 
by  is broad and includes deriving benefit (including 
scientific knowledge). However,  has explained that by 
recognizing that the enjoyment of national parks by future 
generations can be ensured only if the superb quality of 
park resources and values is left “unimpaired”, conserva-
tion of park resources is to be predominant when there is 
a conflict between conserving resources and values and 
providing for enjoyment of them.7
 works to maintain as parts of the natural ecosys-
tems found in national parks all native plants and animals8 
and the full range of genetic types of native plant and ani-
mal populations. In carrying out this over-arching natural 
resource management approach,  aims to maintain all 
the components and processes of naturally evolving park 
ecosystems, including the natural abundance, diversity, and 
genetic and ecological integrity of the plant and animal 
species native to those ecosystems.
Accordingly, the way that  manages access to 
national park resources (including genetic resources) is 
based on the agency’s fundamental duty to conserve na-
tional parks in an unimpaired condition for the enjoyment 
(broadly interpreted) of present and future generations.
Diversity of National Park Resources
The diversity of land ecosystems protected and managed 
by  includes tundra, boreal forest, Pacific forest, dry co-
niferous forest, eastern deciduous forest, grassland, chap-
arral, and deserts. Tropical ecosystems are found in  
national parks in Hawaii and the southern tip of Florida, 
Puerto Rico and the  Virgin Islands, and American 
Samoa and Guam. -protected tropical ecosystems 
include lowland rain forest, summer-deciduous forest, 
swamp and mangrove formations, as well as montane 
rainforest. Aquatic ecosystems protected in  national 
parks are as diverse as the land ecosystems, and include 
marine environments, estuaries, underground systems, 
lakes and ponds, and streams.  units also include pro-
tected areas of volcanism, hot water phenomena, mountain 
systems, and mesas.
The largest national park in the  is Wrangell-St. 
Elias National Park and Preserve in Alaska. At . million 
ha, it makes up .% of the entire system. The largest 
unit in the  contiguous states is Yellowstone National 
Park, comprising . million ha. The smallest unit in the 
system is Thaddeus Kosciuszko National Memorial in 
Pennsylvania, comprising only . ha
Genetic Resource Diversity and 
Management at Yellowstone
Generally recognized as America’s (and the world’s) 
first national park,  was created by an act of the  
Congress9 that was signed into law by President Ulysses 
S. Grant on  March . It is located in the northern 
Rocky Mountain region of the  in the northwest corner 
of Wyoming with territory overlapping into Montana to 
the north and Idaho to the west.
Yellowstone remains the largest national park in the 
continental  outside Alaska. It covers , km² ap-
proximately . million ha), which is larger than the 
states of Rhode Island and Delaware combined. Its ter-
rain includes ,-meter peaks and high plateaus; deep 
canyons and broad sweeping valleys; lakes, rivers, and 
waterfalls; and a variety of archeological and cultural 
sites. Yellowstone also is surrounded by wilderness areas 
protected by six national forests, Grand Teton National 
Park, and two national wildlife refuges.
 forms the core of the Greater Yellowstone 
Ecosystem, considered the largest remaining intact eco-
system in Earth’s temperate zone. In view of its ecologi-
cal significance, Yellowstone was declared a Biosphere 
Reserve under the  Man and the Biosphere Program 
in  and was designated as a World Heritage Site by 
the United Nations in .
Yellowstone protects vital habitats for a variety of 
wildlife, including bison, grizzly and black bears, moose, 
elk, bighorn sheep, eagles, cutthroat trout, and several en-
dangered or threatened species, including the gray wolf. 
Yellowstone is the only area of its size in the  contiguous 
states that has never been farmed or fenced, and it remains 
the only place in the  where continuously free-ranging 
wild bison have survived since prehistoric times. With the 
restoration of the gray wolf to the park in the mid-s, 
Yellowstone’s ecosystem now includes all members of the 
mammalian biotic community that were present in the area 
at the time when Europeans first arrived in America.
Yellowstone also is a volcanic “hot spot” located in 
part of the most seismicly active region of the Rocky 
Mountains. Underground magma which formed an im-
mense caldera approximately  kilometers wide and  
kilometers long still provides the heat for the park’s famous 
thermal features that are an important part of Yellowstone’s 
ecosystem.
There are approximately , thermal features 
C : USA
 
at —the single greatest concentration on Earth. 
Yellowstone’s most charismatic thermal features are well 
known by names such as Old Faithful, Excelsior, Morning 
Glory, and Grand Prismatic, but the overwhelming major-
ity of the park’s thermal features are still unnamed and 
unexplored. Taken together, Yellowstone’s hot springs, 
geysers, fumaroles, and mud pots comprise one of the 
world’s most intriguing but still largely unexplored bio-
logical habitats.
Yellowstone and other  national parks have cooper-
ated and worked to support scientific activities involving 
park resources since the th century. In August , the 
first research permit was issued at Yellowstone to W.A. 
Setchell from the University of California at Berkeley. The 
permit—written on a sheet of stationary from Mammoth 
Hot Springs Hotel and authorized by Captain James B. 
Erwin of the  Cavalry, which then was administering 
Yellowstone—authorized Setchell “to collect and carry 
away such specimens of algous [sic] growth as he may 
deem necessary to carry out the investigation for which he 
is now visiting the Yellowstone National Park”.10
A century later, the park’s thermal features are increas-
ingly recognized as providing rare habitat for many new 
forms of microscopic life only recently discovered—life 
too small to see outside of their sometimes richly colored 
colonies (or “mats”), but reflecting biological diversity that 
rivals the tropical rainforests and thrives in habitats once 
thought far too extreme to allow life to exist.
Like the early explorers, many of the contemporary 
scientific researchers at Yellowstone remain interested in 
the discovery of new forms of life and in the valuable in-
formation associated with such research. While Lewis and 
Clark identified  new plants and  new animals never 
before seen by inhabitants of European origin from east of 
the Mississippi during their historic – expedition, 
the discovery of new life continues in unexpected places 
like Yellowstone’s hot springs that were first described 
by the early th century explorers as places where “Hell 
bubbled up”. With tools of science not available to th and 
earlier th century explorers of the area, contemporary 
scientific researchers are beginning to open windows on 
the heretofore unexplored microbiological worlds found 
among the , thermal features at Yellowstone.
Discovery of Thermus aquaticus
Much of the first  years of research on thermophilic 
(heat-loving) life at Yellowstone tended to focus on trying 
to identify the upper temperature limits of different forms 
of life, and much of that research was based on what could 
be seen by the naked eye. The early “color-temperature” 
correlation observations of some th century scientists 
working at Yellowstone were being refined throughout 
the th century by observations made by many other 
scientists working with the benefit of accumulated data 
and increasingly sophisticated equipment. For example, 
as a result of these ongoing studies at Yellowstone and 
elsewhere, by the early s it was believed that the 
optimum temperature limit for thermophilic bacteria was 
°C, while the upper temperature limit for life was °C 
(K ).
In the mid-s, Professor Thomas Brock, who was 
then working at Indiana University, undertook a series of 
studies on the distribution of photosynthetic microorgan-
isms in the thermal gradients that flowed gently out of 
several hot springs at Yellowstone. During his studies, 
Brock observed that while the upper temperature limit of 
photosynthetic life clearly appeared to be around °C, 
there was evidence of life in the flow of some springs 
where the water was much hotter. At Octopus Spring, 
for example, Brock observed pink filaments alive with 
bacteria in waters with temperatures ranging as high as 
°C (dramatically suggesting the existence of life above 
the commonly accepted upper temperature limit) (B 
). This simple observation opened the door to the pos-
sibility that other types of nonphotosynthetic organisms 
might be discovered alive at Yellowstone at temperatures 
and in conditions previously unknown to support life.
On  September , Brock collected a sample of 
bacteria from Yellowstone’s Mushroom Spring which 
he subsequently isolated, cultured, and named Thermus 
aquaticus. Brock identified the culture of T. aquaticus as 
–. While Brock’s cultures of T. aquaticus grew best at 
around °C, cultures also grew at temperatures as high 
as °C (clearly surpassing the previously assumed upper-
temperature-limit of °C) (B ).
Significantly, Brock’s observations of T. aquaticus 
were not limited just to temperature or other environmental 
factors. Laboratory analyses also led to new observations 
about the organism’s characteristics. For example, Brock 
knew that most of the heat-loving bacteria that had been 
described by earlier researchers belonged to a group of 
spore-forming bacteria that produced heat-resistant spores. 
Brock’s studies of T. aquaticus revealed that the organism 
did not produce spores. This suggested that T. aquaticus 
was some form of life that had not been discovered previ-
ously. Based on taxonomic methods, Brock concluded that 
it was a member of a genus of organisms not previously 
known to science (B and F ).
The discovery, isolation, and culturing of T. aquaticus 
at Yellowstone effectively lifted the lid on human under-
standing (and curiosity) about the upper temperature 
limits of life. Thereafter, Brock identified the existence 
of an abundance of previously unknown microscopic life 
in boiling waters at Yellowstone (water boils at .°C at 
Yellowstone because of the altitude). With a microscope, 
he was able to see bacteria alive on glass slides that had 
been immersed in hot springs located in various places 
throughout the park.
While observations dating back to the th century 
suggested that the colorful formations surrounding many 
thermal features at Yellowstone indicated the presence of 
life, Brock’s discovery of life too small to see in waters too 
hot to touch confirmed that the diversity of life protected by 
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the park (but still unexplored) was far greater than anyone 
had imagined. Since the discovery of T. aquaticus in , 
many other previously unknown organisms have been dis-
covered thriving in Yellowstone’s thermal environments. 
Some scientists now estimate that perhaps less than one 
percent of all the organisms living in Yellowstone’s thermal 
features have been discovered and identified to date.
Taq and PCR
In the s, scientists from the Cetus Corporation were 
conducting research on ways to replicate . Their work 
ultimately resulted in development of the polymerase chain 
reaction (). A polymerase is an enzyme that replicates 
. By incorporating the -copying activity of the 
polymerase,  permits the duplication of batches of  
from only tiny samples, a development so important to 
science that its discoverers were awarded a Nobel Prize. 
Now,  is used in a host of important applications rang-
ing from diagnosing diseases to identifying criminals from 
their  fingerprints.
The early  experiments were not satisfactory, 
however, because the polymerase that was being used 
by the Cetus scientists was unable to withstand the heat 
required by the  process. The researchers theorized that 
perhaps a thermophilic microorganism could produce a 
thermostable enzyme that could tolerate the heat used in 
the  process and thereby fix the problem. Accordingly, 
they ordered samples of T. aquaticus (–) from the  
that had been collected at Yellowstone and deposited by 
Brock approximately  years earlier.
From a sample of the – culture of T. aquaticus, 
the Cetus scientists identified and isolated a heat-stable 
enzyme that they named Taq polymerase. Subsequently, 
they discovered that incorporating the Taq polymerase into 
the  process satisfactorily fixed the “overheating” prob-
lem, which meant that the  process could efficiently 
replicate  as desired.  patents were awarded to the 
scientists in  on Taq polymerase and in  on the 
 process.11
The value of the  process was quickly recognized, 
and in  the patent rights were acquired by the phar-
maceutical firm Hoffmann-LaRoche for a sum widely re-
ported to be in excess of  million .12 Subsequent 
revenues earned by Hoffmann-LaRoche from licensing 
rights to the use of  technology are estimated in excess 
of  billion  and growing.
The importance of the research involving T. aquati-
cus and the Taq polymerase was summarized in  in 
Congressional testimony offered by D. Allan Bromley 
(then Director of the White House Office of Science 
and Technology Policy and Science Advisor to President 
George H.W. Bush):
Different kinds of research and development tend to have 
different kinds of returns. With basic research—the ma-
jority of which is done by individual scientists and small 
groups of scientists at universities—it is very difficult to 
predict when, where, and to whom the returns will eventu-
ally accrue. Yet even work that can seem highly abstract 
can have surprisingly immediate impacts. To take just one 
example, in  Thomas Brock, a microbiologist at the 
University of Wisconsin, discovered a form of bacteria 
in the thermal vents of Yellowstone that can survive at 
very high temperature. From these bacteria an enzyme 
was extracted that is stable at near-boiling temperatures. 
Nearly two decades later this enzyme proved to be vital 
in the process known as the polymerase chain reaction, 
which is used to duplicate specific pieces of DNA. Today, 
PCR is the basis of a multimillion dollar business with 
applications ranging from the rapid diagnosis of disease 
to forensic medicine.13
The success associated with Taq was coupled with ad-
ditional reports of other important biological discoveries 
at Yellowstone. The more scientists learned, the more it 
appeared that the extreme environments characterized by 
Yellowstone’s thermal features comprised a hothouse full 
of undiscovered microorganisms with many new poten-
tially valuable uses precisely because of their ability to 
withstand such extreme conditions (M and M 
). Although there was no definitive comprehensive 
report of all of the valuable discoveries associated with 
research involving Yellowstone’s microbial resources, 
some journalists reported multiple applications that in-
cluded development of new bioremediation technologies, 
“clean” fuels research, and uses involving paper, textiles, 
and plastics.14 Other potentially valuable applications also 
were sometimes identified in scientific papers relating to 
the initial discovery, identification, and isolation of new 
microorganisms at Yellowstone. Taken together, these 
developments suggested that Yellowstone ranked as high 
as some other celebrated environments as a source of still 
undiscovered valuable biological information.
As a result of the research interest in the biological 
materials being discovered in Yellowstone’s extreme ther-
mal environments, the park was asked by the Director of 
the National Park Service to explore development of a 
pilot “benefit-sharing” program. Such a program would 
supplement permitted research use of research specimens 
collected at the park (with special focus on developing 
and implementing a cooperative research mechanism 
that would allow the park to benefit from any valuable 
discoveries resulting from research activities involving 
specimens already lawfully collected at ). The  
Director asked Yellowstone to take this action because of 
public perceptions (fueled in large measure by media re-
ports) that private sector entities were enjoying substantial 
economic and scientific benefits from research involving 
Yellowstone resources without sharing those benefits for 
the conservation of the park.
Not unlike the early th century explorers who were 
amazed by the rich diversity of megafauna such as bear, 
elk, and bison found in the Yellowstone area, the recent and 
ongoing discovery of previously unknown microscopic life 
forms in Yellowstone’s hot springs has sparked a renais-
sance of scientific interest in the park. The rich diversity 
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of previously unknown life at Yellowstone is presenting 
important new opportunities to manage scientific research 
activities that require access to genetic resources found at 
the park. By linking scientific and economic incentives 
associated with research activities with other incentives 
for conserving the park’s valuable biological diversity, 
Yellowstone is exploring ways that it can strengthen re-
search so that it also will rebound benefits to the park for 
sustainable resource conservation.
The Value of Biological Research and the Law
As knowledge and the tools of science have advanced, so 
too has the range of scientific inquiry at Yellowstone. When 
Professor Brock visited Yellowstone in the early-s, 
the definitive upper temperature limit of life was widely 
believed to be °C. Brock and his team of researchers 
at Yellowstone, however, were making observations that 
suggested that some forms of life appeared to thrive at 
higher temperatures—observations that ultimately led to 
the discovery of T. aquaticus.
It is simple to see that the more detail that Brock and 
his team learned about the newly discovered organism, 
the greater would be the value associated with their dis-
coveries and ongoing research program. The term “value” 
does not necessarily imply monetary or economic value. 
Discoveries as significant as T. aquaticus generally help a 
researcher’s appeals for funding and other support, often 
simply as part of the natural fall-out of a successful project. 
Nonetheless, it was the connection between the discoveries 
associated with the isolation of the Taq polymerase and its 
utility in the  process that generated the multimillion 
dollar revenues that in turn generated the headline-making 
news.15 Typically, economic value attaches to discoveries 
that have some “useful” application in human society; the 
use of Taq in the development of  technology is but one 
of countless examples. Likewise, value rarely attaches to 
discoveries or other forms of creativity that simply are not 
useful in human society.
The value of such discoveries in biological research 
was recognized (and effectively amplified) by a landmark 
ruling of the  Supreme Court in . The case con-
cerned the question of whether inventions that relate to 
certain “living things” are eligible for protection under the 
 patent law. While the scientific value of advancing de-
velopments in biological research was clearly recognized 
and not in dispute, the issue of whether the economic value 
that attaches to inventions as a result of patent protection 
turned on the Court’s decision. In retrospect, the case is 
seen as having provided the legal foundation for the phe-
nomenal growth and development of the biotech industry 
in the  since the early s.
The case (Diamond v. Chakrabarty) concerned a patent 
application filed in  by a microbiologist who asserted 
 claims related to a genetically engineered “bacterium 
from the genus Pseudomonas containing therein at least 
two stable energy-generating plasmids, each of said 
plasmids providing a separate hydrocarbon degradative 
pathway”.16 The Court’s ruling in Chakrabarty, which 
held that a human-made living microorganism is patent-
able subject matter under  patent law, was based on 
the Court’s interpretation of the language of the patent 
statute. Commencing with a review of the legislative his-
tory of the Patent Act of  that was drafted by Thomas 
Jefferson, the Court noted that the patent law defined pat-
entable statutory subject matter as “any new and useful 
art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new or useful improvement [thereof]”17 and reflected 
Jefferson’s view that “ingenuity should receive a liberal 
encouragement”.18
From the Court’s rationale, the focus of relevant 
inquiry for purposes of determining whether something 
“biological” qualifies as patentable “subject matter” under 
Section  of the  patent statute is shifted away from 
the simple question, “Is it living?” Instead, the Court’s 
rationale in Chakrabarty placed controlling emphasis on 
whether the living matter is the result of the intervention 
of human ingenuity and creativity.
The Court noted that Mr. Chakrabarty had “produced 
a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics 
from any found in nature and one having the potential 
for significant utility… not nature’s handiwork, but his 
own”.19 Therefore, the Court ruled, “it is patentable sub-
ject matter” under Section  of the  patent statute.20 
Elsewhere, still focusing on legislative intent, the Court 
reemphasized: “Congress thus recognized that the relevant 
distinction was not between living and inanimate things, 
but between products of nature, whether living or not, and 
human-made inventions”.21
The  Supreme Court’s ruling in Chakrabarty 
paved the way under the existing  patent statute for 
new patent claims on biological “inventions,” which in 
turn accelerated development of the economic benefits 
that attach to useful patented discoveries.22 The Court’s 
rationale also emphasized that the “value” in biological 
discoveries recognized and protected by the patent statute 
resides in beneficial research results, not in naturally occur-
ring phenomena “free to all men and reserved exclusively 
to none”.23
Applying the rule announced by the Court in Chakra-
barty, the  Patent and Trademark Office () has 
explained that “it is clear from the Supreme Court decision 
and opinion that the question of whether or not an invention 
embraces living matter is irrelevant to the issue of patent-
ability”, emphasizing that “the test set down by the Court 
for patentable subject matter in this area is whether the 
living matter is the result of human intervention”.24
 also has explained that it “will decide the ques-
tions as to patentable subject matter under    on 
a case-by-case basis following the tests set forth in Chak-
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rabarty, e.g., that ‘a nonnaturally occurring manufacture 
or composition of matter’ is patentable, etc.”, emphasiz-
ing that “it is inappropriate to try to attempt to set forth 
here [ policy guidance on patentability of living 
subject matter] in advance of the exact parameters to be 
followed”.25
Not surprisingly, the number of patents pertaining 
to “living subject matter” approved by the  in-
creased dramatically after the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Chakrabarty. For example, only one patent was ap-
proved by  in  (the year before the ruling in 
Chakrabarty) for a Class  invention (“Multicellular 
Living Organisms and Unmodified Parts Thereof and 
Related Processes”).26 A decade later,  Class  pat-
ents were approved.27 By , the number had increased 
dramatically to , after which it rose to  in  and 
then leapt to  in .28 Similar trends occurred in Class 
 (“Chemistry: Molecular Biology and Microbiology”) 
even though substantially more Class  patents already 
were being approved before Chakrabarty. In , the  
Supreme Court also ruled that plant varieties are eligible 
for protection by utility patents issued pursuant to   
, as well as under the Plant Patent Act of  (  
 et seq.) and the Plant Variety Protection Act of  
(   et seq.).29
The distinction between what the law rewards (new, 
useful, and nonobvious discoveries based on research re-
sults) and what the law protects (naturally occurring life 
forms that remain free for all to use) is at the core of the 
biodiversity prospecting access and benefit-sharing issues 
first pioneered in the  at Yellowstone.30
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The search for potentially useful biological compounds in 
Nature (sometimes popularly referred to as “biodiversity 
prospecting” or “bioprospecting”) involves two distinct 
sets of issues: access to biological resources and benefit 
sharing. Issues relating to access concern the terms and 
conditions associated with collection and sampling of bio-
logical research specimens. These issues also may relate 
to the purpose underlying collection and sampling, or to 
how the research specimens are to be used. Issues relating 
to benefit sharing concern the terms and conditions under 
which the provider of biological research specimens may be 
positioned to share in the beneficial results of research in-
volving biological specimens provided to a research user.
While research specimen collection and related sci-
entific research activities in  national parks certainly 
is not new, the  Congress enacted a law in  that 
mandated increased scientific research in the national 
parks and use of the results of scientific study in park 
management decisions.31 The new law encourages the 
development of cooperative research initiatives between 
individual national parks and scientific researchers (public 
as well as private), and mandates the integration of research 
results into park management decisions. It also mandates 
development of long-term inventory and monitoring ac-
tivities that provide baseline information and document 
trends relating to the condition of resources protected by 
the national parks. Implementation of these new statutory 
directives clearly can accelerate cooperative development 
and management of the wealth of biological resource in-
formation flowing from Yellowstone’s hot springs as well 
as from other national parks.
By linking scientific and economic incentives asso-
ciated with research activities with other incentives for 
conserving valuable biological diversity, research initia-
tives can encourage sustainable resource conservation and 
management in accordance with the new mandates enacted 
by Congress in the National Parks Omnibus Management 
Act of . Effective implementation of these provisions, 
however, requires clear focus on the two sets of core is-
sues that relate to biodiversity prospecting: access and 
benefit sharing.
Access
Access to the biological resources of  national parks 
for research purposes is governed by  regulations. 
The  research specimen collection permit regulations 
have been implemented since , and permits for the 
collection of research specimens throughout the  are 
issued routinely.32 Issuance of an  research specimen 
collection permit is based on a determination by a park su-
perintendent that “public health and safety, environmental 
or scenic values, natural or cultural resources, scientific 
research, implementation of management responsibilities, 
proper allocation and use of facilities, or the avoidance of 
conflict among visitor use activities will not be adversely 
impacted” by issuance of a permit.33 Based on public com-
ments filed at the time the regulations were promulgated, 
 concluded that these determinations are “adequate to 
ensure protection of park resources”.34
A park superintendent’s express regulatory authority 
to issue permits for the collection of research specimens 
(with terms and conditions deemed necessary to protect 
park resources) provides the mechanism for each  
unit to govern access to its own biological resources for 
research purposes. “Permit” is defined under the regula-
tions to mean “a written authorization to engage in uses 
or activities that are otherwise prohibited, restricted, or 
regulated”.35 The regulations also provide that a superin-
tendent “shall include in a permit the terms and conditions 
that the superintendent deems necessary to protect park 
resources”.36 Collection of any biological material in an 
 unit without a permit is strictly prohibited.
 regulations provide that specimen collection 
permits 
may be issued only to an official representative of a 
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reputable scientific or educational institution or a State 
or Federal agency for the purpose of research, baseline 
inventories, monitoring, impact analysis, group study, 
or museum display when the superintendent determines 
that the collection is necessary to the stated scientific or 
resource management goals of the institution or agency 
and that all applicable Federal and State permits have 
been acquired, and that the intended use of the specimens 
and their final disposal is in accordance with applicable 
law and Federal administrative policies.37
The regulations do not discriminate against for-profit 
or other corporate research firms provided they engage in 
reputable scientific research activities. This reflects the 
reality that some of the very best science is practiced by 
private corporations while some of the most entrepreneur-
ial research activities are carried out by universities and 
other academic institutions.
Permits are issued after a researcher has submitted a 
permit application that provides the information required 
by the park and is deemed by the park superintendent to 
be consistent with the park’s mission, applicable regula-
tions (particularly   .), and  policy. The permit 
application process helps ensure that the permit applicant 
discloses the information required to enable the park to 
determine that the proposed research activities are consis-
tent with  regulations and policy38 (Figure ).
In the review of applications for research projects,  
considers it a “favorable” characteristic if the proposed 
research
• Contributes information useful to an increased un-
derstanding of park resources, and thereby contrib-
utes to effective management and/or interpretation 
of park resources;
• Provides for scheduled sharing of information with 
park staff, including any manuscripts, publications, 
maps, databases, etc., which the researcher is will-
ing to share;
• Addresses problems or questions of importance to 
science or society and shows promise of making an 
important contribution to humankind’s knowledge 
of the subject matter;
• Involves a principal investigator and support team 
with a record of accomplishments in the proposed 
field of investigation and a demonstrated ability to 
work cooperatively and safely and to accomplish 
the desired tasks within a reasonable time frame;
• Provides for the investigator(s) to prepare occa-
sional summaries of findings for public use, such 
as seminars and brochures;
• Minimizes disruption to the park’s natural and 
cultural resources, park operations, and visitors;
• Discusses plans for the cataloging and care of col-
lected specimens;
• Clearly anticipates logistical needs and provides 
detail about provisions for meeting those needs; or
• Is supported academically and financially, making 
it highly likely that all fieldwork, analyses, and re-
porting will be completed within a reasonable time 
frame.39
 considers it “unfavorable” for a permit review, if 
the proposed research
• Involves activities that adversely affect the experi-
ences of park visitors;
• Shows potential for adverse impact on the park’s 
natural, cultural, or scenic resources, and particular-
ly to nonrenewable resources such as archeological 
and fossil sites or special-status species (the entire 
range of adverse impacts that will be considered 
also includes construction and support activities, 
trash disposal, trail conditions, and mechanized 
equipment use in sensitive areas);
• Shows potential for creating high risk of hazard to 
the researchers, other park visitors, or environments 
adjacent to the park;
• Involves extensive collecting of natural materials 
or unnecessary replication of existing voucher 
collections;
• Requires substantial logistical, administrative, 
curatorial, or project monitoring support by park 
staff, or provides insufficient lead time to allow 
necessary review and consultation;
• Is to be conducted by a principal investigator lacking 
scientific institutional affiliation and/or recognized 
experience conducting scientific research; or
• Lacks adequate scientific detail and justification to 
support the study objectives and methods.40
Currently, as part of the research permit terms, sci-
entists are required to submit a yearly summary of their 
park research activities, known as an Investigator’s Annual 
Report. In addition, copies of field notes and scientific 
publications may be required by the park.
Microbial research projects at Yellowstone require ac-
cess to the government-owned biological resources that are 
controlled by these research specimen permit regulations. 
There have been approximately  research projects per-
mitted annually at Yellowstone since the mid-s that 
cover a wide range of natural resource subjects. Not all 
of these projects involve the collection of biological or 
other natural resource samples from the park for research 
purposes. In , there were more than  research 
projects relating to thermophilic microbial resources at 
Yellowstone that involved the issuance of research speci-
men collection permits.
Projects also benefit from cooperative guidance and 
data provided by the Yellowstone Center for Resources 
in connection with resource-relevant information for the 
researcher. Researchers are frequently accompanied in the 
field by Yellowstone staff, who monitor specimen collec-
tion procedures and provide assistance on information 
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relevant to the specific research project. This assistance 
from the park often makes the best use of research time 
and resources. Likewise, Yellowstone benefits from the 
researchers’ own research-relevant information (some of 
which may be proprietary and protected by Federal intel-
lectual property laws).
There is an important distinction between “sale or com-
mercial use” of natural products collected from national 
parks (which is prohibited under   .(c)()(v)) and 
the discovery of valuable useful applications from “re-
search results” that could bring the park potential benefits 
(whether commercialized or not). The facts and circum-
stances surrounding permitted research at Yellowstone and 
throughout the  system reflect this important distinc-
tion. This distinction also has been upheld as valid by the 
federal judiciary.41 Significantly, the standardized permit 
terms and conditions also specify that collected specimens 
remain  property.42
There are several additional important standardized 
research specimen collection permit terms and conditions 
that relate specifically to access issues. First, the permits 
provide that permittees shall comply with all applicable 
 and other federal and state laws and regulations, and 
that “[n]o specimens (including materials) may be col-
lected unless authorized on the Scientific Research and 
Collecting permit”.43 Second, the permits prohibit unau-
thorized third-party transfers of any specimens collected, 
which effectively limits legitimate access to  resources 
that have been collected to specifically authorized persons 
only. Third, the permits require that “[c]ollection methods 
shall not attract undue attention or cause unapproved dam-
age, depletion, or disturbance to the environment and other 
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Figure .  Standardized Review Procedures for Scientific Research and Collecting Permit Applications. The chart illustrates 
the general order of decision making and the major criteria used to accept or reject a permit application. The Internet-accessible 
 National Park Service Research Permit and Reporting System webpage describes the review procedures in full detail (http:
//science.nature.nps.gov/permits/index.html). The procedures were made standardized and Internet accessible in January .
1.  encourages researchers interested in natural 
resource or social science research in a unit of the 
National Park System to submit an application 
for a permit.
2. The requestor obtains the application packet 
and related information that could affect the 
researcher on the Internet at the web site listed 
below or by corresponding with the park in which 
the applicant wishes to work.
3. Establish a file of the application.
4. Estimate the turn-around time for application 
review. Notify the applicant if the review is ex-
pected to take longer than 90 days.
5. Review application and proposal for: scientific 
validity; researcher and institutional qualifica-
tions; benefit to the park service and the public; 
actual or potential impacts to park resources, 
visitor experiences, wilderness, safety, and other 
issues; and possible need for other federal or state 
permits or approvals. Depending on the park and 
the content of the proposal, there may be various 
levels of review in the park and possible outside 
peer review.
Once a park has received a completed 
application through the Internet or by 
other means, park staff will:
6. The permit could be denied at this stage (or 
recommendations for denial or acceptance could 
be prepared for review).
7. Assess proposal for potential impact under 
 guidelines. Categorically exclude proposal 
or recommend that further analysis is required.
8. Consider total potential benefits against poten-
tial impacts and risks.
9. Make recommendation to Superintendent or 
designee to approve or reject the permit request.
10. If application approved, send permit and 
attached conditions (including requirement for 
annual accomplishment report) to applicant for 
signature.
11. If application rejected, notify applicant of 
denial decision and identify reasons for denial. 
(In most cases, an opportunity for revising and 
resubmitting the application is possible.)
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park resources, such as historic sites”.44 Fourth, the per-
mits stipulate that research results derived from collected 
specimens must be used for scientific and educational 
purposes only and may not be used commercially unless 
the permittee has entered into a Cooperative Research 
and Development Agreement () or other approved 
benefit-sharing agreement with the .45
In addition to the regulations and specified permit terms 
and conditions,  policy concerning access to national 
park resources is further articulated by the  Director. 
The  Management Policies is the basic Service-wide 
policy document of the National Park Service, and is the 
highest of three levels of guidance documents in the  
Directives System. Interim updates or amendments may 
be accomplished through Director’s Orders (the second 
level of the  Directives System), which also serve as a 
vehicle to clarify or supplement  Management Policies 
to meet the needs of  managers. The most detailed and 
comprehensive guidance on implementing Service-wide 
policy is usually in the form of handbooks or reference 
manuals issued by associate directors (the third level of 
the  Directives System).
Instructions, guidance, and directives for regional or 
otherwise limited application supplementary to and in 
conformance with Service-wide policies may be issued 
by regional directors or associate directors with formal 
delegations of authority. Superintendents may issue, within 
formal delegations of authority, park-specific instructions, 
procedures, directives, and other supplementary guidance 
(such as permit terms and conditions), provided the guid-
ance does not conflict with Service-wide policy.
Chapter  of the   Management Policies 
(“Natural Resource Management”) provides that  
“will preserve the natural resources, processes, systems, 
and values of units of the national park system in an un-
impaired condition” pursuant to the  Organic Act, the 
National Parks Omnibus Management Act of , the 
National Environmental Policy Act (), and other 
laws, and summarizes  policies relating to studies and 
collections,46 independent studies,47 and collections as-
sociated with development of commercial products.48 In 
addition, Chapter  (“Use of the Parks”) of the   
Management Policies provides that “[s]tudies, research, 
and collection activities by non- personnel involving 
natural and cultural resources will be encouraged and fa-
cilitated when they otherwise comport with  policies”, 
and that “[s]cientific activities that involve field work or 
specimen collection… require a permit issued by the 
superintendent that prescribes appropriate conditions for 
protecting park resources, visitors, and operations”.49
While it is illegal to collect any biological material 
directly from a  National Park without a proper per-
mit, acquisition of samples from culture collections50 has 
sometimes been attractive to researchers because they are 
assured of obtaining “pure cultures” (albeit not directly 
from a national park). Culture collections also can pro-
vide an ex situ source for biological material that in some 
cases can help minimize the demands for in situ sampling 
at the parks.
Historically, culture collections have distributed 
biological materials collected from Yellowstone without 
coordination with the park or the . This situation has 
effectively allowed researchers from industry as well as 
academia to circumvent  research specimen collection 
regulations. It has also effectively removed the parks from 
any benefit-sharing opportunities. For example, the Cetus 
Corporation (developer of the Nobel Prize–winning multi-
million-dollar  technology) acquired the now legendary 
sample of Yellowstone’s T. aquaticus from  and not 
directly from the park.
In the past, Yellowstone and other national parks have 
not been positioned to monitor or benefit from third-party 
use of their natural resources acquired indirectly.  is 
evaluating steps to require culture collections to regulate 
distribution of any biological materials collected from 
national parks to ensure that all potential recipients un-
derstand that their use of such samples must be in accord 
with the policies that govern use of samples collected di-
rectly from a national park. There also are opportunities for 
national parks to develop more substantive joint research 
activities with culture collections concerning discovery, 
identification, and ex situ conservation of biological re-
sources that could be of benefit.
Yellowstone-Diversa Agreement and 
Benefit Sharing
Despite the phenomenal success resulting from the 
chain of useful scientific discoveries that flowed directly 
back to the initial discovery by Brock of T. aquaticus in 
Yellowstone’s Mushroom Spring, Yellowstone never was 
positioned to share any of the benefits that resulted from 
the isolation of the Taq polymerase and its successful use 
and development in  technology. Nonetheless, the dis-
covery of T. aquaticus at Yellowstone, the identification 
and isolation of the Taq polymerase, and the successful 
use of Taq in the development of  technology is one 
of the classic examples of the contemporary utility of bio-
prospecting—the search for potentially useful biological 
compounds in nature.
Several observers noted the parallels between 
Yellowstone’s situation and the use of biological samples 
acquired from rainforests and other tropical habitats around 
the world by many research firms. Not surprisingly, how-
ever, the large economic gains resulting from the success-
ful research activities involving samples of T. aquaticus 
first acquired from Yellowstone prompted some alarming 
headlines such as “Industries Exploit First Park”.51 The 
most astute observers also noted that some of these places 
(such as Costa Rica) already were beginning to take steps 
to capture and reinvest some research benefits in ways that 
would yield future conservation dividends.
As public awareness and interest in the issue grew, 
Yellowstone began to evaluate different ways by which 
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it might respond. Yellowstone staff convened a series of 
public meetings attended by National Park Service staff, 
academic and industry researchers, conservation interests, 
and journalists. As a result of this ongoing evaluation of 
the issue by Yellowstone staff, some opportunities for 
initiating a pilot bioprospecting benefit-sharing project 
began to emerge. In addition, the Director of the National 
Park Service also asked Yellowstone in July  to begin 
to take some concrete steps that would position the park 
to share in the benefits of research activities in a way 
that would not chill research and that might serve as an 
example for other parks facing the same issue. As with 
so many other resource-related issues since its founding, 
Yellowstone was presented with an historic conservation 
opportunity.
In response to the  Director’s request, Yellowstone 
evaluated use of the Department of the Interior’s estab-
lished guidelines for negotiation of s to address the 
benefit-sharing issue. A  is defined by the Federal 
Technology Transfer Act () of  as “any agree-
ment between one or more Federal laboratories and one 
or more non-Federal parties under which the Government, 
through its laboratories, provides personnel, services, 
facilities, equipment or other resources with or without 
reimbursement (but not funds to non-Federal parties) and 
the non-Federal parties provide funds, personnel, services, 
facilities, equipment, or other resources toward the conduct 
of specified research or development efforts which are 
consistent with the mission of the laboratory”.52 By enter-
ing into a , Federal and non-Federal partners can 
optimize their mix of resources to undertake cooperative 
research activities equitably and efficiently.
For  purposes, the statute defines the term 
Federal “laboratory” to mean “a facility or group of 
facilities owned, leased, or otherwise used by a Federal 
agency, a substantial purpose of which is the performance 
of research, development, or engineering by employees of 
the Federal Government”. The statute also gives Federal 
agencies broad discretion relating to laboratory determina-
tions. The Senate Report that accompanied Congressional 
approval of the Federal Technology Transfer Act of  
also explains that “this is a broad definition which is in-
tended to include the widest possible range of research 
institutions operated by the Federal Government”.53 It 
also states:
To improve technology transfer, the Federal laboratories 
need clear authority to do cooperative research, and they 
need to be able to exercise that authority at the labora-
tory level. Agencies need to delegate to their labora-
tory directors the authority to manage and promote the 
results of their research. A requirement to go to agency 
headquarters for approval of industry collaborative 
arrangements and patent licensing agreements can ef-
fectively prevent them. Lengthy headquarters approval 
delays can cause businesses to lose interest in developing 
new technologies.54
The Department of the Interior’s  policy was 
outlined in May  in the handbook entitled Technology 
Transfer: Marketing Our Products and Technologies (A 
Training Handbook for the  Department of the Interior). 
While the research specimen permits that are issued under 
  . govern access to Yellowstone’s biological re-
sources for research purposes, s provide one type of 
framework that can be used to structure a benefit-sharing 
arrangement.55 Significantly, the  Senate Report sug-
gests that the  Congress believed when it enacted the 
 statute that prospective and unknown future benefits 
associated with research activities (which are particularly 
characteristic of bioprospecting activities) are matters to 
be negotiated by the parties themselves:
Often, collaboration between a laboratory and some 
other organization can be expected to lead to future 
inventions. All parties should be clear on who will have 
what rights to future inventions when the work begins. 
This amendment [codified at  USC § a(b)()] al-
lows Federal laboratories to assign rights in future inven-
tions to the cooperating, outside parties. It is anticipated 
that agencies will normally retain for the Government a 
paid license to use or have future inventions used in the 
Government’s behalf.56
On  August , Yellowstone announced that it had 
reached agreement on a bioprospecting benefit-sharing ar-
rangement with Diversa Corporation, an enzyme discovery 
firm headquartered in San Diego, California. The agree-
ment was reviewed by the  Director and finalized in 
May  (Box ). This first ever bioprospecting benefit-
sharing agreement involving a national park in the  
positioned Yellowstone to share in future economic and 
scientific benefits that might result from Diversa’s research 
involving microorganisms collected at Yellowstone’s hot 
springs and other thermal features. The agreement grand-
fathered in all of the biological material that Diversa sci-
entists had collected at Yellowstone pursuant to permits 
before the benefit-sharing agreement was negotiated, as 
well as derivatives and other results that might flow from 
Diversa research involving the material.
In addition, the -Diversa  provided a package 
of revenue-sharing mechanisms that included a combined 
up-front payment (“creditable minimum annual royalty”) 
to the park of ,  over five years, additional 
annual earned royalties based on a percentage of revenues 
generated by Diversa from Yellowstone-related research 
results, and supplemental in-kind contributions of labo-
ratory equipment, scientific training, and other research 
and conservation related activities. While the term of the 
 was for an initial five-year period, the agreement 
also provided that the benefit-sharing obligations survived 
termination (very important since development of valuable 
discoveries can sometimes take many years to achieve).
The royalty rates and related payment information con-
tained in the -Diversa agreement relate specifically 
to Diversa’s commercial and pricing interests in products 
that may be derived from research results involving bio-
logical samples acquired from the park. The rates were 
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the result of negotiations involving confidential business 
proprietary information obtained from Diversa, which 
advised Yellowstone that disclosure of this information 
would harm the company’s commercial interests inasmuch 
as it relates to cost issues that are relevant to Diversa’s 
pricing policies. Diversa also advised Yellowstone that it 
does not release this information to the public because 
of its pricing sensitivity. In light of this, the specific roy-
alty rates were treated as confidential information under 
Exemption  of the Federal Freedom of Information Act.57 
Yellowstone did disclose, however, that the rates ranged 
from between . and % of net revenues58 earned by 
Diversa on research results involving biological samples 
acquired from the park.
The agreement did not expand the scope of authorized 
research specimen sampling activities at Yellowstone. The 
fundamental rules of access were not changed;59 but the 
agreement did provide for the sharing of benefits result-
ing from Diversa’s Yellowstone-related research activi-
ties—and that was something new.60
The -Diversa  was challenged in federal 
court in early . After review, the federal judiciary 
upheld the  as consistent with the National Park 
Service Organic Act, the Yellowstone National Park 
Organic Act, the Federal Technology Transfer Act of , 
 regulations, and the “public trust doctrine”.61 The court 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS
This Cooperative Research and Development Agreement 
(“”) is entered into by and between Diversa Corporation 
(“Collaborator”), a corporation organized under the laws of 
Delaware and maintaining its principal corporate office 
headquarters at  Sorrento Valley Road, San Diego, 
California, , and Yellowstone National Park () of the 
National Park Service (),  Department of the Interior.
,  and Collaborator wish to engage in co-
operative activities to promote the conservation, protection, 
perpetuation, and management of biological diversity while 
undertaking scientific research and investigating potentially 
useful applications and processes that might be derived 
from research on certain biological materials existing in 
; and
, it is the intention of  to improve the con-
servation, management, protection, and perpetuation of park 
resources to the fullest extent possible consistent with their 
mandate to conserve the scenery, natural and historic ob-
jects, and wildlife, so as to leave them unimpaired for future 
generations; and 
, it is the intention of  to cooperate in activi-
ties that benefit scientific research within the areas adminis-
tered by them; and
,  coordinates research activities, facilitates 
the exchange of research-related information pertaining to the 
natural resources found at , and promotes the opportunity 
to conduct symposiums and develop publications about such 
research, which will be supported by the cooperative research 
activities authorized by this ; and
, Collaborator is dedicated to the discovery and 
development of new bioactive materials for chemical syn-
thesis, diagnostics, industrial and pharmaceutical uses, and 
agrees to cooperate with  to undertake beneficial scientific 
research relating to certain biological materials existing in 
, to share information and data relating to such research, 
and to protect and monitor those materials and other resources 
in ; and 
, Collaborator agrees to apply the highest profes-
sional and scientific standards in its research and development 
activities, and to pursue the discovery and development of 
new bioactive materials that advance humanitarian goals and 
the public welfare; and
, Collaborator agrees that efforts by the  to 
protect the physical, hydrological, and ecological integrity of 
’s thermal features, hot springs, and geysers, all of which 
contain globally unique microbial ecosystems, contributes 
significantly to the research and development of useful 
discoveries; and
, Collaborator further agrees that the aforesaid 
protection of ’s microbial resources requires sophisticated 
interdisciplinary scientific work by  staff and dedicated 
effort by  management, including working with neighbor-
ing jurisdictions to ensure protection of the thermal features, 
hot springs, and geysers; and
,  agrees that Collaborator has incurred and 
will continue to incur significant time, effort and expense in 
research and development and management of technology 
which will facilitate the research and development of use-
ful discoveries from samples received from  under this 
; and
,  further agrees that the aforementioned 
research, development and management of technology has 
required highly sophisticated, interdisciplinary work by 
Collaborator’s staff and management; and
,  further agrees and recognizes that 
Collaborator has a capability to discover useful products 
from samples obtained from  under this  utilizing 
Collaborator’s proprietary technologies; and
, it is recognized that  derives national dignity 
and recognition of superb environmental quality through its 
inclusion in the National Park System preserved and man-
aged for the benefit and inspiration of all the people of the 
United States, and the superlative natural microbial resources 
found in  may be considered invaluable and priceless in 
nature; and
, the aforesaid protection occurs at considerable 
annual expense to the taxpayers of the United States.
Now, therefore, in consideration of the promises contained 
in this agreement, the parties agree as follows:
Box 1. Cooperative Research and Development Agreement for a Project between Yellowstone 
National Park and Diversa Corporation (Text presented as it was actually executed by the 
parties, the referenced appendices are not provided here.)
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also noted that Section  of the National Parks Omnibus 
Management Act of , which was enacted after initial 
negotiation of the -Diversa , specifically au-
thorizes “negotiations with the research community and 
private industry for equitable, efficient benefits-sharing 
arrangements” involving  units.
Specifically, the court’s analysis concluded that  
units (such as Yellowstone) that satisfy the definition of a 
Federal “laboratory” as provided in the  are eligible 
to negotiate s with qualified researchers. However, 
the court also ruled that  is required to complete an 
analysis under  before the -Diversa  can 
be implemented.62 Therefore, the  was suspended 
pending a showing of  compliance. Thereafter, the 
court dismissed the plaintiffs’ case challenging the -
Diversa  with prejudice.63
Plaintiffs appealed the court’s decision upholding 
the -Diversa  under the National Park Service 
Organic Act, the Yellowstone National Park Organic Act, 
the Federal Technology Transfer Act of , and  
regulations in the  Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit. Following preparation and filing of 
’ brief in support of the district court’s ruling upholding 
the -Diversa , the plaintiffs asked the Federal 
appeals court to dismiss their appeal. The appeal was 
dismissed on  December .
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ARTICLE 1. LEGAL AUTHORITY
.. This agreement is authorized under the National Park 
Service Organic Act, as amended,   §§ -; and the Federal 
Technology Transfer Act, as amended,   §§ -.
.. Payments accepted and retained by  from Collaborator 
are authorized under   § a(b)().
ARTICLE 2. DEFINITIONS
.. The term “Background Intellectual Property” () 
refers to a patent or patent application covering an Invention 
or discovery of either party, or a copyrighted work, a mask 
work, trade secret, or trademark developed with separate 
funds outside of the  by one of the parties or with oth-
ers.  is not considered as a Subject Invention.
.. The term “Collaborator’s Assigned Employees” means 
those employees of the Collaborator who are present at  
for a continuous period of more than two weeks.
.. The term “Cooperative Research and Development 
Agreement” () means this document and all attach-
ments describing research activities jointly undertaken by 
 and the Collaborator.
.. The term “created” in relation to any copyrightable 
software work means when the work is fixed in any tangible 
medium of expression for the first time, as provided for at 
  § .
.. The term “Generated Information” means information 
produced in the performance of the .
.. The term “Industrial Products” means any product 
designed, developed or used in any process associated with 
manufacturing, agriculture, chemical products, commerce 
or industry. 
 .. The term “Intellectual Property” means patents, 
trademarks, copyrights, trade secrets, mask works, and 
other forms of comparable property protectable by federal, 
state, or foreign laws.
.. The term “Invention” means any invention or discovery 
that is or may be patentable or otherwise protected under 
Title  of the United States Code, or any novel variety of 
plant which is or may be protectable under the Plant Variety 
Protection Act (  §  et seq.).
.. The term “made” in relation to any Invention means 
the conception or first actual reduction to practice of such 
Invention.
.. The term “Native Enzymes” means any catalytic pro-
teins, not in a recombinant form, produced by living cells 
that mediate or promote chemical processes in living cells 
that originated from .
.. The term “Natural Products” means any naturally oc-
curring Research Specimen located in or taken from . 
.. The term “Net Sales” means the total gross receipts 
for sales by Collaborator, its licensees or sublicensees of 
Product(s) and copyrighted works created using the results 
of research under this , and from otherwise making 
Product(s) available to others without sale, whether invoiced 
or not, less returns and allowances actually granted, packing 
costs, insurance costs, freight out, taxes and excise duties 
imposed on the transaction (if separately invoiced), and the 
wholesaler and cash discounts in amounts customary in the 
trade. No deductions shall be made for commissions paid to 
individuals, whether they be with independent sales agen-
cies or regularly employed by Collaborator, its licensee or 
sublicensees, or for the cost of collections.
.. The term “Pharmaceutical Products” means “drug” 
as defined by the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act at 
  § (g).
.. The term “Product” means any Subject Invention and 
any commercially valuable or otherwise useful material, 
compound or useful combination of compounds, protein, 
or metabolite [which is encoded by a nucleotide sequence 
recovered, obtained, derived, resulting, or otherwise isolated 
from scientific research conducted] on a Research Specimen 
acquired from , or any derivative or analog of such mate-
rial, compound, protein, metabolite or other isolate, or any 
discovery which is or may be patentable or otherwise pro-
tected under Title  of the United States Code, or any novel 
variety of plant which is or may be protectable under the Plant 
Variety Protection Act (  §  et seq.) and developed 
from Research Specimens acquired from . 
.. The term “Proprietary Information” means trade 
secrets or commercial or financial information that is 
privileged or confidential within the meaning of   § 
(b)(), obtained in the conduct of research or as a result 
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In early  while the  was suspended, 
Diversa publicly announced that it had developed a new 
product from research specimens originally acquired from 
Yellowstone. The product development is significant be-
cause it represents one of the world’s only examples where 
a company has brought a new product to market after it 
negotiated a benefit-sharing agreement with the provider 
of the original biological resources. Diversa has pledged 
payment of all royalties due provided that the agree-
ment suspension is cleared. Also, it should be noted that 
Yellowstone has not spent any of the initial , . 
The funds are being held in escrow and will be kept until 
completion of the environmental impact study conducted 
in compliance with the court’s decision.
As a result of the cooperative research activities initi-
ated under the , Diversa also contributed important 
genetic identification services to Yellowstone in connection 
with the park’s management of its recently reintroduced 
wolf population. This research work was considered by 
Yellowstone to be one of the most valuable “in-kind” ben-
efits derived by the park from the -Diversa benefit-
sharing , even though it was not directly related to 
Diversa’s research on Yellowstone hot spring organisms. 
The genetic pedigree information developed and donated 
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of activities under the terms of this  from a non-Federal 
party participating in this , as provided at   § 
a(b)(A).
.. The term “Protected  Information” means 
Generated Information that is marked as being Protected 
 Information by a party to this agreement and that 
would have been Proprietary Information had it been obtained 
from a non-Federal entity.
.. The term “Research Reagent Products or Diagnostics” 
means any product manufactured specifically and primarily 
for use in research tests, or applications in research labora-
tories or development centers. This term does not include 
items used for evaluation by a customer to make a prospec-
tive use decision.
.. The term “Research Specimens” means those items 
Collaborator has authority to collect under the collection 
permit or permits issued by  to the Collaborator.
.. The term “Subject Data” means all recorded informa-
tion first produced in the performance of this . 
.. The term “Subject Invention” means any Invention of 
the Collaborator or  conceived or first actually reduced to 
practice in the performance of work under this . 
ARTICLE 3. STATEMENT OF WORK
.. Cooperative research performed under this  shall 
be performed in accordance with the attached Statement of 
Work, which is incorporated by reference into this agreement. 
The parties may modify the initial Statement of Work by 
mutual agreement and incorporate it herein by amendment 
as set out in paragraph ..
ARTICLE 4. REPORTS
.. Research Reports. As required by the collection permits 
that  issued to Collaborator, Collaborator will prepare and 
provide to  a written report concerning the research activi-
ties authorized by the collection permits, which shall include, 
but not be limited to, such information as the Superintendent 
of  may require, including, but not limited to, all informa-
tion required under this .  shall have the right to 
use such reports for any Governmental purpose including but 
not limited to the conservation of natural resources at . 
In the event Collaborator asserts that particular information 
delivered to  is proprietary, Collaborator agrees to provide 
to  a nonconfidential nonproprietary summary of such 
information for public disclosure.
.. Payment Reports. Concurrently with each payment, or 
at such other time as payments are due, Collaborator shall 
submit a written report to  setting forth (a) the period 
for which the payment is made, (b) the amount, description, 
and aggregate Net Sales of the Product(s) sold or otherwise 
disposed of, upon which a payment is payable for such com-
pleted calendar year as provided under this , (c) the 
total gross income realized by Collaborator from the sale, 
licensing, or otherwise making Product(s) available to itself 
and others without sale, during such completed calendar year, 
and (d) the resulting calculation pursuant to this section  of 
the amount of all payments due thereon. If no payments are 
due  for any report period, the report shall so state.
.. Copyright Reports. Concurrently with each payment of 
royalties on copyrighted materials as required by Appendix 
B, or at such other time as payments are due, the Collaborator 
shall submit a written report setting forth the period for which 
the payment is made, the amount and a description of the 
copyrighted works upon which a royalty is payable, the net 
sales or other income received therefrom by the Collaborator, 
and the amount of royalties due thereon. If no royalties are 
due  for any report period, the report shall so state.
.. Records. Collaborator agrees to keep records showing the 
sales or other dispositions of all works upon which payments 
are due under the provisions of this  in sufficient detail 
to enable  to determine the payments payable hereunder 
by Collaborator. Collaborator agrees to retain the records for a 
minimum period of five () years from the date a subject pay-
ment is due. Collaborator further agrees to permit an auditor 
selected by  to examine its books and records from time-
to-time during its ordinary business hours and not more often 
than once a year to the extent necessary to verify the reports 
provided for in this Article.  will bear the initial expense 
of the audit. If the audit indicates that  was underpaid 
royalties by at least ten percent (%) for any calendar year, 
or five-thousand dollars (,.), whichever is greater, 
collaborator will reimburse  for the expense of the audit, 
together with an amount equal to the additional royalties to 
which  is entitled.
ARTICLE 5. FINANCIAL OBLIGATION
.. Collaborator hereby agrees to make the payments 
and other contributions set forth in Appendix B. Unless 
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otherwise specified, Collaborator agrees to make all pay-
ments to  in  Dollars, net of all non- taxes (if any), 
by check or bank draft drawn on a United States bank and 
made payable to “Yellowstone National Park.” The parties 
estimate Collaborator’s total contribution at a minimum of 
,, in funds (parties acknowledge that the payment 
for  has been made) plus royalties, and in-kind services 
and resources valued at ,. The method and schedul-
ing of payment for current and subsequent years is included 
in Appendix B. 
.. The contribution of  shall be in the form of resource 
protection, labor, expertise, equipment, facilities, information, 
computer software, and other forms of laboratory support, 
subject to available funding. 
.. The Collaborator will make all payments to  in ac-
cordance with provisions of Appendix B. All payments by the 
Collaborator shall be mailed to the following address:
Yellowstone National Park
Office of the Superintendent
Attention: Yellowstone Center for Resources
 Box 
Yellowstone National Park, Wyoming 
.. Overpayments by the Collaborator shall be offset against 
payments due the following year.
.. If the audit described in paragraph ., above, indicates 
that payments are overdue to , an interest charge will be 
assessed on the overdue amounts for each -day period, or 
portion thereof, that payment is delayed beyond the periods 
described in Appendix B. The percent of interest charged 
will be based on the current value of funds to the United 
States Treasury as published quarterly in the Treasury Fiscal 
Requirements Manual.
ARTICLE 6. RECOGNITION OF CONTRIBUTION 
FROM YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK
.. Collaborator recognizes that the priceless nature of the 
research specimens at , and the efforts and expertise that 
 has invested in the preservation, conservation, and protec-
tion of the research specimens will contribute significantly 
to the discovery of Subject Inventions and development of 
products from the  research specimens, and, as a result, 
agrees that the  Government has a compensable interest 
in any Subject Inventions and products developed from  
research specimens.
ARTICLE 7. PATENT RIGHTS
.. Reporting. The parties agree to disclose to each other 
every Subject Invention, which may be patentable or oth-
erwise protectable, within sixty () days of the time that 
an inventing party reports such Invention to the person(s) 
responsible for patent matters in the inventing organization. 
These disclosures should be in sufficient enough detail to en-
able a reviewer to make and use the invention under   
§ . The disclosure shall also identify any statutory bars, 
i.e., printed publications describing the Subject Invention 
or public use or sale of the Subject Invention in the United 
States. The parties further agree to disclose to each other any 
subsequent statutory bar that occurs for a Subject Invention 
disclosed but for which a patent application has not been filed. 
All such disclosures shall be marked as “CONFIDENTIAL” 
under   § . 
.. Collaborator Employee Inventions. The Collaborator may 
retain title to any Subject Invention made solely by its employ-
ees. The Collaborator agrees to file patent applications on such 
Subject Invention at its own expense and in a timely fashion. 
The Collaborator agrees to grant to the  Government a 
nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license 
in the patents covering Subject Inventions developed by 
Collaborator’s employees to practice the invention or have 
the invention practiced, throughout the world by or on behalf 
of the  Government. Such nonexclusive license shall be 
evidenced by a confirmatory license agreement prepared by 
the Collaborator in a form satisfactory to . 
.. NPS Employee Inventions. , on behalf of the  
Government, shall have the initial option to retain title to 
each Subject Invention made by its employees under this 
. If a Subject Invention is made jointly by personnel 
of both parties under this , it and all patent applica-
tions and patents issued thereon shall be jointly owned by the 
parties, subject to the obligations contained in Articles . 
and . herein.  may release the rights provided for by 
this paragraph to employee inventors or to the Collaborator 
subject to a license in . 
.. Filing of Patent Applications. The party having the right 
to retain title and file patent applications on a specific Subject 
Invention may elect not to file patent applications thereon 
provided that it so advises the other party within ninety () 
days from the date it reports the Subject Invention to the 
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to the park by Diversa enables park biologists to monitor 
and assess the genetic health of Yellowstone’s growing 
wolf population, as well as to precisely identify any wolves 
that are found killed. The information also will enable park 
biologists to detect when wolves from other areas, such as 
Idaho or northwest Montana, migrate into Yellowstone.
The park has observed that corporations, universities, 
and others increasingly recognize the need to satisfy public 
benefit-sharing expectations. For example, with improved 
data relating to microbial distributions throughout various 
thermal systems at the park (which will be an ongoing 
scientific “benefit” that Yellowstone may obtain through 
negotiated arrangements with the research community), 
Yellowstone can strengthen its protection of these re-
sources by directing scientists to less studied pools known 
to hold desired organisms. Many firms also have told the 
park that their willingness to negotiate benefit-sharing ar-
rangements that are favorable to Yellowstone is contingent 
on the contributions being used for resource conservation 
purposes, a very important underlying incentive.
Yellowstone also has observed that the likelihood of 
generating economic value from research results cannot 
be determined from a look at institutional affiliations only. 
This is because many academic researchers have close 
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research ties with biotech and other industrial firms, 
while corporate researchers are not necessarily engaged 
in product-specific research. What seems increasingly 
clear, however, is that “value” can attach to research re-
sults at any stage in the research process without regard 
to who is conducting the research. Here, too, a negotiated 
benefit-sharing agreement can satisfy a park’s needs, the 
public’s expectations, and the incentives required to en-
hance scientific research in national parks consistent with 
the National Parks Omnibus Management Act of .
other party. Thereafter, the other party may elect to file patent 
applications on the Subject Invention and the party initially 
reporting such Subject Invention agrees to assign its right, 
title, and interest in such Subject Invention to the other party 
and cooperate with such party in the preparation and filing 
of patent applications thereon. The assignment of the entire 
right, title, and interest to the party pursuant to this paragraph 
shall be subject to the retention by the party assigning title 
of a nonexclusive, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice, or 
have practiced, the Subject Invention throughout the world. 
In the event that none of the parties to this  elect to 
file a patent application on a Subject Invention, either or 
both (if a joint invention) may, at their sole discretion and 
subject to reasonable conditions, release the right to file to 
the inventor(s) with a license in each party of the same scope 
as set forth in the immediate preceding sentence.
.. Patent Expenses. All of the expenses attendant to the fil-
ing of patent applications as specified in paragraph . above, 
shall be borne by the party filing the patent application. Any 
post-filing and post-patent fees also shall be borne by the same 
party. Each party shall provide the other party with copies 
of the patent applications it files on any Subject Invention at 
the time the application is filed at the  Patent & Trademark 
Office or patent office of another country. Each party also 
will provide the other party with the power to inspect and 
make copies of all documents retained in the official patent 
application files by the applicable patent office. 
.. License Provisions. 
... If requested,  agrees to provide an exclusive 
license for a pre-negotiated field of use in any Subject 
Invention made in whole or in part by a  employee 
for reasonable compensation. The Collaborator’s right 
to negotiate a license(s) begins at the time that a Subject 
Invention disclosure is filed and ceases six months after 
the termination of this  for all Subject Inventions. 
The grant of an exclusive license to Collaborator shall be 
subject to a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, 
paid-up license from Collaborator to  to practice the 
invention or have the invention practiced throughout the 
world by or on behalf of the  Government.
... Collaborator, at any time, may license or sublicense 
in whole or in part, any rights and interests granted to 
Collaborator from  under the terms and conditions 
of this . Collaborator may exercise such right 
without obtaining additional authorization from , but 
Collaborator expressly agrees that in so licensing or sub-
licensing, it will specifically reserve to  all rights and 
privileges provided in this agreement for , including 
the provisions of Appendix B. In the event of a license or 
sublicense, Collaborator will notify  of each license and 
sublicense to enable  to call for the reports provided for 
in this agreement.
.. Enforcement of jointly owned Patents. Collaborator must 
advise  of any events that cause Collaborator to suspect 
that a third party is or may be infringing on jointly owned 
patents resulting from research conducted under this  
(hereafter  patents). Collaborator must institute and dil-
igently prosecute proper legal proceedings at Collaborator’s 
own expense in the event of infringement of  patents. 
Should Collaborator fail to institute such proceedings within 
 days from receipt of written request from  to institute 
such proceedings,  may take the following actions:
• Institute a suit in its own name as subrogee of Collaborator’s 
rights to enforce the patent; or
• Institute a suit against Collaborator for damages result-
ing from Collaborator’s failure to terminate or abate the 
infringement.
In the event of institution of a suit for infringement by  
pursuant hereto, it is understood that Collaborator may 
participate and be represented by its own counsel; however, 
any recovery damages shall be equitably apportioned, less 
the  government litigation costs. Either party may make 
reasonable settlements with respect to any infringements. 
Collaborator agrees to join in any legal proceedings brought 
by  if joinder is required by law.
.. Commercialization. The Collaborator agrees to inform 
 when any Subject Invention is commercialized by provid-
ing written notice to .
ARTICLE 8. COPYRIGHTS
.. The Collaborator shall have the option to own the copy-
right in all software (including modifications and enhance-
ment thereto), documentation, or other works created in whole 
or in part by the Collaborator under this , which is 
subject to being copyrighted under Title , United States 
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Although the  has not ratified the , the access and 
benefit-sharing initiative pioneered by  is consistent 
with the ’s main aims. The  Congress enacted 
national legislation governing access to national parks a 
century ago with the aim of conserving and managing the 
resources to leave them unimpaired for “future genera-
tions”, and the law continues to be refined as circumstances 
require.
The  permit system, which is the pragmatic mecha-
nism used to regulate individual access to national park 
resources for research purposes, implements the concept 
of  through the detailed permit application and approval 
 
process now instituted throughout the . The emphasis 
on “cooperation” and “mutually agreed [that is, negotiated] 
terms” found throughout Article  of the  is further 
manifested in the  approach towards benefit sharing. 
However, whereas the  refers to “sharing in a fair and 
equitable way the results of research,” the National Parks 
Omnibus Management Act of  adds the qualifier “ef-
ficient” in reference to benefit-sharing negotiations.
It is clear that the public and Congress expect firms 
that profit from research involving national park resources 
to share the benefits resulting from their research with 
the park units like Yellowstone for resource conservation 
purposes. By linking the scientific and economic incen-
tives associated with research activities and new incentives 
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Code. The Collaborator shall mark any such works with a 
copyright notice showing the Collaborator as the author or 
co-author and shall in its reasonable discretion determine 
whether to file applications for registration of copyright. 
.. The Collaborator agrees to grant to the  Government, 
solely for its purposes, a nonexclusive, irrevocable, paid-up, 
worldwide license (hereinafter referred to as Government 
Purpose License) in all copyrighted software or other copy-
righted works developed under this . The Government 
Purpose License (“”) conveys to the  Government the 
right to use, duplicate, or disclose the copyrighted software 
or other works in whole or in part, and in any manner, for 
Government purposes only, and to have or permit others to 
do so for Government purposes only. Government purposes 
include competitive procurement, but do not include the right 
to have or permit others to use the copyrighted software or 
other works for commercial purposes. 
.. The Collaborator will clearly mark all copyrighted soft-
ware or other works subject to the  with its name and the 
words “GOVERNMENT PURPOSE LICENSE.” 
.. The Collaborator shall furnish to , at no cost to , 
at least one copy of each software, documentation or other 
work developed in whole or in part by the Collaborator under 
this , subject to the terms and conditions of the  
granted to  under paragraph ..
ARTICLE 9. COPYRIGHT ROYALTIES
.. Appendix B covers the obligations of the Collaborator 
to compensate  from royalties produced from the sale or 
use of copyrighted materials. As provided in Appendix B, 
the Collaborator shall pay to  royalties over the life of 
the copyright from the licensing, assignment, sale, lease, and 
rental (hereinafter “disposition”) of any copyrighted work 
created under this . 
ARTICLE 10. DATA AND PUBLICATION
.. Release Restrictions.  shall have the right to use all 
Subject Data for any Governmental purpose, but shall not 
release such Subject Data publicly except:
(i) , when reporting on the results of sponsored research, 
may publish Subject Data, subject to the provisions of para-
graph . below; and
(ii)  may release such Subject Data where such release 
is required pursuant to a request under the Freedom of 
Information Act, as amended (  §  et seq.); pro-
vided, however, that such data shall not be released to the 
public if a patent application is to be filed (  § ) 
until the party having the right to file the patent application 
has had a reasonable time to file. 
... Proprietary Information. The Collaborator shall 
place a proprietary notice on all information it delivers 
to  under this  that the Collaborator asserts is 
proprietary.  agrees that it will use any information 
designated as proprietary that the Collaborator furnishes 
to  under this , only for the purpose of carrying 
out this .  agrees not to disclose, copy, reproduce, 
or otherwise make available in any form whatsoever in-
formation designated as proprietary to any other person, 
firm, corporation, partnership, association, or other entity 
without the consent of the Collaborator, except as such in-
formation may be subject to disclosure under the Freedom 
of Information Act, as amended (  § , et seq.).  
agrees to use its best efforts to protect information des-
ignated as proprietary from unauthorized disclosure. The 
Collaborator agrees that  is not liable for the disclosure 
of information designated as proprietary that, after notice 
to and consultation with the Collaborator,  determines 
may not lawfully be withheld or that a court of competent 
jurisdiction requires disclosure.
... Background Intellectual Property. Both parties 
agree to identify in advance and during the course of the 
 Background Intellectual Property () that has 
value for the joint research but which was developed with 
separate funds outside the .  does not qualify as 
a Subject Invention and is not subject to a government 
use license. 
.. Protected  Information.
... Each party may designate as Protected  
Information, as defined in Article , any Generated 
Information produced by its employees, and with the agree-
ment of the other party, mark any Generated Information 
produced by the other party’s employees. All such desig-
nated Protected  Information shall be appropriately 
marked.
... For a period of five () years from the date the 
Protected  Information is produced, the parties agree 
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for conserving biological diversity, Yellowstone aimed 
to strengthen research in ways that also might contribute 
significantly to the park’s sustainable resource conserva-
tion efforts.
Through the development of its pilot bioprospecting 
project, Yellowstone has helped to create for national parks 
the opportunity to evaluate how negotiated benefit-sharing 
arrangements might strengthen their resource conserva-
tion mission while also stimulating research incentives in 
ways that could return scientific and economic dividends 
to the parks. Without discouraging research opportunities 
for the broad-based scientific community, the Yellowstone 
experience suggests that parks can be positioned to share 
in the full range of benefits of research results for resource 
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conservation purposes consistent with their mission, while 
also contributing to the ongoing advancement of science 
and related beneficial research as mandated by the National 
Parks Omnibus Management Act of .64
In accordance with the Federal court’s order of  
March ,65  is undertaking an environmental analy-
sis under  of the potential environmental impacts of 
various methods of implementing the provisions of law 
that authorize benefit-sharing agreements while ensuring 
the integrity of  national park resources. Specifically, 
the analysis concerns the potential environmental impacts 
of “negotiations with the research community and pri-
vate industry for equitable, efficient benefits-sharing ar-
rangements” as provided by the National Parks Omnibus 
Management Act of . The study, which is expected 
to be completed sometime in , is believed to be the 
first comprehensive analysis ever undertaken by any na-
tion concerning the potential environmental impacts of 
bioprospecting benefit-sharing agreements in protected 
areas, and should provide a rich source of information for 
others interested in the pragmatic implications of genetic 
resource management in the st century.
not to further disclose such Protected  Information 
except:
(i) as necessary to perform this ; and
(ii) as mutually agreed by the parties in writing in ad-
vance. 
... The obligation of .. above shall end sooner 
for any Protected  Information which shall become 
publicly known without fault of either party, shall come 
into a party’s possession without breach by that party of 
the obligations of .. above, or shall be independently 
developed by a party’s employees who did not have ac-
cess to the Protected  Information, or as required 
by the Freedom of Information Act, as amended (  
§ , et seq.). 
.. Publication.
...  may submit for publication the results of the 
research work associated with this project. Depending 
on the extent of contribution made, employees of the 
Collaborator may be cited as co-authors. In no event, 
however, shall  use the name of Collaborator or any of 
its trademarks and tradenames in any publications without 
its prior written consent. 
...  and the Collaborator agree to confer and consult 
at least thirty () days prior to either party’s submission 
for publication of Subject Data to assure that no Proprietary 
Information or Protected  Information is released and 
that patent rights are not jeopardized. The party receiving 
the document for review has thirty () days from receipt 
to object in writing detailing the objections to the proposed 
submissions. 
ARTICLE 11. RIGHTS IN GENERATED 
INFORMATION
.. The parties understand that the Government shall have 
unlimited rights in all Generated Information or information 
provided to the parties under this  which is not marked 
as being copyrighted (subject to Article ) or as Proprietary 
Information (subject to paragraph ..) or as Protected 
 Information (subject to paragraph .).
ARTICLE 12. TERMINATION
.. The Collaborator and  each have the right to termi-
nate this  upon thirty () days notice in writing to the 
other party. In the event of termination by ,  shall repay 
the collaborator any prorated portion of payments previously 
made to  pursuant to Article . of the  in excess of 
actual costs incurred by  in pursuing this project. A report 
on results to date of termination will be prepared by  and 
the cost of the report will be deducted from any amounts due 
to Collaborators from .
.. In-kind payments received by  under paragraph  of 
Appendix B may be retained in support of the project.
.. A report on results to date of termination will be 
prepared by Collaborator and the cost of the report will be 
deducted from any amounts due to . 
.. Termination of this  by either party for any reason 
shall not affect the rights and obligations of the parties accrued 
prior to the effective date of termination of this . No 
termination or expiration of this , however effectuated, 
shall release the parties hereto from their rights, duties, and 
obligations under Articles , , , , , and , and pay-
ments due under Appendix B.
ARTICLE 13. DISPUTES
.. Settlement. Any dispute arising under this  which 
is not disposed of by agreement of the parties shall be submit-
ted jointly to the signatories of this . A joint decision 
of the signatories or their designees shall be the disposition 
of such dispute. 
.. If the signatories are unable to jointly resolve a dispute 
within a reasonable period of time after submission of the 
dispute for resolution, the matter shall be submitted to the 
Director of the , or his designee, for resolution. 
.. Continuation of Work. Pending the resolution of any 
dispute or claim pursuant to this Article, the parties agree that 
they will diligently pursue performance of all obligations in 
accordance with the direction of the  signatory.
ARTICLE 14. LIABILITY
.. Property. The  Government shall not be responsible 
for damages to any property of the Collaborator provided to 
 pursuant to this .
.. Collaborator’s Employees. 
... During any temporary assignment at  facili-
ties that may result from this , the Collaborator’s 
Assigned Employees (as defined in paragraph . of this 
) shall pursue their activities on the work schedule 
mutually agreed upon between them, the Collaborator, and 
. The Collaborator’s Assigned Employees must agree to 
comply with Federal Government security and conduct reg-
ulations that apply to  employees. The Collaborator’s 
Assigned Employees shall conform to the requirements 
of the Office of Government Ethics “Standards of Ethical 
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editorial support and contributions for this chapter and to 
John Varley at Yellowstone National Park for his time and 
willingness to share important insights on the challenges 
facing national park and other conservation area manage-
ment in the st century.
Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch” ( 
C.F.R. Parts  and ) and Security Regulations, 
hereby made part of this , to the extent that these 
regulations prohibit private business activity or interest 
incompatible with the best interests of the  Department 
of the Interior. 
... The Collaborator’s Assigned Employees shall 
comply with regulations that apply to  employees 
with regard to disclosure of proprietary or procurement-
sensitive information, refusal from any activities which 
may present a conflict of interest, including procurement 
or other actions in which the Collaborator may have an 
interest. The Collaborator’s Assigned Employees may not 
represent the Collaborator or work for the Collaborator 
in competing for award from any other Federal agency 
during the term of the  (see Article ) or exten-
sion thereto. 
... The Collaborator’s Assigned Employees are per-
manently prohibited from representing or performing 
activities for the Collaborator on any matters before  
on which the Collaborator’s employees worked at  
while assigned to this project. 
... The Collaborator’s employees are prohibited from 
acting as Government employees, including making deci-
sions on behalf of the Government or performing inher-
ently Governmental functions while working at .
.. No Warranty. Except as provided in Title , United 
States Code, Section , the United States shall not be 
liable for the use or manufacture of any Invention made 
under this  nor for the infringement of any patent or 
copyright during the performance of this .  makes 
no express or implied warranty as to any matter whatsoever, 
including the conditions of the research or any Invention or 
product, whether tangible or intangible, made or developed 
under this , or the ownership, merchantability, or fit-
ness for a particular purpose of the research or any Invention 
or product. These provisions shall survive termination of 
the .
.. Indemnification.
... Collaborator’s Employees. The Collaborator 
agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the  Government 
for any loss, claim, damage, or liability of any kind involv-
ing an employee of the Collaborator arising in connection 
with this , except to the extent that such loss, claim, 
damage or liability arises from the negligence of  or its 
employees acting within the scope of their employment. 
 shall be solely responsible for the payment of all 
claims for the loss of property, personal injury or death, 
or otherwise arising out of any negligent act or omission 
of its employees in connection with the performance of 
work under this  as provided under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act.   § . 
... Technical Developments and Products. The 
Collaborator holds the  Government harmless and 
indemnifies the Government for all liabilities, demands, 
damages, expenses, and losses arising out of the use by 
the Collaborator, or any party acting on its behalf or under 
its authorization, of ’s research and technical develop-
ments or out of any use, sale, or other disposition by the 
Collaborator, or others acting on its behalf or with its 
authorization, of products made by Collaborator using the 
’s technical developments. In respect to this Article, 
the Government shall not be considered an assignee or 
licensee of the Collaborator. This provision shall survive 
termination of this . 
... Collaborator agrees to maintain insurance in 
amounts reasonably customary in the industry and to pro-
vide proof of liability insurance to  upon request. 
.. Force Majeur. Neither party shall be liable for any un-
foreseeable event beyond its reasonable control not caused 
by the fault or negligence of such party, which causes such 
party to be unable to perform its obligations under this 
 (and which it has been unable to overcome by the 
exercise of due diligence), including but not limited to flood, 
drought, earthquake, storm, fire, pestilence, lightening, and 
other natural catastrophes, epidemic, war, riot, civil dis-
turbance or disobedience, strikes, labor dispute, or failure, 
threat of failure or sabotage of  facilities, or any order 
or injunction made by a court or public agency. In the event 
of the occurrence of such a force majeur event, the party 
unable to perform shall promptly notify the other party. It 
shall further use its best efforts to resume performance as 
quickly as possible and shall suspend performance only 
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 1 Information about culture collections around the world as well as 
specialized discussions about access and benefit sharing as it per-
tains to genetic resources acquired by and from culture collections 
may be obtained from the World Federation for Culture Collections 
(http://wdcm.nig.ac.jp/wfcc).
 2 There are no comprehensive directories of such information for 
the . The nation’s size and complexity alone would require 
constant updating of obsolete information (such as office addresses, 
telephone numbers, and persons-in-charge). Nonetheless, relevant 
information is widely available throughout the  (although legal 
and technical issues almost certainly require the assistance of a 
lawyer or other specialist in the field).
 3 Information about the voluntary guidelines (including the 
text) may be obtained directly from the  Secretariat (http:
//www.biodiv.org).
 4 A section-by-section analysis is under preparation separately. For 
more information, contact the World Foundation for Environment 
and Development in Washington DC.
 5 See, e.g.,  Department of the Interior (National Park Service), 
Natural Resource Year in Review (), at page .
 6    ().
 7 See   Management Policies, Section ...
 8 The term “plants and animals” as used by  refers to the com-
monly recognized kingdoms of living things and includes such 
groups as flowering plants, ferns, mosses, lichens, algae, fungi, 
bacteria, mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, fishes, insects, 
worms, crustaceans, as well as all microorganisms.
 9 Yellowstone National Park Organic Act,    ().
 10 Permit (dated  August ), signed by James B. Erwin, Capt., 
for such period of time as is necessary as result of the force 
majeur event. 
ARTICLE 15. MISCELLANEOUS TERMS AND 
CONDITIONS
.. Successors. Subject to the limitations stated in the 
General Provisions, this  shall be a binding obliga-
tion to the successors and permitted assignees of all the right, 
title and interest of each party hereto. Any such successor or 
assignee of a party’s interest shall expressly assume in writ-
ing the performance of all the terms and conditions of this 
 to be performed by said party. Any such assignment 
shall not relieve the assignor of any of its obligations under 
this . 
.. Severability. The provisions of this  are severable 
and in the event any of provisions of this  are deter-
mined to be invalid or unenforceable by a court of competent 
jurisdiction, such invalidity or unenforceability shall not in 
any way affect the validity or enforceability of the remaining 
provisions hereof, except that for so long as the Collaborator 
is receiving financial benefit from the use of a product, the 
Collaborator agrees to provide royalty payments as provided 
in Exhibit B. 
.. Waiver. Neither party may waive or release any of its 
rights or interests in this  except in writing. Failure by 
either party to assert any rights or interests arising from any 
breach or default of this  shall not be regarded as a 
waiver of any existing or future rights, interests, or claims. 
.. Enforcement. Collaborator and  specifically 
acknowledge the right to pursue all legal and equitable 
remedies necessary to cure any breach of their obligations 
under this  that are not satisfactorily resolved under 
this . 
.. No Benefits. No member of, or delegate to the United 
States Congress, or resident commissioner, shall be admit-
ted to any share or part of this , nor to any benefit that 
may arise therefrom; but this provision shall not be construed 
to extend to this  if made with a corporation for its 
general benefit.
.. Governing Law. The construction validity, performance 
and effect of this  for all purposes shall be governed 
by applicable Federal laws. 
.. Entire Agreement. This , consisting of the 
Statement of Work, Appendix A (collection permits issued by 
 to Collaborator), and Appendix B, constitutes the entire 
agreement between the parties concerning the subject matter 
hereto and supersedes any prior understanding or written or 
oral agreement relative to said matter. 
.. Headings. Titles and headings of the Sections and 
Subsections of this  are for the convenience of refer-
ences only and do not form a part of this  and shall in 
no way affect the interpretation thereof. 
.. Amendments. If either party desires a modification in this 
, the parties shall, upon reasonable notice of the pro-
posed modification by the party desiring the change, confer in 
good faith to determine the desirability of such modification. 
Such modification shall not be effective until a written amend-
ment is signed by all parties hereto by their representatives 
duly authorized to execute such amendment. 
.. Assignment. Neither this  nor any rights or obli-
gations of any party hereunder shall be assigned or otherwise 
transferred by either party without the prior written consent 
of the other party, except that the Collaborator may assign, 
subject to the provisions of ., this  to the successors 
or assigns a substantial portion of the Collaborator’s business 
interests to which this  directly pertains. 
.. Notices. All notices pertaining to or required by 
this  shall be in writing and shall be directed to the 
signatory(s).
.. Independent Contractors. The relationship of the par-
ties to this  is that of independent contractors and not 
as agents of each other or as joint venturers or partners.  
shall maintain sole and exclusive control over its personnel 
and operations. 
.. Use of Name or Endorsements.
... The Collaborator shall not use the name of , 
 or the Department of the Interior on any product or 
service which is directly or indirectly related to either this 
 or any patent license or assignment agreement 
which implements this  without the prior approval of 
. The Collaborator shall not publicize, or otherwise cir-
culate, promotional material (such as advertisements, sales 
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brochures, press releases, speeches, still or motion pictures 
or video, articles, manuscripts or other publications) which 
states or implies Governmental, Departmental, Bureau, 
or  Government employee endorsement of a product, 
service or position which the Collaborator represents. No 
release of information relating to this  may state or 
imply that the Government approves of the Collaborator’s 
work product, or considers the Collaborator’s work product 
to be superior to other products or services. 
... The Collaborator must obtain prior  Government 
approval from  for any public information releases that 
refer to the Department of the Interior, any bureau or em-
ployee (by name or title), or this . The specific text, 
layout, photographs, etc. of the proposed release must be 
submitted with the request for approval.
.. By entering into this ,  does not directly 
or indirectly endorse any product or service provided or to 
be provided by the Collaborator, its successors, assignees, 
or licensees. 
.. Compliance with Law. The operations of the 
Collaborator will be conducted in all material respects in 
accordance with all applicable laws, ratified treaties, inter-
national agreements and conventions, regulations, guidelines 
and other requirements of all governmental bodies having 
jurisdiction over the Collaborator. The Collaborator shall 
have all material licenses (including a radioactivity license), 
permits, orders or approvals from governmental bodies 
required for the conduct of its business. All such licenses, 
permits, approvals or other requirements shall be in full force 
and there shall exist no violations or breaches of any such 
domestic licenses, permits, approvals or other requirements. 
Collaborator shall be in compliance in all material respects 
with all limitations, restrictions, conditions, standards, prohi-
bitions, requirements, obligations, schedules and timetables 
contained in any applicable law or in any plan, order, decree, 
judgment, notice or demand letter issued, entered, promul-
gated or approved thereunder.
ARTICLE . DURATION OF AGREEMENT AND 
EFFECTIVE DATE.
.. Effective Date. This  shall enter into force as of 
the date of the last signature of the parties as shown on the 
signature page, and will terminate five years from the effective 
date. In no case will this  extend beyond the ending 
date specified herein, unless it is revised in accordance with 
paragraph . of this . 
.. Review Period. Notwithstanding paragraph . above, 
the  Director shall have the opportunity to disapprove or 
require the modification of this  for a -day period be-
ginning on the date the agreement is presented to the Director 
by the Superintendent of , unless the agreement is signed 
by the Director.
SIGNATURE PAGE
SIGNATURES
In Witness Whereof, the parties have executed this  
on the dates set forth below. This  may be signed in 
counterparts, each of which will be deemed to be an origi-
nal. All such counterparts shall together constitute a single, 
executed instrument when all parties have so signed. Any 
communication or notice to be given shall be forwarded to 
the respective addresses listed below.
For :
_____________________________ ____________
Robert Stanton    Date
Director
National Park Service
For :
_____________________________ _____________
Michael Finley    Date
Superintendent
Yellowstone National Park
Mailing Address for Notices:
Office of the Superintendent
Yellowstone National Park
P.O. Box 
Yellowstone National Park, Wyoming 
For :
_____________________________ ____________
Terrance J. Bruggeman   Date
Chairman, President & Chief Executive Officer
Diversa Corporation
Mailing Address for Notices:
Diversa Corporation
 Sorrento Valley Road
San Diego, California 
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th Cavalry, Acting Superintendent, Yellowstone National Park 
(copy on file at Yellowstone National Park).
 11 In , the  Supreme Court ruled that a live, human-made 
microorganism is patentable subject matter under the patent laws of 
the . See Diamond v. Chakrabarty,    ().
 12 It should be noted that the patent rights awarded in connection with 
Taq and the  process have been the subject of much dispute in 
the  and abroad. The issues associated with who owns what 
rights to which inventions under what laws are very significant 
to the issues of principal concern to this chapter (the facts and 
circumstances surrounding access and use of genetic resources).
 13 Testimony of D. Allan Bromley, Director, Office of Science and 
Technology Policy, before the Committee on Science, Space, and 
Technology,  House of Representatives,  February . 
It should be noted that Dr. Brock was affiliated with Indiana 
University (not Wisconsin) when T. aquaticus was first discovered 
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Australia: Draft Regulations
on Access and Benefit Sharing
Sally Petherbridge
Australia’s status as a megadiverse nation (one of sev-
enteen in the world) is well known. Australia has the 
planet’s second highest number of reptile species, is fifth 
in flowering plant species, and tenth in amphibian species. 
The Australian continent and its islands have an estimated 
% of the world’s marsupials. More significant, how-
ever, is the high percentage of organisms that occur only 
in Australia. Seven families of mammals and twelve of 
flowering plants are endemic, giving Australia far more 
endemic families than any other country. At the species 
level, the mean percentage of endemism for terrestrial ver-
tebrates and flowering plants is %. Australia’s marine 
biological diversity, like that of the land, is notable for its 
high proportion of endemic species. In the south of the 
continent, about  to % of the species in most marine 
groups are considered to be endemic. On the basis of such 
statistics about biodiversity, Australia’s National Report 
to the Fourth Conference of the Parties to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity concluded: 
…whilst the potential of Australia’s biodiversity as a 
source of food and useful pharmaceutical, medicinal and 
industrial products has scarcely been realized, attention 
is now being given to development of novel Australian 
bio-resources and bio-techniques (E 
A ).
Growing awareness of the potential value of Australia’s 
biodiversity for such uses (as well as the importance of 
ensuring that Australia benefits in economic terms from 
such uses, while ensuring that they are ecologically 
sustainable) has resulted in the development of a draft 
regulatory scheme for access to, and benefit sharing 
from, such resources. The proposed scheme, has been 
the subject of extensive consultations with stakeholders 
and interested parties. The regulations are expected to be 
enacted in .
Draft Access and Benefit-Sharing Regulations
On  September , Senator Robert Hill, Australia’s 
then-Minister for the Environment and Heritage, re-
leased the draft Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Amendment Regulations of  for a 
period of public comment ending on  October .1 
These regulations will be made under section  of the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Act of  () which came into effect on  July 
. Section , which is headed “Control of access 
to biological resources,” states that “the regulations may 
provide for the control of access to biological resources 
in Commonwealth areas” and, further, that the regulations 
may contain provisions about the equitable sharing of the 
benefits arising from the use of these resources; the facili-
tation of access; the right to deny access; the granting of 
access; and the terms and conditions of such access.2
The objects of the  are, among other things:
• To provide for the protection of the environment, 
especially those aspects of the environment that are 
 
matters of national environmental significance;
• To promote ecologically sustainable development 
through the conservation and ecologically sustain-
able use of natural resources; and
• To promote the conservation of biodiversity.3 
The inclusion of section  in the  reflects, 
therefore, not only the importance of facilitating access 
to biological resources, but also the importance of ensuring 
that access is ecologically sustainable.
The access and benefit-sharing scheme in the draft 
regulations essentially reflects the scheme recommended 
by the report of the Inquiry into Access to Biological 
Resources in Commonwealth Areas (Inquiry) (V 
). The Inquiry recommended regulations which would 
require a party seeking access to biological resources in 
Commonwealth areas to apply for an access permit from 
the Minister for the Environment and Heritage. As the 
regulatory agency under the scheme, the Department of 
the Environment and Heritage would assess the applica-
tion, in consultation with any other relevant Australian 
government agency, and make a recommendation to the 
Minister to grant or refuse the permit.
While the assessment process for the permit was un-
derway, the applicant would be required to negotiate with 
the holder (or owner) of the resources a benefit-sharing 
contract which covered the commercial and other aspects 
of the agreement (in particular, matters such as up front 
payments for samples, royalties, and protection of indig-
enous knowledge). The Inquiry proposed that the contract 
be based on a model contract which the Inquiry report 
outlined and recommended be developed and agreed upon 
by governments, industry, indigenous organizations, and 
other stakeholders.
The Inquiry recommended that the regulations provide 
that the Minister may issue the access permit on being sat-
isfied, among other things, that environmental assessment 
(if required) has been undertaken and the process com-
pleted; submissions from interested persons and bodies 
have been taken into account; and there is a benefit-sharing 
contract between the parties which addresses the follow-
ing major issues: prior informed consent; mutually agreed 
terms; adequate benefit-sharing arrangements, including 
protection for and valuing of indigenous knowledge; and 
the use of benefits for biodiversity conservation in the area 
from which the resource was obtained. The benefit-sharing 
contract would only have effect if the Minister issued an 
access permit (V ). The Inquiry and its report 
are discussed in more detail below.
Proposed Coverage of the Regulations
Australia has a federal system of government, compris-
ing the  national government, six State governments, and 
two self-governing Territories. The regulations will apply 
to “Commonwealth areas” which, expressed simply, are 
lands owned or leased by the Australian government and 
marine areas over which the Australian government has 
sovereignty.4 Therefore, the regulations will not apply to 
the States and Territories which have, in varying degrees, 
their own legislation and/or policies governing access to 
biological resources. Proposals for a “nationally consis-
tent” system of access to biological resources are discussed 
further below.
The Inquiry was unable to obtain a comprehensive list 
of “Commonwealth areas” but was assisted in identifying 
major areas which either have been or are likely to be 
of interest to bioprospectors through submissions from 
Australian government agencies with responsibility for 
land and/or marine management. “Areas” thereby identi-
fied included three terrestrial national parks, Australia’s 
Antarctic Territory, the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, 
Commonwealth land in Norfolk Island, lands managed by 
government agencies such as the Department of Defense, 
and the Commonwealth’s marine area5.
Structure and Purpose of the Regulations
The draft regulations provide for a new Part (Part A) to 
be inserted into the existing regulations under the  
and for amendments to Part  of these regulations (Part 
 covers all permits that may be issued under the ). 
While this structure has the advantage of avoiding repeti-
tion of elements that are common to all permits under the 
Act, it may also have the undesirable effect of making the 
access scheme more difficult to comprehend, as it is not set 
out in a self-contained Part under the regulations.
The purpose of the regulations is “to provide for the 
control of access to biological resources in Commonwealth 
areas” by: promoting the conservation of resources in 
those areas, including their ecologically sustainable use; 
ensuring the equitable sharing of benefits arising from 
their use by providing for benefit-sharing agreements 
between persons seeking access and access providers; 
recognizing the special knowledge held by indigenous 
people about biological resources; establishing an access 
regime designed to provide certainty, and minimize cost, 
for people seeking access; and seeking to ensure that the 
social and economic benefits arising from their use accrue 
to Australia.6
The regulations define “access to biological resources” 
as “the taking of biological resources of native species 
for: conservation, commercial application or industrial 
application of, or research on, any genetic resources, or 
biochemical compounds, comprising or contained in the 
biological resources.” Examples of what this might involve, 
quoted from the Explanatory Memorandum of the , 
are included: “Collecting living material, analyzing and 
sampling stored material, exporting material for purposes 
including taxonomic research, conservation, research and 
potential commercial product development.”7 In addition, 
the regulations provide that “a person is taken to have ac-
cess to biological resources if there is a reasonable prospect 
that [the resources] will be subject to conservation, com-
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mercial application, industrial application or research.”8
The meaning of access to biological resources is further 
clarified by reference to activities which it does not cover. 
These include:
• The taking of biological resources by indigenous 
people other than for a purpose mentioned in sub-
regulation () or in the exercise of their native title 
rights and interests (addresses concerns that access 
might limit indigenous people’s existing uses of 
these resources);
• Access to human remains (responds to concerns 
expressed by indigenous people that indigenous 
remains not be accessible and implements a recom-
mendation to this effect in V ());
• Taking public resources, other than for a purpose 
mentioned in subregulation () (makes clear that 
normal commercial and other uses of biological 
resources such as fishing or plant production are 
not regulated under these regulations. “Taking 
public resources” includes: fishing for commerce 
or recreation, game or charter fishing, or collecting 
broodstock for aquaculture; harvesting wildflowers; 
taking wild animals for plants or food; collecting 
peat or firewood; taking essential oils from wild 
plants; and collecting seeds for propagation);9 
and
• Access specified in a declaration under regulation 
A..
Regulation A. provides exemptions for specified 
biological resources. Under this regulation, the Minister 
may declare that the permit provisions do not apply to 
biological resources:
• If they are held in a collection by a Australian 
government department or agency, and if there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that access to the 
biological resources is administered consistently 
with the purpose of the regulations;
• If there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
access to the resources is controlled by another 
national, self-governing Territory, or State law, con-
sistent with the purpose of the regulations (avoids 
duplication of any access arrangements applying 
in a Commonwealth area);
• If an international agreement to which Australia is 
a party, such as the  International Undertaking 
on Plant Genetic Resources (), applies. This 
provision allows a declaration to be sought with 
respect to biological resources covered by the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture (), if Australia 
decided to become a party to this agreement.10
Ex Situ Collections
With respect to ex situ resources, the Inquiry identified col-
lections held by Australian government agencies such as the 
Australian National Botanic Gardens, the Commonwealth 
Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (), 
and the Australian Institute of Marine Science (). 
Although these collections are under Australian govern-
ment jurisdiction by virtue of the legislation governing 
these bodies, as well as by the definition of Commonwealth 
areas in the , the ownership status of particular col-
lections (or parts of them) is less clear. This was an issue 
of particular concern to  which expressed concern 
that, without clear legal title, its rights to deal with its 
collections might be challenged (V ).  
houses several major national collections which include 
the Australian National Herbarium, the Tree Seed Center, 
and insect, wildlife and marine collections.
With respect to this issue, the Inquiry received legal 
advice that: 
It is not possible to make any definitive, general 
statement as to the ownership of all ex situ collections 
of biological resources. Each collection would have 
to be considered on its own merits having regard to 
a range of factors, including the ownership, if any, of 
the material when it was in situ and the circumstances 
under which the material passed into the possession of 
the ex situ holder, including the terms and conditions 
of any relevant agreement, or any relevant legislation 
(V ). 
In recognition of these difficulties, the Voumard report 
recommended that the Minister for the Environment and 
Heritage ask his department to discuss with holders of 
such collections, the value of a combined request for legal 
advice on ownership issues and that, subject to the advice 
obtained, the Minister consider any recommendation for 
legislative amendment to resolve outstanding issues by 
the holders of the collections (V ). To date, 
however, the holders of these collections have not pursued 
the issue.
The Main Characteristics of the Draft Regulations
on Access and Benefit Sharing
The draft regulations set out provisions with respect to the 
information required for access permits and the content of 
benefit-sharing agreements, as well as detailed provisions 
covering the way in which permit applications and benefit-
sharing agreements are to be assessed and environmental 
assessment, if required, is to be carried out. Unfortunately, 
parts of the latter are somewhat difficult to read, requiring 
cross-referencing between different provisions, but this 
was unavoidable from a drafting point of view. However, 
by indicating the administrative procedures which will be 
followed, including timeframes to promote expeditious de-
cision-making, and the information and factors which must 
be taken account of in decision-making, the draft regula-
tions do have the merit of promoting the transparency and 
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accountability of the decision-making process. Fortunately, 
the regulations are written in Plain English with little or no 
legal jargon, although they do encompass some complex 
areas of the law such as ownership/sovereignty11 and native 
title law. It should be noted that, although the regulations 
refer to the Minister of the Environment and Heritage as 
the decision-maker, the  enables the Minister to 
delegate his or her “powers or functions” to an officer or 
employee of the department. An identical provision applies 
to the Secretary of the Department of the Environment 
and Heritage.12 Detailed administrative arrangements for 
the handling of access applications can be expected to be 
developed once the regulations are enacted.
Access Permits
A person may have access to biological resources only 
in accordance with a permit in force under Part  of the 
regulations under the 13 This provision includes an 
explanatory note that the Minister may issue a permit only 
if the applicant has given the Minister a copy of each ben-
efit-sharing agreement. Proposed amendments to Part  
set out the information which will be required of persons 
seeking access to biological resources in Commonwealth 
areas. This includes: the name of the Australian govern-
ment department or agency which administers the area 
in which access is proposed; if the provider is not the 
Australian government, the name of the provider; the re-
sources to which access is sought; where the resources are; 
the amount of the resources that will be collected; the use 
the applicant intends to make of them; details of any other 
person for whose benefit access is sought or who proposes 
to use the samples; how the access is to be undertaken, 
including details of the vehicles and equipment to be used; 
the nature and extent of the likely environmental impacts 
of the access; whether the applicant thinks that further 
access to the resources will be sought; details of any other 
application by the applicant for a permit under this Part; 
and information about the progress of any negotiations 
with the access provider about sharing the benefits arising 
from their use.14
Benefit-Sharing Agreements
An applicant for a permit must enter into a benefit-sharing 
agreement with each access provider for the resources. 
An explanatory note states that there may be more than 
one access provider for biological resources; for example, 
if a Commonwealth area is subject to native title, the 
Australian government and the native title holders are both 
access providers.15 If the access provider is the Australian 
government, the Secretary to the Australian government 
department that has administrative authority for the 
Commonwealth area may, on behalf of the Australian 
government, enter into the benefit-sharing agreement.16 
The agreement takes effect only if a permit is issued.17 
The benefit-sharing agreement must provide for reason-
able benefit-sharing arrangements, including protection 
for, recognition of and valuing of any indigenous knowl-
edge given by the access provider.18 If the access provider 
is the owner of indigenous people’s land or a native title 
holder for the area, the access provider must have given 
informed consent to the agreement.19
Detailed requirements for ensuring informed consent 
by the access provider follow. In assessing whether in-
formed consent was given, the Minister must consider the 
following matters:
• Whether the applicant gave the provider adequate 
information about the application and the require-
ments of the regulations and engaged in reasonable 
negotiations with the provider about the agree-
ment;
• Whether the provider was given adequate time to 
consider the application, including time to consult 
with relevant people, and, if the provider is the 
owner of indigenous people’s land, to consult with 
the traditional owners and to negotiate the agree-
ment;
• Whether the provider is the owner of indigenous 
people’s land and represented by a land council 
and, if so, the views of the land council about the 
matters in paragraphs a) and b);
• If access is sought to the resources of an area for 
which native title exists, the views of any represen-
tative Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander body 
within the meaning of the Native Title Act of  
for the area about the matters in paragraphs a) and 
b); and
• Whether the access provider has received indepen-
dent legal advice about the regulation.20
Assessment of Benefit-Sharing 
Agreements
The regulations then set out the procedures which must be 
followed once the Secretary has received the benefit-shar-
ing agreement(s) and the permit application. The Secretary 
must give a report to the Minister within  days of their 
receipt. The Minister may extend this time if needed for 
consulting any persons who may have information rel-
evant to the application or the agreement.21 In assessing the 
agreement, the Minister may consult with any Australian 
government department or agency that may have relevant 
information; must take into account the provisions of the 
model benefit-sharing agreement, if any, and any variations 
from it; and must consider whether, under the regulations 
requiring consultation with the owners of land leased by the 
Commonwealth, reasonable benefit-sharing arrangements 
and informed consent have been complied with.22
Environmental Assessment
Detailed requirements for environmental assessment are 
also included. There are three ways in which this may 
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occur: on the basis of the permit application; through 
“Environmental assessment by public notice”, the require-
ments for which are set out in the regulations; or through 
the environmental assessment provisions set out in the 
 itself. The regulations provide that environmental 
assessment by public notice may apply to an application 
for a permit under the regulations if the proposed access is 
not a controlled action23. Assessment of an application by 
public notice is required if there are reasonable grounds for 
the Minister to believe that the proposed access is likely to 
have environmental impacts that are likely to be more than 
negligible.24 This is not defined nor are there any guidelines 
to assist the Minister’s decision. However, it would appear 
to encompass activities which pose a lesser threat to the 
environment than activities requiring environmental as-
sessment under the . In the latter case (a “controlled 
action”), an action will require approval from the Minister 
if it has, will have, or is likely to have “a significant impact 
on a matter of national environmental significance”. The 
matters of national environmental significance are: World 
Heritage properties; Ramsar wetlands of international im-
portance; listed threatened species and communities; mi-
gratory species protected under international agreements; 
nuclear actions; the Commonwealth marine environment; 
and national heritage. The Administrative guidelines on 
significance assist in determining whether an action should 
be referred to the Minister for a decision on whether an 
approval is required (E A ).
If the Minister decides, however, that environmental 
assessment by public notice is required, the draft regula-
tions set out in detail the consultation procedures and 
timeframes which apply. Within  days after receiving 
the application, the Minister must inform the applicant and 
the applicant must then give the Minister a summary of 
the likely environmental impacts of the proposed access 
(there is no timeframe for this activity). Within  days of 
receiving the summary, the Minister must invite anyone (by 
public notice) and each person registered under Regulation 
A. to comment on the likely impacts, and within  
days after the end of the period given in the invitation for 
comments, the Minister must give the applicant a copy of 
the comments received. Finally, the applicant must give 
the Minister a response to these comments (again, there is 
no timeframe for this activity but, presumably, it is in the 
applicant’s interests to respond expeditiously).25
Requirements for the consultation register are then set 
out. At intervals of not more than  months, the Minister 
must publish a notice inviting applications from persons 
who want to be registered, to be told of applications for 
access permits where environmental assessment by public 
notice is required.26 The Minister is also required to keep 
a register of information about permits. The register must 
be available for public inspection; however, information is 
not be included in it if the Minister believes the informa-
tion is culturally sensitive or, if disclosed, could damage 
a person’s commercial interests, result in a risk to the 
environment, or harm the national interest.27
Assessment of Permits
Proposed amendments to Part  of the regulations set 
out the requirements for the assessment of permits. If the 
proposed access is a “controlled action”, the Minister 
must decide whether to issue a permit within  days 
after approval of the action. If the access proposed is not 
a “controlled action”, the Minister must decide whether to 
issue a permit within  days of receiving the Secretary’s 
report and any comments and responses from the environ-
mental assessment by public notice process. In making 
this decision, the Minister must take into account these 
documents, the views of any owner of land leased to the 
Australian government, the views of any Australian gov-
ernment department or agency consulted by the Minister, 
the assessment of the benefit-sharing agreement, and any 
other matters that the Minister thinks are relevant.28 The 
Minister may seek more information from any person who 
may have information relevant to the application if he or 
she believes there is not sufficient information to make a 
decision.29
Several circumstances are then set out which must be 
present for the Minister to issue a permit. These are that 
the applicant has entered into a benefit-sharing agree-
ment with each access provider; the applicant has given 
the Minister a copy of each benefit-sharing agreement; the 
Minister believes, on reasonable grounds, that some of the 
benefits will, if practicable, be used for biodiversity con-
servation in the area from where the resources were taken; 
the proposed access is consistent with any relevant plan 
for a Commonwealth reserve30, and the proposed access 
will, taking into account the precautionary principle, be 
ecologically sustainable and consistent with the conser-
vation of Australia’s biological diversity. In addition for 
access in Kakadu, Uluru-Kata Tjuta, or Booderee National 
Parks, the proposed access must be consistent with any 
relevant lease.31
Requirements Arising
from Native Title Rights
Following consultations with, and legal advice from, 
the Native Title Division of the Australian government’s 
Attorney General’s Department, several provisions were 
included in the draft regulations to protect the rights of na-
tive title holders under the Native Title Act of . These 
include clarification that access to biological resources 
does not include the taking of resources by indigenous 
people in the exercise of their native title rights and inter-
ests.32 The definition of “access provider” recognizes that 
native title holders for the area may be access providers33 
and that there may be more than one access provider for 
an area. For example, if a Commonwealth area is subject 
to native title, the Australian government and native title 
holders are both access providers.34 The regulations also 
state that an agreement may be both a benefit-sharing 
agreement and an indigenous land-use agreement under 
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the Native Title Act.35 Further amendments require the 
Secretary/head of the Australian government department 
or agency that has entered into a benefit-sharing agreement 
with the applicant to advise the Minister whether he or she 
thinks that issuing the permit would be an invalid future 
act under the Native Title Act.36 The Minister may issue 
a permit only if satisfied that it would not be an invalid 
future act.37 One basis for being satisfied is that there is an 
indigenous land use agreement under the Native Title Act 
for the area in which native titleholders have consented to 
the issue of the permit.38
Review/Appeals Processes
The Inquiry report recommended that the parties to the 
contract be able to seek merits review of the Minister’s 
decision not to grant an access permit (V ). It 
was decided during the drafting phase, however, that merits 
review would not be available. Nevertheless, procedural 
review is available through the courts under the  
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act. Possible 
grounds include the following: a breach of natural justice 
occurred in connection with the making of the decision; 
procedures required by law in connection with the making 
of the decision were not observed; the making of the deci-
sion was an improper exercise of the power conferred by 
the enactment under which it was made; the decision was 
induced or affected by fraud; and there was no evidence 
or other material to justify the making of the decision. An 
“improper exercise of power” includes taking an irrelevant 
consideration into account; failing to take a relevant con-
sideration into account; exercising a discretionary power 
in accordance with a rule or policy without regard to the 
merits of a particular case; an exercise of power that is so 
unreasonable that no reasonable person would have so 
exercised the power; and exercising power in such a way 
that the result is uncertain.39
Enforcement of the Regulations
Enforcement of the access regulations will be the responsi-
bility of the Department of the Environment and Heritage 
which manages compliance with the . Fifty penalty 
units are set for contravening the regulation (A.) which 
requires a permit for access to biological resources.40
The Process Leading to the Development of the Access Legislation
The Inquiry
Senator the Hon. Robert Hill, then-Minister for the 
Environment and Heritage, announced an inquiry into 
access to biological resources in Commonwealth areas 
on  June . This reflected the government’s  
election commitment to introduce regulations to regulate 
access to genetic resources in Commonwealth areas 
(V ).41 Following the receipt of advice from 
his department as to how the process might be conducted, 
the Minister formally initiated the Inquiry on  December 
.
The Inquiry’s terms of reference stated that the Inquiry 
was to advise on a scheme that could be implemented 
through regulations under section  of the  to 
“provide for the control of access to biological resources in 
Commonwealth areas”. The terms of reference stated that 
the scheme should take into account the following:
• Australia’s obligations under the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (), including the obligation 
to encourage the equitable sharing of benefits aris-
ing from the utilization of biological resources. The 
scheme should particularly focus on the equitable 
sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of 
traditional knowledge, innovations, and practices 
(article (j)).
• The objectives of the National Strategy for the 
Conservation of Australia’s Biodiversity, such as:
− Ensuring that the collection of biological re-
sources for research and development purposes 
does not adversely affect the viability or conser-
vation status of any species or population;
− Ensuring that the social and economic benefits 
of the use of biological resources derived 
from Australia’s biological diversity accrue to 
Australia.
The terms of reference stated further that the scheme 
“should operate in a manner that promotes certainty for 
industry”. Finally, consistent with the objective of the 
, the scheme should:
• Promote a cooperative approach to the protection 
and management of the environment involving 
governments, the community, land-holders, and 
indigenous peoples.
• Recognize the role of indigenous people in the 
conservation and ecologically sustainable use of 
Australia’s biodiversity.
• Promote the use of indigenous peoples’ knowledge 
of biodiversity with the involvement of, and in 
cooperation with, the owners of that knowledge.
The Inquiry was conducted by a solicitor from South 
Australia, John Voumard. The reference group established 
to assist him comprised an environmental law specialist, 
an industry representative, an indigenous representative, an 
intellectual property specialist, and a representative from 
the scientific community.42 The reference group met on 
four occasions, in January, April, June, and July .
In announcing the Inquiry, Senator Hill invited submis-
sions by  March . The Inquiry was advertised in the 
national press and the major newspaper of each State, the 
Australian Capital Territory, and the Northern Territory 
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during January . The Inquiry secretariat also sent out 
approximately  notices inviting submissions, mainly 
to biotechnology organizations (based on a mailing list 
provided by Biotechnology Australia), as well as to in-
digenous land councils in the Northern Territory, Western 
Australia, and Queensland, environment groups, and over-
seas biotechnology companies. The Inquiry received  
submissions (V ), although, as a result of the 
tight deadline for submissions (seven weeks from public 
advertising), several submissions were not received until 
May. In addition to receiving submissions, the Inquiry 
held two public hearings, one in Canberra on  May  
and the other in Brisbane on  June . In some cases 
evidence was presented by telephone (from Melbourne 
and from north Queensland). Extensive consultations were 
also held, most significantly with the traditional owners 
of the three national parks43 and their representatives. The 
Inquiry was required to report to the Minister by  June 
. The Chair sought a short extension, submitting the 
Inquiry Report on  August .
Studies Prior to the Inquiry
Although the Inquiry was undoubtedly the most signifi-
cant step in the development of access and benefit-shar-
ing regulations, it was preceded by several studies which, 
while inconclusive in policy/legislative terms, were useful 
in identifying many of the major issues involved in access 
issues and developing general principles to guide further 
work (Table ). The Inquiry report drew on and acknowl-
edged the work of its predecessors.44
Australia signed the  on  June . In February 
, the Australian and New Zealand Environment and 
Conservation Council (), a consultative group of 
Australian government, State, and Territory environment 
ministers, produced a report to First Ministers45 on the 
Implementation of and Implications of Ratification of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity ( ).
In discussing Article  of the , Access to Genetic 
Resources,  () noted: 
…the control of access to genetic resources is an issue 
of national importance requiring urgent attention... 
the introduction of procedures governing access... 
would enable Australia to take full advantage of the 
opportunities provided by this article and also to protect 
our interests. 
Two further reports followed in quick succession. 
In March   released a paper on Access to 
Australia’s Genetic Resources in which it noted:  
Currently, under existing legislation and guidelines 
it is possible to export a large range and volume of 
genetic resources for use in overseas research and 
development without appropriate returns to Australia 
( ).
Also in March, the Office of the Chief Scientist in the 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet released 
Table . Key steps in the development of the draft regu-
lations on access and benefit sharing
Date Steps
September  Australia signs the Convention on 
Biological Diversity.
December  Australia ratifies the Convention on 
Biological Diversity.
October  The Commonwealth State Working Group 
Paper is released. 
May  Biotechnology Australia is established.
June  The Minister for the Environment and 
Heritage announces an inquiry into access 
to biological resources in Commonwealth 
areas. 
December  The Minister formally initiates the Inquiry 
(V ).
August  The Inquiry Chair submits the Inquiry 
report to the Minister.
September  The Minister publicly releases the Inquiry 
report.
August  The Bailey report (Bioprospecting: 
Discoveries changing the future) is 
released.
September  The Minister releases the draft regulations 
on access and benefit sharing for public 
comment.
December  Responsibility for the development of 
a nationally consistent approach to the 
utilization of genetic and biochemical 
resources is given to the Natural Resource 
Management Ministerial Council .
Octoer  Final comments on the draft regulations 
are received.
Access to Australia’s Biological Resources—A Discussion 
Paper ( ). In May , following advice from 
, First Ministers established the Commonwealth 
State Working Group ().
The  completed its discussion paper in October 
. The paper was subsequently released and eight 
submissions received by April . An important part 
of this public consultation process was the Roundtable 
Discussion on Access to Australia’s Genetic Resources 
held in Canberra on  March . Although the  
paper was the most detailed discussion of issues and 
principles to date, subsequent work on access issues was 
hampered by the lack of specific direction in its recommen-
dations, both in relation to the form access systems might 
take and the bureaucratic/political processes required to 
take the work forward.
Australian government agencies with an interest 
in access issues and a working group, comprising the 
Departments of Environment and Heritage and Agriculture, 
Fisheries, and Forestry, and representatives of State and 
Territory Governments, continued to meet, but without a 
clear focus or political and bureaucratic support, little prog-
ress was made. This situation changed, however, in mid-
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, with the establishment of Biotechnology Australia 
and the announcement of the Inquiry. Biotechnology 
Australia was established in the Department of Industry, 
Science, and Resources in May , but comprised 
five departments: Industry, Science, and Resources; 
Environment and Heritage; Agriculture, Fisheries, and 
Forestry; Health and Aged Care; and Education, Training, 
and Youth Affairs. It was overseen by a Council compris-
ing the Ministers responsible for these departments and a 
Committee of the Secretaries (executive heads) of these 
departments. The Inquiry was one of the major activities 
under Biotechnology Australia’s Access Work Program 
and was funded through this Program.
Australia’s National Biotechnology Strategy, released 
in July , included as an objective, the “development of 
measures to enhance access to biological resources” and, 
among strategies to meet that objective, the need to address 
issues of access to biological resources in Commonwealth 
areas through regulations under the ; matters involv-
ing indigenous people and their ownership of biological re-
sources; and work with the States and Territories to achieve 
nationally consistent regimes on access (C 
 A ).
The Inquiry (and its subsequent implementation) also 
drew extensively on international developments. The 
Inquiry examined existing and proposed access schemes 
in other countries, a summary of developments in Costa 
Rica, the Philippines, the United States, and Brazil be-
ing included in the report (V ). A member 
of its reference group, Elizabeth Evans-Illidge, attended 
the first meeting of the Panel of Experts on Access and 
Benefit-Sharing in Costa Rica in October . The Access 
Taskforce (the Inquiry secretariat) also participated in sev-
eral other international meetings on access and related 
issues, by contributing to the Australian Government briefs 
for them and, in some cases, through its attendance.46 
Consultations Following the Release of 
the Inquiry Report and of the Draft Access 
Regulations
When Senator Hill publicly released the Inquiry report ( 
September ), he wrote to the Biotechnology Australia 
Ministers inviting their comments on it. From this date 
until the draft regulations were released a year later, the 
Department of the Environment and Heritage held exten-
sive consultations with Biotechnology Australia depart-
ments, other agencies within their Ministers’ portfolios 
(for example,  and Intellectual Property Australia 
()47 in the Industry, Science and Resources portfolio), 
other interested Australian government departments such 
as the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and of-
ficials of some State and Territory Government depart-
ments. Consultations were conducted through a series of 
meetings between the Access Taskforce and interested 
agencies, followed by analysis of written comments on 
the scheme proposed in the Inquiry report. Comments 
were also received in response to presentations by Access 
Taskforce members at the International Marine Biology 
Conference (Townsville, September ) and the an-
nual symposium of the Natural Products Group of the 
Royal Australian Chemical Institute at the University of 
New South Wales (Sydney, October ). Copies of the 
report were sent to everyone who had made a submission 
to the Inquiry, as well as to others who had expressed an 
interest in its work (this included a Chinese government 
delegation comprising representatives of national and 
provincial environment agencies which had met with the 
Department of the Environment and Heritage and several 
other organizations involved in access issues during a visit 
to Australia in August ).
Key Australian government agencies were invited to 
comment, not only on the report, but also on the drafting 
instructions for the proposed regulations. On  July  
the Minister sent drafting instructions to his counterparts 
for comment by early August . Comments on the 
drafting instructions were reflected in the draft regulations 
which were released for public comment on  September 
. The Access Taskforce then held further consultations 
with government, industry, indigenous, and environment 
stakeholders. There were thirty-eight submissions on the 
draft regulations, the final one being received in May 
.
Towards a Nationally Consistent System
For several years before the Inquiry was established, there 
had been attempts to address the issue of establishing a 
nationally consistent system of access arrangements for 
the Australian, State, and Territory governments. The terms 
of reference for the  () paper had required it to 
“investigate and report on action required to develop a 
national approach to access to Australia’s biological re-
sources”. The  observed that a “national approach”, 
understood as a common system of regulations and per-
mits across Australia controlling access to all biological 
resources wherever they may occur and whoever owns 
them, was a position which would be “extremely difficult 
to achieve, both administratively and politically”. It con-
cluded, therefore, that it would be more appropriate to 
focus on a “nationally consistent approach” (my emphasis) 
which “seeks agreement to broad principles while allow-
ing jurisdictions the freedom to apply those principles in 
ways which meet their needs and which take into account 
their existing legislative/regulatory frameworks” ( 
). The  paper then addressed the benefits of a 
nationally consistent approach and set out “principles for” 
and “desirable features” of a nationally consistent access 
management scheme ( ).
Although the terms of reference of the Inquiry did not 
include consideration of a nationally consistent approach, 
State and Territory Governments were invited to make 
submissions and the Inquiry Chair and/or secretariat held 
meetings with State Government agencies. The Inquiry re-
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port reflected the views of the governments of Queensland, 
South Australia, Victoria, Western Australia, the Australian 
Capital Territory, and Norfolk Island, concluding that 
“most States and Territories support a nationally consis-
tent approach” and noting that “some support” had been 
expressed for the Commonwealth State Working Group, 
“although this is tempered by concern about a continuing 
lack of progress” (V ). The report made three 
significant recommendations: first, that the Environment 
Minister endorse the  principles; second, that further 
consultations be held with State and Territory Governments 
to address the broader issue of a nationally consistent ap-
proach across jurisdictions; and, third, that the Minister 
review the function of the  and consider steps neces-
sary to increase the involvement of key stakeholders and 
ensure that any future work done by that body was under-
taken with defined outcomes and within agreed timeframes 
(V ). In the meantime, as noted above, the 
National Biotechnology Strategy, released in July , 
supported the Inquiry report’s recommendations by adopt-
ing as one of its objectives “the development of measures 
to enhance access to Australian biological resources” and 
included as a strategy to achieve this objective: “Work with 
the States and Territories to achieve nationally consistent 
regimes on access” (C  A 
).
The next significant support for a nationally consis-
tent system (as well as the draft access regulations) came 
from the report of the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Primary Industries and Regional Services 
(B ). The terms of reference of the Bailey 
Report, referred to the Committee by the Minister for 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry on  October , 
were to 
…inquire into and report on the following areas, with 
particular emphasis on the opportunities in rural 
and regional Australia: the contribution towards the 
development of high technology knowledge industries 
based on bioprospecting, bioprocessing and related 
biotechnologies; impediments to growth of these new 
industries; the capacity to maximize benefit through 
intellectual property rights and other mechanisms to 
support development of these industries in Australia; 
and the impacts on and benefits to the environment 
(B ).
The Committee received  submissions from orga-
nizations such as the Department of the Environment and 
Heritage and several others, both public and private, which 
had also made submissions to the Voumard Inquiry.
In discussing a nationally consistent access regime, the 
Bailey Report observed that the Committee “was told re-
peatedly of the need to establish a nationally consistent ac-
cess regime for Australia’s biological resources” (B 
). It quoted from ’s submission that, as a result 
of “significant variations in both policy objectives and 
administrative systems between all jurisdictions”, there 
is a “real risk of intentional bioprospectors ‘shopping’ 
between various jurisdictions to suit their own needs”, and 
it noted the South Australian government’s reference to the 
“frustratingly long time taken to establish policy and the 
jurisdictional and legislative framework” (B ). 
The Bailey Report also noted the Inquiry’s work on this 
issue and commented that the “wide-ranging consultative 
process” planned for the draft regulations was a “useful 
approach to facilitating the development of nationally 
consistent arrangements” (B ). Finally, quot-
ing Cerylid Biosciences that “what would be helpful 
would be to make it easier to know who are the bodies 
that you need to talk to”, the Committee concluded that 
it was “important to have a single point of information 
about the arrangements for applying for access permits 
anywhere in Australia”. It added that it was also “important 
that the permit system be streamlined, for example, with 
a single permit application acceptable to all jurisdictions 
and agencies” (B ).
Two recommendations followed: first, that the 
Department of the Environment and Heritage, “in con-
sultation with state and territory agencies: develop an 
electronic gateway to information about access arrange-
ments in all jurisdictions and take a lead in coordinating 
the development of a simplified, streamlined system of 
applying for permits” and second, that the departments of 
the Environment and Heritage and Agriculture, Fisheries, 
and Forestry “give a high priority to finishing the regula-
tions on access to biological resources and the sharing of 
benefits from them and working with state and territory 
governments to establish nationally consistent arrange-
ments” (B ).
At the initiative of the South Australian, Queensland, and 
Australian governments, a conference of Commonwealth, 
State, and Territory government representatives, was held 
to discuss work towards a nationally consistent system. The 
Bio-Access Forum met in Adelaide, South Australia, on 
 November . On  December , responsibility 
for the establishment of a nationally consistent approach 
to the utilization of genetic and biochemical resources 
was given to the Land, Water, and Biodiversity Committee 
established under the aegis of Australia’s Natural Resource 
Management Ministerial Council (). The , 
which comprises Australian, State, and Territory gov-
ernment Environment and Agriculture Ministers, was 
established in June  to promote the sustainable use 
of Australia’s natural resources, replacing , which 
had been responsible for the  () paper discussed 
above. Thus the Land, Water, and Biodiversity Committee 
effectively took over responsibility for work commenced, 
but not completed, by  on the development of a 
nationally consistent system of access. Responsibility for 
this task rested with a joint Australian government/State 
task group chaired by a senior official of the Australian 
government Department of the Environment and Heritage. 
The task group aimed to conclude development of a nation-
ally consistent approach for adoption by the  at its 
next meeting in October .
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The benefit of this approach was that it placed the 
management of Australia’s extensive genetic resources 
into the mainstream of significant attempts by Australian 
governments, particularly since the establishment of the 
Natural Heritage Trust in , to address the management 
of the country’s natural resources in an integrated manner 
which acknowledges the seriousness of the threats facing 
Australia’s land, water resources, and biodiversity.
On  October  the  agreed to a set of 
fourteen principles to underpin the development or review 
of legislative, administrative, or policy frameworks for a 
nationally consistent approach in each jurisdiction ( 
). In the announcement released by the  sev-
eral days later, the Council Chair and Federal Minister 
for Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry, the Hon. Warren 
Truss, MP, said, “It is our responsibility to ensure that 
[access to and use of resources] are undertaken in an eco-
logically sustainable way and that the community shares 
in the benefits that come from making resources available. 
Importantly, this approach provides greater certainty to 
industry and encourages continued investment in biodis-
covery research and development. This is a world’s first 
for Australia and it marks us as a desirable location for 
biodiscovery investment over coming years.”
The Government of Queensland was the first state gov-
ernment to release draft legislation for public comment. 
The release of the exposure draft of the Biodiscovery Bill 
48 in mid- for comment by  August  fol-
lowed the release of the Queensland Biodiscovery Policy 
Discussion Paper in  (Q G 
). The Bill is expected to be enacted in . The main 
purposes of the Bill are to facilitate access by biodiscov-
ery entities to minimal quantities of Queensland’s native 
biological resources for biodiscovery; encourage the devel-
opment in Queensland of value-added biodiscovery; and 
ensure that Queensland, for the benefit of all persons in the 
State, obtains a fair and equitable share in the benefits of 
the biodiscovery. These purposes are achieved by provid-
ing for a regulatory framework for taking and using native 
biological resources in a sustainable way for biodiscovery; 
a contractual framework for benefit-sharing agreements; a 
compliance code and collection protocols; and monitoring 
and enforcement of compliance with the Bill. 
The Bill requires that applications for a collection au-
thority be made to the chief executive of the Queensland 
Environment Protection Agency (). The collection au-
thority allows the holder to enter and take minimal quanti-
ties of stated native biological material for biodiscovery 
in State land or waters; on private land (with the written 
consent of the owner); on native title land where there is 
exclusive possession, if a registered indigenous land use 
agreement allows the authority to be issued; and from col-
lections held by the Queensland Department of Primary 
Industries, the Queensland Museum, and the Queensland 
Herbarium with the organization’s written consent. 
The Bill also provides that the Queensland Information 
and Innovation Economy () Minister may enter into a 
benefit-sharing agreement with a biodiscovery entity under 
which the State gives the entity the right to use native bio-
logical material or intellectual property derived from that 
material for biodiscovery if the material was taken from 
State land or waters under a collection authority or was 
sourced from that material, and the entity agrees to pay 
amounts, including royalties, and provide other benefits 
of biodiscovery. 
The  chief executive may establish a compliance 
code for taking native biological material under a collec-
tion authority. The code may provide for: minimum stan-
dards for taking the material to ensure the sustainability 
of the State’s native biological resources; measures for 
minimizing the impact of taking the material; and regu-
lating activities (for example, the use of vehicles) in land 
or waters from where the material is taken. The  chief 
executive may also establish collection protocols for taking 
particular native biological material under a collection au-
thority; taking native biological material from a particular 
area; or using a particular collection technique for taking 
native biological material.
Other issues covered by the Bill include the require-
ment to keep a register of collection authorities; provision 
for the  Minister to publish a model benefit-sharing 
agreement; penalties for offenses such as taking mate-
rial without a collection authority; provision for review 
of decisions; and definitions of terms such as “minimal 
quantity”. A criticism that has been made of the Bill is that 
it only requires a benefit-sharing agreement when collec-
tions are made in State land or waters. Benefit sharing is 
not compulsory where collections are made from native 
title (exclusive possession) or private land. 
In December  the Government of Western 
Australia released a consultation paper, A Biodiversity 
Conservation Act for Western Australia. The paper stated 
that the new Act would include a licensing regime for 
terrestrial bioprospecting activities that will ensure that: 
biological resources are used in an ecologically sustainable 
manner and biodiversity is protected; benefits arising from 
the exploitation of Western Australia’s biological resources 
are shared with the Western Australian community; and 
Aboriginal people’s native title and intellectual property 
rights are recognized and protected (G  
W A ). The paper sought comments 
by  March .
In November , the Department of Conservation 
and Land Management released a table summarizing com-
ments received on the discussion paper49 The Department 
summarized submissions on the issue of bioprospecting 
as follows: 
Many submissions expressed the view that further 
community consultation is required on the issue of 
Bioprospecting …the Act should provide the power 
for the Minister to make regulations about this matter, 
and the Government engage the community on how 
Bioprospecting should be dealt with. A number of 
submissions commented that provisions and funds for 
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Bioprospecting under the Act should only be granted 
for the development and research of Western Australia’s 
native biota. Furthermore, it should be clearly 
identified on licence agreements that a percentage 
of wealth generated from Bioprospecting should be 
used for the protection, management and restoration 
of WA’s biodiversity. Several submissions expressed 
general support for the recognition and preservation 
of indigenous peoples’ native title and intellectual 
property rights. It was suggested that a framework and 
mechanisms for negotiating benefit-sharing agreements 
between the State, corporations, academic institutions 
and indigenous people should be undertaken as part of 
the development of the Act.
Difficulties and Successes Experienced During the
Design of the Draft Regulations
Compared to the lack of concrete progress during the pe-
riod from  until , progress from the establishment 
of Biotechnology Australia and the Inquiry in mid- 
until the release of the draft regulations in September  
was creditable. The Inquiry generated many responses, 
which, in light of the relatively short public consultation 
period, were reasonably comprehensive, generally relevant 
to its terms of reference and compared well in terms of 
quantity and quality to the submissions received by the 
later House of Representatives committee on Primary in-
dustries and Regional Services. The Inquiry also benefited 
considerably from the varied knowledge and experience of 
its Chair and reference group members. The Inquiry report 
(V ) was well received by key stakeholders 
and other interested parties, but in some quarters there 
was a lack of understanding, reflecting, perhaps, that the 
report was long and the issues it attempted to cover in a 
fairly short period were many and complex.
Indeed, the Inquiry and subsequent consultations iden-
tified many issues which had only been referred to briefly 
in previous work, for example, environmental issues as-
sociated with bioprospecting; indigenous knowledge and 
intellectual property issues; and the need to harmonize a 
new access regime with existing schemes (which were 
either based on other legislation or informal administra-
tive arrangements) at the Australian government level. 
Other issues had not been not raised at all, for example, 
native title rights to biological resources. Where the short 
inquiry period prevented adequate consultations about 
issues, the Inquiry report recommended, in general, that 
further research/consultations be undertaken (V 
). This was particularly the case in relation to the 
harmonization of existing Australian government access 
arrangements.50 The proposal for accreditation (although 
the regulations do not use this term) of access schemes, 
reflected in the regulation which permits exemptions for 
specified biological resources, also evolved during con-
sultations following the release of the Voumard report be-
tween the Department of the Environment and Heritage 
and various Australian and State government agencies.51
Ownership of Biological Resources
V () observed that “…debate about methods 
of regulating access to biological resources has been com-
plicated by a lack of understanding about who owns the 
resources in question.” As we saw above, the question of 
ownership in relation to ex situ collections posed some dif-
ficulties for the holders of such collections and the Inquiry 
sought legal advice on this issue. The following advice 
was part of a longer legal advice, which became Chapter 
 of V ():
The advice explains the legal status of the elements of the 
terrestrial and marine biota affected by differing forms 
of land tenures and sovereignty in Commonwealth areas. 
The effect of the advice is that in all Commonwealth 
areas, it is possible to determine either a legal owner 
of biological resources or a holder of the sovereign 
authority to control access and derive benefits from the 
biological resources.
It should be noted, since the question occasion-
ally arose, that ownership under the common law is of 
particular biological resources, that is, of the physical 
specimens themselves, not of the particular plants which 
they represent or the species or genus to which they be-
long. As a result, the Australian government ’s ability, for 
example, to sell samples of plants to a bioprospector for 
biodiscovery purposes would not prevent it (or any other 
owner of the same plants) from selling other samples of 
the same plants to another person (unless it had agreed 
with the first bioprospector not to do this).52 However, 
the essential point is that neither a holder nor a buyer can 
claim ownership under the common law in the sense of 
exclusive rights to a particular plant or to the species or 
genus to which it belongs. The Inquiry report commented 
on the need for stakeholders to understand the law regard-
ing ownership of biological resources and stated explic-
itly that it did not propose to make any recommendations 
“that would affect the existing ownership arrangements” 
53 (V ).
The Bailey report also considered the ownership is-
sue, commenting that the advice provided in the Inquiry 
report should be widely available: “It is important that the 
perception of uncertainty and complexity is dispelled as 
far as possible as both are deterrents to making agreements 
about bioprospecting, and investing in it and the indus-
tries derived from it” (B ). The Bailey report 
observed further that “the lack of clarity about ownership 
applies to areas under state and territory jurisdiction” and 
that “legislative details vary from state to state”, recom-
mending accordingly, that “Biotechnology Australia and 
the Attorney-General’s Department, in conjunction with 
the state and territory governments, ensure that information 
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about the ownership of biological resources is compiled, 
and made publicly available as a single, easily accessible 
source” (B ). 
One issue that could, perhaps, benefit from clarifi-
cation is that raised by the submission from the Center 
of Indigenous History and the Arts to the inquiry into 
Indigenous Cultural and Indigenous Property Rights and 
quoted in J ()54 to the effect that amendments 
to Western Australian legislation could effectively deprive 
indigenous people of their potential intellectual property 
rights and existing use rights (see further, below, under 
“Indigenous Issues”). Similar comments were made by 
David Epworth, manager of the Caring for Country Unit 
of the Balkanu Aboriginal Development Corporation on 
Cape York with respect to the collecting arrangements 
between the Queensland Herbarium and AstraZeneca: 
“[The Herbarium is] actively accelerating their collection 
program in order to exclude Aboriginal people. In that 
process they’re advantaging pharmaceutical companies at 
the expense of Aboriginal people.” In response, however, 
the manager of the Herbarium, Gordon Guymer, said that 
the Herbarium had done extensive vegetation mapping 
on Cape York, but as far as he knew they had not been 
collecting on any Aboriginal land. He said that if they 
were going to do that they would certainly get in contact 
with the relevant people.55 In any case, the impact of leg-
islation, policies and agreements on indigenous interests 
may also be an issue for a nationally consistent scheme 
to address.
The legal advice also commented briefly on the owner-
ship of intellectual property rights. Since this has been an 
important issue in debates over access and benefit sharing, 
particularly for indigenous people, the advice is quoted 
here in full: 
Prime facie, the intellectual property rights in any 
processes or products (i.e., patent rights) derived 
from ex situ collections of biological resources held 
by Commonwealth agencies will belong to the person 
responsible for developing [them] (the inventor). 
[Patents Act  (Cth), s  () (a)]. This is regardless 
of the ownership of any resources from which [they] are 
derived, or where those resources may be held. However, 
it would be open to a Commonwealth agency to permit 
access only on the condition that intellectual property 
rights in any products derived from these resources are 
vested in a certain way, e.g., jointly with the inventor, the 
Commonwealth, and a representative of the traditional 
owners (V ).
Finally, it should be noted, since this is a controversial 
and complex issue at the international level, that several 
submissions raised the issue that Australia’s patent laws 
should not allow patenting of living organisms, whether 
modified or not.56 As this issue was outside the Inquiry’s 
terms of reference, however, the Inquiry declined to ad-
dress it (V ).
Benefit Sharing
The  submission to the inquiry explained that the 
lack of benefit-sharing arrangements had resulted in lost 
opportunities through stalled projects, sometimes after 
biodiscovery leads had been identified. The reluctance of 
some marine resources-controlling agencies to grant per-
mits was “over concerns that adequate benefit sharing will 
not take place, should commercialization of a discovery 
occur... some agencies have attempted to ... require some 
downstream benefit negotiations in the event of a com-
mercial discovery. In other cases, access has been delayed, 
restricted, or denied.” The Inquiry supported ’ recom-
mendation that benefit sharing be negotiated at the outset of 
a project, rather than after a lead had been identified, and 
reflected this in the proposed scheme (V ). 
Anecdotal evidence presented to the Access Taskforce 
in consultations following the completion of the Inquiry 
suggested that some agencies welcomed the establishment 
of benefit-sharing mechanisms, particularly where public 
moneys were being used to support research which could 
result (and in one case, was known to have resulted) in 
discoveries with commercial potential.
The Bailey report also addressed this issue: “One of 
the factors that has complicated and slowed the granting 
of access to biological resources has been uncertainty on 
the part of those granting access permits about the benefits 
that should be required from bioprospectors, should com-
mercial discoveries result” (B ). 
Overblown expectations of benefits has also caused 
some agencies to delay the issue of permits.  reported 
to the Committee that in some cases delays had amounted 
to many years (B ). The Committee noted that 
experience was now being gained in development of 
benefit-sharing contracts and that the Department of the 
Environment and Heritage was developing a model benefit-
sharing contract. Citing the Inquiry report, the Committee 
explained the purposes of the model contract: to promote 
parties’ understanding of the issues; to facilitate negotia-
tions and agreement between them; and to provide cer-
tainty for industry by ensuring that agreements are based 
on prior informed consent, mutually agreed terms, and 
adequate benefit-sharing arrangements, which will in turn 
provide an agreed set of standards against which industry’s 
performance can be judged (B ).
Another issue which arose in the context of benefit 
sharing was the need to ensure that both the access scheme 
and the model contract are sufficiently flexible to allow 
benefits to be negotiated appropriate to both commercial 
and noncommercial situations. The Inquiry report related 
that many submissions, particularly those from research 
organizations, commented on the importance of access 
to biological research and of ensuring that an access sys-
tem does not inhibit research. The Inquiry decided that, 
in view of the fact that in many cases research will have 
unforeseen commercial implications or possibilities, this 
should be considered, as far as possible, at the outset of 
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negotiations and reflected in the contract. It recommended 
that “…terms in the proposed model contract anticipate 
that most contracts will be for commercial purposes but 
that in some cases, terms which reflect noncommercially 
motivated research purposes may need to be drafted, and 
benefit sharing negotiated accordingly” (V ). 
The Bailey report reflected these concerns in its recom-
mendation that “when finalizing benefit-sharing arrange-
ments, the Australian government ensure that commercial 
activity is not discouraged by the benefits bioprospectors 
are required to provide” (B ).
Indigenous Issues
The terms of reference of  () discussed above 
included the obligation to take into account “the interests 
of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in the use 
and ownership of traditional knowledge, innovations, and 
practices and biological resources on Aboriginal lands”. 
However,  () discussed the issue only briefly, 
concluding that it was not within its terms of reference 
to resolve this complex matter, and suggesting that “it 
was more appropriately dealt with in other fora, because 
wider policy issues concerning the treatment of indigenous 
peoples are involved, particularly in the context of recon-
ciliation and social justice”.
The issue of the appropriation of indigenous biodiver-
sity knowledge was raised in the report of the inquiry into 
Australian Indigenous Cultural and Intellectual Property 
Rights. which found that a major concern of indigenous 
people was that “…their cultural knowledge of plants, 
animals and the environment is being used by scientists, 
medical researchers, nutritionists and pharmaceutical com-
panies for commercial gain, often without their informed 
consent and without any benefits flowing back to them” 
(J ). Janke related the story of the smokebush, 
a plant which grows in certain coastal areas of Western 
Australia and which has traditionally been used by indig-
enous people of the region for healing. In the s, the 
Western Australian government granted the  National 
Cancer Institute () a license to collect plants for screen-
ing purposes. In the late s scientists at the  found 
that the smokebush contained the active compound cono-
curvone, which tests showed could destroy the  virus 
in low concentrations. This “discovery” was subsequently 
patented. The  awarded  Discovery Technologies 
(known today as Cerylid Biosciences57) an exclusive 
worldwide license to develop the patent. Under amend-
ments to Western Australian environmental legislation, 
the Western Australian Minister of the Environment has 
the power to grant exclusive rights to Western Australian 
flora and fauna species for research purposes. In the early 
s, the Western Australia Government also awarded 
 the rights to the smokebush species, to develop 
an anti- drug.  paid . million  to secure 
access to smokebush and related species. If conocurvone 
is successfully commercialized, the Western Australia 
Government will recoup royalties of  million  
per year by  (see section “Examples of Access and 
Benefit-Sharing Agreements in Existing Bioprospecting 
Projects” for additional details about the smokebush agree-
ment currently implemented by Cerylid). 
Intellectual property rights issues for indigenous peo-
ples were put forward by a submission from the Center 
of Indigenous History and the Arts (University of Western 
Australia) that was quoted by Janke as follows: 
“The current legislation disregards the potential 
intellectual property rights that indigenous peoples 
in Western Australia have in flora on their lands. 
Furthermore, multinational drug companies could be 
sold exclusive rights to entire species of flora, preventing 
anyone from using those species for any other purpose 
without the consent of the companies. Indigenous peoples 
in WA now face the possibility of being prevented from 
using any of the flora which is the subject of an exclusive 
agreement. It is therefore vital that any reform of the 
intellectual and cultural property laws include provisions 
for the recognition of Indigenous peoples as the native 
title owners of all the biological resources of the flora 
and fauna that are on their lands” (JANKE ). 
Among the rights which indigenous people want in 
relation to their cultural and intellectual property, Janke 
listed: “Control [of] disclosure, dissemination, reproduc-
tion, and recording of Indigenous knowledge, ideas, and 
innovations concerning medicinal plants, biodiversity, and 
environmental management” (J ).
The launch of Janke’s report, Our Culture, Our Future 
(J ), in September  coincided nicely with 
the announcement of the Inquiry (V ) three 
months earlier. The terms of reference of the Inquiry 
stated that “The scheme should particularly focus on the 
equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization 
of traditional knowledge, innovations and practices” 
(V ).
The issue was very critical for the Inquiry because 
three of the Commonwealth areas under s of the  
are owned by indigenous people: Kakadu and Uluru-Kata 
Tjuta in the Northern Territory and Booderee on the south 
coast of New South Wales. As national parks, they are sig-
nificant tourist destinations and could be expected to be of 
interest to bioprospectors. They are leased to the Director 
of National Parks and administered by the Department 
of the Environment and Heritage. The  provides 
for joint management, by the Director and a Board of 
Management, of Commonwealth reserves that consist 
of, or include, indigenous people’s land. A majority of 
Board members must be indigenous people nominated by 
the traditional Aboriginal owners if the reserve is wholly 
or mostly on indigenous people’s land.58 The Boards, in 
conjunction with the Director, are required to prepare 
management plans for each of the parks.59
The Inquiry report quoted sections from the manage-
ment plans for Kakadu and Uluru-Kata Tjuta on the rights 
and roles of the traditional owners in managing biological 
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resources. The Kakadu plan includes sections indicating 
the importance of continuing traditional use and manage-
ment of native plants and animals; the need for the Board’s 
approval of applications for commercial activities in the 
park; plans to develop a strategy for research in the park; 
and provisions regarding the collection of specimens in 
the park. The Uluru-Kata Tjuta plan specifically refers to 
bioprospecting and states that the owners have important 
cultural and intellectual property rights that must be re-
spected (V ).
In light of these issues, the Inquiry consulted with 
the park owners and their representatives (in the case of 
Kakadu, the Northern Land Council, and in the case of 
Uluru-Kata Tjuta, the Central Land Council), making two 
visits to each of the Northern Territory parks and one to 
Booderee. The Inquiry carefully considered submissions 
from the owners of Kakadu (prepared in conjunction with 
the Northern Land Council) and the Central Land Council, 
reflecting both in some detail in the report, as well as sug-
gestions for a scheme under s  of the  from other 
interested individuals and organizations. In addition, the 
Inquiry reflected its awareness of the importance of con-
tinuing consultations, recommending, among other things, 
that the Department of the Environment and Heritage “en-
sure that traditional owners and their representatives are 
further consulted on, and given adequate opportunities to 
contribute to, development of regulations under s  of 
the ” (V ).
Many submissions expressed concern about the use 
of indigenous knowledge without consultation, prior 
informed consent, or benefit sharing. These views went 
beyond the issue of protecting the rights of the traditional 
owners of the parks in the context of the s  regulations 
(which could be achieved through the access and ben-
efit-sharing arrangements recommended by the Inquiry) 
and were, in that respect, beyond the Inquiry’s terms of 
reference. Nevertheless, in the knowledge that these are 
significant and sensitive issues for indigenous people, the 
Inquiry report summarized them, concluding that “in view 
of the complexity of these issues, their extension beyond 
Commonwealth “areas” under the , and the fact that 
discussion about them is relatively recent in the Australian 
context, the Inquiry believes that further research, consulta-
tions with stakeholders, and community education are de-
sirable”. V () made four recommendations: 
• The Department of the Environment and Heritage 
should monitor international research and debate 
by the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(), the World Trade Organization (), and 
other fora on protection of indigenous knowledge, 
as well as debate and research on the issue in 
Australia. 
• In the event that stronger measures to protect in-
digenous knowledge are introduced internationally 
or in Australia, the Department should consider 
the adequacy of the regulations in protecting indig-
enous intellectual property rights. 
• The issue of protecting indigenous knowledge 
should be considered further in (but not necessar-
ily limited to) discussions towards developing a 
nationally consistent system.
•  A should consider amending patent law 
to require proof of source and, where appropriate, 
prior informed consent, as a prerequisite for grant-
ing a patent.60
The Department of the Environment and Heritage 
has continued its involvement in these issues, through its 
participation in the Australian delegation to the second 
meeting of the  Intergovernmental Committee on 
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional 
Knowledge and Folklore, held in Geneva in December 
 and its contributions to briefs for meetings of the 
Committee. The Department has also funded several 
projects on indigenous knowledge including one by the 
Nepabunna Community in South Australia, and one by the 
Kuku Yalanji People Community and the Balkanu Cape 
York Development Corporation in Far North Queensland, 
and organized a workshop on indigenous knowledge in 
Canberra in February , to consider the further imple-
mentation of Article (j) of the .61
The Bailey Committee also addressed the issue of 
indigenous rights, commenting that “There are two ele-
ments to Indigenous involvement in bioprospecting: one 
is the result of indigenous ownership of the land and the 
other comes from knowledge of the uses to which na-
tive plants and animals can be put” (B ). With 
respect to ownership, the Committee noted that in some 
parts of Australia significant areas are owned by Aboriginal 
groups (% of the Northern Territory and % of South 
Australia) and referred to the recommendations of the 
Inquiry report regarding prior informed consent, mutually 
agreed terms, and adequate benefit sharing that protects 
and values traditional knowledge, as well as to recom-
mendations that decisions by indigenous communities to 
deny access to bioprospectors should not be reviewable; 
and that advice be provided to indigenous communities 
on how to get the best deals possible with bioprospectors 
(B ). 
With respect to traditional knowledge, the Committee 
stated that “There has been some criticism and dispute 
in the past about the unacknowledged use of traditional 
knowledge in Australia,” and included the example of 
the Western Australian smokebush (B ). The 
Committee then cited, as an example of continuing 
criticism, the submission of the Royal Society of Western 
Australia relating to the contract between the Western 
Australia government and a company, BioProspect, 
which the Society claimed appeared not to allow for the 
recognition of indigenous knowledge. The Committee 
commented, however, that a national trust fund, such as 
that BioProspect proposed in its submission, would ad-
dress this problem, adding that BioProspect does not rely 
on traditional knowledge to guide its bioprospecting, but 
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prefers to use high throughput screening which is more 
effective in discovering bioactive materials than using 
traditional knowledge (B ).
The Inquiry report also commented that the Inquiry’s 
informal discussions with industry suggest that indigenous 
knowledge is not widely used as a source of information 
about the potential uses of plants. V () stated 
that:
One explanation offered for this was that, in the absence 
of clear and fair rules, companies were generally 
reluctant to pursue the application of indigenous 
knowledge to biodiscovery. Companies were concerned 
that irrespective of the good faith agreements they might 
make with indigenous groups, they might be vulnerable 
to criticism about the adequacy of the agreement unless 
there were independent standards against which they 
could be judged. The Inquiry also heard comments 
that, increasingly, the focus of biodiscovery is on 
microorganisms which industry believes did not play a 
role in indigenous culture.” 
Indeed, it is not clear from accounts of the smokebush 
issue whether indigenous knowledge was actually used 
to identify the potential healing properties of the plant or 
whether this was only revealed through screening.
With respect to intellectual property issues, the Bailey 
Committee acknowledged that Australia’s intellectual 
property regime does not currently protect traditional 
knowledge, noted some of the difficulties in doing this, 
and commented that: “What may therefore be needed is a 
new category of rights that protects traditional knowledge 
from unauthorized use, recognizes its origin, and provides 
just compensation. Sui generis methods of intellectual 
property protection, such as those used for plant varieties, 
have been recommended in this context”( B ). 
The Committee noted recent developments (particularly 
the work of ’s Intergovernmental Committee on 
Intellectual Property) and concluded (without making a 
specific recommendation) that it “…supports ’s work 
in promoting the use of existing intellectual property pro-
tection among Australia’s indigenous people and assisting 
’s efforts to provide a more comprehensive system for 
protecting traditional knowledge” (B ). 
In October , the Australian Senate considered 
amendments to the Plant Breeder’s Rights Act , in-
cluding proposed amendments by Senator John Cherry, 
a member of the Australian Democrats, a minority 
Opposition party in the Senate. Addressing the Senate on 
 October , Senator Cherry explained the purpose 
of the amendments as being to “…reduce the chances of 
biopiracy from Indigenous land and increase the capacity 
of the Indigenous community to object when biopiracy is 
occurring”.62 
However, the amendments did not have Government 
support. The Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for 
Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry, Senator Judith Troeth, 
explained that “The amendments … are not the subject 
matter of the bill. In addition, they are not particularly 
well considered. They fail to recognize that the …Act rep-
resents world’s best practice through its basic principles, 
that the scope of the Act is limited, that it coexists with 
other legislation and that the exercise of [plant breeders’] 
rights is regulated by such legislation.”63 The issue does 
remain a live one, however, particularly in Queensland, 
as evidenced by a radio program in which various people, 
including the Executive Director of the Balkanu Cape York 
Development Corporation, Gerhardt Pearson, continued to 
express concern about the lack of opportunities for indig-
enous people to gain from benefit-sharing agreements and 
the lack of recognition by the government of the rights of 
indigenous people to biological resources and traditional 
knowledge.64 Their concerns have not, it appears, been 
allayed by the Q G (), which 
stated that the Government would ensure that the develop-
ment of biodiscovery policy in Queensland “engages local 
indigenous communities, relevant community organiza-
tions, and Native Title Representative Bodies to identify 
methods to address and respect traditional knowledge of 
Queensland biological resources where such knowledge 
is used for biodiscovery”. It should be noted that Principle 
 of the Nationally Consistent Approach is that legisla-
tive, administrative, or policy frameworks in Australian 
jurisdictions shall “Recognize the need to ensure the use 
of traditional knowledge is undertaken with the coopera-
tion and approval of the holders of that knowledge and on 
mutually agreed terms” ( ).
This may be a narrower principle than that which in-
digenous people appear to be asserting. The fact that the 
debate continues, however, suggests that there may be a 
need for a more rigorous attempt to identify and clarify 
the issues and to develop acceptable solutions.
Exclusivity
Another issue which the Committee noted as being of par-
ticular concern in submissions to its inquiry was the ques-
tion of exclusivity. We have seen, above, concerns quoted 
in J () about the impact of exclusive rights on 
the intellectual property rights of indigenous people and 
on access for other purposes, including traditional uses. 
The Inquiry report did not address this issue in detail, but 
did note similar concerns expressed by the Queensland 
Government and by indigenous people (V ). 
It noted that the parties to the contract are free to negotiate 
“exclusivity” terms in whatever manner they wish and that 
a range of terms is possible. The Inquiry decided that it 
was not necessary to make any recommendations on this 
matter, as the proposed scheme would require the Minister, 
in deciding whether to grant or refuse a permit, to con-
sider the fairness of “exclusivity” clauses in the contract, 
among other issues, against the indicia of proper informed 
consent, mutually agreed terms, and adequate benefit shar-
ing. The report did suggest, however, that terms of a more 
“exclusive” nature which benefit the bioprospector should 
be reflected in the nature and/or amount of benefits payable 
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to the resource provider (V ).
Concerns which the Bailey report discussed included 
ensuring that arrangements made with commercial op-
erators do not restrict noncommercial activities and do 
allow reasonable access to other commercial operators. 
The Committee noted the concerns of some operators, 
both commercial and noncommercial, that this type of 
restriction might (or indeed does) occur, and commented 
that “…care must be taken when setting the permit con-
ditions and making benefit arrangements to ensure that 
reasonable opportunities are available to all wishing to 
access a particular area” (B ).
The Committee recommended that when granting ac-
cess, the Australian Government ensure access for non-
commercial activities and, with commercial activities, 
ensure a balance between open competitive access and 
restricting access by granting exclusive use. Exclusivity 
should be restricted by permit conditions such as dura-
tion, area or species collected, and uses to be explored 
(B ).
Criticism of the Proposed Scheme
The Bailey report is a useful source of evidence of criti-
cisms which were made of the proposed access scheme, 
some of which were variously made in response to the 
Inquiry report, the drafting instructions for the regulations, 
and the draft regulations themselves. In particular, the 
Committee discussed criticisms of the proposed scheme 
by the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry 
().  expressed the following concerns: first, that 
the proposed regime might alter existing property rights 
and interfere with intellectual property rights (or at least 
give that appearance); second, that it might jeopardize 
Australia’s ability to access genetic material from overseas 
for crop improvement; and, third, that it was too onerous 
(B ).
With respect to the second point,  claimed that 
“…while such international developments [the revision 
of the  International Undertaking on Plant Genetic 
Resources] do not preclude the application of an access and 
benefit-sharing system in Australia, the need to reconcile 
any domestic system with such international developments 
is highly important to avoid having two systems of access 
and benefit-sharing operating in Australia” (B ). 
Furthermore,  related that Australia is a “significant 
net beneficiary” from the current and likely future multi-
lateral system for the exchange of plant genetic resources, 
and further stated that: “If Australia were to charge for 
access to public biological material we would not be 
surprised if other countries were to do the same to us” 
(B ).
With respect to its third point,  listed the fol-
lowing as “elements of the Voumard recommendations 
that if adopted could prove onerous and a disincentive 
to commercial bioprospecting”: every interested person 
registered under s A of the  must be invited to 
make written submissions about whether a permit should 
be issued (on environmental grounds) and that these 
should be taken into account by the Minister in making 
his decision; the “precautionary principle” must be applied, 
“where appropriate”; any variations to the model contract 
must be “acceptable”; a maximum of three years would 
be set for the validity of an access permit; and the permit 
may be transferred only with the approval of the Minister 
(B ).
The key elements of the scheme which  preferred 
were: a model material transfer agreement () for access 
to in situ material (and ex situ material in some cases) under 
Australian government ownership and control; inclusion 
in the  of a flexible benefit-sharing agreement contin-
gent on the material being commercialized (for example, 
a percentage of the gross profits over the last five years of 
commercialization); exemptions for benefit sharing consid-
ered if the recipient company or institution is prepared to 
make the developed material publicly available for further 
research; access to, and benefit sharing of, biological re-
sources on freehold property subject to private negotiation 
(although the model  for Commonwealth areas may 
serve as a model for the private sector); and encouragement 
extended to States and Territories to adopt the Australian 
government approach as a basis to achieve a nationally 
consistent framework (B ).  also stressed 
the need for a detailed regulatory impact statement examin-
ing the practical impact of any regulations on government, 
business, and other users (B ). The Bailey report 
noted some of the responses of the Department of the 
Environment and Heritage to ’s points. In hearings 
before the Committee, the Department disputed that the 
scheme of the Inquiry report would replace the common 
law with new property rights or interfere with intellectual 
property protection. The Department also stressed that 
the proposed benefit-sharing arrangements would allow 
for considerable flexibility in what should be included in 
contracts (B ).
The Committee also noted that, with respect to the 
need to accommodate existing international obligations 
such as the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic 
Resources, the Inquiry report had recommended that mate-
rial which is the subject of such agreements be excluded 
from the regulations. , however, took the view that this 
approach would introduce complexity because it would 
establish “multiple systems covering different biological 
material” (B ).
The Committee did not discuss these issues further 
but, in relation to them, recommended that in finalizing 
the regulations, the Australian government should ensure 
that the regulations did not create new property rights; 
should obtain a detailed regulatory impact statement65; and 
should examine fully the implications of the regulations 
for Australia’s access to overseas plant genetic material 
(B ). 
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There is already a history of bioprospecting companies ne-
gotiating with government agencies and other institutions 
for access to biological resources and agreeing to provide 
benefits. Some major examples of these agreements are 
outlined below.66 It would seem unlikely that major bio-
prospectors would have any difficulties in operating within 
the terms of the Australian government regulations, in light 
of their experience in dealing with legislative and/or con-
tractual requirements in other jurisdictions.
Under the draft regulations, the cost of a permit is 
notional and the same for all applicants (national or in-
ternational, research or commercial):   for access 
and no payment for a transfer of the permit or variation 
or revocation of a permit condition.67 This fee would not 
even cover administration costs. Benefits, of course, are 
to be negotiated on a case-by-case basis.
Examples of Access and Benefit-Sharing 
Agreements in Existing Bioprospecting 
Projects
AstraZeneca R&D Griffith University
AstraZeneca R&D Griffith University has contracts with 
the Queensland Museum and the Queensland Herbarium 
under which the Museum and the Herbarium collect 
specimens for AstraZeneca’s R&D facility located at 
Griffith University in Brisbane, Queensland. Key terms 
of these contracts include: payments to the collectors for 
the samples and a percentage of proceeds from commercial 
exploitation of compounds obtained from them; agreement 
by the collectors to keep confidential certain matters relat-
ing to samples and supply, while ensuring that essential 
taxonomic information is placed in a public collection; and 
the University’s exclusive right to the collectors’ services 
(V ).
Australian Institute of Marine Science
The Australian government established  in  to 
generate the knowledge needed for the sustainable use and 
protection of the marine environment through scientific 
and technological research. For over a decade ’ ac-
tivities have included bioprospecting research. The center-
piece of this research is the marine biodiversity collection 
which includes material from more than , marine 
macro-organisms and , marine microorganisms col-
lected from over , sites around Australia (V 
).  has had contracts with organizations such as 
the  and Cerylid. 
’ contract with the Queensland government 
(signed in July ) is the only Australian benefit-shar-
ing arrangement whose text has been made public (see 
Box ). The context in which it was negotiated was the 
Queensland government’s interest in promoting the bio-
technology industry in that state. The contract includes 
agreement regarding the payment of royalties (if a lead 
emerges and  derives net royalty income,  shall 
pay .% of the net royalty income to the state), but other 
benefits focus on research and biotechnology development 
opportunities, particularly in Queensland.68
Cerylid
Cerylid has entered into plant collecting contracts with 
a wide range of collectors: the Royal Botanic Gardens 
in Melbourne, Victoria, and the Victorian Department of 
Conservation and Natural Resources; the Parks and Wildlife 
Commission of the Northern Territory; the Arnhem Land 
Aboriginal Land Trust and the Northern Land Council; 
the Tiwi Aboriginal Land Trust; the Tasmanian Herbarium 
through the Trustees of the Tasmanian Museum; the 
Government of the State of Sarawak (Malaysia); the 
Kelam People of the Kaironk Valley in Papua New 
Guinea, through the Australian National University; and 
the Tillegerry Habitat Association, New South Wales. 
Agreements relating to microorganisms have been made 
with the Antarctic Cooperative Research Center; the 
Department of Ecology and Biodiversity at the University 
of Hong Kong; the Australian Tropical Mycology Research 
Center; Flinders University, South Australia; and Biotech 
International Limited. Agreements relating to microorgan-
isms and macroorganisms were made with the Australian 
Institute of Marine Science (V ).
Cerylid observes the following principles in its plant 
collecting arrangements: agreements are enacted with 
relevant government and indigenous authorities; agree-
ments provide for sample/species collection; samples are 
collected by local botanical authorities; voucher specimens 
are maintained by local herbaria; agreements are long term 
and exclusive to the company; intellectual property rights 
are owned by or assigned to the company; and benefits, 
either commercial (payments for samples, royalties) or 
noncommercial (such as training), are provided to the 
custodians (V ). Issues relating to the smoke-
bush project and agreement were presented earlier in the 
section “Indigenous Issues.” Additional details about the 
agreement are presented by  K and L () 
as follows: In  a  botanist collected around , 
plant specimens in Western Australia which were then sent 
to the  National Institutes of Health for screening. In 
the late s, a species of smokebush showed promising 
activity in anti-cancer screens. The Institute obtained a 
patent on the active compound of the smokebush. At the 
same time, research by scientists in Western Australia also 
revealed the potential anti- activity of the smokebush. 
To ensure that the development and production of any po-
tential drug be based and coordinated in Western Australia, 
the Department of Conservation and Land Management 
() entered into an agreement with the company under 
which it was granted access to the smokebush and permis-
sion to develop it commercially. The company agreed to 
provide to  , , a share in royalties, and the 
Bioprospecting Initiatives
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right of first refusal to conduct any research on the active 
compound. The company also provided ,  for 
further research by a consortium of Western Australian 
scientists, in collaboration with the , on some eight 
smokebush patents lodged by . Benefit sharing took 
two forms: research funding (covering joint research and 
technology acquisition) and a share in royalties. The sci-
entists received ,  to cover research conducted 
prior to the agreement that had led to several Western 
Australia patents on conocurvone. Over the year following 
the agreement, they received an additional ,  
for further research. Government and university laborato-
ries of consortium members were equipped with various 
technologies.  used the remaining funds to establish 
the Western Australia Biotic Extract Library, a library of 
biotic extracts for drug discovery.
BioProspect
BioProspect, a listed Australian company, was established 
in  in Western Australia. The company negotiates ac-
cess to biological resources for the purpose of drug dis-
covery, screens plant extracts for a range of therapeutic 
activities in their laboratory in Perth, Western Australia, 
and supplies drug discovery companies with samples 
for further testing. In late , Western Australia’s then 
Environment Minister announced the “commencement of 
the largest scientific research for new medicines derived 
from Western Australian flora yet undertaken in Australia”. 
Under this agreement,  would collect plant samples 
from Crown (government-owned) land for BioProspect 
under a license agreement. The company would pay a fee 
for each sample provided, as well as a percentage of all 
revenue earned from other companies seeking access to the 
Recitals
• ’ marine research activities include biodiscovery (or 
bioprospecting) research whose goals include to discover 
biologically active molecules that can be developed as 
useful products by and with industry collaborators.
• ’ research has the potential to deliver benefits (both 
monetary and non-monetary) to .
• When  receives benefits, it seeks to equitably share 
those benefits with the resource owners.
•  is interested in facilitating ecologically sustainable 
access to and use of its biological resources for biodiscov-
ery purposes; utilizing its biodiversity to facilitate incre-
mental capacity building and value adding in the State’s 
biotechnology industries; and capturing an equitable share 
of the benefits derived from the use of ’s resources for 
biodiscovery purposes.
Purpose and scope of the agreement
• The purpose of the agreement is to set the framework 
within which  and  fairly share in the benefits of 
biodiscovery research using  samples.
•  samples are samples obtained from coastal areas de-
termined by the Seas and Submerged Lands Act of  
and the Coastal Water (State Titles) Act of .
Duration
• The agreement commences on the date of the agreement 
and continues until terminated by one or both parties 
pursuant to the terms of the agreement.
Review
• The agreement is subject to review by both parties after 
it has been in operation for one year and every two years 
hereafter, at which time amendments can be negotiated 
by the parties.
• After  years, the operations of  biodiscovery research 
will be independently reviewed ( to choose reviewer, 
cover costs, and keep information commercial in confi-
dence;  will have access to all information).
Access Arrangements
•  has exclusive right to access  samples for its 
research (this does not extend to the species that are rep-
resented by the  samples).
•  may collect new  samples for the purpose of bio-
discovery research, subject to any requirements to obtain 
permission from the appropriate  government agency.
•  has the exclusive right to supply biodiscovery re-
search samples that are  samples to third parties for 
biodiscovery research in which  is a collaborator 
(third parties may include industrial and/or commercial 
collaborators in Australia or overseas).
• If  provides  samples to third parties,  must 
ensure that under the third party agreement it is acknowl-
edged that the State is the owner of the resource from 
which the  samples were derived.
• Under a biotechnology benefit-sharing arrangement with 
,  has the right to access and conduct scientific 
research on the samples.
• Before attempting to negotiate collaborative agreements 
with third parties outside Australia,  must use all 
reasonable endeavors to satisfy the following criteria:
− Similar collaborative opportunities are not available on 
reasonable terms, first, in  and second, elsewhere 
in Australia.
− The option of transferring the technology from over-
seas, first, to  and second elsewhere in Australia, 
to eliminate the need to send  samples overseas is 
not possible on reasonable terms.
− The quantity of material sent overseas is restricted to 
the minimum required for pre-agreed work and the 
overseas collaborator is required to return any unused 
material.
− Data accompanying the material sent overseas will be 
limited to data reasonably required by the overseas 
collaborator to achieve the agreed objectives of the 
collaboration.
Box 1. Summary of the Biotechnology Benefit-Sharing Agreement
between AIMS and the State of Queensland (QLD)
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samples, and a royalty on the sale of the products derived 
from the samples. Funds received would be used to boost 
flora conservation and research. The agreement would not 
prevent others from applying for permits to collect plants, 
including those wanting to pick wildflowers commercially, 
academics wanting to further their research, and Aboriginal 
people wanting to use plants for medicinal purposes. The 
company planned to invest about  million  over 
the next five years to equip its screening facilities and to 
employ scientific and administrative staff.69
BioProspect has identified the following as key ele-
ments of its contracts: access is on the basis of sustain-
able access; primary ownership of all intellectual property 
derived from a biological resource remains in the hands of 
the state (Western Australia); the state receives royalties 
from any commercial activity resulting or derived from 
its biological resources; and whenever possible, the in-
frastructure and human resources of the state are used to 
collect, process, and add value to the primary biological 
resource (V ).
•  agrees to use reasonable endeavors to ensure any 
commercial arrangement with a third party complies with 
the following criteria:
− Opportunities for intellectual property development 
are maximized, first, in  and second, elsewhere in 
Australia.
− Opportunities are captured, first, for  and second, 
for elsewhere in Australia, for re-supply of material for 
a nominated sample; for full taxonomic consignment 
for the nominated sample; and for assessment of op-
tions for large scale long term supply of material for 
the nominated sample.
− An appropriate  collaborator, first, or Australian 
collaborator, second, will share in any patent rights/
terms to leads whose discovery and/or development 
has involved an overseas party.
− The share of monetary benefits to be paid to AIMS 
or another Australian collaborator will be stipulated 
and fair and commensurate with their input to the 
process.
− Development of any leads will recognize ’s or other 
parts of Australia’s rights as the place of origin.
Benefits
•  will provide an annual report, summarizing its bio-
discovery research using  samples.
•  will provide appropriate  resource manage-
ment agencies with detailed collection data for new  
samples.
• Where practical, or where stipulated in a permit or per-
mission, a preserved voucher specimen shall be lodged 
with the  Museum with collection data and any other 
information that may contribute to furthering the State’s 
scientific knowledge.
•  shall use its best endeavors to collaborate with the 
 Museum regarding the coordination and lodgment of 
preserved voucher specimens.
•  shall use its best endeavors to collaborate with 
appropriate  government agencies to maximize the 
taxonomic and biosystematic research benefits derived 
from these collections.
•  shall use its best endeavors to collaborate with 
non-AIMS scientists based in  in all aspects of its 
biodiscovery research relating to  samples.
•  shall use reasonable endeavors to inform the appro-
priate  government agencies of any opportunities for 
biotechnology industry capacity building, value adding, 
or joint venture investments to allow those opportunities 
to be captured for the benefit of the State.
• If a lead emerges and  derives net royalty income, 
 shall pay . % of the net royalty income to the state 
(if non- -based scientists also make intellectual 
inputs to the discovery of such a lead,  may negotiate 
a distribution of part of the remaining net royalty income 
to those scientists and/or their organizations).
− This clause continues to apply despite the possible 
termination of the agreement.
Intellectual property – confidential information
• Information provided by  to  regarding its research 
will be ’ intellectual property and in some cases  
will require the State to hold such information “commer-
cial in confidence.”
Box 1. Continued
Biodiversity Conservation, Sustainable Use, and Benefit-Sharing Strategies
As required by its terms of reference, the Inquiry report 
addressed environmental issues at some length. Many sub-
missions to the Inquiry emphasized the need for environ-
mental assessment to be undertaken before bioprospecting 
activities could be approved, although only a few presented 
specific evidence about the possible adverse environmen-
tal impacts of bioprospecting (V ). However, 
reflecting the current lack of knowledge about much of 
Australia’s biodiversity (marine invertebrate fauna were 
cited as a specific example), submissions advocated the 
need for a “precautionary” approach (V ).
Possible environmental impacts of bioprospecting 
were considered by both the Queensland government 
and  which, as related above, have entered into a 
major bioprospecting contract (Box ). The Queensland 
government’s submission said that:
…most primary biodiscovery collections involve 
relatively small samples sizes of less than  grams 
per species and, provided the target species are readily 
available with a sustainable population in the target area, 
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are not considered threatened or endangered and proper 
collection methods are used, the environmental impact 
may be minimal. Secondary collections of a specific 
species, conducted after a lead has been identified, 
may first require an environmental impact and species 
distribution analysis to determine the viability and 
ecological sustainability of the proposed second or any 
subsequent collection (V ).
 went further, proposing increasingly stringent 
requirements depending on the nature of collection 
(V ). For primary collections, allowable 
collection methods and procedures were desirable, which 
would ensure minimal environmental impact and avoid-
ance of rare species. For medium-scale secondary collec-
tion, there should be a requirement for a separate permit as 
the re-collection would be targeted on a particular organ-
ism, noting the option of species-specific environmental 
assessment. For large-scale collections, there should be 
full-scale environmental assessment and mandatory con-
current investigation of alternatives such as synthesis or 
culture for long-term and large-scale supply. 
In general, industry submissions did not make detailed 
comments about environmental issues, but support for 
conservation and sustainable use was implicit in many 
comments regarding the need to ensure continuing access 
to biological resources. To take one example, BioProspect 
stated that its corporate mission statement was based on the 
. Key elements which the company insists be included 
in its contracts are as follows (V ): access is 
strictly on the basis of sustainable access and contingent 
on agreement to collect only the minimal quantity required 
to satisfy screening for biological activity; all collections 
are “vouchered” and identified by qualified taxonomists, 
with voucher specimen libraries maintained by the state, 
for example, in herbaria or museums; no extract collec-
tions of endangered or protected species are ever collected 
from the wild (collections of protected species only oc-
cur if material is sustainably available from cultivated 
or farmed collections); and any requirement for further 
material is from cultivated or farmed collections or, in 
rare circumstances, from proven sustainable collections 
from natural resources. 
The Inquiry report’s recommendations for environmen-
tal assessment were generally reflected in the resulting 
draft regulations. However, the major difference between 
the approach of the report and that of the regulations was 
the addition in the regulations of the scheme for environ-
ment assessment by public notice. In effect, this allows a 
shorter, less complex approach to environmental assess-
ment in situations where environmental impacts are likely 
to be more than negligible. This criterion, while not defined 
in the regulations, would appear to require environmental 
assessment of a proposed bioprospecting activity which 
does not reach the ’s threshold for assessment of an 
action “that has, will have, or is likely to have a significant 
impact on certain aspects of the environment”.70
The Inquiry report also recommended that in decid-
ing whether or not to issue an access permit, the Minister 
consider the precautionary principle and noted that this 
would require an amendment to section  of the  
(V ). Section  of the Act requires the 
Minister to take account of the precautionary principle 
in relation to making specified decisions set out in a table 
under the Act. The Act explains the principle as follows: 
“lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a 
reason for postponing a measure to prevent degradation 
of the environment where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible environmental damage”. This recommendation 
was reflected in the draft regulation which requires the 
Minister to take account of various matters before mak-
ing a decision to grant a permit, one of which is that “the 
proposed access will, taking into account the precautionary 
principle, be ecologically sustainable and consistent with 
the conservation of Australia’s biological diversity”.71 
In considering whether this paragraph is satisfied, the 
Minister “must consider whether the proposed access 
may adversely affect: a) the conservation status of any 
species or population, or b) any ecosystem or ecological 
community”.72
The Inquiry also considered and made recommenda-
tions relating to proposals that would promote further 
conservation-oriented research. This was in response, for 
example, to comments by the Queensland government that 
bioprospecting had significantly enhanced the discovery 
and documentation of Australia’s biodiversity, yet this out-
come had not always been a mandatory permitting require-
ment. A frequently cited example is the results of the agree-
ments between AstraZeneca R&D Griffith University and 
the Queensland Museum and the Queensland Herbarium. 
The submission from Professor Quinn, the Director of 
AstraZeneca R&D Griffith University and the industry 
representative on the Inquiry’s reference group, revealed 
that collaboration with the Herbarium to date had resulted 
in the discovery of  new plant species; new populations 
of threatened species in remote areas, providing the ge-
netic material which can be used to propagate the species; 
records of weed encroachment in native forests which are 
useful for forest management; and the creation of new 
distribution records in the Herbarium. Collaboration with 
the Museum had resulted in the discovery of approxi-
mately , new species and provision of infrastructure 
to define accurately the distribution of marine sponges in 
Queensland and adjacent waters; this provided data which 
will eventually produce taxonomic expertise in these areas 
and is of great value in further understanding of marine 
biota (V ).
To maximize potential scientific outcomes, the 
Queensland government’s submission recommended that 
there be a strict requirement that representative samples 
of all taxa obtained from biodiscovery be lodged with a 
State or Australian government museum accredited by the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora () together with collection 
data and any other information that may contribute to the 
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scientific knowledge of Australian biodiversity (V 
). The Inquiry recommended that the regulations re-
quire the parties to the contract (in practice, this would 
usually be the collecting body) to lodge voucher specimens 
and information about the collection with a -approved 
authority in Australia which has facilities for preservation 
(and further dissemination, when appropriate) of this mate-
rial (V ). This recommendation has not been 
reflected in the draft regulations.
Finally, the Inquiry report recommended that the regu-
lations and the model contract include a requirement that 
at least some of the benefits under the contract (whether 
of a monetary or nonmonetary nature) should promote 
biodiversity conservation in the area covered by the agree-
ment (V ). This recommendation evolved 
from suggestions in some submissions, such as that by 
the Australian Conservation Foundation, that “…perhaps 
an identified percentage of the monetary benefits gained 
from the access [could be] placed into an environmental 
fund, managed by independent trustees, for conservation 
purposes” (V ). BioProspect also supported a 
model where royalty income derived from bioprospecting 
would reside in a fund and be distributed to protect biodi-
versity and reward the use of indigenous knowledge for the 
sustainable development of the biota (V ).
The Inquiry decided that, given the difficulty of predict-
ing the nature and size of benefits under future contracts 
and the fact that potential providers of resources had not 
been consulted on such a proposal (which could affect their 
share of benefits), a preferable approach was to attempt to 
ensure that at least some benefits under the contract were 
used to promote biodiversity in the area covered by the 
contract (V ). Such terms are not unknown: 
for example,  used ,  from its agreement 
with  for the conservation of rare and endangered 
flora and fauna and ,  for other conservation 
activities ( K and L ).
The draft regulations reflect this recommendation by 
including, among the circumstances the Minister has to 
consider in deciding whether to grant a permit, that “the 
Minister believes, on reasonable grounds, that some of 
the benefits of access will, if practicable, be used for 
biodiversity conservation in the area from where the 
relevant biological resources were taken”.73 A regula-
tion along these lines could also be drafted to address 
the Inquiry’s recommendation regarding the lodging of 
voucher specimens.
The terms of reference of the Bailey report also re-
quired it to inquire into and report on “the impacts on and 
benefits to the environment” of bioprospecting (B 
). The Committee acknowledged that bioprospect-
ing can harm the environment, for example, through over 
collecting (a particular danger in relation to rare and en-
dangered species); the introduction of exotic species and 
pathogens to habitats visited by collectors; and/or the use 
of inappropriate collection methods that result in collat-
eral damage to habitats or biota other than those being 
targeted (B ). The Committee also commented 
that much bioprospecting involves the collection of only 
small quantities of material and noted the potential for 
synthesizing active chemicals found in material, making 
further collections unnecessary (B ).
The Committee commented that existing legislation in 
many parts of Australia already addresses negative envi-
ronmental impacts and is being used or could be used to 
control bioprospecting, referring to the Victorian approach 
and to the  (B ). The Committee also re-
ferred to “positive impacts” of bioprospecting, citing, for 
example, the outcomes of the research referred to above 
(B ). The Committee mentioned suggestions 
that voucher specimens and associated information be 
lodged with museums and herbaria and comments about 
the potential value of royalties and other payments as a 
source of revenue for conservation purposes. However, 
it also acknowledged the view of the Department of the 
Environment and Heritage that information collected in the 
course of bioprospecting may make a greater contribution to 
conservation than any monetary returns (B ).
The Committee concluded its discussion of the en-
vironmental issues involved in bioprospecting with the 
observation that the conservation of biodiversity is funda-
mental to biodiscovery and to building industries based on 
these discoveries. Although its terms of reference did not 
include a requirement to assess the adequacy with which 
biological resources are being conserved, the report noted 
evidence regarding the lack of resources for conservation 
and the lack of protection for some biodiversity and 
stated its belief that it is essential that state, territory, and 
Australian government conservation programs compre-
hensively cover Australia’s biodiversity and are adequately 
funded to maintain it. The Committee recommended that 
the Department of the Environment and Heritage give a 
“high priority to continuing its work with state and territory 
governments to develop a nationally consistent approach 
to establishing conservation areas that comprehensively 
cover all species and ecosystems” (B ).
The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry 
has, in consultation with other interested government agen-
cies (particularly the Department of the Environment and 
Heritage), prepared a response to the recommendations of 
the Bailey Committee. The response was submitted to the 
Committee in September .
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There have been few, if any, sustained and rigorous cri-
tiques of Australia’s international positions on the relation-
ship among the , , and the negotiations which led 
to the . This probably reflects the complexity of the 
issues, as well as the lack of opportunities and resources 
available to interested parties to develop and express their 
concerns. Several issues relating to these agreements, par-
ticularly with respect to intellectual property and tradi-
tional knowledge, remain controversial at the intentional 
level. The following is a summary of Australia’s positions 
on these agreements.
The CBD and TRIPS
One of the principles of  is that national laws should 
provide patent protection to inventions, without discrimi-
nation as to the field of technology concerned (Article 
.).74 In response to concerns about the patenting of 
plants and animals, members of the  agreed to an 
optional exception to this principle which provides that 
members may exclude from patentability “plants and 
animals and other microorganisms, and essentially bio-
logical processes for the production of plants and animals 
other than non-biological and micro-biological processes” 
(Article .(b)). Australia, in common with many of its 
key trading partners, including the United States, Japan, 
the European Union, and New Zealand, allows for the 
patenting of plants, microorganisms, and related biological 
materials, provided that these meet the usual standards of 
proof for patentability.75
Since  a review of this Article has been underway 
in the  Council. The Australian government submit-
ted its views in a communication to the  Council in 
September .76 Australia’s view is that the review is 
relatively narrow; that is, it is concerned with the effective-
ness of the optional exclusion to patentability. Australia 
acknowledges, nevertheless, the importance of broader 
issues related to the provision, such as access to genetic 
resources and protection of traditional knowledge, and sup-
ports the work of ’s Intergovernmental Committee on 
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional 
Knowledge and Folklore on these issues.
Australia considers that these broader issues would 
be more appropriately approached under the Article . 
review of the implementation of the  Agreement. One 
of these issues is the relationship between the Agreement 
and the  (particularly Article (j) on the role of indig-
enous communities in preserving biodiversity, and Article 
 on access to genetic resources). It is Australia’s view 
that these agreements are not in conflict; indeed, if properly 
managed, the national implementation of the obligations 
under the two agreements could result in a regime that 
substantially addresses these concerns. Australia’s com-
munication notes that  members had proposed the 
following amendments to Article .(b) to provide ad-
ditional conditions for patentability: a) the identification of 
the source of the genetic material; b) the identification of 
related traditional knowledge used to obtain that material; 
c) evidence of fair and equitable benefit sharing; and d) 
evidence of prior informed consent from the government 
of the traditional community for the exploitation of the 
subject-matter of the patent.
The communication expresses two reservations about 
these proposals. The first is that Australia feels that more 
analysis needs to be undertaken into the most effective way 
of ensuring that access to material that is subsequently the 
subject of a patent application was sourced in compliance 
with the provisions of the . Rather than an amendment 
to the  Agreement, more efforts should be made to ex-
amine the potential for compatible implementation of both 
conventions at the level of national legislation and policy-
making. It should be noted that the draft access regulations 
do not impose on the patent system requirements of this 
nature, which, even if they were to occur, would be more 
appropriately placed in patent legislation than in environ-
ment legislation. They do, however, include provisions 
requiring prior informed consent fair and equitable benefit 
sharing, and adequate valuing of indigenous knowledge in 
the benefit-sharing contract. As noted above, the Inquiry 
report recommended that  consider amending patent 
law to require proof of source and, where appropriate, 
prior informed consent, as a prerequisite for granting a 
patent (V ). Australia’s second reservation 
relates to the most appropriate location in the Agreement 
for any amendments: it is suggested that Article , which 
stipulates conditions to be fulfilled by patent applications, 
may be more suitable than Article .
In summary, Australia’s position is that a specific 
amendment to  should only be considered when a 
complete survey of the situation has been made (within that 
context) Australia would support the examination of op-
tions for disclosing information about the source of biologi-
cal material into the patent application process. Following 
this process, consideration could be given to whether this 
necessitates an amendment to . With respect to pos-
sible initiatives at the national and local level to address 
the problems of protection of biodiversity and indigenous 
knowledge, Australia’s communication outlines the draft 
access and benefit-sharing regulations, the Bailey report, 
the report by J () and, with respect to artistic/
cultural expression (as distinct from ecological knowledge), 
eight case studies where the existing intellectual property 
system has been used to protect traditional knowledge77.
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS), and the International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA)
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The International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture
Australia voted for adoption of the  at the st 
session of the Conference of the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization in Rome on  November , signed the 
 on  June , and is expected to ratify it. In 
the course of the long and somewhat tortuous negotia-
tions on the , Australia was subjected to criticism 
from some civil organizations, particularly the Rural 
Advancement Foundation International () (now the 
Action Group on Erosion Technology and Concentration 
( Group)), for its approach to certain issues in the nego-
tiations, particularly intellectual property issues. In voting 
for the , Australia issued a statement78 to “em-
phasize certain aspects of [its] position and to avoid any 
misunderstanding on the possible future implementation 
of [the] treaty.” Australia expressed its belief “in the global 
need for an effective and workable system of exchange 
for plant genetic resource for food and agriculture” and its 
commitment to ensuring “that a workable system, based 
on the provisions of [the] text, is achieved in practice.” 
Australia emphasized four issues “considered necessary” 
for the implementation of the :
• Article .(d) and Article  are ambiguous with 
regard to the scope and application of intellectual 
property rights by participating countries. Australia 
considers that .(d) and associated Articles do 
not impinge on national intellectual property rights 
laws and polices. Australia will insist on respect in 
this  for the intellectual property laws of 
member countries. To do otherwise would under-
mine this agreement.
• The  cannot and does not change the exist-
ing rights and obligations of the contracting parties 
under other international agreements.
• It will be essential that the material transfer agree-
ments which underpin this  are commer-
cially realistic in order to facilitate and encourage 
exchange and development of plant genetic re-
sources for food and agriculture for the benefit of 
all parties.
• It is desirable that the list of crops under the multi-
lateral system be assessed and extended. Exclusion 
of some important crops has the potential to distort 
the system of exchange with negative implications 
for the objectives of the .79
Conclusions
The development of Australia’s draft regulations on ac-
cess and benefit sharing has been a long, complex, and 
in some respects, controversial process, but it is now 
close to completion. Initially, progress was assisted by 
the existence of adequate funds for staff and administra-
tive costs through Biotechnology Australia and support at 
the political level. However, resource constraints subse-
quently slowed progress during Australian financial years 
– and –. This was remedied in mid- 
with renewed funding from Biotechnology Australia for 
the next four years. Some amendments to the draft regu-
lations can be expected, based on submissions on them 
(the relationship between native title legislation and the 
draft regulations has proved to be particularly complex); 
the draft model benefit-sharing agreements remain to be 
completed; and administrative arrangements for handling 
permit applications and their associated benefit-sharing 
agreements are being finalized.
With respect to possible lessons for parties and other 
stakeholders involved in the development and implementa-
tion of access and benefit-sharing schemes in the future, 
it is suggested that providers of biological resources have 
realistic expectations about potential benefits from agree-
ments and consider focusing on negotiating up-front and 
in-kind benefits, rather than focusing on potential monetary 
benefits (this should not, however, exclude agreement over 
fair and reasonable royalties). Providers should also ex-
ercise some caution about the users with which they deal, 
preferring those which have a good track record as bio-
prospectors. It is, of course, too early to assess the impact 
of the regulations, as well that of a nationally consistent 
system, on access to, and benefit sharing from, biologi-
cal resources, but there would probably be some value in 
conducting a review of the system, from the perspective 
of all parties and stakeholders, two to three years after its 
establishment.
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Chile: Early Attempts to Develop
Access and Benefit-Sharing Regulations
Luis Flores-Mimiça and Dominique Hervé-Espejo
Since the entry into force of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (), many countries have begun to develop 
national biodiversity strategies and access regulations 
pursuant to the requirements in its Articles  and , spe-
cifically to regulate the access to genetic resources within 
their national jurisdiction. Their experience is very valuable 
for those countries that are just about to initiate the process. 
As a part of a comparative study of the policies and laws in 
charge of regulating the access and the exchange of genetic 
resources among Pacific Rim Countries, the main objective 
of this document is to review and analyze the situation of 
Chile on this matter.
As will be explained in this document, Chile does 
not have any kind of specific framework for regulating 
access and benefit-sharing issues, nor is it engaged in a 
serious process for developing such laws or policies. In 
, shortly after Chile’s ratification of the , there was 
a brief initiative to regulate this matter, prompted by the 
political impact that some bioprospecting projects had on 
the environmental authorities of the time. In the long run, 
there were no significant results from this initiative. This 
failure was due, in considerable part, to the complexity of 
the subject and the many difficulties that the development 
and implementation of such an initiative has, but overall it 
was the result of a lack of political will among legislative 
and higher-ranked administrative authorities to consider 
this a matter of importance for the country.
Given the total lack of policies and legislation on the 
matter, in order to make an adequate analysis of the current 
situation in Chile in relation to the actual exchange, han-
dling, and utilization of genetic resources and its eventual 
regulation by State authorities, throughout this paper the 
main related principles, rules, and concepts of the  
will be used as a reference and as a means of confronting 
Chilean reality. With that perspective, the paper will pres-
ent an overview of the actual institutional management 
of genetic resources in Chile, analyzing the questions 
of property, access, intellectual property rights, and bio-
prospecting agreements, concluding with some remarks 
about the process of developing a regulatory framework 
on access and benefit sharing.
Analysis of the Legal, Institutional, and Political Situation
of Genetic Resources in Chile
The international legal framework of access and benefit 
sharing established by the  can give countries the op-
portunity to make substantial profits from the sustainable 
utilization of their own genetic resources, through a fair 
and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the 
use of such resources. Nevertheless, national governments 
must know how to take advantage of this opportunity, es-
tablishing some type of legislation to regulate the access 
and benefit sharing of their own genetic resources and, 
equally important, developing political awareness, institu-
tional strategies, procedures, and capacities to implement 
these provisions.
The regulatory system created by the  should also 
be seen as a very useful mechanism of negotiation for 
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those countries that are providers of genetic resources, 
although it has to be adapted to local circumstances and 
to national interests and priorities in order to achieve its 
goals. The manner in which countries approach this matter 
and finally enact a legal regime of access to their genetic 
resources will necessarily reflect the status of their eco-
nomic, environmental, and technological development, as 
well as their legal, institutional, economic, and cultural 
situation. There is no ideal model to be followed, because 
each country has its own reality and is placed in a very 
singular position.
Thus, there are many alternatives by which the mecha-
nism of access and benefit sharing formulated by the  
can be set into practice in the particular scope of national 
legislation. However, according to the regulatory experi-
ence that already exists, from a formal point of view it 
would be possible to identify three basic ways to deal with 
the subject ( ):
• The Legal Approach, through measures that involve 
the development, implementation, and enforcement 
of legal, administrative, and policy provisions and 
frameworks. National governments are able to ex-
ert their authority through a variety of alternatives: 
taking advantage of general laws on environment; 
using framework laws; developing specific laws 
to regulate access and distribution of benefits or 
regulating genetic resources as a singular compo-
nent of legislation of broader range; and adapting 
or modifying existing laws and regulations, etc. 
• The Contractual Approach, by means of private ar-
rangements or agreements directly made between 
the suppliers of genetic resources and those inter-
ested in using them. These private arrangements or 
contracts are essentially legally enforceable agree-
ments between two or more parties, consisting of 
exchanges of negotiated promises or actions, set 
under the rules of national or international private 
law, generally made between stakeholders consid-
ering mutual benefits on access and distribution. 
There are multiple contractual alternatives for 
the exchange of genetic resources, from simple 
contracts to letters of understanding, licensing 
agreements, and many others. In the case of the 
exchange of biological samples, such agreements 
are usually known as Material Transfer Agreements 
(s). These s were the first formula through 
which the question of access to genetic resources 
and benefit sharing was ever approached.
• The Voluntary Approach, by means of codes of con-
duct or voluntary guidelines, generally elaborated 
as the result of a consensus among stakeholders or 
developed by someone with such authority. These 
regulatory instruments are not legally enforceable 
and their fulfillment and utility depend on the good 
will of those who are parties to the matter.
These different approaches can have advantages and 
disadvantages that will, of course, be determined by the 
particular circumstances of each country. They differ from 
each other in a series of formal aspects that are applicable 
to many different situations. However, all these formal 
approaches can coexist without problems within the same 
internal legal framework. For example, a law that regulates 
access to genetic resources (the legal approach) can clearly 
establish that certain matters should be directly negotiated 
between the stakeholders, according to the rules of the 
private law (the contractual approach) but considering 
the guidelines designed by the competent authority (the 
voluntary approach).
So far, in all those countries in which the system of 
access and benefit sharing established by  has not yet 
been implemented, private agreements have been the main 
mechanism to regulate access to genetic resources and the 
way benefits are shared (the contractual approach). Such 
is the current situation in Chile, where political authorities 
have not yet been able to begin a serious legislative process 
for the implementation and enforcement of the rules and 
principles of the , and the administrative authorities 
do not have a legal framework nor any specific provision 
to enable them to regulate the exchange and utilization of 
genetic resources.
The Political and Legislative Management 
of Genetic Resources
First of all, it is very important to point out that in Chile 
there are many endemic species (as many in flora and 
fauna as in microorganisms) that are broadly distributed 
in the national territory. A considerable number of these 
species have not yet been properly studied and remains 
almost unknown (U  C ). In ad-
dition, in Chile there exists a considerable scientific and 
technological capacity to carry out projects of research 
and development in the area of biotechnology, which adds 
important value to Chilean genetic resources. This scien-
tific and technological capacity is mainly placed within 
the scope of universities and the public sector (G and 
I ).1 All of these factors have made Chile 
a very attractive place for bioprospecting projects.
In spite of the above-mentioned, in Chile there has not 
been a parallel institutional and legislative development, 
with specific policies and laws established to regulate 
access to national genetic resources. Unfortunately, the 
complexity of the subject and the lack of political will have 
determined the complete absence of any kind of regula-
tion. Chile does not have an official policy or a national 
strategy to confront any of the multiple subject areas of the 
utilization of genetic resources. Even though the  is a 
national law, the government and the political authorities 
have not yet given much significance either to this matter 
or to other important aspects of biological diversity. The 
situation is such that after more than nine years Chile has 
just completed its National Biodiversity Strategy and has 
initiated (mid-) its National Biodiverity Action Plan 
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for the conservation and sustainable use of its biological 
diversity, nor has it fulfilled many of the obligations ac-
quired when it ratified the .
Since the date in which the  finally entered 
into force in Chile2, the National Commission of the 
Environment () and the Ministry of Agriculture 
(through its different departments and offices) have been 
the two governmental institutions mainly responsible for 
the implementation of the different provisions of the . 
Even though  has the general institutional task 
of coordinating the action of all the public entities with 
environmental responsibilities, in Chile the administrative 
authority that specifically manages the several components 
of national biological diversity is dispersed among a variety 
of institutions; in addition, these components are more 
often handled under the ideological conception of “natural 
resources” rather than of biodiversity. Furthermore, among 
the regulations related to the subject there are many cases 
of overlapping principles and provisions, which cause con-
siderable confusion and, in the particular circumstance 
of genetic resources, an almost total lack of institutional 
definitions.
In fact, though it could be said that the corresponding 
articles of the  constitute the only legislation for access 
and benefit sharing that there is in Chile, it is a useless regu-
lation, because it has not yet been properly implemented 
in the internal legal framework. This means that even 
though the basic rules exist, they are neither applicable 
nor enforceable. This situation has occurred because there 
are no authorities with specific responsibilities on this par-
ticular matter nor there is a mechanism to allow the rules 
and principles of the  to operate at the national level. 
So far, the only effective rules that regulate the exchange 
and the utilization of genetic resources in Chile are private 
arrangements, made under civil law, between stakeholders, 
upon whom the principles and provisions of the  can 
not be legally imposed, because of the lack of competent 
authorities and of an adequate national regulation.
Indeed, the implementation of an international legal 
instrument within a national legal regime cannot be made 
by the direct incorporation of its rules to the national 
legislation through a simple administrative or legislative 
act. Implementation should be a much more complex pro-
cess. In fact, the success of such a process is essentially 
determined by the feasibility of the international rules to 
actually operate in an efficient and effective way at the 
internal level. On the other hand, the way in which the 
national implementation of international treaties takes 
place is widely determined by the degree of evolution of 
the internal legal and institutional framework. To carry out 
an effective and efficient process of implementation the in-
ternal legislative regime would, at a minimum, have to: 
• Define and determine certain principles, objectives, 
priorities, and goals in relation to the matter. 
• Impose certain obligations upon the authorities and 
the citizens of the country in relation to the provi-
sions of the international treaty at issue.
• Prevent possible conflicts between the regulations 
in force and the provisions of the international 
treaty and, if necessary, create a mechanism to 
solve such legal conflicts.
• Establish an institutional structure to fulfill the pre-
viously determined objectives and goals, unless an 
existing structure is already sufficient.
Finally, for a national legislative regime to be really 
suitable for implementation, besides the fulfillment of the 
minimum conditions previously indicated, a serious and 
detailed assessment of the national legislation already 
in force should be made, and a national plan, capable 
of covering general and specific aspects of the matter, 
should be elaborated (with the purpose of fulfilling the 
particular principles and objectives of the international 
treaty at issue).3
So far, in relation to the , and specifically in the 
area of genetic resources, none of the above has been done 
in a systematic and considered way by competent Chilean 
authorities. 
What then has been the local evolution on the subject 
of genetic resources? As mentioned before, shortly after 
Chile’s ratification of the , there was a significant ef-
fort to start a process for developing a national legislation 
on access and benefit sharing. This initiative was mainly 
conducted by the Department of Natural Resources of 
, which tried to coordinate the different national 
authorities that could eventually have some relation to 
the subject. After some internal debate, a working group 
was created with the participation of officials of , 
the different departments and offices of the Ministry of 
Agriculture (Agricultural Studies and Policies Office 
(), the Agriculture and Livestock Service (), the 
National Institute for Agriculture Research (), and the 
National Forestry Corporation ()), and the Ministries 
of National Goods and Foreign Affairs. 
Besides taking the first steps to initiate the national 
debate on access and benefit sharing, one of the main 
efforts of the governmental working group on genetic re-
sources was to try to identify the bioprospecting projects 
that were currently going on in Chile and interviewing 
those in charge of such projects. In fact, the presence of 
international institutions that, directly or through national 
universities, were carrying out such initiatives in Chile 
was one of the factors that provoked the interest of envi-
ronmental authorities, making them aware of the need to 
implement the provisions of the  on access and benefit 
sharing of genetic resources in Chile.
In , a couple of public seminars were conducted by 
the environmental authorities in order to generate national 
awareness on the subject. In the same year, an administra-
tive agreement between the Ministry of Agriculture and 
 was signed, with the purpose of creating a National 
Program for Plant Genetic Resources. In , after an 
internal institutional workshop organized by  and 
the Ministry of Agriculture, a National Commission on 
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Genetic Resources was informally created. The formation 
of this commission never had a supporting legal provision 
and its constitution was based only on an agreement among 
public officials. The work of this commission never gave 
any significant results. In less than a year, after two or three 
meetings, it vanished. 
Throughout  and , a couple of consultants 
were hired by  in order to analyze the national 
legislative situation and propose ways of developing a na-
tional regulation for genetic resources. After some internal 
debate, it was concluded that the only way to initiate legis-
lation capable of enabling the governmental authorities to 
manage the exchange and utilization of genetic resources 
in Chile was by confronting the question of ownership of 
genetic resources, through some legislative changes in the 
property regime. 
This conclusion turned out to be the main obstacle for 
continuing with the regulating efforts of the time. This 
occurred because in the Chilean Constitution the property 
regime gives very strong protection to private property, 
and in order to make any kind of change to such a regime, 
it would be necessary to have a special quorum in the 
National Congress ( ). Some efforts were 
made by the relevant administrative authorities to explain 
to congressmen the importance of this subject and of its 
regulation, in order to take the first steps in the process of 
developing a national access and benefit-sharing frame-
work. Unfortunately, the issue was not really understood 
and the political authorities of the country never considered 
it important.
By the end of , most of the officials who were 
originally actively involved in this process had left their 
positions in the public sector, and the current political 
and administrative authorities were not worried about 
bioprospecting projects going on in Chile anymore. So, 
the process started to lose the momentum it had previ-
ously had. 
Since ,  had not been directly involved 
in any significant activity related to this subject until the 
end of , when the issue was considered again by the 
Department of Natural Resources.4 At the Ministry of 
Agriculture, efforts on the subject continue, on a much 
smaller scale; they are mainly carried out by , but 
the political importance originally assigned to this matter 
by the Ministry has been lost. Nevertheless, the Ministry 
is the only authority that has been permanently working 
on this issue by studying a way to solve the legislative 
obstacles related to ownership of genetic resources and by 
developing a ministerial policy regarding the protection 
and economical valuation of national genetic resources 
(A ). In late , the Ministry completed 
a first draft of a legislative proposal regarding access to 
and sharing of benefits derived from agricultural genetic 
resources, but it was discarded after being criticized by 
some sectors. However, since efforts to develop a better 
proposal continues, it is important to discuss some of its 
main elements which are:
• Its scope of application is limited to agricultural 
genetic resources.
• It is a stand-alone and brief piece of legislation 
which only establishes the basic framework of the 
access system and the obligation to inform the 
Ministry of any bioprospecting project.
A future proposal will therefore need further elabora-
tion and the enactment of administrative regulations to 
determine, for example: a) the authority that would sign 
the agreements in the name of the Ministry; b) the kind and 
contents of the access agreements; c) the information re-
quired; d) the way in which benefits will be shared, and; e) 
the way in which traditional knowledge will be protected. 
This proposal is currently being discussed inside the gov-
ernment, but there is no public discussion nor information 
about when it will be sent to the National Congress.
 It can be argued that the original initiative to start 
a process of developing a national regulation for access 
and benefit sharing in Chile was aborted at a very early 
stage. It was never based on a real national policy for bio-
diversity, and its beginning was essentially determined by 
circumstantial facts, such as governmental concern about 
bioprospecting projects going on in Chile at the time and 
the need to fulfill the obligations acquired by Chile when 
ratifying the . The current initiative promoted by the 
Ministry of Agriculture lacks the support of a national 
policy for biodiversity which would allow the discussion 
and adoption of a regulation on this matter based on a seri-
ous commitment of the government and a broad acceptance 
by the different stakeholders.
Finally, concerning the  International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources, in March  the Ministry of 
Agriculture started a process of consultation and analysis 
within the public sector, in order to determine the conse-
quences and benefits that signature and ratification may 
have for Chile. After a few months of discussions Chile 
signed the  Treaty on  November .
The Ownership of Genetic Resources
The  makes no reference to ownership of land or 
genetic resources, dealing only with access to genetic 
resources and sovereign rights over natural resources. 
Questions of ownership and tenure inevitably have an 
important bearing on the practicalities of bioprospecting 
and are an important element of national legislation and 
policy that governments can use to “determine access” to 
resources, yet they are often overlooked by policy-makers. 
Users of genetic resources must be sure that the supplier 
has the authority to collect and provide such resources, or 
the  requirements would not be fulfilled. Such author-
ity may rest not only with the government but also with 
those who have private rights or tenure over the land or 
resources. Because of this, at a certain point, governmental 
authorities may have to clarify the relationship between 
the ownership, tenure, and access regimes.
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The international recognition of sovereign rights over 
genetic resources within national territory constitutes the 
foundation and the theoretical framework over which each 
State has the responsibility to specify its own legal regime, 
in order to establish concrete and specific rights, over con-
crete and specific resources. This international recognition 
only means that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, has 
the legitimate right to “define and determine” the type and 
the modalities of property that are recognized, according 
to the principles and rules of its internal legal framework 
and in harmony with the international commitments that it 
has acquired. As with the legal framework for access, the 
different possibilities through which the sovereign power 
of a State can determine the property regime for genetic 
resources are multiple and diverse.
In order to enact and implement a particular legisla-
tion, one of the first tasks is to define the object that will 
be regulated and the ownership of the rights attributable to 
this object, particularly property rights. The determination 
of a specific property regime requires a clear identifica-
tion of the goods to which it refers and of the rules and 
principles according to which it will be structured. In the 
case of genetic resources, this subject is new, extremely 
complex, and, in most countries, has still not been seri-
ously confronted.
Today, private property prevails in the majority of the 
legal systems of the world. However, there are certain 
resources that are considered of such value for national 
interests that its ownership is left in the hands of the State. 
Other resources, however, are placed under the regime 
of private property and will belong to individuals or to 
the State, according to the rules and principles of the ap-
plicable legislation. Thus, nations usually retain certain 
goods under their control as public property (for example, 
in some countries mining resources are State-owned) and, 
in addition, they may maintain ownership of some goods 
as private property. Public property can be declared with 
respect to individualized and quantified goods, or with 
respect to an undetermined amount of resources belonging 
to a certain category. Such is the case, for example, in the 
public property established over waters or oil reserves.
Considering all that has been already said, it must be 
held in mind that both the definition and the implementa-
tion of a property regime (public or private) or other types 
of rights, in relation to genetic resources, are limited by the 
intrinsic nature of such resources. For any property regime 
on such resources to be effective, the subject to which it 
refers and the type of rights that are going to be granted 
must be defined in a suitable way. In the first place, it is 
necessary to establish a distinction between rights on the 
physical entities (the physical property or plant-animal) 
and the eventual rights on the genetic information con-
tained in such entities (intangible property). The real value 
of genetic resources lies in the second element, and the 
legal questions that arise in relation to it are particularly 
complex.
In order to know how Chile interprets the legal defini-
tion of genetic resources, it is necessary to identify the legal 
provisions that, directly or indirectly, regulate the subject. 
The only definition of genetic resources that exists in the 
Chilean legal regime is in Article  of the , which, in 
the absence of any other legal provision, determines the 
conceptual framework of the regulated object. With regard 
to attributing ownership or tenure to genetic resources, it 
is necessary, in the first place, to identify and analyze the 
general provisions of the property regime in the national 
legal framework and then to check if they are applicable 
to the objects that are legally conceptualized as genetic 
resources. If there is not such an express provision by ex-
tension the applicable provisions will be those that regulate 
the property of the biological resources which contain the 
genetic resources ( ).5
The Political Constitution of the Republic lacks all 
explicit reference to biological diversity or some of its 
elements; neither does it refer to it through other con-
cepts, such as flora and fauna or plants and animals. It 
only alludes indirectly to these realities, when imposing 
on the State the constitutional duty of “maintaining for 
the preservation of nature”, when determining that by 
law it will be possible to establish specific restrictions 
on the exercise of certain rights or liberties in order to 
“protect the environment” (Article , Number ); and 
when indicating that a fundamental concept of the social 
function of property is “the conservation of the environ-
mental patrimony” (Article , Number ). In addition, 
the Constitution establishes “the freedom to acquire the 
ownership of all types of goods”, with the single excep-
tion of “those that nature has made common to all men or 
should belong to the Nation and that the legislation has 
thus declared” (Article , Number ). This provision, 
besides being a constitutional guarantee, establishes the 
freedom to acquire all types of goods as the general rule 
of the Chilean legal property regime. Under this provi-
sion, the possibility of acquiring property of any type of 
biological resource is totally granted (in conformity with 
the provisions of the Civil Law on goods and acquisition 
of ownership), unless a Law of Higher Quorum, when it 
is demanded by the national interest, establishes special 
requirements or limitations to the acquisition of the owner-
ship of such goods.
The Constitution sets forth general rules for struc-
turing the national property regime, but it is the law’s 
responsibility to specify the particular regime of property 
applicable to specific goods and to establish the ways to 
acquire ownership. Therefore, it is necessary to review the 
pertinent provisions of the Civil Law. 
The few references in the Civil Code to biological 
resources are made according to obsolete conceptual cat-
egories that have nothing to do with biological diversity. In 
relation to those biological resources that can be included 
in the concept of fauna, the Civil Code establishes that 
domestic animals are linked to the land they serve and that 
wild fauna such as fish, birds, and others are considered 
freely acquirable goods, in the condition of res nullius.6 In 
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relation to those biological resources that can be included 
in the concept of flora, the Civil Code considers that they 
follow the ownership of the land in which they are located. 
Given the fact that under the Chilean property regime there 
are no lands without an owner, the different biological 
resources associated with flora will be the property of 
the individual owners of the respective land or, in their 
absence, of the State of Chile. In relation to microorgan-
isms (fundamental raw material of the biotechnological 
industry), national legislation has not established any type 
of provision for regulating their ownership regime.
This is the general legal framework that regulates the 
property of biological resources in Chile. There are other 
laws and regulations that deal with questions relative to the 
“handling” of biological resources, but they do not alter 
or modify the general regime of property established by 
the provisions described before.7
Evidently, in Chile’s legal framework on property there 
is no particular and differentiated regime to regulate the 
question of ownership of genetic resources. Genetic re-
sources constitute a new legal object, still not recognized 
by the legislature, and their ownership is not specifically 
regulated by any particular regime. Therefore, we can as-
sume that, considering the nature of genetic material and 
the legal principle indicating that the accessory follows 
the principal or main thing, in Chile genetic resources are 
placed under the property regime applicable to biological 
resources, such as animals and plants.
The Regime of Access to Genetic and 
Biological Resources
The ratification of the  brings with it obligations that 
can be difficult to implement and that require profound 
changes in the internal legal framework. Article  of 
the  defines the obligations and rights of the Member 
Parties with respect to access to genetic resources and their 
subsequent use. These obligations and rights are based on 
the following principles and fundamental rules:
• National sovereignty over genetic resources and, 
as a consequence, the full authority of national 
jurisdiction to regulate access to such resources;
• Access to resources subject to the prior informed 
consent of the supplying nations; and
• Access to resources subject to mutually agreed 
terms and conditions that will define, in a concrete 
and specific way, the manner in which the sharing 
of the benefits will be carried out.
Two issues are basic for the development and imple-
mentation of a system of access in Chile: 
• Determining the competent authority or authorities 
in charge of access to domestic genetic resources 
(competent national authority), and, secondly, 
• Identifying the provisions regulating the way in 
which the access procedure should be carried out. 
In addition, an analysis of the provisions charged 
with attributing competencies and establishing rules for 
access will allow the identification of interests and objec-
tives of an eventual national policy regarding the matter 
in question.
As noted before, under current legislation Chile does 
not have a regulation directly establishing the competent 
authority regarding access to genetic resources. Indeed, 
genetic resources are not treated as such by any law, apart 
from the mandates established by the . Nevertheless, 
taking into account the legal framework applicable to 
biological resources, there are several public institutions 
that could potentially serve as the competent authority 
regarding certain aspects related to access. These are: 
the Ministry of Agriculture (through , , , 
and ); the Ministry of Economy (through the 
Fishing Undersecretariat, the National Fishing Board 
(); and the Forestry Institute); the Ministry of 
National Goods; the National Commission on Scientific 
and Technological Research; ; and the National 
Corporation on Indigenous Development (). 
Chile does not have any authorities with a specific and 
exclusive competency in genetic resources; nor does it 
have any particular regulation concerning access to such 
resources. In practice, as is the case of property, the only 
mechanism that might come near to fulfilling such a role 
are the legal provisions charged with regulating access to 
biological resources.
Access to biological resources found in fauna 
Chile’s legal structures generally define the components of 
fauna as res nullius, that is, as a good that does not belong 
to anyone. This legal situation allows the state to establish, 
via the corresponding mechanisms, certain restrictions to 
the access to these biological resources. In order to review 
the mechanisms we will distinguish between nonwild 
fauna, wild fauna, and hydrobiological species.
Access to faunal biological resources not included in 
the wild fauna category only requires the authorization of 
the owner of the land and specimen. In contrast access to 
biological resources found in wild fauna species, where 
such access necessarily requires the species’ capture or 
hunt, will always need, in accordance with the Hunting 
Law, a hunting permit or license.8. This permit or license 
is also required for owners of estates where hunted animals 
are found. Since the law states that ownership of biologi-
cal resources is not granted through the use of wild fauna 
species nor of its products, by-products, or parts if this is 
carried out by transgressing the regulations of the law or 
its jurisdiction, the permit or license may be particularly 
relevant. Hunting permission is granted by .9 A hunt-
ing permit allows the bearer to hunt big or small game as 
indicated. Granting permission is subject to passing an 
exam and payment of a fee.
However, there are certain cases in which hunting or 
capture is prohibited or restricted. This potentially contro-
versial situation also implies the prohibition or restriction 
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of access to the corresponding genetic resources. The fol-
lowing is a brief description of such cases:
• Hunting or capturing is prohibited in areas which 
constitute protected zones or other special zones.10 
Regardless of the latter,  may give authorization 
for scientific aims, such as controlling the activities 
of animals that cause serious damage to the ecosys-
tem, establishing reproduction or breeding centers, 
or allowing the sustainable use of a resource.
• Hunting or capturing species in danger of extinc-
tion or vulnerable, rare and scarcely known species 
is prohibited, as is hunting or capturing species 
regarded as beneficial to forestry, fishing, and 
agricultural sciences, or to the maintenance of the 
equilibrium of natural ecosystems, or species with 
reduced population densities. Regardless of the 
latter,  may authorize such hunting or capture 
when the authorized party proves that hunting or 
capturing of specimens is necessary for research, 
for the creation of reproduction or breeding cen-
ters, for the sustainable use of a resource, or for 
controlling the activities of animals that cause 
serious damage to the ecosystem. In any case, the 
corresponding authorization should indicate the 
prevalence of the species, the maximum number 
and type of specimens whose hunting or capture is 
being authorized, and any other conditions under 
which the extraction will take place.
• For species not included in the above cases, the 
law establishes hunting and capturing seasons and 
areas, as well as the number of specimens that may 
be hunted or captured per day, season, or age group. 
The only exceptions to these restrictions are certain 
species of wild fauna which are considered harm-
ful and which may thus be hunted or captured at 
any time of year, throughout Chilean territory and 
regardless of quantity or specimens. However, a 
hunting permission or license is still required for 
these species.
• On the other hand, the international trade and 
transportation of wild fauna species must be carried 
out according to the provisions established by the 
Convention on International Trade of Endangered 
Species (). This international treaty aims to 
regulate the trade and transportation of wild ani-
mals and plants considered to be in danger or threat 
of extinction. This regulation not only encompasses 
live flora and fauna species but also includes all their 
derivatives and by-products (stuffed animals, furs, 
bones, tissue samples, pharmaceutical products, 
etc.). Although this Convention refers only to the 
protection of species and not to genetic diversities, 
its provisions constitute, in practice, an eventual 
requirement to be met in the case of international 
trading of a genetic resource contained in any one 
of the species included in the treaty.
Regarding the regulation of access to biological 
resources found in hydrobiological species, we should 
essentially consider the rules established by the General 
Fishing and Aquaculture Law which regulate the proce-
dure of access to these resources in reference to fishing 
for extraction and research. 
Extractive fishing activity may be industrial or tra-
ditional. Regarding the former, the law establishes a 
general mechanism and a special mechanism of access 
to resources that apply to Chilean Territorial Sea and 
Exclusive Economic Zone, with the exception of areas 
reserved exclusively for traditional fishing. The general 
mechanism of access to industrial extractive fishing means 
that persons interested in carrying out industrial fishing 
must request a fishing permit for each vessel. This permit 
is granted for an unlimited period of time according to 
the species and zones outlined. On the other hand, there 
are special access mechanisms applicable in the case of 
resources which are currently being fully exploited and in 
which fishing systems are in recovery or just starting. For 
every fishing unit declared to be in any one of those states, 
a management plan must be developed which must outline, 
among other elements, the means of conservation and ac-
cess mechanisms which apply in the particular case.
For traditional fishing the access mechanism is that of 
freedom to fish. However, in order to carry out their activ-
ity, traditional fishermen and their vessels must previously 
register with the registry coordinated by . In 
any case, with the aim of protecting hydrobiological re-
sources, granting permits may be temporarily suspended 
(by traditional fishermen category or by fishing company) 
when one or more species becomes fully exploited.
Regarding research fishing, the law determines 
whether the species and areas are subject to a general 
or special access mechanism. In either case, the Fishing 
Undersecretariat is responsible for authorizing the capture 
of corresponding hydrobiological species according to the 
approved research project. In the case of special mecha-
nisms, global quotas, if they exist, must be obeyed.
Certain mandates also exist that allow restrictions on 
access to hydrobiological species with the aim of protect-
ing and preserving the species. These mandates refer to the 
establishment of prohibition periods (biological, extractive, 
or extraordinary); to the temporary or permanent prohibi-
tion of capture of hydrobiological resources protected by 
international treaties in force in Chile; to the establishment 
of marine parks and reserves; and to the fixing of annual 
quotas of capture by species in a defined area. 
Lastly, regarding the regulation of access to biological 
resources found in fauna in general, the restrictions on the 
capture of determined species set out by international trea-
ties signed by Chile must also be considered. Among these 
we highlight the following: the International Agreement 
for the Regulation of Whaling (), the Convention for 
the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (), the Convention 
on Wetlands which is of international importance specially 
regarding the habitat of waterfowl, the Convention on the 
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Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals 
(), and the Convention for the Conservation and 
Management of the Vicuña (), all in force in Chile.
By virtue of the above mentioned regulations we may 
conclude that access to biological resources found in fauna 
is quite exhaustively regulated in Chile. The only excep-
tions are land invertebrates which have not been included 
in the mentioned provisions.
Access to biological resources found in flora
Flora, in general, is considered by Chile’s legal structure 
as a property that is defined by the fact that it is rooted 
to the ground; it thus belongs to the owner of the land in 
which it is found.11 This legal situation prevents the state 
from establishing, in general terms, restrictions upon these 
biological resources. Regardless of this, Chile’s legislation 
has a variety of laws and policies that regulate, particularly 
for certain cases, access to the biological resources found 
in Chilean flora.
In the first place, it is relevant to refer to the mandates 
directly related to the collection of plant material. The 
Forestry Law constitutes the first legal framework that 
regulates this aspect. The following are prohibited by 
Article :
• Cutting down of native trees and shrubs located less 
than  meters from fresh waters that spring from 
the hills and less than  meters from water banks 
from the point at which the fresh water arises until 
it reaches level ground;
• Cutting down or destruction of woods located within 
a  meter radius of water supplies that originate 
in plain terrains that are not watered; and
•  Cutting down or exploitation of native trees and 
shrubs located on land that slopes over %.
Regardless of the latter, cutting down in such sectors 
may be possible when duly justified and with previous 
approval of an operating plan in conformity with Decree 
Law No. , . 
This mandate allows restriction of access to the biologi-
cal resources contained in Chilean tree and shrub species, 
especially in specific in cases which Chile’s legislature 
considers the species in need of protection. Nevertheless, 
this is not an absolute prohibition since 12 can ex-
pressly authorize this collection on “justified grounds”.
On the other hand, the Decree Law No.  on Forestry 
Promotion also indirectly regulates the cutting of forests 
and plant material, by establishing incentives for the sub-
stitution of forest plantations. Another law, Decree Law 
No. , (The Agricultural Protection Law), establishes 
certain mandates in relation to exportation of plant prod-
ucts, requiring a sanitary certificate issued by 13, thus 
restricting the international transference of plant material. 
Finally, regarding the commerce and international trans-
portation of wild flora species, the mandates that can be 
applied are those agreed upon by , which has been 
discussed above with regard to wild fauna.
With such few mandates in mind, it can be concluded 
that Chile’s legal framework does not expressly regulate 
access to plant material. Indeed, there is a huge imbalance 
in the regulation of access between floral and faunal bio-
logical resources (I ). Regarding this, the cur-
rent legislation on the matter of protected areas is of great 
relevance, as are the requirements that define the access to 
these areas, because both are indirectly applicable to the 
plant material found in them. This legislation is composed 
of the following legal texts: the Supreme Decree No. , 
, approved by the Convention for the Protection of the 
Flora, the Fauna and the Natural Scenic Beauties of the 
Countries of America (Washington  Convention); Law 
No. ., the National Monuments Law; Decree Law 
No. , on Purchase, Administration, and Disposition 
of State Goods; Supreme Decree No.  the Forestry 
Law; Law No. ., that establishes Protected Areas 
for Tourism; Law No. ., that creates a National 
System of Wild Areas Protected by the State14; and the 
Environmental Framework Law No. .. According 
to these laws, the following main categories of protected 
wild areas exist:
National Park: A generally extensive zone, where di-
verse environments that are unique or that are representa-
tive of the country’s natural ecological diversity are found. 
These are not significantly altered by human action, are 
capable of self-perpetuation, and their flora, fauna, and 
geological formations are of special interest for scientific, 
educational, or recreational reasons. The objectives of this 
category are the preservation of our natural environments 
with the cultural and scenic characteristics that are associ-
ated with them; the continuity of evolutionary processes, 
and, whenever compatible to the aforementioned, research, 
educational, and recreational activities. The national parks 
constitute fiscal property, although some parks are partially 
owned by private organizations. This category of protected 
areas is constituted by Supreme Mandate of the Ministries 
of Agriculture and National Goods.  authorizes the 
operating plans of the activities that are carried out inside 
each protected zone.
Forest (or National) Reserve: An area whose natural 
resources need particularly careful conservation and use 
because of its susceptibility to degradation or its relevance 
to the community’s well being. The aim of this category 
is the conservation of soil and water of threatened species 
of wild fauna and flora, the maintenance or improvement 
of water production, and the development and applica-
tion of efficient technologies of advantage to flora and 
fauna. A regulated intervention is allowed in these areas 
and it is therefore possible to give concessions and ap-
prove operating plans in them. Nevertheless, in practice 
handling plans for forest exploitation are only granted to 
fiscal entities. They are constituted by Supreme Mandate 
of the Ministry of Agriculture and their administration is 
also a responsibility of .
National Monument: A generally reduced area, charac-
terized by the presence of native species of flora and fauna 
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or by the existence of geological sites that are relevant 
from a scenic, cultural, educational, or research point of 
view. The aim of this category is the preservation of natural 
environmental samples and associated scenic and cultural 
characteristics and, whenever compatible, research, educa-
tional, or recreational activities. National Monuments have 
the same characteristics as national parks but are smaller 
areas or defined objects (e.g., the Araucaria and Alerce 
trees). They are also constituted by Supreme Mandate of 
the Ministry of Agriculture and  is responsible for 
their administration.
Natural Sanctuary: Land or sea areas whose natural 
resources are so relevant that they offer special possibilities 
for scientific research. These areas are created by Supreme 
Mandate of the Ministry of Education (Council of National 
Monuments) and in practice they are nearly all privately 
owned lands. These areas allow forest exploitation under 
approval of an operating plan. In conformity with the 
National Monuments Law, all activities carried out in a 
Sanctuary need approval from the Council of National 
Monuments.
Protected Areas for Tourism: Areas comprised of pri-
vate land of great scenic and tourist value in which  
regulates the cutting of trees and undertakes measures to 
protect natural resources. These areas are created by 
Supreme Mandate of the Ministry of Agriculture.
Furthermore, according to Law No. ., all works, 
programs, or activities to be carried out must be submit-
ted to the Environmental Impact Assessment System, 
coordinated by . This applies to national parks, 
national reserves, natural monuments, virgin area reserves, 
natural sanctuaries, marine parks, marine reserves, or any 
other areas under official protection, when the respective 
legislation so permits. Thus to be able to carry out any 
activity in a protected area, including access to the bio-
logical resources found in it, an authorization from the 
appropriate authority and the corresponding environmental 
qualification is required. 
Finally, it is also important to mention the mandates 
established by Indigenous Law No. ., in which ar-
ticle No.  refers to indigenous participation. It declares 
that state administrative services and organizations that 
deal with territorial matters must take into account the 
opinion of the indigenous organizations acknowledged by 
this law when considering topics related to indigenous is-
sues. Likewise, Article  states that the administration of 
protected wild areas that are in the indigenous development 
zones must include the participation of its communities. 
 or  and  will decide the manner and 
depth of participation on the rights of use of the area that 
correspond to the indigenous communities. 
In conclusion, the current procedures in Chile regard-
ing access to biological resources do not meet the main 
objective of the  with respect to the regulation of ac-
cess to genetic resources: that is, the fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits resulting from its use. Indeed, the 
procedures that we have taken into consideration regard-
ing biological resources have specific objectives that are 
different from those established by the ’s system of 
access to genetic resources.
The National Program for the Protection of 
Plant Genetic Resources
In Chilean institutional practice,  is the only public 
sector institution that has actively dealt with the issue of 
conservation and utilization of genetic resources (specifi-
cally plant genetic resources). This has been done through 
a Program on Plant Genetic Resources, with the general 
objective of looking after the preservation and distribution 
of both Chilean and foreign germplasm, and of trying to 
increase its availability for future generations (C 
and L ). 
With the aim of obtaining official support for this 
Program of Development and Protection of the Country’s 
Plant Genetic Resources,  and the Ministry of 
Agriculture signed an agreement on  August . 
According to the agreement, the general objective of this 
program is to safeguard the preservation and interchange 
of germplasm of wild plant species and those improved 
and obtained by the State. Its specific objectives are the 
following:
• Avoid loss and promote better use of Chile’s plant 
genetic material.
• Support and coordinate work on genetic resources 
carried out in Chile and other countries promoting 
national and international collaboration.
• Generate, with the use of Chile’s plant genetic re-
sources, new crops or variants, to be incorporated 
into the national production.
• Establish and operate germplasm banks.
• Propose to the Ministry policies for the handling 
and interchange of germplasm.
The actions carried out by the program are the fol-
lowing:
• Exploration and collection15: The agreement es-
tablishes that  must verify that all explorations 
or collections of plant genetic resources that are 
state property must be carried out according to the 
following requirements: 
− A request for exploration or collection must be 
made with tentative plans for the field mission, 
including the types of materials to be collected, 
their species and quantities, and the subsequent 
evaluation, storage, and use. Also, required is a 
description of the distribution of the germplasm 
that will be carried out and the information that 
those in charge of collection must present once 
the mission has finished. 
− The exploration or collection must be carried 
out with the participation of national equiva-
lents designated by  and paid for by the 
collectors.
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− The Ministry of Agriculture can forbid the 
collection of certain species and establish 
areas where collection cannot be carried out. 
Likewise, it can establish the types, origin, and 
quantities that must be deposited in Chile.
− Priority is given to requests of exploration or 
collection by the classification of species, as 
follows: native-grown species; native species of 
a potential interest; naturalized foreign species; 
species long introduced but that have not been 
collected or that have a low representation in 
the country’s collections; ancestral species of 
cultivated species; and wild species related to 
cultivated species.
• Documentation, characterization, and evaluation 
of the resource16: Adequate information on the 
collected resources must be obtained (botanical 
descriptors and physiological, genetic, agronomic, 
industrial, and biochemical characteristics) in co-
ordination with specialized personnel evaluating 
and characterizing the germplasm.
• Conservation17:  must use germplasm banks 
as its genetic resource conservation system with a 
basic collection and, when appropriate, an active 
collection, of each stored species.
• Information and distribution of genetic resources18: 
 will publish periodically updated catalogues 
of the genetic material stored in their banks. This 
material will be grouped in three distribution cat-
egories: free, restricted, and prohibited distribution. 
This classification is based on the desire to maintain 
a policy of reciprocity between research organiza-
tions and as well as the need to keep material that 
clearly represents a competitive advantage in the 
context of international commerce. Until now, 
 has not classified any genetic resource in the 
prohibited distribution category.
• National guardian of plant genetic resources19:  
acts as National Guardian20 of Chile’s plant genetic 
resources, with the responsibility to define and 
determine priorities regarding the existing species 
in Chile that are considered as genetic resources; 
verify compliance with the general regulations es-
tablished by the Ministry of Agriculture regarding 
the conditions under which the explorations and 
collections of Chile’s genetic resources will be car-
ried out; conserve in the germplasm Bank System 
samples of genetic resources entrusted by the state 
or left in custody by private entities; define the con-
ditions that must be complied with when depositing 
in the germplasm Bank System; carry out follow-up 
and monitoring of the deposited samples; multiply 
and regenerate the deposited samples; document 
and report the existence of genetic resources con-
served in the system; distribute and use the genetic 
resources that are entrusted by the state under the 
established regulations; and certify compliance 
with the regulations established by the Program 
for export of genetic material.
• Introduction of germplasm into Chile21: All intern-
ment of germplasm for  must be backed by a 
sanitary plant certificate issued by the organization 
officially in charge of plant sanitation in the country 
of origin, and the germplasm must be submitted to 
quarantine post-entry measures required by .
In compliance with this Program, in past years  has 
subscribed to different bioprospecting agreements under 
a contractual approach, trying to follow the rules of the 
. Nevertheless, being only a research entity,  does 
not have any institutional authority over national plant 
genetic resources nor has it any regulatory authority at 
all. So it cannot be said that these agreements are part of 
public policy or regulation on the matter.
Intellectual Property Rights and Genetic 
Resources
The intellectual property protection system currently in 
force in Chile has two different formulas that apply to 
inventions related to biological resources. These are pat-
ents, regulated by Law No. ., , and breeders’ 
rights, regulated by Law No. ., . Both formulas 
have different scopes and structures. The breeders’ rights 
system only applies to plant varieties, which are expressly 
excluded from the patent system. 
Regarding the awarding of a patent and the consequent 
protection given to biotechnological innovations (products 
or procedures), the current legislation expressly excludes 
only the patenting of plant varieties and animal species.22 
Therefore, according to the tenor of Article  of the 
Regulation of Law No. . “inventions related to bio-
technological procedures and products that either consist 
of life material or contain it” can be patented. This allows 
the patenting of inventions carried out on genetic material, 
but the patent must refer to an invention, not a discovery, 
and the requirements stipulated by Law No. . and 
its regulation must be complied with. 
Given that inventions based on plant varieties and as-
sociated biological material (mainly seeds) are not covered 
by patent protection, they may be subject to protection 
via the breeders’ rights mechanisms, as stipulated in the 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants () treaty and Law No. .. Thus, plant 
varieties can be subject only to breeders’ rights, but inven-
tions based on biological material of plant origin (that are 
not included in the concept of variety) may be protected 
either by the breeders’ rights system (indirectly, since the 
protection includes the variety of which it forms a part) or 
by the patent system (directly, on any innovation).
Regarding animals, there is no special legislation in 
Chile that contemplates a specific protection system, as 
with plant varieties. Nevertheless, material of animal origin 
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can be protected by means of the patent system, as long 
as the stipulations and requisites of Law No. . and 
its regulation are complied with. 
In the case of microorganisms, cellular composites, and 
other biological classifications, apart from those indicated 
by Article  of the regulation of Law No. ., there 
is no provision that, directly or indirectly, refers to their 
inclusion or exclusion from the patent system. Given the 
fact that patentability is the general rule of the system and 
considering the reference to Article , it can be concluded 
that the aforementioned materials may be the object of 
patent protection, if and when the respective inventions 
comply with the requisites stipulated by Law No. . 
and its regulation.
Since the legislation that regulates patents has a gen-
eral rule of broad patentability, alongside the mandates of 
Article , the possibility to patent all kinds of inventions 
based on diverse biological resources exists. Nevertheless, 
it is important to note that this is only a possibility and does 
not imply a systematic patenting of forms of life. Although 
the possibility exists, the system enacted in the respective 
legislation was not elaborated with such cases in mind, 
and, for now, does not have the necessary structure and 
institutionalization to handle the complexity surrounding 
the attribution of intellectual property rights over different 
life forms. It is the responsibility of the qualified institu-
tion (Department of Industrial Property of the Ministry of 
Economy) to determine the extent of the protection granted 
to the patent system of Law No. ..
Beyond the possibility of patenting inventions carried 
out on live material, it is fundamental to define a national 
policy on the subject of intellectual property and its scope. 
A harmonious regulation can be established, with clear 
and efficient rules, founded on objectives relevant to na-
tional interests. Given the tremendous complexity of its 
implications, the possibility of attributing or not attributing 
intellectual property rights to biotechnological inventions 
must comply with such a national policy and not only 
manifest the interests of some sectors. In its current state, 
the legislation is unsystematic and vague in many of its 
mandates and concepts. This leaves the door open for a 
variety of interpretations and applications.
With this reality in mind, we will refer briefly to the 
current process of modification of the Chilean intellectual 
property legislation. It began in  with the presenta-
tion of a Bill by the Executive Power in the National 
Congress23. that seeks to adapt the Chilean legislation to 
the international obligations it undertook by subscription 
to the Marrakech Agreement. (Indeed, by virtue of the 
ratification of the Marrakech Agreement, Chile acquired 
the obligation to adapt its internal legislation in matters of 
intellectual property. The deadline originally established 
was  March . Today, Chile, like many other develop-
ing countries, has not complied with this stipulation).
Nevertheless, as we have already mentioned, dur-
ing  a Bill introducing modifications to Law No. 
., Related to the Regulations Applicable to Industrial 
Privileges and Protection of the Rights of Industrial 
Property, was submitted for consideration in the Chilean 
Chamber of Deputies. The aim of the Bill is “the execu-
tion of obligations that, in matters of industrial property, 
were adopted by the Chilean State within the framework 
of the Marrakech Agreement, modifying Law No. . 
in conformity with the stipulations established in that in-
ternational legislative body”. Likewise, this Bill introduces 
some modifications to current laws that are destined to 
complete and comply with the Paris Agreement (in force 
in Chile since ). 
Regarding the modifications proposed for the patents 
system, the main changes are related to the period of pro-
tection of the rights conferred by the patent (it increases 
from  to  years) and the procedural aspects for the 
granting of this right. Specifically, in relation to the pat-
entability of different forms of life, the Bill reproduces, 
nearly identically, Article ..b of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 
Thus Article  of Law No. . would indicate the 
following:
The following will not be considered as an invention 
and will remain excluded from the patent protection of 
this legislation: b) Plants and animals, excluding micro-
organisms, and essential biological procedures for the 
production of plants or animals, that are not biological 
or microbiological procedures. The plant varieties will 
benefit from protection whenever they can stay within 
the boundaries of the mandates of Law No. . on 
breeders’ rights of new plant varieties.
To illustrate some aspects of this incipient discussion 
in Chile on this matter, we will refer to the most relevant 
suggestions that have been formulated during the discus-
sion of this proposal in Congress (C  D 
). For example, a request has been made to add a new 
letter f) to Article  that establishes that the following 
would also be excluded from patent protection: 
All or part of living beings as they are found in nature, 
the natural biological processes, the biological material 
found in nature or that which may be isolated, including 
the genome or germplasm of any natural living being. 
This suggestion was proposed with the aim of prevent-
ing the possibility of patenting any kind of genome (plants 
as well) and not only human genomes.
Regarding biotechnology, the relevant suggestions are 
those formulated in relation to the current Article  of 
Law No. . that states: 
An invention can be patented when it is new, has an inven-
tive level, and is susceptible to industrial application. 
The Bill in process does not incorporate modifications 
to this article; nevertheless, there have been proposals in 
the parliamentary discussion offering suggestions that 
would modify it. For example, one proposal would sub-
stitute the following for the text of this article: 
Patents can be obtained for all inventions, be they prod-
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ucts or procedures, in all fields of technology, with the 
condition that they be new, have an inventive level, and 
are susceptible to industrial application. Regardless of 
Article  of this Law, patents can be obtained and the 
rights of the patents can be used without discrimina-
tory aspects such as the place of invention, the field of 
technology, or the fact that the products are imported or 
produced in the country. 
There has also been a proposal to add a second para-
graph to Article , as follows:
 The principle of non-discrimination in technical fields 
will be recognized by safeguarding and respecting our 
national biological and genetic patrimony, as well as 
the traditional knowledge of indigenous or local com-
munities. As a consequence, the concession of patents for 
inventions developed on the basis of material obtained 
from that patrimony or knowledge would be subject to 
the acquisition of the material in conformance with the 
relevant international and national Regulations.
It is also important to mention the paragraph formu-
lated by Article  of Law No. . which currently 
states that: 
Patents are not awarded to inventions that infringe upon 
the law; public order; state security; ethics and good 
customs; nor to any inventions presented by whomsoever 
is not the legitimate owner. 
As with Article , the original bill did not modify this 
article. However, the Chamber of Deputies formulated the 
following paragraph, which aims to replace the text of 
Article  with the following: 
Patents cannot be awarded to inventions whose commer-
cial exploitation needs to be prevented in order to protect 
public order, state security; ethics and good customs; 
the health or life of persons or animals, or to preserve 
plant material or the environment, whenever such an 
exclusion is not carried out due to the existence of a 
legal or administrative clause that prohibits or regulates 
said exploitation.
The Chamber of Deputies’ Permanent Economic 
Commission, which is in charge of studying the Bill in 
question, has approved all the above-mentioned para-
graphs.
We must say, that in Chile, almost all biotechnologi-
cal development is carried out by universities and a few 
government agencies (mainly  and ), with the 
fundamental aim of preserving resources and developing 
scientific research. Chile does not have a significant bio-
technological industry, nor does it have a particularly de-
veloped economic activity in this area. Therefore, most of 
the pressure for a better adaptation of national intellectual 
property legislation to the patenting of biotechnological 
developments originates from abroad. To date, this pres-
sure has not been significant.
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Bioprospecting Projects in Chile
There is currently neither a regulatory framework nor 
a clear policy regarding this issue. Thus, regarding the 
activity of access to genetic resources (bioprospecting 
projects) the approach taken is predominantly contractual 
and is defined by the particular interests of the contracting 
parties and controlled by the regulations of private law 
(national or international). It does not include the concrete 
participation of the country’s environmental authorities. 
Practically all cases of bioprospecting have been carried 
out via Chilean universities and with the supposed aim 
of developing research ( ). Since Chile does 
not possess a developed biotechnological industry and no 
Chilean stakeholder have shown an interest in developing 
the sector, most of the bioprospecting projects have their 
origins abroad, be it in the private or public sectors. 
Given the fact that no entry control system exists, nor 
is there an obligation to register, no precise information 
is available regarding the exact number of bioprospecting 
expeditions that have been carried out or are currently 
being carried out in Chile. Nevertheless, these expedi-
tions can be categorized into two clear groups: specific 
expeditions, carried out on a small scale and in relation 
to certain very special species (these probably constitute 
the majority but are less often registered), and large scale 
bioprospecting programs, which consist of the systematic 
analysis of samples in considerably large terrains carried 
out over significant periods of time. Among the latter the 
most important have been: the project carried out by the 
International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups (ICBGs), 
under the guidance of the University of Arizona with the 
collaboration of the Chilean Catholic University24; the pro-
gram developed by the British Technology Group and the 
University of Chile, with the participation of the University 
of Southampton Agrochemical Unit, the Institute of 
Arable Crops Research, and the Royal Botanical Garden, 
and the program carried out by  in conjunction with 
the Japan International Cooperation Agency ()25. To 
a great degree, these three projects, at the time of their 
development, motivated the authorities responsible for 
environmental matters to politically approach the issue 
of genetic resources and their regulation. This led them to 
promote the development of a kind of regulatory instru-
ment and policy to deal with the situations generated by 
these types of projects.
As mentioned above, these projects have had a pre-
dominantly contractual basis, with a minimum or total 
lack of involvement of the environmental authorities, local 
communities, nongovernmental organizations (s), and 
indigenous groups. The majority of these projects have 
adopted the ’s general principles and rules in order to 
define their frameworks. Nevertheless, in practice, their 
development has generated a great deal of distrust, while 
the willingness of the parties involved to comply with 
these principles and rules has been questioned by various 
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sectors. The main criticism, apart from the lack of real par-
ticipation, is related to the absence of clarity and certainty 
regarding the benefits owed to Chile or to its citizens in 
exchange for access to genetic resources. 
This lack of participation and transparency is not 
necessarily nor exclusively due to the unwillingness of 
those involved in the projects. Rather, it is due to the fact 
that the Chilean authorities responsible for environmental 
matters have been incapable of offering clear guidelines 
regarding the procedures to follow, the organizations to 
be consulted, the principles and rules to be respected, etc. 
This is mainly due to the absence of a framework that regu-
lates genetic resources in Chile. Because of the absence 
of public sector regulations, private law has been applied, 
in all legitimacy, and the private interests of contracting 
parties have prevailed. 
Regarding organizations linked to the public sector, it is 
important to highlight the work of  in the contracting 
and development of bioprospecting projects. In compliance 
with its programs,  has subscribed to various contracts 
of access to genetic resources in Chile. Below we describe 
the fundamental aspects of two such contracts. It is impor-
tant to emphasize that in both cases the parties recognize 
the sovereign rights of states over their own biological 
resources while making a commitment to comply with the 
contents and the spirit of , , and the national laws 
and regulations related to biodiversity, including access to 
plant genetic resources and their transfer.
• Contract of Access to and Participation in the 
Benefits, signed by  and the Trustee of the 
Royal Botanical Garden, Kew, United Kingdom 
( July ). Via this contract,  expressly 
awards its previously informed consent to the 
“Ex Situ Conservation of Endemic, Vulnerable, 
and Endangered Species from the Desert and 
Mediterranean Zones in Chile” project which is 
to be carried out by both institutions, according 
to the project summary attached in Appendix  of 
this contract. The main clauses of the contract refer 
to the following aspects: terms of transfer of col-
lected material to the Royal Botanical Garden, Kew 
(Transfer Notification in Appendix  of the con-
tract); a pledge of noncommercialization of trans-
ferred genetic resources, unless expressly agreed 
upon by the involved parties; a just and equitable 
distribution of the benefits; regulation of transfer 
of collected material to third parties (stipulated in 
an Appendix ); a pledge to treat confidential in-
formation in a confidential manner; and duration 
of the contract and conflict resolution. 
• Contract of Access to germplasm, signed by  
and the C.M. Rick Tomato Genetics Resource 
Center (), of the University of California, 
Davis ( October ). Via this contract,  
expressly grants its previously informed consent 
to the  to collect germplasm (seeds) samples 
from species and from places expressly indicated 
in the contract. The fundamental contents of the 
contract are as follows: the restriction of collection 
of material so as not to put the respective population 
in danger of extinction;  pledge not to claim 
property rights over the germplasm collected; equi-
table distribution of collected material between the 
involved parties; regulation of transfer of collected 
material to third parties; pledge to share information 
generated among parties involved;  pledges to 
assist  in increasing its technical capacities and 
genetic resource research; and conflict resolution.
The differences between these contracts lie in the 
clauses that do not refer to the essence of the agreement 
(for example, duration of the contract, conflict resolution 
mechanisms, and future technical cooperation pledge). The 
essential elements are practically the same, consisting of: 
previously informed consent, declaration of equitable 
distribution of benefits, and regulation of the transfer of 
material collected to third parties. As these contracts are 
just starting to be implemented there is yet no information 
about their results.
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Conclusions
As has been explained throughout this paper, to date 
Chile has not yet developed a structural framework for 
the general implementation of the , which would be a 
necessary base for specific formulation of an access and 
benefit distribution regime on the basis of objectives, goals, 
and priorities previously determined. However, the cur-
rent National Biodiversity Strategy and the future National 
Biodiversity Action Plan are steps in the right direction. 
We have yet to see the results of the process leading to 
a National Biodiversity Action Plan, but it is certainly 
an approach that considers the integral and systematic 
implementaion of the .
This process is being coordinated by  in its 
role as the authority in charge of proposing environmental 
policies to the government and as a national focal point 
for the . Regarding a strategy for the formulation of 
the access and benefit-sharing regime,  and the 
other institutions with some competence on the subject 
will have to consider the different formal systems by which 
the matter can be treated through a legal, contractual or 
voluntary approach. In addition, it will be necessary to 
decide whether to structure regulation through an integral 
formula (framework) or a flexible one (amendments to the 
existing legislation), of immediate or gradual development. 
The characteristics and the effectiveness of the legislative 
and institutional framework that regulates access to the 
genetic resources of each country will have a close relation 
to the process through which this framework is developed 
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and implemented.
Once established, in order to operate efficiently the 
legislative framework must, at least, fit within the national 
strategy for the conservation and the sustainable use of 
biological diversity and be endorsed by institutional pro-
cedures with sufficient capacities for implementation.
The effective formulation of a legal regime of access to 
genetic resources requires the participation of a high num-
ber of interest groups and experts. Governmental entities 
of different sectors must participate in the process as well 
as representatives of the scientific community and the pri-
vate sector (for example, pharmaceutical and agricultural 
companies), local and indigenous groups, and s. The 
collective experience and the technical knowledge of all 
the sectors will not only benefit the legislative process, but 
also will help to identify any type of potential opposition 
to the legislation.
When formulating the regulatory framework it is also 
important to have an integrated approach, so that the sub-
ject is not treated in an isolated manner. The regulatory 
framework at issue would have to be integrated within a 
broader set of policies and governmental activities. The 
discussion on how to regulate genetic resources would 
have to be carried out through a process of national plan-
ning, as required by Article  of the . A similar process 
offers the opportunity to gain important knowledge on 
the state and distribution of the biological diversity of 
the country, which is important to determine the more 
attractive geographic zones for the exploration of genetic 
resources and, in addition, to establish if the resources at 
issue are shared with other countries. Such a process also 
allows the establishment of wider objectives and national 
policies, while facilitating the evaluation of the existing 
institutions, laws, and policies. Since the regulation of ac-
cess to the genetic resources is a new area of legislation, 
few countries have the necessary institutions and resources 
for its implementation. To develop this capacity requires a 
long-term process and, for that reason, it is vital to begin 
it as soon as possible. However, considering the elements 
mentioned before, it is clear that there are tensions between 
the urgent need to take measures and the complexity of the 
process. Evidently the  is a superstructure difficult to 
implement for developing countries, and Chile is a clear 
example of this difficulty. Throughout recent years there 
has been only erratic consideration of the subject, and it 
has never been considered a question of importance for the 
national interests, which is demonstrated by a clear lack of 
serious actions on the part of the political authorities.
The subject is so difficult and complex that it is neces-
sary to surpass the way in which these subjects are tra-
ditionally approached. The issue can be seen and treated 
from an ideal perspective or a practical perspective. The 
latter is able to diagnose and to recognize all the present 
difficulties and obstacles at stake to obtain the desired 
objectives and goals. We consider it advisable to follow a 
pragmatic approach to the subject in Chile, and to develop 
a process in a reasonable time frame with predetermined 
objectives, priorities, and goals. 
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Malaysia: Recent Initiatives to Develop 
Access and Benefit-Sharing Regulations
Mohamad Osman
Malaysia consists of two large landmasses over  
km apart separated by the South China Sea. Peninsular 
Malaysia is a continuum of the Asian continent, a nar-
row landmass sandwiched by Thailand in the north and 
Singapore in the south, comprising eleven states, namely, 
Perlis, Kedah, Pulau Pinang, Perak, Kelantan, Terengganu, 
Pahang, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, Melaka, and Johor, 
and two Federal Territories, namely, Kuala Lumpur and 
newly established Putrajaya. East Malaysia, comprising 
the states of Sabah, Sarawak, and the Federal Territory 
of Labuan, is situated on the island of Borneo and is 
bordered by Brunei and Kalimantan, Indonesia (Figure 
). The country occupies about , km² of land area, 
of which % is the Peninsula and % East Malaysia. 
Malaysia’s population was . million in  (date of 
the last Malaysian census). About % of the total popula-
tion resides in Peninsular Malaysia, .% in Sabah, and 
.% in Sarawak.
Malaysia’s territorial waters cover an area of , 
km². Its maritime area borders Indonesia, Singapore, 
Thailand, Brunei, and the Philippines. The principal 
water bodies are the Straits of Malacca and the South 
China Sea. The Straits of Malacca, one of the world’s 
busiest shipping passages, is a narrow sea-lane between 
Peninsular Malaysia, the Indonesian island of Sumatra, and 
Singapore. The South China Sea is significant because of 
its continental shelf which is extremely rich in nutrients 
and able to support a remarkable diversity of species.
Malaysia has a hot and humid tropical climate marked 
by seasonal variations in rainfall. Generally, the climate is 
influenced by the northeast and southwest monsoons. The 
annual average rainfall in Peninsular Malaysia is approxi-
mately , mm, with most precipitation occurring during 
the southwest monsoon (September to December). East 
Malaysia receives most of its rainfall during the northeast 
monsoon (October to February). Sabah’s average annual 
rainfall is , mm, while Sarawak’s average is approxi-
mately , mm. There is, however, great variation in 
rainfall between locations. For example, northern Perlis on 
the average receives only half of Terengganu’s annual rain-
fall, whereas parts of eastern Sarawak receive more than 
, mm of annual rainfall. Average annual temperature 
is °C with a diurnal range of °C. Relative humidity is 
high ( to %), especially in the coastal areas.
Almost one-half of the total surface area of the Peninsula 
is granite of the Triassic Age. The central core is domi-
nated by a series of parallel mountain ranges, which run 
northwest to southeast along the length of the Peninsula. 
Sabah is crisscrossed by a series of mountain ranges with 
the Crocker Range dominating its topography. Sarawak’s 
topography shows a flat coastal plain followed by a narrow 
belt of many hills with a sharp rise of mountainous mass 
extending the full length of the state. Malaysia receives 
approximately  billion m³ of rainfall annually, of which 
% appears as surface run-off and .% recharges the 
groundwater aquifers. Of this total,  billion m³ return 
to the atmosphere by evaporation and transpiration, leav-
ing an estimated  billion m³ as theoretically available 
water resources. Only approximately % of the water 
resources are found in the Peninsula. 
Of a total of . million ha of land, . million, . 
million, and . million ha are estimated to be suitable for 
agriculture in Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah, and Sarawak, 
respectively. The sector is dominated by plantation crops, 
 
of which rubber and oil palm occupied .% and .% 
respectively of the total land area in , followed by 
cocoa. Of the food crops, rice is the most important, fol-
lowed fruits and vegetables. Almost all the forests cleared 
for agricultural development were lowland forests with 
their large reservoir of genetic diversity of fauna and flora, 
because their high soil productivity was deemed ideal for 
agricultural production.
Sarawak agricultural land use constitutes almost a third 
of the total land area. The major user of agricultural land in 
Sarawak is shifting cultivation, or slash and burn farming, 
that accounted for .% of the total land area in . 
Shifting cultivation is the traditional way of life for the 
ethnic and native peoples. It is estimated that % of virgin 
forests are cleared annually for shifting cultivation. By 
contrast in Sabah, agricultural land use comprises only a 
small percentage of total land area (.% in ). In , 
oil palm was the major land user at .% of total land area 
and cocoa was the second major crop with .% of the land 
area. Forest lands constituted approximately ,, ha 
(or % of Peninsular Malaysia’s total land area) in , 
of which ,, ha is designated as Permanent Forest 
Estates (s). The demand for land use, however, has 
led to the delisting of , ha of s in Peninsular 
Malaysia and , ha in East Malaysia from  to 
, largely for agricultural use.
As of , Sarawak was still largely covered by forests 
(over % of the total land area was under s and other 
forests). s also include areas that have been developed 
for the production of forest products and logged-over 
areas replanted with forest species that have good timber 
potential. Forests constitute the bulk of nonagricultural 
land in Sabah with .% or . million ha in , out 
of which . million ha were still undisturbed. This con-
sists mainly of mangroves and swamps, lowland and hill 
dipterocarp, and montane forests. Deforestation of over 
% of the state’s undisturbed lowland and highland dip-
terocarp forests during the last two decades has resulted 
in an overwhelming gross domestic product growth by the 
forestry sector in Sabah. Because of their differing histo-
ries, geographic locations and physical features, Peninsular 
Malaysia and East Malaysia are significantly different in 
their biological holdings. Both areas are inhabited by many 
endemic species, while even shared species have distinct 
genetic differences.
Malaysia is identified as one of the world’s twelve 
megadiversity countries with extremely rich biological 
resources. Tropical forests, the most biologically diverse 
ecosystems on earth, cover much of the country. There are 
over , known species of flowering plants,  species 
of mammals, over , species of invertebrates, over 
, species of butterflies and , species of moth, and 
over , species of marine fishes in Malaysia’s varied 
ecosystems, and the list goes on. 
Therefore, Malaysia offers many opportunities to 
bioprospectors, and policy-makers have been working 
to develop regulations that promote and facilitate bio-
prospecting in the country. This chapter analyses current 
and future laws and policies that regulate access to these 
genetic resources, the process that is leading to the devel-
opment of these laws, and bioprospecting initiatives that 
have been implemented in Malaysia.
Figure . Map of Malaysia
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In Malaysia, the Constitution allocates to the thirteen states 
ownership of land and any minerals on or within it. More 
complex is the situation regarding inhabitants of the land. 
For example, Sabah and Sarawak have a different consti-
tutional status vis-à-vis the Federal Government. Prior to 
joining the Federation, they signed a -point agreement 
with the Federation of Malaysia that guaranteed them spe-
cial rights. Sabah and Sarawak are excluded from national 
plans for land use, local government, and development. As 
a result, the indigenous or local communities1 in Sabah 
have been accorded certain special legal rights over land. 
In a way, we can think of such lands as lands that have 
been alienated to the indigenous communities. Legally, the 
indigenous communities do not “own” the minerals found 
in that land even though they are accorded certain special 
rights over the land. However, biological/genetic resources 
are not explicitly addressed in the law. It is, therefore, still 
uncertain whether the indigenous communities fully hold 
the “proprietary rights” or “access” to biological/genetic 
resources.
Sabah’s land law, enacted under the Land Ordinance 
, permits native customary rights over certain lands 
to indigenous peoples. The Sabah Land Law recognizes 
special classes of land rights, namely, native title to land 
and native reserves, which are applicable only to the native 
peoples. The situation is different in Peninsular Malaysia, 
where the indigenous communities are not accorded cus-
tomary rights over land, even though the land may have 
been occupied and cultivated by them for long periods 
of time. In Peninsular Malaysia, indigenous communities 
occupy lands that have been reserved or designated for 
them by the States. As in Sabah and Sarawak, it is still 
uncertain whether the native people fully hold the pro-
prietary rights or access to biological/genetic resources 
found on their lands. 
It is also uncertain whether private landholders own 
the biological/genetic resources found on their land. This 
question remains open, but on the premise that private 
properties are considered as alienated lands, the relevant 
State may no longer hold the proprietary rights or access to 
biological/genetic resources found on such lands. However, 
it is clearly stated in law that the State holds the proprietary 
rights or access to minerals found on lands.
The constitutional situation in Malaysia prevents the 
legal implementation of a general and all-encompassing 
law governing all types of genetic resources and ben-
efits. Indeed, it would be very difficult for a nationally 
administered policy or law to cover all of Malaysia’s 
biodiversity. The Federal Government does not have the 
legal competency to do so. However, the Constitution does 
allow the Federal Government to take a coordinating role. 
For example, a federal law that ensures access to genetic 
resources is consistent on a nationwide basis. However, 
within the national boundaries, the concept of national 
sovereignty over such resources brings up several issues 
in need of resolution (O ). The question of rights 
to access within the country presents a Federal-State ju-
risdictional dichotomy.
The Federal-State Jurisdictional 
Dichotomy
In Malaysia, the Federal-State jurisdictional dichotomy 
means that the jurisdiction over land and natural re-
sources lies with the State governments and not the 
Federal Government. While it is the Federal Government 
that possesses the authority to enter into international 
agreements, such as the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (), under the Ninth Schedule of the Federal 
Constitution, State governments govern land and natural 
resources. This division of responsibilities causes difficul-
ties in implementing national policies and international 
commitments. The management of the environment and 
biological diversity in Malaysia is the joint responsibil-
ity of Federal, State, and local governments. The Federal 
Constitution divides legislative power between the Federal 
and State Governments into three lists: Federal, State, and 
Concurrent lists. Neither the environment nor biological 
diversity appears in the three constitutional lists as a mat-
ter for legislation, but are instead defined in their related 
subjects under all three lists.
The Federal Government has jurisdiction over com-
merce, trade, and industry, and is responsible for envi-
ronmental protection and pollution prevention. The State 
Governments have control over land, water, agriculture, 
forestry, and local governments, and thus retain jurisdic-
tion to protect, manage, and utilize natural resources. At 
the same time, both Federal and State Governments may 
exercise concurrent jurisdiction over issues such as the 
protection of wildlife and national parks, land rehabilita-
tion, fishing and fisheries, and agriculture. The distinct 
division of Constitutional responsibility to the Federal and 
State Governments respectively has far-reaching implica-
tions for the management and use of natural resources 
and biological diversity, and undermines all efforts for a 
comprehensive and effective management of the environ-
ment.
An example of the dilemma this situation presents is 
in the management of Marine Parks. Legislative control 
over land and forests and the sea up to a limit of three 
km offshore is with the State governments. The Federal 
government has jurisdiction over the sea from three km to 
the Exclusive Economic Zone limits,  nautical miles 
offshore. It also has control over the fisheries and estuarine 
resources in Peninsular Malaysia, but shares concurrent 
responsibilities for the resources in Sabah and Sarawak. 
While the State Governments have jurisdiction over the 
land-based resources of islands, the Federal Government 
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has jurisdiction over the marine resources of Marine Parks. 
This often results in the use of island resources that are in 
conflict with the objectives of marine park management 
systems. A conflict of interests between the Federal and 
State governments can be detrimental to efforts to protect 
and conserve marine biological diversity. 
The implementation of an international convention that 
requires the management of a resource under state jurisdic-
tion must be endorsed by the relevant State government. An 
example is the allocation of the , ha Tasek Bera site 
in the State of Pahang for designation as a site under the 
Ramsar Convention. The area continues to remain under 
Pahang State jurisdiction; however, it may be delisted as 
a Ramsar site if the State so wishes. It should be noted 
that the situation may be even more complex in Sabah and 
Sarawak. The Federal Government has weaker jurisdiction 
over the East Malaysian states relative to the Peninsular 
Malaysian States. The States, Sabah and Sarawak in 
particular, will therefore have to develop clearly defined 
mechanisms at the state level and more refined Federal-
State coordination for effective implementation of inter-
national commitments.
Another related issue is the right of indigenous and 
local communities to control access to biological diversity 
and to receive benefits generated therefrom. This question 
relates to the rights of indigenous and local communities 
to control access to their land and to the resources on those 
lands. Again, in terms of the Federal-State dichotomy with 
regard to special biodiversity rights, the implementation of 
any changes in the policy will present problems.
Malaysia was one among the first countries to sign the 
final text of the  at the Earth Summit in June , 
and it ratified the treaty on  June . Having ratified 
the , Malaysia has incorporated it into its national 
policies and is planning more commitments under the 
treaty (Table ). At the national level, Malaysia’s efforts 
to implement the  are led by the Ministry of Science, 
Technology, and the Environment (). To coordi-
nate these efforts, a National Committee on Biological 
Diversity () was established under  and chaired 
by the Secretary-General of . Established under this 
National Committee is the National Technical Committee 
on Biological Diversity and its three task forces working on 
specific issues: the country study on biological diversity, 
the national policy on biological diversity, and access to ge-
netic resources. A national Genetic Modification Advisory 
Committee () was also established. 
As a party to the , Malaysia has the responsibility to 
conserve and utilize its biological diversity resources in a 
sustainable way. Based on a country study on biological di-
versity that resulted in the document entitled “Assessment 
of Biological Diversity in Malaysia” ( ), the first 
step taken by the country was to develop a national strategy 
on biological diversity2 that would integrate conservation 
and sustainable use of biological resources into plans, pro-
grams, and policies for sectors such as agriculture, fisher-
ies, and forestry, and for cross-sectoral matters such as 
land-use planning and decision making. This Assessment 
was commissioned as part of Malaysia’s international 
commitment. As a consequence, the Government launched 
the National Policy on Biological Diversity on  April 
. This national policy provides important guidelines 
to States and institutions in Malaysia to take affirmative 
actions to safeguard the country’s biodiversity heritage. 
These guidelines are important to Malaysia, in particular to 
states like Sarawak and Sabah, because it contains within 
its boundary immense biodiversity, much of which is still 
unknown and yet to be discovered and studied since tropi-
cal forests cover much of the country.
The national policy outlines the objectives and provides 
the direction for the nation to implement strategies and ac-
tion plans to conserve Malaysia’s biological diversity and 
to ensure that its components are utilized in a sustainable 
manner for the continued progress and socio-economic 
development of the country. Among the objectives are 
to optimize economic benefits from sustainable utiliza-
tion of the components of biological diversity, to ensure 
long-term food security for the nation, to maintain and 
improve environmental stability for proper function-
ing of ecological systems, to ensure preservation of the 
unique biological heritage of the nation for the benefit 
of present and future generations, to enhance scientific 
and technological knowledge and the educational, social, 
cultural and aesthetic values of biological diversity, and 
to emphasize biosafety considerations in the development 
and application of biotechnology. It is the hope and the 
aspiration of the Government to transform Malaysia into 
a world center of excellence in conservation, research, 
and sustainable utilization of tropical biological diversity 
by the year .
Both to safeguard and manage these rich biological 
resources in a sustainable manner as well as to support 
the National Policy on Biological Diversity and the , 
Sarawak passed a State law in  to establish the Sarawak 
Biodiversity Council and the Sarawak Biodiversity Center 
to manage the State’s rich biodiversity in a prudent man-
ner. Similar steps were taken by the State of Sabah which 
enacted the Sabah Biodiversity Ordinance in  and 
subsequently established the Sabah Biodiversity Center. 
To strengthen further the governance of biological diversity 
in this country, the Government is now in the process of 
finalizing a number of major commitments, namely, the 
Access to Genetic Resources Bill, the Biosafety Bill, and 
the Plant Variety Protection Bill. 
Implementation of the CBD in Malaysia
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Table . The  and Malaysia’s actions and commit-
ments, in chronological order
 Malaysia signed the  during the Earth Summit in 
Rio on  June.
 Malaysia ratified the treaty on  June, the th coun-
try to do so.
Implementation of the  is coordinated by .
 was established to carry out biological biodiver-
sity planning and its implementation and subse-
quently created the following:
National Technical Committee on Biological 
Diversity

National Technical Committee on Biological Diversity 
established three Task Forces:
Country Study on Biological Diversity
National Policy on Biological Diversity
Access to Genetic Resources
 established the Task Force on Biosafety.
 Country study on biological diversity was undertaken, 
from June  to August , by the World 
Wildlife Fund (), Malaysian Nature Society 
(), Universiti Putra Malaysia () and Institute 
of Strategic and International Studies () of 
Malaysia (following the guidelines set forth in the 
United Nations Environment Program Guidelines 
for a Country Study on Biological Diversity).
 Country study on biological diversity entitled 
“Assessment of Biological Diversity in Malaysia” 
was published ( ).
Sarawak passed a State law in December to establish 
the Sarawak Biodiversity Council and the Sarawak 
Biodiversity Center.
 National Policy on Biological Diversity was approved 
by Government in October, and officially launched 
on  April .3
 Sabah passed a State law in November to establish 
the Sabah Biodiversity Council and the Sabah 
Biodiversity Center.
 National Biodiversity and Biotechnology Council held 
its inaugural meeting in December
National Biotechnology Directorate under  
established the Task Force on National Policy on 
Biotechnology in December.
  is handling two draft legislative initiatives, 
namely the Biosafety Bill and the Access to Genetic 
Resources Bill.
The Ministry of Agriculture handled the Plant Variety 
Protection Bill, passed by Parliament.
Current Measures that Regulate Access 
Currently, there is no access regime in place at the national 
level with regard to access control and benefit sharing. Few 
specific measures currently exist in Malaysia to regulate 
access to biological resources, with the exceptions of the 
states of Sarawak and Sabah.
Some national- and state-level access controls are 
already in place for foreign researchers, but such mea-
sures predate the . For example, at the national level, 
a minimum procedure has already been put in place to 
control access to genetic resources by foreign nationals. 
The Economic Planning Unit (), located within the 
Prime Minister’s Department, administers the scheme. 
Foreign researchers intending to conduct research in the 
country need to obtain permission from the Government 
of Malaysia to do so. The permission granted by  is 
really not a permit, so a foreign researcher has to further 
obtain the relevant license/permit from Sabah or Sarawak. 
The permission is required even in areas where the fed-
eral government has no jurisdiction (i.e., the States).  
does this to ensure that all collection activities by foreign 
researchers are properly and centrally monitored. These 
records, upon request, will assist the States in carrying 
out their own monitoring on such collection activities. 
Malaysians do not need to apply for permission from ; 
however, they do have to apply for relevant permits at the 
state level. Foreign bioprospectors also need to obtain the 
necessary visa for conducting any research. 
In Peninsular Malaysia, one is required to have a permit 
or license to prospect in the forest. Under the Forestry Act 
of , two types of licenses can be issued. One type is 
for major forest products like timber, poles, fuel wood, 
charcoal, and manau and sega rattans. A minor license 
can also be issued for forest products other than those 
mentioned above. Under section  of the same Act, the 
State Forestry director is empowered by the State authority 
to control the removal of plants or resources from the for-
est. In general, all licenses will correspond to a boundary 
demarcated on the ground. Licenses are usually issued 
for a term of three to  months and can be renewed from 
time to time. However, a license cannot be transferred and 
will be terminated upon the death of the license holder or 
dissolution of the body granted the license. Applicants 
will have to pay charges, which may consist of royalties, 
premiums, development fees, or administrative fees and 
these vary from State to State.
Malaysian researchers will have to apply for a Use 
Permit under section  of the Act to carry out research 
activities in a permanent forest reserve. For this, they have 
to first submit a research proposal which the Forestry 
Department will study. Once approval is granted, certain 
conditions, normally parallel with State interests, will be 
attached. In certain cases, there can be a joint expedition 
with department staff.
In the State of Sabah, the “Guidelines for Plant 
Specimen/Botanical Collecting” apply specifically to 
collecting from areas under the Forestry Department’s 
jurisdiction or where special requirements necessitate 
Forestry Department approval. With the enactment of the 
Sabah Biodiversity Enactment  and the subsequent 
establishment of the Sabah Biodiversity Council, any 
collector who intends to obtain biological resources from 
the State will now need to apply in writing to the Sabah 
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has become all the more significant in light of the 
renewed interest in natural and pharmaceutical 
products derived from plant samples. An exception 
to this general legislative omission is the Sarawak 
State legislation called the Wildlife Protection 
Ordinance , Protected Plants Listing.
• Legislation related to the management and use of 
natural resources and natural habitats. There are a 
number of statutes that provide for the management 
of natural habitats and other critical areas such as 
water catchment areas and rivers. Existing legisla-
tion which relates to the establishment and man-
agement of protected areas includes the National 
Parks Act of  in the Peninsula, the Sabah Parks 
Enactment of , and the Sarawak National Parks 
and Reserves Ordinance of . Such legislation 
also provides for the protection and conservation 
of biological diversity found within the boundaries 
of the parks.
• Legislation which has indirect impact on biological 
diversity. An example is the Land Acquisition Act 
of  or the Town and Country Planning Act of 
, in the sense that the acquisition of land or 
development in a particular area may threaten the 
biological diversity and the natural habitats which 
house such biological diversity.
The Sarawak Research Permit System
In , the State of Sarawak proposed the idea of set-
ting up a specific-purpose biodiversity center to enable 
Sarawak to protect more of its own biodiversity. The idea 
was thoroughly debated over the next few years. The 
debate culminated in late  with the enactment of 
the Sarawak Biodiversity Center Ordinance . This 
ordinance provided for the establishment of the Sarawak 
Biodiversity Council in February  and the birth of 
the Sarawak Biodiversity Center () in July of the same 
year. Consequently,  will become the focal point for 
biodiversity inventory, monitoring research, education, 
utilization, management, and conservation.
Apart from being a focal point for biodiversity informa-
tion and related activities in Sarawak,  is also charged 
with the responsibility of regulating the access to, collec-
tion of, and research on Sarawak’s biological resources. 
To this end, in   put in place a Research Permit 
System () which also ensures the conservation of the 
State’s biodiversity, its sustainable use, and fair and eq-
uitable benefit sharing from its use, in line with the three 
basic objectives of the . As the  does not differenti-
ate between commercial and noncommercial purposes, all 
scientists seeking access to genetic resources in Sarawak, 
whether local or foreign, have to go through this system 
to apply to the relevant permits.
The  provides for four types of permits: Research 
Permit, Export Permit, Sales Permit for Protected Species, 
and Ethnobiological Permit (Figure ). The term “biologi-
Biodiversity Council for an access license. In such cases, 
permission from the Sabah Director of Forestry is required 
prior to collecting. Collectors are required to lodge a good 
duplicate of any collection with the Forestry Department 
within  days. When the field work is finished, collec-
tors must submit a field report listing plants collected and 
their numbers. 
In April , the state of Sarawak amended its Forests 
Ordinance to incorporate new controls on access to genetic 
resources. The new provisions require any persons wishing 
to remove or export trees (or any of their derivatives) to 
acquire prior authorization from the Director of Forests 
on the approval of the Minister of Forestry of Sarawak if 
they intend to conduct research into pharmaceutical or 
medicinal compounds. The legislation’s coverage is lim-
ited to “trees”. Thus, its main limitation is that it does not 
cover biological diversity other than trees found in forests 
or other habitats.
Currently, little information exists on the remain-
ing eleven States’ positions on the issue of access to 
genetic resources. Against the backdrop of the current 
political situation, it is remotely possible that some 
of the eleven States may enact their own access laws. 
However, with the setting up of the National Biodiversity 
and Biotechnology Council, which includes all Mentri 
Besar4 and Chief Ministers, the States may adopt and 
implement the new “Access to Genetic Resources Bill”. 
The inclusion of all Mentri Besar and Chief Ministers in 
the Council is significant, since natural resources, such 
as forests, are under State jurisdiction. In any case, so 
far, none of the Peninsular Malaysia states have adopted 
unilateral measures like Sarawak and Sabah, which now 
have their state laws in place through the enactment of 
the Sarawak Biodiversity Center Ordinance in December 
, the Sarawak Biodiversity (Access, Collection and 
Research) Regulations in December , and the Sabah 
Biodiversity Enactment in November , respectively. 
The proactive positions of the States of Sarawak and Sabah 
are underscored by the fact that some of Malaysia’s richest 
biodiversity is found in these two states, upon which their 
indigenous communities still depend for their livelihood 
and survival.
As for nonspecific measures, there is a fairly extensive 
framework of legislation for biological diversity conser-
vation, which may relate indirectly to access to genetic 
resources. This framework can be broadly categorized 
into three types:
• Legislation directly related to the protection and 
conservation of biological diversity with emphasis 
on the flora and fauna of the country. However, 
protection of plants is currently not provided for 
in national legislation. The National Forestry Act 
of  and the forest enactments of Sabah and 
Sarawak are intended to regulate and control the 
harvesting of timber and other forest products, but 
these are inadequate to cover the many species of 
wild plants found in the country. This omission 
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Figure . The research permit system as stipulated by the Sarawak Biodiversity Center (). Four types of permits 
are provided (shaded hexagons). The solid lines designate the steps from application to receipt of permit and the un-
dertaking which it allows. The dashed lines indicate information feedback pathways. The dotted boxes provide specific 
requirements or information needed at several steps. The unbounded text provides commentary on specific steps and 
results of the processes.
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cal resources” as defined by the Ordinance includes any 
extracts, whether in liquid or solid form, tissues, by-prod-
uct or derivative, or synthesized form thereof. In relation 
to biological resources, the term “derivative” includes their 
genetic and genomic form or material. The term “ethno-
biology” means the knowledge or information pertaining 
to the uses by the native peoples of the State of biological 
resources for medicinal, food, health, or other purposes, 
including the classification, indigenous nomenclature, con-
servation techniques, and general sociological importance 
of such biological resources to them.
Before any permit may be granted for research on 
biological resources or for ethnobiological research, a 
research agreement must be entered into between the 
Government and the person or institution intending to carry 
out such research. A research agreement shall include, but 
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is not limited to the following:
• The place or institution in Sarawak or outside 
Sarawak where research is to be carried out;
• Access by the Council to any reports, data, studies, 
or results of the research undertaken;
• Rights of the Government to patents and intellectual 
property or over any discovery resulting from the 
research undertaken, and where appropriate, the 
sharing of such rights with other parties in accor-
dance with the research agreement;
• The rights of the Government to license any pat-
ent or intellectual property and the entitlement to 
benefits derived therefrom;
• Confidentiality over any reports, data, studies, or 
results from such research;
• The transfer of technology, skills, and knowledge 
derived from such research, including the training 
of scientists from the State, and their participation 
in such research;
• Ownership of data and results accruing from re-
search; and
• Other terms and conditions as may be mutually 
agreed upon.
For ethnobiological research, the permit holder may be 
required to make payments to native peoples as rewards 
for the knowledge or information provided by them in 
connection with the research. The payment may be made 
regardless of whether the research results in the com-
mercial development of any medicinal or other products. 
Where such research leads to the development of any 
pharmaceutical or medicinal compound or any health 
or nutritional product, the patent or intellectual property 
right to such compound or product shall be shared with 
the native people.
The Sabah Access License
In , Sabah passed the Sabah Biodiversity Enactment 
 and established the Sabah Biodiversity Council. As 
stipulated by the Enactment, any collector who intends 
to obtain biological resources shall apply in writing to 
the Sabah Biodiversity Council for an access license. 
The application shall be in respect of access to biological 
resources found on: a) State lands; b) any reserves, indig-
enous peoples’ customary lands, or any other sites over 
which indigenous and local communities exercise com-
munity-based or customary rights; or c) any other areas, 
including rivers, tributaries, waterways or areas covered 
by water, marine parks, or territorial waters of the State, 
as well as any ex situ collections maintained by the State. 
There will be no export for research purposes of any bio-
logical resources without a license issued by the Council. 
With the establishment of the Sabah Biodiversity Center 
in , it began taking on procedures for granting access 
permits in the State (Figure ). 
National Level:
The Access to Genetic Resources Bill
At the national level, the National Task Force on Access 
to Genetic Resources was established by the National 
Technical Committee on Biological Diversity with the spe-
cific mandate of addressing the issue of access to genetic 
resources (Box ). In drafting the country’s future access 
law and policy through a broad consultative process, the 
Task Force was represented by agencies with responsibil-
ity for the management of biodiversity in the country. In 
general, the Task Force opted for developing the Access to 
Genetic Resources Bill with wide consultative public input 
and with access requirements that are simple and clear, by 
taking into consideration the following:
• Promotion of local scientific research and de-
velopment, i.e., to reduce unnecessary potential 
constraints on local research and development;
• Promotion of bioprospecting, in particular by pri-
vate sector and multinational firms;
• Provision of ample opportunities for participation 
by all stakeholders;
• Securing and maximizing practical and enforce-
able sharing of benefits from the uses of biologi-
cal resources and associated traditional knowledge 
and traditions, with emphasis on conservation of 
biological resources and associated knowledge, 
financial benefits, research collaboration, and 
technology transfer;
• Ensuring the practicality of prior informed consent 
() procedures and benefit-sharing arrangements 
with local communities;
• Ensuring that the emerging access regime is not 
overly bureaucratic; and
• Ensuring adequate government administrative and 
technical capacities to implement the laws and the 
access procedures with the relevant degree of 
centralization/decentralization.
Analysis of the Process that Led to the Development
of the Access to Genetic Resources Bill 
The process leading to the development of the Access to 
Genetic Resources Bill is summarized in Table . The 
process really took off in , two years after the Rio 
Summit, when the  was formed and began strategic 
planning on biological diversity in Malaysia. The National 
Technical Committee on Biological Diversity then estab-
lished the Task Force on Access to Genetic Resources (Box 
). To assist the Task Force, the  played a pivotal role in 
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Figure . Access license application as stipulated by Sabah Biodiversity Enactment of .
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the revision of the law on access to genetic resources. The 
process was intensified and culminated in the organization 
of the National Workshop on Access and Benefit Sharing 
of Genetic Resources in  (Box ). 
The Task Force finally recommended, after a reversal 
of an earlier stance and in-depth deliberations, enactment 
of a national (Federal) framework legislation that would 
be known later as the “Access to Genetic Resources Bill” 
applicable to the whole of Malaysia. Earlier, based on the 
recommendation of the  that no new legislation was 
required to address the issue of bioprospecting, access, and 
benefit sharing, the approach was to consider amending 
three statutes, namely the National Forestry Act of , 
the Protection of Wildlife Act of , and the Fisheries 
Act of , by inserting new provisions relating to the 
establishment of a licensing system within the existing 
legislative provisions. The license (or access license as it 
is referred to in the amendments) was meant to be a form 
of access control. However, the approach of amending 
each piece of legislation was too fragmented to ensure 
a consistent approach. In addition, the process did not 
identify a single agency with the responsibility of admin-
istering the licensing system. Instead, it imposed respon-
sibility on many agencies, depending on the responsible 
authority for each piece of legislation amended. Neither 
did the process provide for a monitoring mechanism. 
Benefit sharing was addressed only in terms of technol-
ogy transfer and the collection of fees and payment of 
royalties. The distribution of benefits for the purposes 
of conservation and local community development was 
not adequately considered. The amendments addressed 
the issue of access and benefit sharing () at one level, 
but no clear linkages were drawn from the amendments 
to the objectives of conserving biological diversity and 
equitable benefit sharing. Furthermore, in light of the vital 
contributions made by local and indigenous communities, 
the protection of indigenous knowledge and innovations 
becomes particularly relevant and needs to be addressed. 
Therefore, it was imperative that national legislation be 
enacted that would guarantee consistency in approach to 
key issues, for the purpose of fulfilling obligations under 
the , despite the fact that the Federal-State dichotomy 
issues at hand would still need to be resolved.
At one point in the process leading to the development 
of the access law, the Task Force worked on the provision 
to establish a National Biodiversity Council responsible 
for matters relating to access to genetic resources and also 
to the biosafety of genetically modified organisms (s). 
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This meant that that there would be three separate bills 
to be considered together, namely, one bill for access to 
genetic resources, one bill for biosafety, and the third bill 
for establishing the institutional structure that would be 
responsible for administering and implementing the other 
two bills (Table ). This approach, which would have cre-
ated a colossal legal predicament, was proposed by the 
Task Force to . It has now been decided that this 
approach will no longer be pursued, and two of the bills 
(i.e., access and biosafety), each with its own institutional 
infrastructure, will now be tabled separately.
Five years after its establishment, the Task Force of-
ficially completed its task when it adopted the final text 
of the Access to Genetic Resources Bill in October . 
The whole process from the final draft to the passing of 
the Bill into law would be handled by , in close 
collaboration with the  and was expected to be com-
pleted in not less than one year. In the meantime, the Bill 
was scheduled to go through the national consultative 
process in the years  and , then to the Cabinet 
for approval, and finally to the Parliament for the Bill 
to be passed into law. Be that as it may, the process has 
progressed at a relatively slower pace particularly with 
regard to national consultation.  is currently giving 
priority to passing the Biosafety Bill into law in . 
Therefore, the process of completion and adoption by the 
government of the Access to Genetic Resources Bill will 
now extend beyond . The responses from the different 
States, in particular Sarawak and Sabah, are crucial for the 
completion and adoption of the access law.
It should be noted that while the above process was 
taking place at the Federal level, the states of Sarawak 
and Sabah had their own processes underway, and these 
culminated in the enactment of the Sarawak Biodiversity 
Pursuant to the decision of the National Committee on 
Biological Diversity, the Task Force was set up to review or 
revise the relevant Malaysian laws to meet Malaysia’s  
obligations. One of the important areas identified by the Task 
Force for urgent revision relates to access to genetic resources 
as addressed under Article  of  to ensure that Malaysia’s 
interest under the Article is fully protected.
The Task Force membership included representatives from 
the Attorney General’s Chambers; ; Forest Department; 
Department of Agriculture; Wildlife Department; Fisheries 
Department; Veterinary Department; research institutions; 
universities; representatives from the states of Pahang, 
Perak, and Sarawak; and representatives from s such as 
the Third World Network. With regard to biotechnology, a 
representative from the National Biotechnology Directorate 
under  and a number of researchers from several re-
search institutions and universities also sat in as members of 
the Task Force.
There was no direct representation from the indigenous 
and local communities in the Task Force; however, their inter-
ests were represented by the relevant ministries and agencies. 
 was especially very helpful, since it is directly involved 
with various indigenous and local communities in Sarawak, 
and since the end of , it has been administering and 
implementing the Sarawak Biodiversity (Access, Collection 
and Research) Regulations of .
In the course of undertaking its task, the Task Force had 
consultations with all the states in Peninsular Malaysia and 
Sabah and Sarawak, taking into consideration different and 
ad hoc concerns pertaining to various issues relating to the 
 in general, and issues on access to genetic resources in 
particular. With  providing administration, the Task 
Force held a series of meetings from  through . 
In , the Task Force sent the draft Bill to all States and 
requested their comments in writing. In ,  orga-
nized a consultative workshop on access and benefit sharing 
to explain the draft Bill to various ministries and agencies 
with responsibilities for the management of biodiversity in 
the country, including representatives from private sector, 
industries, and s, and to obtain feedback from them. A 
national consultative process was also initiated in early  
and all States and relevant stakeholders had been asked for 
their responses and for feedback on the final draft.
The work of the Task Force can be summarized as occur-
ring in two phases:
Phase One: Amendment of Existing Sectoral Legislation 
and Enactment of a Separate Legislation to Address the 
Gaps or Loopholes Applicable to Peninsular Malaysia.
The Task Force started its review with a focus on legal mecha-
nisms already available within Malaysia’s legal framework. 
It further restricted its review to laws applicable only to 
Peninsular Malaysia, since the relevant laws in Sabah and 
Sarawak are separate from the relevant laws in Peninsular 
Malaysia. Based on the framework of existing laws, the re-
view would address, on a component by component basis, the 
following: forests, fisheries, wild animals, domestic animals, 
agrobiodiversity, and microorganisms. Subsequently, it was 
considered whether, based on the results of the review, the 
necessary legal requirements relating to access to genetic 
resources could be incorporated separately but uniformly into 
relevant existing laws, e.g., the National Forestry Act of  
or the Protection of Wildlife Act of . These revised laws 
would then provide strict legal mechanisms for protection of 
genetic resources found in Malaysia and should legally reflect 
the various requirements under Article  of the : access 
to genetic resources based on , mutually agreed terms, par-
ticipation in research and development by parties providing 
the genetic resources, and equitable sharing of benefits arising 
from commercial use and utilization of genetic resources and 
the results of research and development on them.
Having undertaken this initial review exercise, the Task 
Force came to several conclusions presented in the following 
paragraphs along with the current implementation status of 
each of them:
• Based on the relevant existing laws, the Task Force found 
that the requirements under Article  could be incor-
porated into existing laws for only some components of 
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Center Ordinance of  and the Sabah Biodiversity 
Enactment of . 
Identification and Analysis of the Main 
Difficulties and Successes Experienced 
during the Design of the Access to Genetic 
Resources Bill
Many issues and questions experienced during the design 
of the Access to Genetic Resources Bill still remain un-
resolved. Therefore, considerable efforts are still needed 
before the access Bill is adopted by all States and passed 
into law. These were the main difficulties:
• Determining the authority (Federal-State dichoto-
my) to legislate on matters relevant to biological 
diversity;
biodiversity: the Animal Ordinance of  for domestic 
animals; the Protection of Wildlife Act of  for wild 
animals; the National Forestry Act of  for forests; and 
the Fisheries Act of  for fisheries. In other words, the 
only components of Malaysia’s biodiversity that could 
be addressed under the present legal framework for the 
purposes of  Article  were these four. While a na-
tional (Federal) framework law applicable to the whole 
of Malaysia was also being considered, the Task Force 
took cognizance of the gaps or loopholes in these laws 
that would need to be addressed.
• With respect to agrobiodiversity, the Task Force found 
that existing relevant laws were inappropriate for the 
purposes of incorporating  Article  requirements, 
especially after taking into account, with respect to plant 
varieties, the various on-going international developments 
(i.e., , the revision of the International Union for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants agreement, and the 
revision of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic 
Resources). Therefore, the Task Force felt that this matter 
would be best addressed in a new and separate law so as to 
be consistent with these developments and to ensure that 
the new law would address the totality of issues relating 
to plant varieties. So, the draft Plant Variety Protection 
Bill was proposed.
• With regard to microorganisms, the Task Force found that 
existing legislation relating to plants and animals could not 
be readily extended to implement the requirements under 
 Article . This is because of the different nature of 
microorganisms, as opposed to plants and animals per 
se, and the finding that microorganisms have never been 
legislated upon in any manner in Malaysia. The Task Force 
felt therefore that it would best to embody the Article  
requirements regarding access to microorganisms in a 
separate law. Therefore, the issue of microorganisms 
would be addressed by the national Access to Genetic 
Resources Bill.
• In order to formulate strict legal mechanisms for access 
to genetic resources found in Malaysia, the Task Force 
was of the view that this should be approached on two 
levels: First, a mandatory statutory requirement should be 
imposed on persons gaining access to genetic resources in 
Malaysia to obtain a prescribed form of license under the 
law, whether or not such access relates to collection, use, 
export, or research of the genetic resources in question. 
Second, a separate contractual mechanism (as opposed 
to the statutory offenses mechanism) should be imposed 
whereby any persons intending to gain access to genetic re-
sources in Malaysia must enter into an agreement with the 
Government of Malaysia regulating activities with respect 
to the collection, use, export, or research of the genetic 
resources. Both mechanisms were incorporated in the draft 
Access to Genetic Resources Bill. Any collector seeking 
an access activity is required to apply for an access license 
and also to enter into a separate contractual agreement. In 
this manner, apart from being able to impose sanctions as 
provided for in the governing statute, sanctions in the form 
of breach of contract can also be imposed.
• Further, the Task Force was of the view that although 
these mechanisms must be incorporated separately into the 
various laws, sufficient uniformity in its format to ensure 
basic principles and requirements (such as , equitable 
sharing of benefits arising from commercial use and 
utilization, and results of research and development of 
genetic resources, and participation of parties in research 
and development) should be embodied. With respect to 
ensuring sufficient uniformity for the above mechanisms 
when incorporating them into the various laws, this would 
be addressed by the draft Access to Genetic Resources 
Bill.
• Consistent with the Task Force’s approach to impose strict 
legal requirements to protect genetic resources, the Task 
Force took note of ’s efforts to formulate a new set of 
guidelines relative to research and was of the view that 
the imposition of these guidelines would be insufficient 
for the purposes of  Article  because they were not 
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• Promoting uniformity of the laws of the States;
• Intersections with other areas of law;
• Ensuring that access legislation meets all objectives 
of the  and is consistent with national priorities;
• Establishing the institutional structure for the 
implementation of the law (including the idea of 
an umbrella institution to be responsible for both 
access to genetic resources and biosafety, which 
turned out to be unworkable.
• Obtaining model laws to serve as templates or as 
sources of useful rules and principles to guide the 
development of access regime;
• Establishing/designating appropriate competent 
authorities with a clear mandate to determine mat-
ters related to access and benefit sharing, e.g., inter-
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agency composition, monitoring and enforcement 
of compliance;
• Establishing competent authorities/negotiating 
partners to take account of the interests of the 
holders of indigenous/traditional knowledge;
• Determining the nature of biological resources to 
be covered under the scope of the application, e.g., 
derivatives of biological resources and their asso-
ciated intangible components; culture collections; 
migratory species; and resources collected before 
the  came into force and stored in ex situ col-
lections;
• Adequate participation of the holders of indigenous/
traditional knowledge or their representative orga-
nizations in the development of appropriate terms 
of access, such as determining the  process and 
benefit sharing to an access agreement;
• Determining the nature of traditional knowledge 
and innovations to be covered under the scope of 
the application as mandated by Article (j) and 
related provisions;
• Ensuring access regulations that will not hinder 
basic noncommercial research, e.g., education and 
taxonomy; and 
• Promoting fairness and equity to a wide range 
of relevant stakeholders in developing the access 
measures.
The main successes included:
• A comprehensive Bill was designed to regulate 
access to genetic resources rather than simplify-
ing or amending existing sectoral laws (i.e., if the 
 is to have any practical impact, it needs to be 
legally binding. Currently, there is little information on 
the proposal or on progress by  to formulate a new 
set of guidelines relative to research. However, pending 
the conclusion of revision and amendment of laws, ’s 
Guidelines on Research should be adopted immediately 
as a temporary measure for the protection of genetic 
resources found in Malaysia. The ’s Guidelines on 
Research are still in force as a continuing measure of 
protection of genetic resources found in Malaysia.
• The Task Force’s general conclusion was that both the 
revision and amendment of existing laws with respect to 
wild animals, domestic animals, forests, and fisheries, and 
the setting up of new laws with respect to agrobiodiver-
sity and microorganisms in the manner suggested above, 
would fully address Malaysia’s concerns regarding access 
to genetic resources in the context of Article . The set-
ting up of new laws with respect to agrobiodiversity and 
microorganisms to address the gaps or loopholes arising 
from the existing sectoral laws became unnecessary since 
the Access to Genetic Resources Bill was proposed. 
• The Task Force further noted that Sabah and Sarawak have 
separate laws on forests and animals, and in the case of 
Sarawak, its laws have already been updated to meet the 
’s Article  requirements. The Task Force welcomed 
this effort by the State of Sarawak, but noted that where 
the relevant laws in these States had not been updated, it 
would be useful for these States to continue participating in 
the Task Force so as to achieve consistency and uniformity, 
where possible. However, it should be noted that with the 
enactment of the Sarawak Biodiversity Center Ordinance 
of  and the Sabah Biodiversity Enactment of , 
many relevant laws on forests and animals have already 
been updated to meet the ’s Article  requirements.
• The Task Force also noted that implementing the revi-
sion of laws was to be done in accordance with the 
respective legislative authorities of the Federal and State 
Governments, as appropriate, as specified in the Federal 
Constitution. The Task Force was of the opinion that the 
revision of laws should not require any amendments to 
the Federal Constitution, and this was to be done in ac-
cordance with the respective legislative authorities of the 
Federal and State Governments, as appropriate, as stipu-
lated under Article  of the Ninth Schedule.
Phase Two: Enactment of a National (Federal) Framework 
Legislation Applicable to the Whole of Malaysia
The preliminary findings of the Task Force (Phase One) were 
presented to the National Committee on Biological Diversity 
before the launch of the National Policy on Biological 
Diversity in . Important objectives of the policy are the 
optimization of economic benefits through the sustainable 
utilization of biological diversity and the identification of 
biodiversity prospecting activities as a priority. 
The National Committee sought to appraise the adequacy 
of the measures which would be undertaken to implement the 
policy objectives on access and benefit sharing as stated in the 
National Policy on Biological Diversity. First, the National 
Committee was of the opinion that there was an absence 
of an integrative approach across sectors due to the limited 
scope of various enactments in relation to the overall objec-
tives of biological diversity conservation. Second, the areas 
of jurisdiction of Federal and State governments as defined 
in the Constitution would lead to nonuniform implementa-
tion between States. Consequently, the National Committee 
decided that Malaysia’s interests under  Article  would 
be fully realized and protected only if a national (Federal) 
framework legislation applicable to the whole of Malaysia 
were to be legislated.
With the new guidance provided for by the policy change 
intervention, the Task Force continued to progress on the draft 
access law, and to incorporate the legislative provisions to pro-
mote and enforce these objectives on a nationwide basis. The 
draft Access to Genetic Resources Bill was finally adopted by 
the Task Force in October  and subsequently presented 
to  for further deliberations and actions.
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translated into national law and then enforced).
• A system of cooperation between the Competent 
Authorities6 of the Federal and State Governments 
was proposed to ensure uniformity in the adminis-
tration of the law.
• Biotechnology and biodiversity prospecting, hav-
ing considerable potential to add value to specific 
biological/genetic resources, have been given prior-
ity and will increasingly become strategic factors 
in the near future.
• A distinction was made between academic research 
and commercial bioprospectors.
• A system of mandatory licenses for access and ac-
cess agreements between parties, containing mini-
mum terms concerning the provision of information 
and samples, technology cooperation, and benefit 
sharing, was developed.
• A system of community intellectual rights was pro-
posed for the purpose of: a) recognition of owner-
ship rights of communities over their knowledge 
and innovations, b) protection of the communities’ 
knowledge and innovations, and c) ensuring that 
an equitable share of benefits arising from use of 
such knowledge is channeled back to the com-
munities. (This system was discussed but due to 
its controversial nature it was not taken on board 
in the Access to Genetic Resources Bill. However, 
the discussion of the system can be considered as 
one of the successes of the process.)
• The elements of a community intellectual rights 
system were determined, such as: a) identifica-
tion of recognized community intellectual rights, 
including setting up a system of collection and 
registration of traditional knowledge and innova-
tions, b) criteria, mechanisms, and procedures for 
• , established in , in turn established the 
National Technical Committee on Biological Diversity 
and .
• The National Technical Committee on Biological 
Diversity established in  the Task Force on Country 
Study on Biological Diversity, the Task Force on 
National Policy on Biological Diversity, and the Task 
Force on Access to Genetic Resources.
• A Country Study on Biological Diversity was undertaken 
by , ,  Malaysia, and , June –July 
. A Task Force, jointly coordinated by Universiti 
Kebangsaan Malaysia () and Forest Research 
Institute Malaysia (), which reported to the National 
Technical Committee on Biological Diversity, was 
responsible for overseeing the preparation of the docu-
ment entitled “Assessment of Biological Diversity in 
Malaysia” ( ).
• The Task Force on Access to Genetic Resources held 
meetings from  through .
• The meeting ‘Guidelines to facilitate access to biologi-
cal resources and the equitable sharing of benefits in the 
South East Asian Region’ was organized by  and 
the Malaysian Natural Products Society and held – 
April .
• National Workshop on Access and Benefit Sharing of 
Genetic Resources, – August , produced an as-
sessment of national needs and opportunities with regard 
to access and benefit sharing initiatives, adopted the 
direction of amending existing sectoral legislation, and 
discussed the model agreement for biodiversity prospect-
ing and reviewed the provisions of the draft Agreement 
for Research, Collection and Utilization of Biological/
Genetic Resources for Environmentally Sound Uses 
(drafted by ).
• “Assessment of Biological Diversity in Malaysia” was 
published in .
• The Sarawak Biodiversity Center Ordinance was adopted 
December .
• The National Wetland Policy (currently still in the draft-
ing process) was expected to be ready in .
• South and Southeast Asia Regional Workshop on Access 
to Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge was 
held in Chennai, India, – February , with 
Malaysian participation.
• National Policy on Biological Diversity was launched on 
 April .
• Sarawak Biodiversity Center was established, July .
• Sarawak Biodiversity (Access, Collection and Research) 
Regulations were enacted in December .
• A meeting on the  Framework Agreement on 
Access to Genetic Resources was organized by the 
Department of Environment and Natural Resources of the 
Philippines and the World Resources Institute (), , 
– December ; Malaysia could not participate.5
• Consultation took place with all States on  issues 
throughout .
•  rendered a decision in  with a new direction: 
To enact a national (Federal) framework legislation ap-
plicable to the whole of Malaysia.
• Final text of Access to Genetic Resources Bill was adopt-
ed in October .
• First Meeting of Panel of Experts on  took place in 
Costa Rica, October  with Malaysian participation.
• The International Conference “Biodiversity ”, took 
place in Kuching, Malaysia, – November .
• The Sabah Biodiversity Enactment occurred in 
November .
• Consultation with ministries/agencies responsible for 
the management of biodiversity, and industries on , 
Malaysian Center for Remote Sensing, Kuala Lumpur, 
 December 
• Second Meeting of Panel of Experts on , Montreal, 
March  (Malaysia participated)
• The Sabah Biodiversity Center was established in .
• Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on  met in Bonn, 
Germany, October  with Malaysian participation.
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implementing the system, c) identification of tech-
nical institutions, and d) registration of indigenous 
and local community organizations.
• Types of benefits7 were specified to include: a) 
voucher specimens, b) support for conservation 
and related activities, c) participation/collaboration 
of nationals in research, d) sharing of research and 
development results, e) effective access and transfer 
of technology, f) capacity building of institutions 
and indigenous and local communities, and g) fi-
nancial benefits of various forms (e.g., collection 
fees, payments of agreed sums at various stages, 
and royalties).
Issues that were Controversial during the 
Discussions
Ownership of Genetic Resources:
• Access to biological resources found on public 
This workshop was organized in August  by the Genetics 
Society of Malaysia and , on behalf of the National 
Committee on Biological Diversity and the Task Force on 
Access to Genetic Resources in collaboration with the . 
The objectives of the workshop were to: ) formulate national 
responses to  articles ,  and ; ) review existing 
national legislation with respect to access and benefit-sharing; 
and ) review current initiatives in neighboring countries and 
other regions of the world while assessing the existing inter-
national situation on genetic resources utilization.
The workshop participants included representatives 
from government agencies, universities, and NGOs. 
Representatives from the ,the World Conservation Union 
() Environmental Law Center, and the Royal Botanic 
Gardens, Kew, also attended the workshop as resource per-
sons. The workshop was an awareness-raising consultative 
process involving the various stakeholders at the national level. 
Recommendations for developing the legal and institutional 
framework for access and benefit sharing in Malaysia were 
discussed and three issues were identified as targets.
Assessment of needs and opportunities
The workshop agreed that there was a need for a comprehen-
sive assessment of the current situation in the country with 
regard to access and benefit-sharing initiatives. The objective 
of such a measure would be to assess the needs, opportuni-
ties, resources, and capacities in the country. The assessment 
could comprise surveys and consultations to ) identify needs 
and priorities; ) assess industry demand; ) identify market 
opportunities; and ) document biodiversity prospecting ac-
tivities. An assessment would also create awareness on issues 
relating to biodiversity prospecting, access, and benefit-shar-
ing. The assessment’s findings would then form the basis upon 
which a national strategy for biodiversity prospecting could 
be formulated.
Access and benefit-sharing legislation
The primary concern about legislation relating to access and 
benefit sharing was the Federal-State system in Malaysia. 
The constitutional dichotomy raises the issue of legislative 
authority over genetic resources. The workshop agreed that the 
constitutional issues should be examined further to explore the 
possibility for new legislation. In this context, the workshop 
identified a number of options that could be considered:
• Enacting a national (Federal) framework law applicable to 
Peninsular Malaysia;
• Enacting a national (Federal) framework law applicable to 
the whole of Malaysia;
• Amending existing sectoral legislation and enacting a 
separate law to address the gaps or loopholes; and
• Enacting model state legislation for the individual states 
to adopt.
The workshop also discussed the elements which should 
be included in legislation for access and benefit sharing, such 
as a definition of genetic/biological resources, the problem 
of administrative authority, enforcement issues, and consti-
tutional issues.
A model agreement for biodiversity prospecting
The workshop agreed that a model agreement would be an im-
portant element within the framework for regulating biodiver-
sity prospecting activities. It would ensure minimum standards 
and facilitate benefit-sharing arrangements. Legislation might 
be able to provide minimum standards, but a further set of 
standards could be incorporated into biodiversity prospecting 
agreements. As for benefit sharing, while the general character 
of benefits can be specified in legislation, specific agreements 
can spell out a detailed list of benefits and other operational 
aspects. It was also agreed that while a model agreement would 
provide a useful basis for negotiations, it should not be looked 
upon as a rigid prescription but rather as a checklist of items 
for consideration. With these points in mind, the workshop 
reviewed the provisions of the draft Access Agreement for 
Research, Collection and Utilization of Biological/Genetic 
Resources for Environmentally Sound Uses (drafted by the 
). A list of provisions to be reconsidered was compiled to 
forward to the  for further action. The draft is apparently 
still under consideration by the .
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− Cells, genes, or copies of genes;
− Biological and microbiological processes for 
production of plants and animals; and 
− Traditional knowledge and innovations.
The above are the three major issues that are being ad-
dressed by the Access to Genetic Resources Bill. There are 
many questions surrounding them, especially the last two 
issues. These important questions still remain unresolved, 
not only at the national (inter-ministerial) level, but also at 
the international level. The need for quick action should 
form part of the national implementation process of the 
; however, such action must be balanced by the need 
for a well-thought-out policy which meets the objectives 
of conservation, development, and equity. Lately, because 
of these reasons, there was even a proposal to reduce the 
scope of the present Access to Genetic Resources Bill. In 
other words, quick action might be achieved by concentrat-
ing only on access licensing and benefit sharing. 
lands belonging to Federal/State governments;
• Access to biological resources found on lands where 
ownership rights are communal or customary;
• Access to traditional knowledge and innovations; 
and
• Pre- ex situ collections.
Indigenous Knowledge and Innovations:
• Establishment of a system of community intellec-
tual rights and
• Elements of community intellectual rights.
Intellectual Property Rights:
• Exclusive or monopoly ownership rights exercised 
over biological/genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge/innovations.
• Exclusion of intellectual property rights, such as 
patents over: 
− Plants, animals, microorganisms, or parts 
thereof;
Access to Genetic Resources Bill (The Future Access Law)
Based on federal law, if the Access to Genetic Resources 
Bill is adopted and implemented at the federal level, then 
all the Sarawak access regulations, the Sabah guidelines, 
and other state laws will have to be modified accordingly. 
However, the expeditious passage of such modifications 
will largely be determined by the political will at the State 
level. The Access to Genetic Resources Bill will also have 
to consider the interests of Sarawak and Sabah regarding 
access to their genetic resources; however, at the same 
time it is important that the Bill is in line with the spirit 
and provisions of the .
Main Parts of the Bill
The components consist of Preamble, Preliminary (title, 
application, commencement, savings, and interpretation/
meaning of terms), Objectives, Scope, License for access, 
Access application, Evaluation of application, Decision-
making procedure, Conditions for approval (terms of access 
license, endorsement of access agreement, assignment, and 
terms of access agreement), Disclosure of information to 
the public, Review of decision, Monitoring and enforce-
ment (authorities, powers of entry and investigation), 
Costs, Appeals, Offenses, Institutional structure (compe-
tent authority), Traditional knowledge (ownership, proof 
of ownership, co-ownership, system of protection of tradi-
tional knowledge, system of records of traditional knowl-
edge, technical institutions, registration of indigenous and 
local community organizations), Prior informed consent, 
Fair and equitable sharing of benefits/agreements (types 
of benefits, mechanisms for sharing of benefits arising 
from traditional knowledge), Intellectual property rights 
(nonpatentability, limitations, certificate of origin, , 
and compulsory licenses), Exemptions/Nonapplicability 
(public officers and researchers), Relation to other Acts, 
Regulations, and Transitional provisions. Thus far, the is-
sue of funding for the implementation of the access Bill 
has not been discussed.
Interpretation/Meaning of Terms
The term “access” will include all activities relating to pros-
pecting, collection, commercial utilization, and research 
and development of biological resources or the associated 
relevant community knowledge and innovations. Terms 
such as biological resources, genetic resources, genetic 
material, in situ conditions will be as defined in Article  
of the . The term “biological resources” will include 
genetic resources, organisms or parts thereof, populations, 
or any other biotic component of ecosystems with actual or 
potential use or value for humanity. Biological resources 
in ex situ collections will include those resources and their 
components that are conserved outside their natural habi-
tats such as in herbariums, research institutions, universi-
ties, botanical gardens, and any other similar conservation 
centers, while biological resources in in situ conditions 
will include those resources that exist within ecosystems 
and natural habitats, and in the case of domesticated or 
cultivated species, in the surroundings where they have 
developed their distinctive properties. The term “genetic 
resources” means genetic material of actual or potential 
value, and the term “genetic material” means any mate-
rial of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing 
functional units of heredity.
The term “community knowledge and innovations” 
will include the knowledge, innovations, and practices of 
indigenous and local communities associated with any 
biological resource or any part thereof with regard to its 
use, properties, values, and processes in various forms, 
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whether written, spoken, narrative or anecdotal. 
Scope
The draft law stipulates that access to genetic resources 
must be limited to the clear biological and geographical 
boundaries as defined by the Government. It is intended 
to regulate the access of biological resources found on 
public lands, communal or customary lands, and alienated 
or private lands, as follows: 
• Public lands, which either belong to the State or 
Federal governments or come under their juris-
diction (e.g., forest, wildlife reserves, parks, and 
marine parks);
• Communal or customary lands, where the indig-
enous and local communities have the ownership 
rights which are collective or communal or based on 
custom (e.g., native customary lands and aboriginal 
reserves); and
• Alienated or private lands, which are lands held un-
der individual title or by another legal proprietor.
The law will also regulate access to community knowl-
edge and innovations associated with the biological re-
sources. It also preserves the rights of indigenous and local 
communities to continue with their traditional customary 
practices of use, exchange, and marketing of biological 
resources. As an exemption, the draft law prohibits access 
to human genetic resources.
It is therefore apparent that the scope, as described 
above, is intended to cover biological resources and asso-
ciated community knowledge and innovations as defined, 
with the exclusion of human genetic resources. This will 
impinge on many industries, i.e., the draft law will regulate 
access to genetic resources pertaining to agriculture, bo-
tanical medicine, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical prod-
ucts. As will be discussed later, the Sarawak Biodiversity 
(Access, Collection and Research) Regulations of , for 
example, includes in its scope any compound, chemical or 
curative agent, molecule or product which has pharmaceu-
tical, medicinal, biotechnological, scientific, commercial, 
or economic value, properties, or potential.
Two contentious issues invariably appear when we deal 
with the scope of the application of the draft law on access 
to genetic resources. The first is the issue of ex situ collec-
tions obtained pre-, i.e., all exotic genetic materials (for 
example, rubber, oil palm, and cocoa) obtained through 
various collection missions and exchange programs before 
 December . Malaysia is of the opinion that such 
materials should not be covered in the scope and thus be 
subjected to benefit sharing. Any reference to pre- 
years should be outside the scope and context of the  
as well. The second is the issue of benefits arising from 
the use of biological resources including derivatives and 
products. Malaysia is of the opinion that such benefits 
should be included in the scope of the draft law, since 
derivatives and products of the biological resources will 
offer value-added options for benefit sharing. However, 
this issue continues to remain unclear and contentious 
at the international level. For example, when developing 
the Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources 
and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising 
out of their Utilization which was adopted in  by 
the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Access and 
Benefit Sharing, one of the obstacles to progress, which 
remains unresolved, is the question of the kind of genetic 
resources and their benefits to be covered in the scope of 
the Guidelines.
Ex Situ Collections. As previously discussed, the draft 
legislation to regulate access does not include in its scope 
ex situ botanical collections and seed banks that had al-
ready been available pre- (See Box  for examples). 
Ex situ collections that were procured from other parties 
after  December  are addressed by the proposed 
law and are included within its scope. However, it remains 
unclear how the various issues surrounding the pre- ex 
situ collections could be expeditiously resolved, at both 
national and international levels. 
In Malaysia, ex situ conservation activities of various 
plant genetic resources are carried out in aboreta, seed 
genebanks, field genebanks, and in vitro genebanks or 
under cryopreservation. Based on a survey in , it 
was estimated that , accessions of plant genetic 
material were in ex situ collections of various institutions 
in Malaysia, inclusive of both indigenous and introduced 
plant species. The most established and common form of 
ex situ genetic resource collections in Malaysia is through 
the establishment of plants in arboreta. These can be found 
in arboreta of many research institutions. In Peninsular 
Malaysia, the major arboreta are found in , Rimba 
Ilmu in Universiti Malaya, Medicinal Plant Garden at 
, Orchid Collection in the Malaysian Agricultural 
Research and Development Institute () and in Penang 
Botanical Garden. In Sabah, ex situ collections include the 
Kinabalu Park, Sepilok Aboretum, Tenom Orchid Center, 
and several Agriculture Research Centers. In Sarawak, the 
Botanic Garden in Semonggok is the main center. With the 
exception of the aboreta in , most of the other forest 
genetic collections are small in size.
Commercial Versus Academic Access. Malaysia is of the 
opinion that if there were no discrimination or distinction 
between academic research and commercial exploitation, 
research would be stifled, since researchers would be re-
quired to undergo the same stringent process as commer-
cial bioprospectors.8 From current experience faced by 
researchers in two States, namely, Sabah and Sarawak, 
where the State law does not differentiate between the two 
categories of applicants, nondiscrimination has proven to 
be a hindrance to research activities. We are in favor of the 
principle based on the “Free For All Malaysians”9 feature 
(i.e., free access to our own biological resources).
The restriction on access to genetic resources should be 
discriminatory so as to facilitate enforcement. Therefore, 
it is proposed10 that reference to and approval of the 
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competent authority is required in three circumstances11, 
namely:
• When there is commercial exploitation;
• When R&D is done in collaboration with foreign-
ers; and
• When the biological resources are to leave the 
country.
Access Procedure
All scientists, whether they are foreigners or Malaysians, 
would have to follow this access procedure in order to ob-
tain access to genetic resources for commercial purposes. 
But international bioprospectors will have additional 
conditions for approval of the application. For example, 
the access application will require that a foreign biopros-
pector name a local collaborator (a Malaysian institution) 
that will collaborate in collection, research, development, 
and other activities in relation to the biological/genetic re-
source concerned. A foreign bioprospector is also required 
to name the foreign institution that will act as a sponsor 
organization and will be responsible for the actions of the 
collector (to whom the access license has been granted). 
Both national and international bioprospectors are required 
to sign an access agreement with the competent author-
ity and the relevant resource provider. However, where 
appropriate, the competent authority may decide that the 
restrictions relating to access to resources shall not apply 
to Malaysian researchers conducting noncommercial and 
basic research.
The procedure for foreign scientists who want to obtain 
access for noncommercial purposes is still not clear at this 
Cocoa
For cocoa, prior to the setting up of the Malaysian Cocoa 
Board () in , various government agencies and plan-
tations were involved in maintaining cocoa genetic materials. 
At present, there are over  clones held in various organiza-
tions in Malaysia. Since ,  has undertaken efforts to 
collect and to establish all available cocoa genetic materials, 
including imported and locally selected clones, in its regional 
research stations. With regard to fruits, various research bod-
ies in the country have collected and maintained indigenous 
living collections of fruit genetic resources. Overall, the ex 
situ collections total more than  species with over , 
accessions (M et al. ). The various institutions 
that provide for in situ conservation of fruits include  
in Kepong, Forest Research Center in Sepilok, Sabah and 
Sabah’s Department of Agriculture ().
Oil palm
The genetic base upon which oil palm breeding populations 
had been established in Malaysia is extremely narrow, as it 
originated from the four seedlings planted in the Botanic 
Garden in Bogor in . Efforts to broaden the genetic 
base received a boost in  when  and the Nigerian 
Institute for Agriculture Research collaborated in large-scale 
prospecting in Nigeria, followed by many subsequent col-
lecting and prospecting missions. The present field genebank 
collection in the Malaysian Palm Oil Board Research Center 
in Kluang totals more than , accessions of the oil palm 
species Elaeis guineensis and E. oleifera from various parts 
of Africa and tropical Central and South America.
Orchid
The ex situ orchid species collection is maintained in , 
Serdang. The collection of indigenous species began in , 
and there are still active collection trips, especially to unex-
ploited areas such as the Belum Forest. A small orchid species 
collection is also maintained in , Cameron Highlands. 
More than  species of lowland wild orchids are also being 
maintained by  in the Tenom Orchid Center. Apart from 
collecting, the Center is also helping in conservation activities 
of orchid species through collection and culture of seeds or 
seedlings of endangered species and reintroducing them into 
wild habitats. For example, Paphiopedilum rothschildianum 
was reintroduced in the Kinabalu Park in .
Rice
At the national level, the total rice germplasm collection 
stands at more than , accessions including several 
local wild rice species (A et al. ). All these 
rice accessions are conserved ex situ in ’s Genebank 
at the Rice Research Center in Seberang Perai. About one 
half of this collection comprises indigenous varieties which 
had been collected from remote areas nationwide. Some rice 
germplasm was also collected and conserved in Sarawak at 
the Agricultural Research Center in Semonggok, which 
maintains , rice accessions. The  maintains over 
, collections of three rice species.
Rubber
Rubber also has a narrow genetic base, as most of the present 
plantings are derived from a small collection of  seedlings 
brought from Brazil around . This situation is further 
exacerbated by the planting of a few selected, high yielding 
clones. To prevent the possibility of a genetic calamity in the 
near future, the Rubber Research Institute of Malaysia (now 
known as the Malaysia Rubber Board) embarked on an on-go-
ing enhancement program by introducing materials from the 
centers of diversity. These comprised the – importa-
tion, the  importation, and the  prospecting mission. 
The  prospecting mission carried out by the International 
Rubber Research and Development Board () resulted 
in a collection totaling , seeds and , m budwood 
from  presumably high yielding ortet15 trees. In compli-
ance with the International Code of Plant Collection, % 
were retained in Brazil while the balance was distributed to 
Malaysia (%) and Ivory Coast (%) for conservation, 
evaluation, utilization, and redistribution to other  
countries. In , Malaysia carried out another major pros-
pecting mission in Brazil and successfully collected , 
seeds from eight Hevea species, of which only , seeds 
germinated and , plants were established.
Box 3. Important Malaysian ex situ genetic resource collections
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Figure . Proposed access procedure
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point. The economic costs of applying for access are not 
expected to be prohibitive to the bioprospectors. However, 
such costs have not yet been ascertained. The country is 
fully aware of the fact that some neighboring countries in 
the region have similar biodiversity, and this fact is taken 
into consideration on such matters. Again, comparative 
analysis on such costs has not been done. The proposed 
access procedure is envisaged to comprise the following 
steps (Figure ).
Application
Applications for an access license12 shall be submitted 
to the competent authority13 in writing, together with a 
prescribed application fee. There shall be no access to 
biological resources or community knowledge and innova-
tion without an access license granted by the competent 
authority.14 Upon conviction, any collector found guilty of 
an offense shall be liable for a prescribed fine.
Information required in the application includes:
• The collector’s identity (including the identity of a 
foreign institution or organization that will act as a 
sponsor, responsible for the actions of the collector 
with regard to access activity);
• Details of collector’s proposed access activity, 
namely: 
− Types of material to be collected or knowledge 
or innovation to be accessed;
− Sites of access activity or where the resource is 
located;
− Quantity and intended use of the resource, 
including intention to commercialize;
− Time when the access activity is to be carried 
out; and
− Environmental and socioeconomic impact as-
sessment.
•  by the resource provider;
• Benefit-sharing arrangements (what benefits shall 
be derived: payments, royalties, beneficiaries, etc.); 
and
• The identity of the local collaborator or sponsor16 
(a Malaysian institution).
Upon receiving the application, the competent au-
thority may make the information therein available to the 
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public, and if necessary, provide for public consultation. 
Where the resource provider(s) is the indigenous and local 
community, the competent authority shall ensure that the 
concerned indigenous and local community who may be 
affected by the application are informed and consulted, 
and their  is obtained.
Evaluation of Application
Factors which the competent authority shall take into ac-
count in evaluating an application include:
• The activity should contribute to, and not under-
mine, the conservation and sustainable use of 
biological resources.
• Impact assessments on biological resources, the 
environment, and ecology are provided. 
• Impact assessments on communities and their 
knowledge, innovations, and practices (Article (j) 
of ) are provided.
•  has been obtained in writing from the resource 
owner in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
• The benefit-sharing arrangement is fair and equi-
table. 
When determining what is fair and equitable benefit 
sharing, the competent authority may take into account 
the factors such as: endemism or rarity of the biological 
resource; the conservation status of the biological re-
source; its existing, potential, intrinsic, and commercial 
value; its intended use; and whether traditional knowledge 
is involved.
Decision-Making Procedure
In making a decision on the application, the competent 
authority may, if necessary, request further information 
with regard to the application, and shall notify the collec-
tor in writing of its decision. The decision made by the 
competent authority can be either approved with or without 
conditions or rejected. A decision can be appealed and the 
appeal process begun at any time within three months of 
the date of receipt of the decision.
Conditions for Approval 
Approval of an application may be contingent on an agree-
ment in writing (an access agreement), an indemnity or 
guarantee, on obligations during collection or access ac-
tivity (quantities or species of material to be collected), 
obligations after collection or access activity (deposit of 
specimens, records, report of activities), and other condi-
tions.
Review of Decision
Any approval given may be revoked or subject to further 
conditions upon review of such approval. Grounds for 
such review include when new information or review of 
existing information establishes risks or adverse impacts 
on the environment, biological resources, or communi-
ties or when serious impacts or unanticipated effects on 
biological resources, environment, communities, and 
ecology occur.
Monitoring and Enforcement
Existing monitoring and enforcement authorities shall be 
responsible for monitoring and enforcement of this law, 
within their respective sectors or jurisdictions, and include 
the following: 
• Monitoring of collection or access activity, report-
ing requirements, and procedures; and
• Powers of arrests, entry, search and seizure with 
respect to offenses under the law.
Institutional Structure
Two options17 have been proposed with regard to the in-
stitutional structure under which the draft Bill might be 
implemented (Table ). Option . The federal government 
is to designate a Federal authority as the competent author-
ity. This means that the Federal authority shall receive, 
process, and grant all applications for a) access to biologi-
cal resources and b) access to community knowledge and 
innovations. There will be a national body (the National 
Biodiversity Council, modeled on the Environmental 
Quality Council) to be set up to formulate policy and 
make recommendations to the competent authority on 
implementation of the law.
Option : State governments are to designate State 
competent authority to receive, process, and grant access 
applications for access to lands within the State territories. 
The federal government is to designate Federal competent 
authority to receive, process, and grant access applications 
for: a) access to lands within Federal territories, and b) ac-
cess to community knowledge and innovations. There will 
be national body (e.g. the National Biodiversity Council 
which is modeled on the National Land Council) to be set 
up to advise the State and Federal competent authorities 
on implementation of the law. There will also be a Federal 
body (new or designated) which will be the national co-
ordinating and clearinghouse mechanism, and which will 
receive and channel to appropriate competent authorities 
all applications for access licenses.
The relevant sectoral authorities will administer and 
implement the proposed law or policy. These include 
the national and State Departments of Agriculture, the 
national Veterinary Services Department, the national 
Fisheries Department, the national Department of Wildlife 
and National Parks, the State forest departments, and the 
various State ministries in Sarawak and Sabah. 
Therefore, responsibility to enforce the law or policy 
rests with both national and State administrations. A coor-
dinating body or national focal point is needed. No body 
exists presently to ensure consistency in decision making, 
to monitor implementation, to assess progress, and to act as 
a national focal point while providing recommendations on 
how the law or policy could be improved in the future.
Novel Provisions of the Future Law or Policy
There is a provision which allows exemptions or nonap-
plicability of the law if access to genetic resources is 
undertaken by any of the following: 
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• The general public for their own utilization;
• Public officers in the course of carrying out their 
public duties;
• Malaysian researchers affiliated with local in-
stitutions conducting noncommercial bona fide 
research;
• Indigenous and local communities, to continue with 
their traditional and customary practices relating 
to the keeping, use, exchange, sharing, marketing, 
or sale of biological resources by and among such 
communities; and
• Farmers to replant on their own land, exchange, 
or sell for further propagation, seeds and other 
propagating materials, that are grown on their 
own land.
Another provision proposes the establishment of a 
common trust fund where knowledge and innovation can-
not be attributed to a particular community. Any access ac-
tivity seeking to use traditional knowledge for commercial 
utilization shall pay to the fund a sum, to be determined, 
representing a percentage of the gross sales of any prod-
uct or process utilizing or incorporating the traditional 
knowledge. The competent authority and the indigenous 
or local community shall then be jointly responsible for the 
equitable distribution of the monies solely for the benefit 
of the concerned indigenous or local community. The pay-
ment made to the said fund will be administered by the 
competent authority for use in promoting the welfare of the 
indigenous and local communities and for the conservation 
and sustainable use of the biological resources.
Provisions not Included in the Bill
The following three items were discussed earlier, but are 
still considered contentious, both at national and interna-
tional levels and thus were not included in the Bill.
• When a patent has been granted over a product or 
process as a result of access activities in Malaysia, 
the establishment of a provision to regulate the in-
ventions, including granting compulsory licenses 
on the grounds of public interest or necessity to 
compensate for the high costs or insufficient supply 
of the said product or process; 
• The establishment of a proposed system of inter-
national cooperation with the relevant authorities 
of other countries to incorporate a provision that 
patents should not be granted without the prior con-
sent of the country of origin, to prevent biopiracy 
or the misappropriation of traditional/traditional 
knowledge through patenting abroad of a product, 
process, or knowledge by persons or institutions of 
other countries; and
• The establishment of a system of community in-
tellectual rights for the purpose of the recognition 
of ownership rights of communities over their 
knowledge and innovations, the protection of the 
communities’ knowledge and innovations, and for 
ensuring that an equitable share of benefits arising 
from use of such knowledge is channeled back to 
the communities, including setting up a system of 
collection and registration of traditional knowledge 
and innovations, establishing technical institutions, 
and registering indigenous and local community 
organizations.
Table . Examples of the relevant sectoral authori-
ties that will administer and implement the Access to 
Genetic Resources Bill
Federal Ministry of Agriculture
. Department of Agriculture
Enforcement of Pesticides Act of  and Plant 
Quarantine Act of .
. Department of Fisheries ()
Administration and enforcement of Fisheries Act of  
and Exclusive Economic Zone Act of  for the proper 
management and conservation of inshore and deep sea re-
sources. The  also develops, administers and manages 
the waters of the  designated Marine Parks in Malaysia.
. Veterinary Services Department
The Animal Quarantine Station manages the import and 
export of wildlife.
Federal Ministry of Primary Industries
. Federal Forest Department
Responsible for administration and management of all for-
est resources and is guided by the National Forest Policy. 
States are empowered to formulate independent forest 
policies, and the Department provides advice and technical 
assistance to them.
Federal Ministry of Science, Technology and the 
Environment
. Department of Environment
Administers and enforces the Environmental Quality Act 
of . It also assesses development projects subject to 
the environmental impact assessment order with respect to 
their impact on the environment.
. Department of Wildlife and National Parks 
Manages wildlife reserves and national parks, and ad-
ministers and enforces the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, and 
Wildlife Enactment of .
State Ministry of Sarawak
. Sarawak Biodiversity Center
Ensures conservation of State’s biodiversity, identifies new 
natural and biotechnological products (bioprospecting) 
that can bring socio-economic benefits, and facilitates and 
authorizes access to Sarawak’s biological resources.
State Ministry of Sabah
. Sabah Biodiversity Center
Ensures conservation of the State’s biodiversity, and facili-
tates and authorizes access to Sabah’s biological resources.
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Bioprospecting Projects
Bioprospecting is defined as the search for new bioac-
tive compounds from biological resources as diversified 
as plants, soil microbes, marine sponges, and insects. In 
general, bioprospecting involves the collection (access) 
of a diverse range of biological resources or organisms, 
the preparation of crude abstracts for multiple biologi-
cal screening, and the isolation of chemicals, enzymes, 
secondary metabolites, genetic materials, and others that 
may provide leads for the development of new commer-
cial products in the pharmaceutical, food, and agricultural 
industries. In bioprospecting, ethnobotanical information 
can serve as an important lead in drug discovery and 
other specific uses. Biotechnology is also increasingly 
being used to capitalize on various biological and genetic 
resources.
Currently, there are only a mere handful of bioprospect-
ing projects that are going on in the country, virtually all 
of which are of a noncommercial nature. An exception is 
the involvement of the Government of Sarawak in a joint 
venture in bioprospecting collaboration, which will be 
described in more detail later. One of the most active as-
pects of these projects is the search for potentially valuable 
medicinal products or for potentially useful compounds for 
modern drug development from tropical plants carried out 
by research institutions and universities (Table ). Many 
researchers, however, still consider such projects to be at 
the infancy stage, as well as expensive, technologically dif-
ficult, and better left to be carried out by affluent developed 
countries or multinational companies (A and L 
). More recently, a few medicinal plants have been 
accorded research priorities by the National Biotechnology 
Directorate, for example, tongkat Ali (Eurycoma longi-
folia, Simarubaceae), hempedu bumi (Andrographis pa-
niculata, Acanthaceae), kacip fatimah (Labisia pumila, 
Myrsinaceae), and pegaga (Centella asiatica, Apiaceae). 
The first three have even been aggressively promoted in 
commercial products.
Pharmaceutical products are also being developed from 
various marine organisms. Sponges, corals, tunicates, and 
algae are among the organisms which produce compounds 
that have been shown to have antibiotic, antitumor, anti-
viral, or anti-inflammatory activities. For example,  
tested  samples of marine sponges on human tumor 
cell lines in cytotoxic tests and found  samples to be 
toxic to the tumors, while sea cucumbers were screened 
at Universiti Sains Malaysia for bioactive compounds 
(O and L ). 
More recently, preliminary screening for novel drugs 
has also been carried out on bacteria, myxobacteria, and 
fungi collected from rich lowland dipterocarp rainforests 
and mangrove forests. Excellent targets for such screens 
are components of the signal transduction pathway and 
cell cycle in the pursuit of effective treatment and the un-
derstanding of diseases such as cancer and Alzheimer’s 
disease (H et al. ). 
During the past few years, several foreign and multina-
tional companies were interested in applying for access to 
biological resources, despite the fact that the Government 
was in the midst of working on the law or policy to be 
adopted. For example, a Japanese company wanted access 
to soil samples for microbes and a multinational company 
wanted access to forest species for pharmaceuticals. In 
fact, a model agreement intended to ensure minimum 
standards and to facilitate benefit-sharing arrangements 
in biodiversity prospecting activities was developed in 
response to access interest from a foreign company. This 
model agreement became the basis of the draft “Access 
Agreement for Research, Collection and Utilization of 
Biological/Genetic Resources for Environmentally Sound 
Uses”. Many prospective bioprospectors have some idea 
about what is in the offing for the proposed national leg-
islation, and many are becoming fully aware of the State 
laws of Sarawak and Sabah. Most bioprospectors hope that 
Malaysia does not enact very restrictive national access 
legislation and regulations. 
In any case, it should be noted that, at present, no 
Malaysian personnel are specialists in the negotiation of 
bioprospecting agreements. Negotiation is very critical, 
since during negotiation with a technology partner, rights 
and commercialization benefits are ascertained at the 
beginning of the relationship. The amount of rights and 
benefits available to the biological resource owner is quite 
dependent on negotiating skills as well as on the investment 
contributed. There is a need for capacity building for such 
personnel in the near future to assist government agencies, 
research institutions, and others who are involved in bio-
diversity prospecting arrangements. It is particularly im-
portant to be aware of the required “minimum” standards 
or terms where there is no existing legislation or policy 
on such matters. It should also be noted that bioprospect-
ing arrangements are going to reflect commercial realities 
and common best practices, and we need personnel with 
the ability to negotiate mutually agreeable and satisfy-
ing terms. In order to prepare for increasing numbers of 
agreements to be negotiated by government agencies in the 
future, more attention should be devoted to developing the 
business and negotiating skills of those involved in pros-
pecting agreements, since the quality of the agreements 
is essential in ensuring a practical contribution to an ac-
cess regime. As previously mentioned, several companies 
were interested in bioprospecting attempts but these did 
not materialize into agreements for many reasons. One 
such reason could be due to the lack of negotiating skills, 
both at the Federal and State levels.
An Example of Commercial Bioprospecting
and International Collaboration in Sarawak
In , the  National Institutes of Health, through the 
Natural Products Branch of the National Cancer Institute 
C : M
 
A B  S  B
Table . Examples of research on medicinal plants in Malaysia (adapted from M et al. )
Common name Species/Genus/Family Use/Potential use/Study
Forest Research Institute Malaysia 
 —a Leuconotis spp.  Medicinal properties
Mambu Azadirachta indica "
Pokok minyak kayu putih Melaleuca cajuputi "
Kandis Dipterocarpus spp. "
Cempaka hutan Aromadendron spp. "
Edible medicinal plants (ulam): Antioxidant activity (V et al. )
Selom, Pegaga, Oenanthe javanica, Centella asiatica,
  Terung kecil, Kesom,   Solanum ferox, Polygonum minus,
  Kadok, Ulam raja,   Piper sarmentosum, Cosmos caudatus,
  Cemumar, Beluntas   Micromelum pubescens, Pluchea indica
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia 
Lada hitam Piper nigrum Phytochemical and pharmacological studies
Pinang Areca catechu “
Pokok minyak kayu putih Melaleuca cajuputi Survey of essential oils
Putarwali Tinospora crispa Studies on tissue culture techniques
 — Alstonia angustifolia, Crotalaria spp., Cytotoxic effects (I et al. )
    Mitragyna speciosa
 — Goniothalamus spp. Antiproliferative effect (Z et al. )
Betik (flower), Putat, Carica papaya, Barringtonia macrostachya, Antitumor promoting activity (L et al. )
  Ubi keling/Kemili,   Coleus tuberosus, 
  Pelam epal (skin),   Mangifera indica,
  Serai kayu   Eugenia polyantha
Universiti Malaya 
Mempisang Annonaceae Widely used as medicines by local natives
Gambir Uncaria spp. Antihypertensive properties
Bintangor Calophyllum spp. Diverse bio-activities
 — Trema orientalis Analgesic and anesthetic effects
      (H et al. )
Universiti Malaysia Sarawak 
Oran, Pelai, Ageratum conyzoides, Alstonia scholaris, Antibacterial properties
  Pedada, Rugin,   Brucea javanica, Cassia alata,    (F and G )
  Sengkayap, Engkara-bai,   Eurycoma longifolia, Pasychotria viridiflora,
  Kelapahit, Akar kelait   Quassia indica, Unicaria longiflora
Universiti Putra Malaysia 
Zingiber Zingiberaceae Studies on medicinal properties
Jarum emas Striga asiatica "
Gelenggang Cassia alata "
Kenarah Goniothalamus spp. "
Bratawali/Putarwali Tinospora crispa "
Universiti Sains Malaysia 
Pokok kapal terbang Eupatorium odoratum As an analgesic
Gajah beranak Goniothalamus macrophyllus As an abortifacient and antifertility agent
or Selayak hitam
Tongkat Ali Eurycoma longifolia For antimalaria action
Api-api Avicennia spp. Pharmacological studies
—, Selayak hitam, Cerbera odollam, Goniothalamus  Toxicity screening (S et al. )
  Pokok German   macrophyllus, Eupatorium odoratum
 — Malpighiaceae coccigera Antilithotrophic, antiasthmatic and as
   relief for yellow fever (U et al. )
Universiti Teknologi Malaysia 
Kunyit Curcuma spp. Studies on medicinal roots
Medang Alseodaphne perakensis Studies on chemical structures and activities
Petai Parkia speciosa Study on hypoglycemic activity
ªThe symbol ‘—’ indicates that no common name was available for the species.
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(), commenced a program to acquire plant extracts 
derived from different parts of the world and to screen 
such extracts for anticancer and anti- activities. One 
of the source countries selected by the  was Malaysia, 
and subsequently a collection mission was conducted in 
Sarawak in  (J et al. ). This led to the isola-
tion of calanolide A from cuttings of the plant bintangor 
(Calophyllum lanigerum, Guttifereae), and the discovery 
in  that this naturally occurring compound was active 
against . Shortly thereafter, in , calanolide B was 
discovered from samples of C. teysmannii through a re-col-
lection mission. The original purpose of the re-collection 
mission was to obtain more quantities of calanolide A, 
since only small quantities of the compound were isolated 
in the first collection mission. Calanolide B was also found 
to be active against , but unlike calanolide A, it was 
present in greater abundance from its natural source.
Following the ’s confirmation of the therapeutic 
properties of the calanolides, efforts were directed towards 
obtaining sufficient quantities of the compounds for pre-
clinical evaluation. In ,  awarded MediChem 
Research an R&D grant to develop a synthetic route 
to calanolide A. MediChem scientists were successful 
and their efforts were duly recognized by  in . 
Subsequently,  awarded MediChem an exclusive 
license to their patents, which included the preparation 
and use of the calanolides. Under the terms of the license, 
MediChem was obliged to negotiate an agreement with 
the Sarawak Government.
Negotiations began in  between the State 
Government of Sarawak and MediChem Research, cul-
minating in a Joint Venture Agreement between the two 
parties in . This fulfilled the ’s obligations, as 
specified in their “Letter of Collection” with the Sarawak 
Forestry Department in . In , the joint venture 
company, owned equally by the two partners and for-
mally known as Sarawak MediChem Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., commenced operation with the primary function to 
advance the development of calanolide A as an anti- 
agent. Secondly, Sarawak MediChem’s function was to 
spearhead the development of other promising calanolide-
based therapeutics. In , MediChem’s original share 
in the company was wholly transferred to Advanced 
Life Sciences, Inc. Through co-ownership, the Sarawak 
Government and  will receive royalties on any future 
sales of a calanolide drug, apart from the benefit from the 
transfer of technology and training. There continues to 
be direct involvement of scientists from Sarawak in the 
management of the company and in the company’s pre-
clinical and clinical drug development programs. Under 
Sarawak’s  Biodiversity Center Ordinance and  
Access, Collection & Research Regulations, there is a 
framework for discovery and partnering in future drug 
development initiatives based on materials derived from 
the rainforests of Sarawak.
Intellectual Property Rights and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
By virtue of the , we have sovereign rights over our 
natural resources but not automatic rights over products or 
derivatives developed from these resources. These rights 
belong to the party who owns the intellectual property 
rights (s) to the products or derivatives. And more often 
than not, such a party is the one with the technology to 
derive commercial value from the biological resources. In 
this regard, it is the owner of the biological resources who 
is responsible for coming up with an intellectual property 
framework (laws and procedures) under the .
Intellectual property includes patents, copyrights, 
trademarks and designs. s, especially patents, are said 
to help those in control of the resources to obtain economic 
benefits from them, and this in turn would be an incentive 
to conserve rather than destroy the forest. According to 
section  of the Patents Act of , patents are granted 
to a novel invention which is commercialized. An inven-
tive step must also be involved in developing the product. 
Plants, animals and biological processes to obtain new 
varieties or strains are not patentable by virtue of section 
() of the Act unless, they are human-made living mi-
croorganisms or microbiological processes.
The Access to Genetic Resources Bill includes a “non-
patentability” provision which means that no patents shall 
be recognized with respect to a) plants, animals, and natu-
rally occurring microorganisms, including parts thereof 
and b) essentially biological processes and naturally occur-
ring microbiological processes. No application for patents 
with respect to inventions involving biological resources 
shall be granted without the prior approval of the com-
petent authority so as to ensure that the patent protection 
thereof shall be supportive of, and not run counter to, the 
objectives of the Bill.
The provisions on patentability have to be read in con-
junction with the provisions of the Malaysian Patent Act 
of 18 (Act ) on the requirements of patentability. 
It is noted that amendments to the Patents Law are being 
considered, in order to comply with , specifically 
with regard to the patenting of life requirements of Article 
.(b) of . To satisfy the requirements of , a 
draft Protection of New Plant Varieties Bill was developed. 
It is essentially a sui generis system for the protection of 
plant genetic resources. The Bill was supposed to be have 
been tabled in the Parliament as early as , but only 
became law in  (Protection of New Plant Varieties 
Act , Act , Laws of Malaysia).
There are no other intellectual property right instru-
ments that protect inventions derived from genetic re-
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sources and traditional knowledge. However, it has been 
determined that the provisions of the Patents Act of  
are “insufficient” to protect Malaysia’s interest under 
Article  of the . The scope of what can be patent-
able is not very clear as to whether genes are patentable. 
Moreover, there is no specific provision in this Act that 
could relate to the protection of traditional knowledge 
related to genetic resources19. Given the development 
in the international arena especially relating to genetic 
resources, it is necessary to review the Patent Act of  
to harmonize the provisions of this Act with Malaysia’s 
international obligations under the  and  and 
with the Protection of New Plant Varieties Act of  
(Malaysia’s response to Article .(b) of )
The Impact of IPRs on Biodiversity and 
Traditional Knowledge
It has been argued that s could encourage access and 
benefit sharing, if applications for such rights require 
identification of the source of genetic material used in 
the development of subject matter protected by s and 
proof of  of the competent authority of the provider 
country, if the genetic resource was acquired after the entry 
into force of the  and does not fall within the scope of 
a possible multilateral system for plant genetic resources 
for food and agriculture.
Article  () of the  recognizes that patents and 
other s may have influence on its implementation. In this 
regard, subject to national legislation and international law, 
the contracting parties to the  shall cooperate to ensure 
that such rights are supportive and do not run counter to 
the ’s objectives. This can be done by harmonizing the 
different approaches of the  and , as the former 
recognizes the sovereign rights of States over their genetic 
resources, and the latter treats intellectual property as a 
private right. 
The objectives of the , particularly for ensuring 
the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of 
the utilization of genetic resources, could be achieved if 
the application procedures for the s require that the 
applicant submit evidence of . However, obtaining the 
 of competent national authorities and holders of tra-
ditional knowledge may prove to be difficult, especially if 
the material is obtained from a research institution lacking 
knowledge of the origin of the material, or if it is a plant 
genetic resource for food and agriculture covered by a pos-
sible multilateral system for access and benefit sharing on 
certain plant genetic resources for food and agriculture.
The traditional forms of s are inadequate to protect 
indigenous knowledge, because they are based on pro-
tection of individual intellectual property rights, whereas 
traditional knowledge is collective. Such knowledge, 
developed over a period of time and codified in texts or 
retained in oral traditions over generations, may not be able 
to satisfy all the conditions required, such as the novelty 
and innovative steps required for the granting of patent 
protection to traditional knowledge. For the protection of 
traditional knowledge, innovations, and practices in rela-
tion to the use of genetic resources, the following forms 
of mechanisms could be considered: documentation of 
traditional knowledge, a registration and innovations patent 
system for traditional knowledge, a sui generis system for 
protecting traditional knowledge.
The FAO International Undertaking and the International Treaty
on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
The International Undertaking has had a strong influence 
on the national policy and the proposed access bill, in par-
ticular with regard to ex situ collections procured pre-. 
However, issues surrounding the ex situ collections still 
remain largely unresolved. Malaysia is really in a unique 
position, because the country is considered to be important 
both as a donor as well as a recipient country. 
After a long negotiation process, the International 
Undertaking became the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (, 
adopted  November ). The treaty establishes a mul-
tilateral system of access and benefit sharing for plant 
genetic resources, for an agreed list of crops ( 
Annex I) established on the basis of interdependence and 
food security. Malaysia is not a signatory of the treaty and, 
at this point in time, it is still too early to assess the impact 
of the treaty on the Access to Genetic Resources Bill and 
the State laws. However, Malaysia now has a strong inter-
est in and a commitment to become a member country in 
the very near future. The provisions of the treaty should 
be taken into account in the draft access Bill, particularly 
with respect to existing ex situ collections; for example, 
rice is included in the Annex I of the treaty.
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Early Lessons and Recommendations that can be Identified from the 
Process Leading to the Development of the Draft Access Bill
Early lessons learned include:
• Setting up an ad hoc committee/task force for national 
planning for access to genetic resources is imperative 
for developing a comprehensive legislation.
• The involvement of , ministries, and agencies 
with responsibilities for the management of bio-
diversity in the country, and s in the ad hoc 
committee/task force is crucial to the process.
• The involvement of the indigenous and local com-
munities at the early stage of the process would 
be desirable in outlining an enforceable access 
determination process, in particular with regard to 
 and equitable sharing of benefits.
• The involvement of the State’s representatives and 
the private sector and industries as early as possible 
would also make the process more efficacious.
• A national workshop on access to genetic resources 
was an effective means to assess the needs, oppor-
tunities, resources and capacities in the country.
• The contributions from resource persons in the 
national workshop, (e.g., from the , the  
Environmental Law Center, and the Royal Botanic 
Gardens, Kew), were particularly useful in formu-
lating a national strategy for biodiversity prospect-
ing.
• For certain biological resources, experience and 
expertise was lacking; for example, microorgan-
isms had never been legislated upon in any manner 
in Malaysia.
• Sustained awareness-raising endeavors involving 
various stakeholders with regard to assessment/
inventory of biological diversity and biodiversity 
prospecting in the country could contribute effec-
tively to the process.
• The enactment of their own state laws in Sarawak 
and Sabah reflected the gravity of the Federal-State 
jurisdictional dichotomy. 
• The enactment of their own State laws in Sarawak 
and Sabah also highlighted the paramount impor-
tance of both their biological diversity and their 
indigenous and local communities.
• In formulating strict legal mechanisms for access to 
genetic resources in Malaysia, we should consider 
the imposition of a) a mandatory statutory require-
ment to obtain a license and b) a separate access 
agreement.
• In order to promote bona fide local research and 
development, there is a need for discrimination or 
distinction between academic research and com-
mercial bioprospectors.
• A model access agreement would provide a useful 
basis for negotiations and also serve as a checklist 
of items for consideration.
• The national consultative process should be initi-
ated as early as possible and be given adequate time 
for the benefit of all relevant stakeholders.
• Amending existing laws and enacting a compre-
hensive new law is usually a very complex and 
long-term process, since we need to deal with wide-
ranging issues from the appropriate administrative 
authority to enforcement to constitutional issues.
• The important objectives of the National Policy on 
Biological Diversity to optimize economic benefits 
through the integrated conservation/sustainable 
use of biological diversity and to give priority 
to biodiversity prospecting activities need to be 
promoted.
• Political intervention may be necessary to speed 
up the process.
• Pending the passing of the draft access Bill, ’s 
Guidelines on Research should continue to be 
adopted as a temporary measure of protection of 
genetic resources found in Malaysia.
Some specific recommendations with respect to the na-
tional implementation process include (O ):
• Increase awareness of the issues related to biodi-
versity prospecting and access and benefit sharing 
at the Federal and State levels.
• Initiate a strategic planning process to define the 
national strategic goals in terms of biodiversity 
prospecting, including a national consultation 
process with key players and stakeholders.
• Assess the role of legislation in the context of 
strategic goals and examine the feasibility of a 
framework legislation to ensure a nationally con-
sistent approach to the legal aspects of biodiversity 
prospecting.
• Evaluate the legal protection of local and indig-
enous knowledge and livelihoods and consider 
the use of existing legal provisions to afford such 
protection.
• Build and develop the required institutional ca-
pacity to address biodiversity prospecting issues, 
including further defining the role of the national 
focal point for biodiversity prospecting issues.
• Evaluate existing rural development and other com-
munity programs for replication as benefit-sharing 
mechanisms.
• Develop model agreements in consultation with 
relevant experts and build capacity in business and 
negotiating skills.
• Consider appropriate funds or funding sources to 
carry out the above recommendations.
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Conclusions
At present, there is no legislation specific to access to ge-
netic resources in Malaysia at the national level, but two 
States (Sabah and Sarawak) have regulations that facili-
tate access to their genetic resources. However, Malaysia 
supports an effective regulatory framework for access to 
genetic resources and the commercial utilization of such 
resources, so as to ensure that the economic benefits ac-
cruing therefrom are channeled towards conservation of 
biodiversity and to the indigenous and local communities 
from whom knowledge of genetic resources are derived. It 
would appear that opportunities exist for reaping benefits 
from the commercialization of biodiversity use. Based on 
this premise, Malaysia is currently undertaking relevant 
policy review to ensure that the proper measures are ad-
opted to prevent negative impacts on biodiversity and to 
ensure fair and equitable sharing of benefits, among other 
goals. This pragmatic approach has been followed through 
by the drafting of the Access to Genetic Resources Bill, 
an effort that was initiated as early as . 
The Access to Genetic Resources Bill is being drafted 
as a comprehensive national legislation that will form part 
of the national implementation process of the . In line 
with Malaysia’s commitments, the National Policy on 
Biological Diversity is based on many salient principles, 
one of which is the recognition of the role of local com-
munities in the conservation, management, and utilization 
of biological diversity, as well as their rightful share of the 
benefits accruing therefrom. In addition, the action plan 
lists the undertaking of activities in biodiversity prospect-
ing as a priority.
The eventual relationship between the federal  per-
mission and the new law is not clear. When the appropriate 
competent authority(s) is set up under the new law to grant 
an access license, it may be able to carry out the ’s 
function. Thus the permission from  may no longer be 
necessary. Applications for access licenses/permits may be 
made directly to the competent authority(s); however, such 
required information may be kept, managed, and made 
available by the designated competent authority. 
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Endnotes
 1 Indigenous or local community means any group of individuals 
who have one or more of the following characteristics or that falls 
within any of the following definitions: a group of individuals who 
occupy or occupied a particular territory for many generations, and 
whose cultural and economic traditions are integrally connected 
to their occupation and customary uses of those territories; an 
aborigine or aboriginal community as defined in the Aboriginal 
Peoples Act ; and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak as defined 
by Article () and () of the Federal Constitution.
 2 The National Policy on Biological Diversity aims to provide the 
direction for Malaysia to implement  strategies through vari-
ous action plans until the year . There are no specific time 
periods indicated for the strategies; neither are the implementing 
institutions or agencies identified. However, the Government’s 
goals have been further enhanced by the setting up of the National 
Biodiversity and Biotechnology Council chaired by Hon. Deputy 
Prime Minister in December .
 3 http://www.arbec.com.my/NBP.pdf
 4 This is the Malay term for Chief Minister of a State. As handed 
down in history, Malaysia, in brief, comprises two “types” of 
States: a) Federated Malay States and b) Unfederated Malay States. 
The former States are those which had never been ruled directly by 
the British (e.g., Kedah, Kelantan), while the latter have had direct 
British administration/intervention (Penang, Malacca, Sabah, and 
Sarawak). Thus, the former have Menteri Besars while the latter 
have Chief Ministers. Both have equal powers.
 5 In , there was an initiative to develop the  Framework 
Agreement on Access to Genetic Resources but it has seen little 
progress. Thus far, this initiative has provided little or no bearing 
on our efforts to develop a national law or policy on access to 
genetic resources. The question of whether something similar to 
that of the Andean Community regional legislation was appropriate 
for  had been raised in many discussions, perhaps leading 
to what is now the proposal for the  Framework Agreement 
on Access to Genetic Resources. There was already a model that 
 could have looked at for this purpose. However, what was 
really seen as more important was the harmonization of national 
laws and policies, since many countries share similar biological di-
versity. The priorities accorded to the matter (i.e., access to genetic 
resources) by countries were also a factor, since the matter of s 
was seen as more urgent. Therefore, a regional harmonization for 
’s regulation took precedence. The st Meeting of the  
Ministers for Agriculture and Forestry held on – October  
in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, endorsed the  
Guidelines on Risk Assessment of Agriculture-Related Genetically 
Modified Organisms.
 6 In order to ensure uniformity in the administration of the law, it 
is important to have close cooperation between the competent 
authorities of the Federal and State Governments.
 7 These benefits are listed by the “Access to Genetic Resources Bill.”
 8 The Access to Genetic Resources Bill states that the competent 
authority may formulate guidelines for the exemption of research-
ers from local academic and research institutions involved in the 
conduct of noncommercial research from the provisions of the Bill, 
provided always that such exemption is without prejudice to the 
right of the competent authority to withdraw the exemption where 
appropriate.
 9 This is intended for Malaysians who want to apply for access for 
noncommercial purposes.
 10 This (the Ministry’s) position has emerged as a result of reviewing 
several draft laws from other countries, such as India, and is likely 
to be the position supported by the Government.
 11 This (the Ministry’s) position came into focus after the final text 
of the draft Access to Genetic Resources Bill, and therefore, the 
position and the three circumstances are not stated in the Bill. No 
distinction is made in the access procedure to differentiate between 
the three different circumstances.
 12 The application for an access license shall include, among other 
things,  in writing and certified by the resource provider. The 
competent authority shall establish an appropriate process for 
securing  of the resource provider that may be affected by the 
application. The process shall be prescribed by the competent 
authority, after consultation with relevant parties, in order to ensure 
and verify that  is properly obtained. The consultation procedure 
shall include, but is not limited to, the following measures: a) 
participation of representatives of the indigenous and local com-
munities and b) wide and effective dissemination of all the relevant 
information to the concerned communities and other interested 
parties on the proposed access activity. At this point in time, such 
an appropriate procedure has yet to be established.
 13 The competent authority has not yet been determined. The draft 
Bill provides for the two options previously mentioned.
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 14 The scope of the draft legislation covers biological resources, 
found both in in situ conditions and ex situ collections, on public 
lands, communal or customary lands, and alienated or private 
lands. In the case of access to biological resources, where the 
land comes under the Federal jurisdiction, the competent federal 
authority shall negotiate on the benefits. Where the land comes 
under the State jurisdiction, the competent authority shall negotiate 
on the benefits. As for communal or customary lands, and alien-
ated or private lands, the competent State authority may take into 
account relevant factors as may be appropriate (such as the status 
of endemism or rarity of the biological resource, conservation 
status, existing and potential value and use, and whether tradi-
tional knowledge is involved), including the resource provider, in 
determining the nature and combination of benefits in accordance 
with the merits of each case. In the case of access to traditional 
knowledge, the competent authority may take into account relevant 
factors (such as whether the knowledge is in common use by large 
sections of the population, whether the knowledge can be attributed 
to a particular indigenous or local community, the number of com-
munities involved in the conservation and use, and the uniqueness 
of the traditional knowledge).
 15 This is a term used by plant breeders to describe plants which are 
selected from seedlings, usually not out of planned hybridization, 
and these plants are later cloned for further breeding use.
 16 Foreign scientists who want to apply for access to genetic 
resources are required to have a local collaborator or sponsor. A 
similar requirement has already been put in place by the Sarawak 
Biodiversity Center Ordinance of  and Sabah Biodiversity 
Enactment of .
 17 The two options were proposed by the Task Force on Access to 
Genetic Resources after consultative discussions. 
 18 In drafting the Access to Genetic Resources Bill, there was always 
active participation and strong input by the representative of the 
Ministry of Consumer Affairs with respect to the need to review the 
Patent Act of  vis-à-vis the access bill. 
 19 Personal communication with Rozina Ayob of the Ministry of 
Science, Technology and the Environment, Malaysia on – 
October .
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Legal Issues Regarding the International 
Regime: Objectives, Options, and Outlook
Tomme Rosanne Young
The years – have seen some of the most dynamic 
action in the realm of access and benefit sharing ()1 
under the Convention on Biological Diversity () since 
the convention was adopted in .2 Key decisions within 
this time frame include:
• -Conference of the Parties () Decision -
3 (March ), at which the voluntary Bonn 
Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and 
Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising 
out of their Utilization (hereafter Bonn Guidelines) 
were adopted in a decision that clearly requires 
the Parties to keep this document under review 
and also to undertake additional work regarding 
key definitions and concepts relating to  more 
generally;
• Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development ()4 (September, 
), which called on all countries to “negotiate 
within the framework of the , bearing in mind 
the Bonn Guidelines, an international regime to 
promote and safeguard the fair and equitable 
sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of 
genetic resources”;
• The  meeting on the Multi-Year Programme of 
Work () for the Convention5 (March ) 
which integrated an adapted version of a provision 
of the  Plan of Implementation, calling for 
the parties to consider the process, nature, scope, 
elements, and modalities of an international regime 
and provide advice on how it may wish to address 
this issue; and
•   Decision /,6 which sets the Terms 
of Reference for the process of negotiating that 
regime.
The  issue, however, has long suffered from critical 
limitations inhibiting national implementation. Key issues 
of interpretation of the  and of the application of exist-
ing legal and institutional systems to new concepts have 
proven to be a significant stumbling block to the creation 
of a functional  system.
Hence it is not enough simply to make the decision 
to go forward with new negotiations. It is essential that 
underlying legal concepts be clarified, and practical imple-
mentation measures identified, so that the negotiators and 
policy makers can base their work on a clear understand-
ing of what is possible and what it will cost in money, 
manpower, and other trade-offs to bring an effective  
system to life. 
Opening Comment: The International Regime
One of the first points that must be made in any discussion 
of the negotiation of an international regime on access and 
benefit sharing is that a regime7 already exists. Although 
its coverage is extremely “patchy” in many ways, the 
regime includes a variety of international laws, policies, 
guidelines, and other instruments, as well as both regional 
and national implementation measures. Internationally, the 
most commonly mentioned documents and institutions, in 
addition to the , that comprise the international regime 
are the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
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Food and Agriculture (),8 the World Intellectual 
Property Organization () system, and the Bonn 
Guidelines. However, the Seventh Conference of the 
Parties to the  (-) has identified at least  other 
international instruments that must be evaluated to deter-
mine how they fit into the regime.
At the regional level, the best publicized components 
of the regime have been Decision  of the Andean 
Community of Nations on access and benefit-sharing 
processes and procedures (A C ), 
the European Union’s Directive / on disclosure 
of origin of biological sources of natural material in 
biotechnological inventions,9 and the Organization of 
African Unity’s adoption of the the African Model Law 
for the Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, 
Farmers, and Breeders, and for the Regulation of Access 
to Biological Resources.
On the national level, eighteen countries have so far 
adopted access and benefit-sharing legislation or other 
instruments that directly address some or all of the -
related commitments under the  (C ). A 
number of other countries have asserted that their exist-
ing national legislation adequately addresses  matters, 
although initial evaluation suggests that many of these 
claims should be more clearly examined.10
In addition, contractual agreements for access and 
benefit sharing must also be considered to be part of the 
regime. This is not only because these instruments are 
adopted and interpreted under national  systems,11 
but also because they are often directly negotiated by at 
least one government.12 As such, their interpretation (in 
practice and through the courts) is a critical input into the 
regime.
This leads to a basic question: What exactly is meant 
by the phrase ‘negotiate an international regime on [ac-
cess and] benefit sharing’? Although the final decisions 
about what and how will be negotiated will not be made 
for some time, a few observations (based on facts and 
research set forth in the rest of the paper) are warranted. 
First, the international regime itself cannot be negotiated 
in its entirety. Even if the ’s entire existing provisions 
regarding access were completely renegotiated, this action 
would still not impact the following:
• Other international instruments; 
• National implementing instruments;
• Existing contracts; and 
• The legal interpretations developed from applying 
and interpreting existing contracts and other instru-
ments. 
Contrary to many statements, the current choice is not 
between ‘negotiating an entirely new regime’ and ‘nego-
tiating a parts or interpretations of the regime’, because 
any negotiation will involve only part of the regime. The 
regime is and will be a combination of established and 
new instruments, concepts, and principles. The only 
question is “what kind of instrument will be added to this 
mix—interpretation, protocol, annex, guideline, or  
Decision?” From a legal perspective, however, the type 
of instrument that is developed is perhaps less important 
than its particular characteristics. In this connection, this 
paper should start by considering the frequent discussions 
about whether it should be binding or voluntary. This ques-
tion blends two concepts—binding versus nonbinding and 
voluntary versus mandatory.
Binding and Nonbinding Provisions
In international law, binding refers to a commitment by 
a country to take a particular action. Often, binding com-
mitments are expressed in language that ‘softens’ their 
impact (“endeavor to regulate”, rather than “regulate”) or 
that recognizes priority among commitments (“subject to 
available resources”). It should be noted that these soften-
ers do not affect the binding nature of the commitment. 
The countries continue to be obligated to make a ‘good 
faith’ (e.g., nontoken) effort to comply, and will be in 
violation otherwise. Nonbinding international instruments 
may be adopted as guidelines and declarations, but the 
governments involved specifically state that they are not 
committing to take these actions.
At the national level, binding refers to whether a com-
mitment has legal effect. A promise to pay money, for 
example, may be binding (if it is a part of a contract in 
which another party has made commitments or taken ac-
tion), or nonbinding (if it is simply an indication of intent 
or a statement made to convince a beggar or borrower to 
“go away and try again tomorrow”). 
Voluntary and Mandatory
By contrast, the concepts of voluntary and mandatory refer 
to a different kind of legal question—the contrast between 
what one may do and what one must do. Laws are typically 
seen to fit into three categories—enabling laws (telling the 
regulated public13 what they are permitted to do—these 
express voluntary options), mandatory laws (telling the 
regulated public what they must do), and prohibitory laws 
(telling the regulated public what they cannot do). 
Within particular areas of law, there are also voluntary 
(enabling), mandatory, and prohibitory components. In the 
area of private contracts, for example, the law specifies 
that only certain kinds of contracts are legally enforce-
able—those in which:
• Both parties are informed of all relevant informa-
tion (i.e., no party intentionally or inadvertently 
lied or concealed facts relevant to the contract);
• Both parties are reasonably interpreting the contract 
terms and agree on what those terms mean; and
• Both parties have given or are committed to giving 
consideration (payment of money, performance or 
abstention from some action, giving of tangible or 
intangible items or rights, etc.).
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These three elements are mandatory in all contracts—
that is, the law will not enforce a purported contract with-
out them. However, there are many voluntary elements of 
contract law. Initially, it must be an absolutely voluntary 
choice to enter a contract or not. The law will not enforce a 
contract if either party was forced to enter into the contract 
against his will. The terms of the contract are negotiated 
by the parties—thus the selection of terms is voluntary. 
In some cases, however, the law will identify ‘standard 
terms’—it may say, for example, that in payment-for-ser-
vices contracts, payment will be owing after the services 
are provided, unless otherwise provided in the contract. 
This is a voluntary provision. The parties may adopt an-
other payment option, however, if they don’t specify the 
order of payment, the law will assume the order is services 
first, money second. There are also many prohibitory ele-
ments of contract law. For example, in most countries, a 
contract provision that sets excessive interest (usury) or 
that forces a party to take action against his will (extortion) 
may not be enforced. 
Mandatory, Binding, Voluntary, and 
Nonbinding Components of the Regime
The most important point relating to both of these con-
cepts (binding/nonbinding and voluntary/mandatory) is 
that they do not affect the application of the ultimate laws. 
The same is true where a country decides to adopt a law 
recommended in a nonbinding international instrument. 
In either case, where a country meets its binding obliga-
tion to adopt a law, that law applies to all members of the 
regulated public according to the terms of the law (if the 
law says that it is mandatory, it is mandatory.) The law’s 
effect is not altered by the fact that the country was not 
internally obligated to adopt it. 
Similarly, where legislation creates a set of voluntary 
contractual provisions, the parties have a choice about 
whether to adopt those provisions or not. However, once 
the parties have exercised that option and included some 
of these provisions in a binding contract, then they are 
enforceable obligations, no different from other terms of 
the contract. As further discussed below, nearly all of the 
-related provisions in the  are legally binding on 
the countries that are part of the . Similarly, the state-
ment that the provisions of the Bonn Guidelines are vol-
untary—only means that the parties have a choice between 
these provisions and other approaches, in their efforts to 
implement the binding provisions of the .
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The Current Situation: ABS and the Bonn Guidelines
As a basis for substantive analysis, this section sum-
marizes the  issue, its role in the , and the issues, 
concerns, and processes that led to the adoption of the 
Bonn Guidelines. This summary is not designed to be a 
complete description, but instead to provide an idea of what 
the international regime will seek to create and foster. 
ABS in the CBD
Most commentators begin by noting that  is the heart 
of the third primary objective of the , which calls for 
“fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of 
the utilization of genetic resources”.14 However, within 
the ,  is more than just an aspiration. Although this 
fact is often overlooked in discussions, the  contains  
separate, non-optional obligations15 relating to . These 
 obligations, in the order they appear in the , are:
• “create conditions to facilitate access to genetic 
resources for environmentally sound uses by 
other Contracting Parties and not to impose re-
strictions that run counter to the objectives of this 
Convention” (Art. .).
• “develop and carry out scientific research based on 
genetic resources provided by other Contracting 
Parties with the full participation of, and where 
possible in, such Contracting Parties” (Art. .).
• “take legislative, administrative, or policy measures, 
…with the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable way 
the benefits arising from the commercial and other 
utilization of genetic resources with the Contracting 
Party providing such resources” (Art. .).
• “take legislative, administrative, or policy mea-
sures, …with the aim of sharing in a fair and equi-
table way … the results of research, development 
arising from the commercial and other utilization 
of genetic resources with the Contracting Party 
providing such resources” (Art. .).
•  “take legislative, administrative, or policy mea-
sures, …with the aim that …developing countries, 
which provide genetic resources, are provided ac-
cess to and transfer of technology which makes use 
of those resources, …including technology pro-
tected by patents and other intellectual property 
rights…” (Art. .).
• “facilitate the exchange of information, from all 
publicly available sources, …taking into account 
the special needs of developing countries.… Such 
exchange of information shall …where feasible, 
include repatriation of information” (Arts. . and 
).
• “take legislative, administrative, or policy mea-
sures, …to provide for the effective participation 
in biotechnological research activities by those 
 
Contracting Parties, especially developing coun-
tries, which provide the genetic resources for such 
research, and where feasible in such Contracting 
Parties” (Art. .).
• “take all practicable measures to promote and 
advance priority access on a fair and equitable ba-
sis by Contracting Parties, especially developing 
countries, to the results and benefits arising from 
biotechnologies based upon genetic resources pro-
vided by those Contracting Parties” (Art. .).
• “provide, in accordance with its capabilities, fi-
nancial support and incentives in respect of those 
national activities which are intended to achieve 
the objectives of this Convention…” (Art. .).
• “developed country Parties …provide, and develop-
ing country Parties avail themselves of, financial 
resources related to the implementation of this 
Convention through bilateral, regional, and other 
multilateral channels” (Art. .).
The existence of these commitments underscores three 
basic understandings that will be critical to the rest of this 
paper, and to the entire discussion of the international re-
gime: First, the above commitments are not optional. Each 
party is required to endeavor to take these actions. As noted 
above, the ‘endeavor’ language may soften these require-
ments for those who try but cannot achieve them, but it 
does not make the commitments less obligatory. Parties are 
required to try to take the relevant actions, and will only 
be considered to meet these commitments if either a) the 
requirement is fulfilled or b) the country made a serious 
and significant attempt, but was not able to fulfill it (due 
to external preventing factors). These requirements will 
not be excused by a lack of political will, for example. 
Countries having acceded to the  are required to take 
action. A country will have violated the  unless it has 
made every reasonable effort to adopt measures, or to take 
other required actions, irrespective of whether or not it has 
been successful.
Second, these commitments are not directly binding 
on individuals, corporations, NGOs, other entities, or 
even sub-national (state and provincial) governmental 
structures. They bind only the Contracting Parties to the 
CBD—that is, the  national governments,17 which must 
adopt the relevant measures directly. The only way that any 
person, business, NGO, or other entity can become sub-
ject to the requirements set out in the Convention will be 
through national law adopted by each Contracting Party.18 
And then, the individuals or entities are subject to the 
relevant national law, and not directly to the Convention 
or any processes under the Convention.
Third, these provisions do not address purely domestic 
 situations (i.e., those in which a country’s genetic re-
sources are sampled, studied, and utilized by entities and 
activities within the national jurisdiction of that country.) 
The access requirement, for example, is specifically limited 
to the facilitation of “access to genetic resources for envi-
ronmentally sound uses by other Contracting Parties…”.19 
Parties are clearly allowed to adopt domestic  frame-
works, of course, (and in fact, the adoption of compre-
hensive frameworks for all genetic resource issues may be 
necessary to make the international system effective) but 
the Convention specifically does not cover them.
Hence, it is essential (and mandatory) that all 
Contracting Parties must adopt the various kinds of mea-
sures and take the other actions described above. In this 
connection, it is also useful to note that  is only one of 
the genetic-resource-related issues addressed in the . 
As further discussed below, it is possible that the provisions 
on  should be viewed in conjunction with the provisions 
addressing agriculture, biosafety, and Genetically Modified 
Organisms (s), and with subsequent work on these 
issues, including the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol that 
came into force on  September  and the national 
legislation and policy frameworks on biosafety and s 
that have been developed and are being developed around 
the world.
The Bonn Guidelines 
The Bonn Guidelines were adopted in , by the Sixth 
Conference of Parties to the  (-). Although an 
important first step toward enabling the creation of a net-
work of national law systems addressing  issues, the 
Guidelines cannot be seen as a positive development if they 
are perceived to represent a final decision or guidance. In 
fact, the Bonn Guidelines represent ideas expressed by the 
parties, but in many cases, those ideas either have never 
been tried in practice or their use has not been made public 
and scrutinized from all perspectives. Hence, these ideas 
are designed as starting points for national framework de-
velopment processes and national  negotiations, rather 
than as “tried-and-true” recipes for implementation. 
The Guidelines recognize this fact specifically—call-
ing themselves “evolutionary” in nature. At their adoption, 
the Parties clearly agreed that “the Guidelines are intended 
to be reviewed and accordingly revised and improved as 
experience is gained in access and benefit sharing”. In this 
first iteration, these Guidelines rely rather substantially on 
information regarding the views of businesses working 
with genetic resources. As such, they appear to answer an 
unasked question—”Why are there only a few  agree-
ments?” (see Chapter ).  Most do not address developing 
country concerns or conservation/sustainable use issues. 
This approach has resulted in a rather strong focus on 
streamlining national processes and providing forms and 
lists that will streamline the negotiation and documentation 
of  agreements and other relevant instruments. Since 
their adoption, the Bonn Guidelines have been relatively 
controversial. Some parties and participants have been very 
strong in promoting national legislative development, but 
saying that development should be “based on the Bonn 
Guidelines”. Other parties have noted that many critical 
components of necessary national legislation are not dis-
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cussed in the Bonn Guidelines—suggesting that “national 
legislation based on the Bonn Guidelines” would be fatally 
flawed. These arguments may be resolved by recalling that, 
according to the terms of the Guidelines themselves, they 
are voluntary and understanding that the term voluntary:
• Applies only to the Parties (national governments or 
countries) adopting legislation—they have the op-
tion to follow recommendations of the Guidelines 
or not as they choose.
• Does not mean that compliance is optional, when 
these terms are included in an agreement or a law. 
If national law states that they are mandatory, or if 
the contract by which the corporation/entity obtains 
access rights so provides, then the corporation must 
comply or it will be in breach of contract. 
Framework Approaches at International 
and National Levels 
The creation of an international regime involves both in-
ternational instruments and also the implementation and 
adoption of national legislation based on these interna-
tional decisions and commitments. It is useful to examine 
briefly the components of an international regime and how 
they work together. 
At the international level, ‘policy-style’ instruments 
exist which focus on obtaining general agreement among 
sovereign governments to address key issues. Many of 
these are also ‘framework’ instruments.20 The  is 
such an instrument. It is different from other international 
conventions, in that its object is promoting concerted na-
tional implementation in a programmatic way (providing 
the economies and strengths of collaborative action), 
and with the assistance of so-called “framework tools”21 
developed under the framework system. Another type of 
international instrument is regulatory in style. It contains 
specific requirements, under which each country is obliged 
to take clearly identified action. Examples of this kind of 
instrument include the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol, the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(), and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer22. Where the framework system 
is working well, these regulatory-style conventions may 
be able to utilize the framework tools, and thus be relieved 
of the necessity of separately developing tools and instru-
ments that are relevant to all instruments within the frame-
work. A third international element is the development of 
guidelines and soft law. For example, as noted above the 
Bonn Guidelines are not obligatory on any Party, but are 
offered only on the chance that they may assist the Parties 
and others in implementing international objectives. 
At the national level, a similar structure exists. National 
policy provides overarching guidance and coordination 
among national laws, with guidance on national objec-
tives and compliance with regard to and implementation 
of international conventions and obligations. This policy 
provides an idea of the outcomes and objectives toward 
which legislation should be directed. National laws and 
regulations focus more specifically on the actions to be 
taken to achieve national policy mandates and outcomes, 
in order to, inter alia, fulfill international commitments. 
Yet another level of implementation is found in the form 
of both hard and soft rules, as well as contracts and other 
action by the private sector, NGOs, and others. In opti-
mal situations, this national level pyramid begins to be 
developed early in the international process. Together 
these processes (in all relevant forums) constitute the 
international regime.
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Why Revise/Reconsider the International Regime? 
At this point, it may perhaps not be obvious why the “ne-
gotiation of an International Regime” was proposed by the 
. In simplest terms, the answer is that, even  years 
after the  was adopted, and despite significant interest 
and commitment (particularly by developing countries), 
the world’s governments have not been able to create a 
functional  system. Based on initial detailed research 
into existing national and regional legislation on  and 
initial inquiries into a few available  agreements, it is 
clear that there has been a notable lack of progress in ful-
filling the -related obligations under the  (C 
) (see Chapters , , and ). 
Fewer than  countries and regional organizations 
have adopted specific national  legislation (C 
), and in most cases there are doubts about whether 
the legislation has been effective or even fully implemented 
(P ). The basic theory of this paper is that the 
failure to progress on the implementation of an effective 
 system is tied to incorrect concepts and assumptions, 
supplemented by the lack of a shared understanding and 
clarification of key concepts. The country whose overall 
 regime is generally considered the most successful 
(Costa Rica),23 for example, is rather emphatically not 
replicable.24
A great many articles and opinions have been pub-
lished and circulated about the reasons behind this lack 
of progress in the development of a functional legislative/
administrative system through which  arrangements 
can become recognized contractual/property interests and 
can develop their potential as components of the “biodi-
versity triad”. Many of these were stated in the preamble 
of the Bonn Guidelines and in documents submitted to 
the -. In general, these sources focus on the fact that 
corporations’ representatives in  and Bonn Guideline 
negotiations strongly indicated a general corporate un-
willingness to pay the transaction cost associated with 
negotiating  arrangements under existing national leg-
islation (often described as overly complex and demand-
 
ing).25 Hence, relying on this industry perspective, many 
commentators (and the Bonn Guidelines) suggest solutions 
proposed by these sources focus on simplifying national 
legislation, minimizing national legislative requirements, 
streamlining governmental processes, and harmonizing the 
countries’ various approaches to domestic requirements, 
such as public participation26 ( K and L , 
S ).
Research under the   Project27 suggests 
that this may not be the case. Based on examination of 
specific content of some national legislative and policy 
frameworks, and comparing them to general informa-
tion about  activities within the country, it appears 
that legislative choices have not had a particular impact 
on the country’s success in attracting  arrangements 
(E , C and Y , W 
et al. ). Those that have attempted to streamline, or 
adopt specific provisions about , for example, have not 
seen a more positive industrial reaction than others. It may 
be that several deeper underlying reasons explain why 
the system is not fully functional, even in those countries 
which have adopted the required legal measures. These 
arise out of two key legal assumptions (about ownership 
and about the ability of existing contract law to address 
genetic resource issues) which were made by the negotia-
tors of the , but which were not actually legally cor-
rect—then or now.28
Assumptions about Ownership
The negotiators made a primary assumption about own-
ership—that “the ownership of genetic resources will be 
determined under national law” (G ). While 
providing a relatively easy solution at the time for the 
negotiators (enabling them completely to avoid address-
ing ownership in the Convention), the legal basis for this 
statement had not been fully analyzed at the time. In fact, 
as further discussed below, then and now, no clear legal 
concept exists under any country’s national law to delin-
eate what a genetic resource is, what it means to own one, 
what it means to use one, or how any of these concepts 
can be applied. 
Existing law relating to ownership generally focus on 
two kinds of subject matter:
• Physical tangible property (land,29 plants, animals, 
equipment, furniture, cars, etc.) The right to own an 
interest in physical property derives from the right 
to dispose of it—originally seated in one person or 
entity; and
• Intangible property (intellectual property, financial 
rights, licenses of the use of trademarks, processes, 
etc.). The one quality that these various kinds of 
intellectual property share is that they are created 
by a single individual or entity (they are human-cre-
ated ideas, processes, designs, etc.). Rights to own 
such property derive from that original creation. 
Intellectual property that has been independently 
or collaboratively created by a variety of people 
(who are not contractually related) usually cannot 
be effectively protected through this system.
As further discussed below, genetic resources do not 
appear to fit in either category. They do not appear to be 
tangible, given that they are based on  and  (sub-
stances which, under generally promulgated theories of 
life, are thought to be the information from which any life 
form can be synthesized). The use of genetic resources, 
the ownership implications that arise from the fact that 
the same species exist in many countries, and the overall 
nature of the concept are not yet clearly understood and 
agreed upon, even by experts. 
Assumptions about Contract Law 
The second overarching assumption is reflected in the fre-
quent statement that  would generally be addressed by 
contracts and governed under national contract law ( 
K and L ). This statement is based on the 
expectation that existing contract law could govern the 
creation, execution, implementation, and oversight of  
agreements, as well as address compliance or noncompli-
ance under those agreements.
As discussed in more detail below, this statement 
also appears to have been based on some slightly flawed 
assumptions. Primarily, it assumed that contracts can be 
created and implemented even when there is no legal con-
cept or understanding regarding the subject matter of the 
contract. In fact, however, contracts can exist only where 
law and shared understanding embody a unified perception 
of the contract, including physical subject matter, the ac-
tivities that are permitted or required (or forbidden) under 
the contract, and the conditions and terms that govern the 
obligations of the individuals or entities that are bound 
by the contract. 
Expectations about National Law
There was a general expectation that all parties would 
adopt legislation or take other action implementing the 
 -related commitments listed above. As noted above, 
to date this expectation remains unfulfilled in more than 
% of the Parties. To some extent, this lack of progress 
creates a “chicken-egg” situation, in which countries are 
reluctant to attempt to develop new legislation without 
the positive stimulus of a successful example, while at 
the same time no national law is able to operate a system 
focused on international trade in genetic resources, when 
the other countries involved have not adopted coordinat-
ing frameworks.
The Parties to the  have always very strongly em-
phasized that “implementation of the Convention will be 
through national law”.30 In most instances, this focus has 
not significantly impeded implementation, because the 
concepts addressed (in-situ and ex-situ conservation and 
sustainable use of natural resources) already existed, were 
clearly subject to national sovereignty, and were governed 
under national law. The ’s provisions were designed to 
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enable this global net of national controls and programs 
to function efficiently together—to achieve economies of 
scale through international cooperation and collaborative 
development of programs of work.
In other contexts, however, the national implementation 
approach is less efficacious. Some of these issues include 
the problems of invasive species (frequently caused by 
importation and other activities of global trade and transit), 
migratory species (which frequently cross international 
boundaries),31 and particularly .
The -related provisions of the  are rather spe-
cifically directed at transboundary agreements—i.e., situ-
ations in which a user from one country seeks access to 
genetic resources from another country. Domestic access 
to and use of genetic resources is not regulated, nor are 
the domestic issues regarding how benefits are distrib-
uted, once the user has complied with the requirement to 
share them with the source country.32 Despite this purely 
international scope, however, the  assumes that its  
requirements (like all other parts of the ) will be satis-
fied through the development of national laws, policies, 
and institutions.
In combination, the transnational nature of  trans-
actions and the preference for national implementation 
strongly suggests that governance of these transactions 
must be rigorously overseen by both the law of the source 
country and the law of the user country. To date, however, 
fewer than % of the  Parties have adopted legislation 
addressing their primary  obligations, and these are all 
developing countries that generally perceive themselves to 
be source countries (potential beneficiaries). During the 
negotiation of the Bonn Guidelines, for example, some of 
the most controversial discussion centered around the fact 
that the draft guidelines attempted to govern/guide the ac-
tions of “source countries” and “users”. It was noted that 
developed country negotiators intended the latter term to 
refer only to corporations or other entities directly acquir-
ing the assets, rather than the countries that are Party to 
the Convention.33 
The current call to reconsider the international regime 
on  seems to arise out of the lack of progress to date, 
as well as the lack of clarity on some terms and mutual 
understandings which would, if present, enable that prog-
ress. These issues can generally be thought of in three 
categories: 
• Concepts that require clarification;
• Assumptions that need to be reconsidered; and 
• Critical issues and areas that have not yet been 
addressed.
C : L I   I R
Concepts Insufficiently Clarified
The ’s provisions of  do not address a number of 
issues that are needed to form the basis of an integrated 
or collaborative international regime. In general, a policy 
instrument such as the  is seen as setting out the over-
arching objective. National and subnational governments 
then develop legislation whose task is to find or create a 
concrete method of achieving all or part of those objectives. 
This is the primary task of legislation—to look at both the 
objectives that the policy makers seek to achieve, and the 
available tools, and, on the basis of this analysis, to deter-
mine what action is possible and adopt a concrete system 
for requiring, facilitating, or controlling that action.
In the years immediately following the ’s entry into 
force, it was hoped that national implementing legislation 
would take on this task, clarifying these points. If many 
countries did this, there would eventually be one or more 
recognized approaches which could be unified into a gen-
erally international understanding, which in turn might 
then be reflected in a document like the Bonn Guidelines. 
Unfortunately, however, national legislation to date has 
almost uniformly adopted the policy-style language of the 
, rather than adopting practical systems for applying 
that language (C ). This means that a number 
of large gaps and inconsistencies still exist that the regime 
discussions will have to address.
Law and Consistency
A critical basis for the call for clarification is the fact that 
the international system must, necessarily, be legally gov-
erned and enforced consistently across borders. At pres-
ent, although  agreements are negotiated under the law 
of the source country, there is often no basis for source 
country enforcement in cases of later violation. Typically, 
by the time any violation of the source country’s  law 
is known, the user may be completely removed from the 
source country. Unless the violator or some valuable as-
sets of the violator remain in the source country, the only 
way to compel the user’s compliance will be to take action 
in another country—one in which user is present or has 
assets. This is true even if the contract specifies that it is 
“governed under the law of the source country”. 
It may be (financially or otherwise) difficult or impos-
sible for the source country to obtain access to the courts in 
a developed country. Even if a legal action is undertaken, 
the contract will be interpreted by a judge or arbitrator in 
a country of the user, who cannot be a good judge of the 
intentions and practices of the source country. Without 
international consistency, based on clearly agreed inter-
national concepts, another country’s courts will probably 
interpret the source country’s contracts quite differently 
from what the source country expects.
Concerns about clarity seem to be one of the primary 
drivers motivating detailed processes and complex institu-
tions in national and regional  legislation. Governments, 
when entering into transactions for the use of patrimonial 
property or assets subject to sovereign control, are bound 
by high standards and duties to protect the interests of the 
people. Individual officials who breach this responsibility 
 
of care may be subject to large fines and other penalties, 
and may lose their careers due to a lack of trust. It is no 
wonder, then, that they insist on a high level of procedural 
protection, detailed contracts, and other complex require-
ments, when they are undertaking such transactions as to 
kinds of property and use rights that are not clearly under-
stood. The call from industry to simplify legislation and 
procedures may have the impact of diminishing protection 
of national patrimony, increasing the risk of inappropriate 
or even corrupt transactions, or, in the alternative, increas-
ing possible exposure of officials to claims that they have 
violated their fiduciary obligations.
Explanatory Guidance on Terms and 
Concepts
One of the most frequently recognized needs relating to 
 is the need for clear, shared understanding of key terms 
and concepts. This primarily definitional process, however, 
is integrally connected to the conceptual development pro-
cess. Agreement about the outcomes and mandates that will 
be embodied in the international  regime must develop 
first, and definitions be concretized based on the substance 
of this agreement, as a means of rendering it clearly. In 
a number of instances, potentially useful concepts have 
been sketched by the , and seem to need only to be 
more concretely clarified. The following discussion briefly 
identifies several such concepts.
Access and Benefit Sharing as Distinct Concepts
 In general, the  seems to draw a distinction between 
access (the processes of obtaining samples, generally in-
cluding screening) and benefit sharing (the later sharing of 
profits and other benefits that the user of those resources 
obtains through their commercialization). This issue was 
discussed in the mid-s, in the context of the revi-
sion of the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic 
Resources (now superseded by the ). Looking at 
the question of access to and use of genetic resources for 
food and agriculture, this concept was noted repeatedly: 
“‘free access’ does not mean ‘free of charge’”.34
This point was particularly relevant in this context, 
because the  does not necessarily contemplate any 
direct payment of benefits.  sets up a multilateral 
system to facilitate exchanges of germplasm from a large 
list of important food and forage species. In essence, the 
parties agree that they receive a benefit from mutual shar-
ing of “plant genetic resources for food and agriculture”, 
for purposes of plant variety development and improve-
ment—an activity that virtually all developing countries 
are directly undertaking. This sharing of resources is 
agreed to be “benefit sharing” for  purposes, without 
the need for specific  contracts. However, this is a col-
lective benefit, but the burden of providing access (letting 
strangers collect samples on their land) may fall on a single 
farmer or community. This person or community must 
be compensated for access in addition to sharing in the 
collective benefit.
Distinguishing Between Countries of Origin and 
Source Countries
The  identifies two categories of countries providing 
access and receiving a share of benefits, based on their 
relationships to the genetic resources that they provide. 
The “country of origin” of a species is defined as the 
country which possesses in it conditions where genetic 
resources exist within ecosystems and natural habitats, and, 
in the case of domesticated or cultivated species, in the 
surroundings where they have developed their distinctive 
properties.35 Rather clearly, where a species, subspecies, 
or variety36 is widely distributed, it may have more than 
one country-of-origin. This is also true for species which 
migrate across national boundaries and for traditional 
varieties that have been historically and prehistorically 
developed, traded, and carried over large areas. Although 
the  notes that countries-of-origin “should” receive 
certain types of voluntary capacity-building,37 none of the 
’s mandatory commitments relating to benefit sharing 
are directed at countries-of-origin.
By contrast, the “country providing genetic resources” 
(generally referred to as source country) refers to the 
country supplying the particular specimens of genetic re-
sources38 in a particular transaction. With the development 
and proliferation of botanical gardens, zoos, herbaria, and 
more generalized international trade and transportation 
of plants and animals over the past century-and-a-half, 
many species (even those of highly localized origin) may 
have dozens of potential source countries. However, the 
 obligations in the  are specifically directed at one 
source country (the one in which samples are collected), 
rather than any country-of-origin.
Hence, the source-country definition, and its relation to 
the equity concept that is the raison d’être of  imple-
mentation, poses one of the most difficult challenges in the 
. In  years of international species movement, there 
has been little or no tracking. Even today, most botanical 
gardens do not keep records of transactions by which third 
parties obtain samples from their collections, and down-
stream sharing by private users of specimens is almost 
completely untracked. Scientifically, it is increasingly 
possible (provided funding and equipment are available) 
to identify the species of an extracted  sample from 
genetic analysis of that sample (without direct observa-
tion of any part of the physical specimen.) However, it 
remains virtually impossible to credibly determine the 
source location from which a particular specimen or its 
genetic material was collected.
The Concept of Potential Value
As discussed below, the definition of genetic resources 
in the  is tied to the whether the resource has “actual 
or potential value”. At present, it is not clear whether the 
quoted language would exclude any species’ or specimen’s 
genetic resources from the coverage of the . (In the 
world of genes, it is not yet clear whether there are some 
species whose genes are more valuable and useful than 
A B  S  B
 
others.) Recently, significant work in the field has been 
focused on microbial biodiversity (often found in brack-
ish waters), and various weed species that were formerly 
thought to be valueless.
The Basis for the Term Equitable
In general,  is perceived to be the ‘third pillar’ of the 
 and the only direct statement of the commitment to 
equity within the . The legal meaning of the term 
equity, however, has not been well explained. Equity is 
a legal concept that embodies many kinds of fairness. 
For purposes of developing the international regime, it 
is important to understand many aspects of equity, but 
especially those that are expressly applied to  in the 
terms of the .
At its most basic, the  requires Parties to ensure 
that conservation and sustainable use is also equitable. The 
, however, does not simply impose a general duty of 
equity—presumably because this duty that already exists 
in both national and international law. Rather, in the  
provisions, it identifies a particular area of equity-related 
concern and obligation—the use of genetic resources. This 
focus on genetic resources arose because there was a lack 
of general legal principles addressing these resources. 
Throughout distant and recent history, where there is a 
legal vacuum and limited capacity on an issue relating to 
the exploitation of resources, many (especially developing) 
countries have been legally and equitably disadvantaged 
when other countries obtained and used those resources. In 
the s and s, as information became known about 
many new and very profitable uses of genetic resources, 
there was a fear that a similar pattern of inequitable ex-
ploitation was developing (G ). 
As to this type of inequity, the  invokes a specific 
component of the larger concept of equity sometimes 
called “unjust enrichment”. Equity law provides that 
unjust enrichment should lead to fair compensation. In 
other words, it is not fair for one person or entity to ob-
tain benefits through the uncompensated exploitation of 
the resources belonging to another.39 The  makes this 
clear—stating the obligation of “equitable sharing of the 
benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources”. 
The term “benefits …of utilization” is a clear reference 
to the benefits received by the users. This seems to be 
separate from the ’s more general equity provisions, 
where it calls upon the parties to endeavor to work in the 
country of origin of the genetic resources, and undertake 
other actions that benefit local people, for example.40 Such 
benefits seem to be in addition to, and not a substitute 
for, a “share of the benefits arising from utilization”—i.e. 
profits, intellectual property rights, and other value. Other 
parts of the convention suggest that countries have broader 
equitable obligations, however the obligation of equitable 
benefit sharing is specifically the obligation of the user to 
share the benefits that it receives.
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The Relationship of ABS to Other 
International Legal Frameworks
A third area in which further clarification may be needed 
is the manner in which the  system interacts with 
other legal systems and frameworks, both domestic and 
international. Here also, although the  includes some 
important provisions on this issue, many open issues 
remain. It is not possible to incorporate the discussion 
of this issue into this paper, in part due to limitations in 
time and length, but more particularly because the full 
range of legal analysis into these issues is still ongoing. 
One example may be useful to illustrate this issue—ma-
rine biodiversity. The  addresses the conservation of 
oceans beyond the coastal and exclusive economic zones 
through four primary provisions. First, the Parties specifi-
cally take on “the responsibility to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage 
to the environment of other States or of areas beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction”.41 This undertaking 
is enhanced by jurisdictional provisions noting that “the 
provisions of this Convention apply … within the area of 
its national jurisdiction or beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction”.42 Most important, the parties are to engage 
in appropriate cooperation “directly or, where appropriate, 
through competent international organizations, in respect 
of areas beyond national jurisdiction…, for the conserva-
tion and sustainable use of biological diversity”.43 Finally, 
the parties are specifically mandated to “implement the 
 with respect to the marine environment consistently 
with the rights and obligations of States under the law of 
the sea”.
Unfortunately, the  United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (),44 which is recognized to 
be a comprehensive unified framework for international 
governance of oceans was negotiated for nearly  years, 
beginning well before the commencement of the  nego-
tiations, being formally adopted nine years before the , 
but entering into force two years after the . All of this 
occurred, at a time when a) the legal concept of ‘genetic 
resources’ as some type of ownable property right did not 
yet exist; b) it was generally assumed that there was little 
or no life in the oceans below  m depth; and c) it was 
believed that marine mammals were the primary targets 
of high-seas conservation, because pelagic fish and other 
commercially harvested high-seas species were thought 
to be so plentiful that even drastically increased harvest 
levels would still be sustainable.
Since that time, however, many kinds of marine species 
of remarkable scientific value and other potential have been 
found on the deep seabed, well below  m, and in fish 
and other marine organisms in the water column beyond 
national jurisdiction (B , P ). 
The sustainability of commercially harvested pelagic fish 
species is being called into serious question.  is 
unclear about whether and how it governs  issues and 
the rights to marine genetic resources ( Secretariat and 
 
  ). Within the world’s oceans there are 
both areas within national jurisdiction and control (territo-
rial seas, exclusive economic zones, continental shelves, 
etc.) and so-called international waters that are outside 
of any country’s jurisdiction. However, it does contain a 
mechanism (the International Seabed Authority) and other 
mandates which may be useful for international sharing 
of the benefits from genetic resources of the seabed. It is 
possible that this mechanism may not only be used for 
sharing the benefits from seabed genetic resources, but may 
also be a useful example of how benefits may be shared 
nationally and internationally. Similar issues may apply 
in integrating  with frameworks relating to Antarctica, 
international trade, migratory species, intellectual property, 
and others.
Relationship of ABS to Other Obligations 
of the Parties 
 issues, although firmly entrenched concepts in inter-
national law, are only one part of a much broader set of 
issues—genetic resources. These issues are addressed by 
a number of international instruments, which create or 
address specific obligations of their Parties, including espe-
cially the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in conjunction 
with the ’s other provisions on biosafety issues (issues 
relating to genetically modified organisms), the  
(issues related to the sharing of agricultural varieties of 
important crops for food security), and the  instru-
ments and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights () (issues related to the 
creation of intellectual property rights in innovations using 
genetic resources.) All of these instruments and others are 
very similar to  in the sense that they address outcomes 
in many of the same fields of endeavor, seek to promote 
a similar type of systematic development, and involve at 
least some aspects of genetic resources.
A recurring theme that arose in nearly every aspect of 
the first year of the   Project has been the need to 
address these issues in a synergistic way, particularly at the 
national level. There is a well-recognized value in expand-
ing the issue of consistency beyond the confines of , to 
include all legal issues relating to genetic resources—in 
essence, to consider the need for an integrated framework 
that encompasses not only , but also biosafety, genetic 
resources for food and agriculture, and genetics-based 
research. To a large extent, the separation among these 
issues is artificial. The separation was originally designed 
to simplify the  negotiations. However, there is no clear 
reason for maintaining these distinctions permanently, if 
the merger of the issues will be of assistance.
Certainly the linkage between the issues should be 
more clearly recognized legally. For example, the primary 
subject of the Cartagena Protocol is s. All (or at least 
a significant number) of s are products of the use of 
“genetic resources” as defined in the —i.e., they have 
been developed utilizing at least some of this genetic mate-
rial. In essence, where the  discussion focuses on the 
needs and desires of source-countries/countries-of-origin 
(to be compensated as providers of genetic resources), 
the Cartagena Protocol focuses on the needs and desires 
of the users (to be able to introduce and market s 
around the world).
As further discussed below, it may be appropriate 
to consider reuniting these issues at the national level, 
through the development of a single National Framework 
on Genetic Resources and their Use. This approach would 
enable a unified compliance with this range of international 
agreements, and avoid inconsistency, overlap, or unregu-
lated gaps in the system. A unified approach to implement-
ing these issues might be of real assistance. Perhaps more 
important, as discussed below, this re-linkage might tie two 
market components together in a way that enables better 
development of incentives and other financial tools.
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Assumptions Insufficiently Considered
The negotiators of the  made a number of assumptions 
about legal issues and how genetic resources issues will 
operate. These assumptions underlie a significant part of 
the current conception of  at the international political 
level. They have not generally been borne out in practice. 
As such, they are probably the most immediate (and dif-
ficult) hurdles that must be surmounted in the regime 
negotiations.
This paper will briefly examine three of the primary 
assumptions that were promulgated during the negotiations 
of the  and explain how they prevent, impact, or restrict 
the implementation of  concepts—a) the nature of ge-
netic resources, b) reliance on existing national contract 
law to provide the framework for , and c) valuation of 
genetic resources. Although these are discussed as separate 
issues, they are interconnected to such an extent that it 
appears that they can only be addressed collectively.
Genetic Resources As Property under 
National Contract Law 
In the years of the negotiations (the s), there was only 
a very rudimentary understanding of genetic research, even 
among biologists and specialists in scientific research and 
development (the primary technical advisors to the nego-
tiators of the ).45 As a consequence, there were strong 
concerns during the negotiations regarding coverage. It 
was feared that definitions and primary provisions relating 
to genetic resources would be either: 
• Too restrictive (which might mean that some users 
would still be able to benefit inequitably from the 
use of omitted types of resources) or
 
• Too broad (which might mean that the system 
would apply to uses that are already operating in a 
fair and equitable manner).
In the end, the negotiation of the  appears to have 
sidestepped the primary coverage questions relating to 
—i.e., decided not to answer the questions “What are 
‘genetic resources’ and how are they (legally) different 
from ‘biological resources’?” Clearly, however, the reso-
lution of these issues will color the nature and content of 
the entire regime negotiations.
The failure to address this definitional problem left the 
field open to the multitude of commentators who promoted 
the assumption that genetic resources were simply a new 
type of property that is similar (under the law) to all other 
types of property—that national legal frameworks govern-
ing ownership of property and commercial transactions 
would also directly govern -related activities (in the 
same way that the first inventors and marketers of radios 
were able to use the markets and rules applicable to fur-
niture, to market their inventions46). The basic problem 
regarding the nature of genetic resources is exemplified 
by the relevant definitions within the  (“biological 
resources”, “genetic material”, and “genetic resources”) 
as well as by two concepts that are completely omitted 
from the —the use of genetic resources and their 
ownership.47 
Recognizing/Defining Genetic Resources
The most important single concept relating to  is prob-
ably the definitional or conceptual understanding of what 
a genetic resource actually is, and how it is distinguished 
from other resources. The ’s provisions, and many 
statements of the Parties thereafter, have made it clear 
that  and requirements apply only to genetic resources, 
so that a clear understanding of their nature is essential 
to application of these provisions.48 Unfortunately, the 
relevant definitions in the  itself (Article ) do not 
provide a basis for this understanding:
“Genetic resources” means genetic material of actual 
or potential value.
“Genetic material” means any material of plant, animal, 
microbial, or other origin containing functional units 
of heredity.
“Biological resources” includes genetic resources, 
organisms, or parts thereof, populations, or any other 
biotic component of ecosystems with actual or potential 
use or value for humanity.
On their face, it is difficult to see a distinction among 
these definitions. It is generally assumed that the phrase 
‘functional units of heredity’ refers to  and . 
Currently,  and  are thought to be the biologi-
cal components that determine the nature and heritable 
properties of every life form—and to be present in every 
cell of all organic (and no nonorganic) matter. Hence, all 
biological resources (including “parts thereof”) contain 
functional units of heredity.
However, the very fact that there are separate defini-
tions of the two, and that the  uses them in very dif-
ferent contexts, suggests that the negotiators intended the 
meaning of genetic resources to be different from that of 
biological resources. Lacking a clear definition, good legal 
practice suggests that the difference must be determined 
by examining the usage of the terms within the  and 
in subsequent decisions and practices.49 In general, the 
’s provisions discussing genetic resources are entirely 
directed to the use of those resources. They seem especially 
focused on transactions that do not involve bulk purchase 
of organic matter as for normal bulk uses. The assumption 
seems to be that a genetic resource can be synthesized or 
propagated based on a single sample, so that there is little 
long-term need for additional samples.
Even the access requirement (Article .) focuses 
on use. It speaks directly to the need to “facilitate access 
to genetic resources for environmentally sound uses…”. 
Nearly all of the other  provisions described above ad-
dress either the use of the genetic resources, information 
developed or discerned from accessing them, or various 
particular benefits from those uses.50 Taken together with 
the literature of the period in which these issues were 
being negotiated (late s), it appears that the general 
assumption was that the  pattern of each species, (or 
more particularly, each subspecies or variety) was the 
resource. It may also have been assumed that  was a 
separate physical substance that could be separately con-
trolled. But it was generally recognized as an informational 
resource—one that could be synthesized or used in the 
process of synthesizing so-called artificial  or creating 
s. At a minimum, the clear expectation was that  
would focus on the special issues surrounding the use of 
functional units of heredity.
By contrast, the provisions addressing biological 
resources are focused very directly on activities and im-
pacts on species and ecosystems, and on positive measures 
within each country to preserve biodiversity both in situ 
and ex situ. It appears, then, that the distinction between 
genetic resources and the rest of biological resources is 
the manner in which they are used. Genetic material and 
genetic resources, as used in the , refer to either: 
• The genetic code or unique genetically defined char-
acteristics of species (a type of information) or
• The use of samples: i.e., particular analysis and 
utilization of their , genes, and other genetic 
components (a right of use).
A genetic resource would thus be, not a type of mate-
rial, but an intangible property—a type of information or 
use. The buyer of a blue flower buys the biological resource 
when he intends to use the flower as a decoration on his 
table. He buys a genetic resource if he intends to use the 
 to create a new strain of blue carrot. For the latter 
activity, he would need an  arrangement or license. 
This kind of distinction between biological resources and 
genetic resources seems clearly to be what the Convention 
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envisions, but it needs to be stated in legislation and other 
instruments, so that it can be applied in implementation 
and enforcement of the  process. 
At the same time, the above clarification is at the 
heart of many difficulties encountered in attempting to 
implement  obligations and objectives. The same ma-
terial, specimen or sample would be treated differently 
in the  system, depending on how it will be used.  
measures and controls in provider-based contractual  
arrangements would be legally effective, then, only where 
the governments and providers have the ability to know, 
oversee, and control the uses that are made of the resources. 
However, in the case of , the provider government’s 
involvement occurs at the ‘front end’—the  process 
requires negotiation of contracts and other actions before 
any use has been made. By the time the resource is used, 
the samples are usually outside of the jurisdiction of the 
agencies that conducted the negotiation and signed the 
contracts. Most source countries cannot know how the 
resource is being used, and cannot enforce permits and con-
tracts against a bioprospector who violates his restrictions 
or commitments after he has left the source country.
Use of Genetic Resources
A second question that is rather clearly still not understood 
is what it means to use genetic resources. During the ne-
gotiations of the , overwhelming attention focused on 
genetic laboratory processes—the sampling of species and 
direct commercial use of their  for the laboratory-based 
creation of new biochemical compounds, s, and the 
artificial propagation or synthesis of substances having 
biochemical properties.51 It was sometimes difficult for 
agricultural organizations to ensure that the negotiators 
remembered other kinds of variety development that might 
also be a part of the  concept. This leads, however, to an 
interesting question. Exactly what activities are considered 
to be use of genetic resources? If we think of this as utiliza-
tion of a species’ ‘functional units of heredity’, then:
• The most common use of any species’ functional 
units of heredity is by ordinary reproduction of 
that species—including by planting seeds that have 
been purchased or saved or breeding animals held 
in captivity. This is the basis for claims of inclusion 
of conventional plant breeding (hybridization and 
selection) as uses of genetic resources.
• The theory of genetics that is generally based on the 
 discoveries made by Watson-Crick and others 
holds that a species’ biochemical properties are de-
termined by its . On this basis, some commen-
tators have suggested that bulk use of biological 
resources (as ingredients in commercial products, 
herbal medicines, components in other medicinal 
products, cosmetics, spices, tea, etc.) constitutes a 
utilization of genetic resources.
In virtually all countries, however, the ownership of or 
other legal dominion over a plant or animal usually carries 
with it the right to ordinary methods of propagation or 
breeding of that plant or animal, or at a minimum, some 
clear rules regarding any limitations on that right. One of 
the main factors in determining the value of a horse or cow, 
for example, is by whether it is capable of reproduction. 
Similarly, the rights to bulk cultivation and/or collection 
and sale of wild and domesticated plants (and animals) 
is a well-accepted component of the ownership of seeds 
and seed sources.52 An  regime that casts its nets too 
widely may include these traditional uses—thus creating 
either a disruption of existing markets or an inconsistency 
in the  system. 
The international regime, as well as national legisla-
tion, must clarify what activities constitute utilization of 
genetic resources for which access and benefit-sharing ar-
rangements will be required. One of the critical challenges 
will be to define this concept in a way that is broad enough 
to enable oversight of new or special uses and ensure that 
middlemen and agents cannot circumvent  require-
ments, while ensuring that the legislation does not create 
difficulties of enforcement application. In this connection, 
it seems important to ensure that the ordinary sale of bulk 
goods is not included. A farmer’s sale of his crop of cotton, 
maize, bananas, etc. should not be subject to restrictions 
under benefit-sharing concepts. At the same time, it should 
be clear that a purchase of beans from a farmer’s market 
does not confer on the purchaser a right to commercially 
utilize the genetic material from those beans without com-
plying with  requirements.
Practical Implementation: Owning and Tracking 
Genetic Resources
As a practical matter, ownership and resource tracking 
issues are probably the greatest hindrances to progress 
on .
Owning Genetic Resources. Virtually any definition of 
genetic resources and the use of genetic resources will still 
be incomplete without a unification of the issue of owner-
ship of those resources. The difficulties in this respect arise 
out of three sources: 
• Genetic resources are often not country specific. If 
the same species, subspecies, or variety is present 
in two countries, then under the , both countries 
have sovereign rights to its genetic resources (that 
is either genetic information or the right to make 
use of that information). The genetic resource is 
the same for both of them.
• Negotiation of  arrangements occurs between 
the user and the specific country in which the 
species samples are collected (which will provide 
the genetic material to be studied and utilized.) It 
does not even involve notice to other countries of 
origin. When the benefit-sharing element of the ar-
rangement comes into play, the benefits are shared 
only with the source country (or in some cases, only 
with the particular community or property owner 
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from which the specimens were taken).
• However, if the user applies for the relevant intel-
lectual property right or other legal protection for 
innovations based on or using this genetic material, 
he will obtain a patent or other right that is valid 
against all the world.
Although obtaining the rights from and providing 
benefits to only one person or community or country, the 
user’s  application can essentially prevent other coun-
tries from engaging in a similar use of the same species, 
despite equal sovereignty over the species within their 
borders. The genetic resource is localized for payment 
(minimizing the cost to the user) and globalized for pro-
tection (maximizing the protection and potential value to 
user.) The benefits to source countries and their people are 
essentially caught in a squeeze.
The inherent inconsistency can be illustrated by a 
simple story: Suppose that five people cowrite a song. They 
all agree that any of the five may, if he chooses, sell the 
song to anyone (multiple ownership.) Then one of the five 
sells the exclusive rights to the song for a large sum, and 
does not share his profits with the others. The buyer then 
copyrights the song, based on his exclusive rights. At this 
point, the buyer can claim that he is the only owner with 
a continuing right to sell the song. He is protected against 
any other claim, including from the other four original 
co-writers. None of the others can ever sell the song again. 
Realistically, if the international regime is to function as a 
legally consistent and rational process, it must find a way 
to rationalize these ownership issues. On the surface this 
would suggest that it must either: 
• Recognize single ownership through the entire 
process (in which case the buyer could not patent 
the resource against countries that do not share in 
benefits); or 
• Consider the genetic resource to be an international 
resource from the beginning (in which case ben-
efits from genetic resources should compensate all 
countries which possess that resource).
Both of these options, although satisfying the needs for 
equity and consistency, would be difficult or impossible to 
apply in practice. However, the need for consistency is not 
simply a matter of aesthetics. In order for a legal regime to 
operate it must not only contain clear, enforceable state-
ments, but also be organized into a rational, consistent 
framework. Without rational consistency, every time an 
issue arises that is not directly discussed in the legislation, 
new legislation will be required. If the system is consistent, 
judges and administrators (and enforcement officers) will 
have a basis for determining how each new question fits 
within the overall system, and need not continually return 
to Parliament for guidance. Accordingly, it is critical to 
reconsider the questions of ownership. All of the various 
aspects of access, benefit sharing, patenting (and/or us-
ing) innovations based on genetic resources must fit into 
a single unified property framework.53
Tracking Genetic Resources. Two other practical ele-
ments that must be addressed in this connection are 
downstream transactions and the concept of a research 
exception. A number of institutions (particularly botanical 
gardens, universities, and other research organizations) 
have strongly asserted that exceptions should be gener-
ally created under which they can gain access to genetic 
resources more easily, and not be bound by stringent con-
trols on subsequent sharing of the genetic resources and 
information concerning it. These assertions are based on 
the public and scientific nature of these institutions—their 
research is undertaken to increase knowledge and is thus 
different from commercial research and development.
This position strongly supports the view that genetic 
resources are actually rights of use. It also illustrates the 
related point—that the use of genetic resources cannot 
be known at the time of the transaction and can change 
over time. 
The promotion of research is a vital activity. It remains 
true, however, that even where resources are being taken 
solely for research, their use can change in the future. As 
a result, any simply expressed research exception will 
probably serve as a major loophole in the international 
regime. Already, botanical gardens have indicated that 
they do not track lateral transfers of genetic resources to 
other gardens and collectors and do not intend to do so. A 
system has been proposed that will seek to ensure that this 
lack of tracking does not invalidate the  system, but it 
is still not adopted by internationally active associations 
of botanical gardens.54 
Other research institutions have even less willingness 
to support a genetic material tracking system. Noting that 
noncommercial researchers are the primary current mecha-
nism by which key developing country research needs are 
addressed,55 they point out that even transaction and time 
costs that would be acceptable to commercial entities may 
be impossible within the tight budgets of noncommercial 
research.
Mechanisms for tracking traffic in genetic resources 
and monitoring downstream transactions seem to be es-
sential to the oversight of any direct use-based system of 
benefit sharing. Discussions of some of these mechanisms 
are already underway, even though the configuration of 
the  system is still not clear (R ).56 Many 
commentators, however, suggest that due to the difficul-
ties involved, such tracking should not even be attempted 
(P  C ). Instead, they suggest rely-
ing on new provisions of patent law that would require 
disclosure of origin when any patent is sought for an 
invention that utilizes genetic material. This mechanism 
may be partially effective. It cannot be thought of as the 
entire solution, however. For example, it would omit many 
significant types of commercial utilization of genetic re-
sources,57 and for enforcement it would require a kind of 
technological oversight that is currently unavailable and 
unlikely to be generally accessible by developing countries 
in the near future.58 
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National Contract Law as a Basis for ABS 
Arrangements
The assumption that  issues can be addressed through 
national contract law seems valid on the surface.59 
However, the complete novelty of the legal concept of 
genetic resources as a specific type of property or property 
right actually means that there is no existing legal basis 
through which  arrangements can be regulated. 
At its simplest, this can be explained in terms of the 
most basic contract principle—mutual agreement (some-
times called the “meeting of the minds”). If the persons en-
tering into a contract do not share identical understandings 
about what the contract covers and requires, then it is not 
a contract. Thus, if  promises to pay for ’s trip to Rome, 
in exchange for certain performance by , it may seem that 
they have a contract. However, if  is referring to Rome, 
Italy and  is referring to Rome, New York, then there has 
been no mutual agreement. Due to lack of specificity and 
mutual understanding, the contract is invalid  (see Box 1 
for an analysis of contract components).
In many cases, national law clarifies common areas 
of contractual misunderstanding. For example, there are 
numerous laws governing contracts for the sale of intel-
lectual property rights. Often these provide that, if the 
contract is silent about an issue, then the definition or 
explanation in the law will govern the contract; but if the 
contract clearly addressed the issue in another way, the 
contractual provision will control.
The underlying need for both legal and individual 
understanding is clearest when considering situations in 
which one party fails to perform or otherwise violates the 
contract. The lack of shared understanding about what 
the contract covers would make it almost impossible for 
a court to mediate or adjudicate such a dispute. If it is not 
clear what a genetic resource is, then it is almost certainly 
also not clear whether an individual or entity has a right 
to dispose of it or indeed whether the contract disposes 
of it. If the right of the party giving access to genetic re-
sources was challenged (by either party or by some other 
individual), a court could not confidently decide the issue 
if it does not know what genetic resources are. This is also 
true of a claim that someone using genetic resources was 
exceeding his rights, for example. 
Valuation of Genetic Resources: Markets 
One of the most insidious continuing assumptions relat-
ing to  is the assumption that the value of the genetic 
resources can be determined by negotiation of each  ar-
rangement on a case-by-case basis. Within this assumption 
lurks the most serious insufficiency of the  system—the 
lack of any kind of market oversight or regulation. One 
of the most important and unaddressed aspects of the  
issue is the fact that it seeks to create a market in a com-
pletely new kind of property. While the concept of a market 
is virtually universal and dates back to very ancient times, 
in today’s world even the simplest retail markets are subject 
to legal oversight and controls in most countries.
Many companies and users suggest that regulation will 
prevent or impede the formation of  arrangements. In 
practice, however, the opposite may well be true. If a clear, 
consistent market system were in place and subject to 
appropriate oversight and control mechanisms, parties on 
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The need for supporting legislation and a body of legally 
recognized facts and issues may be illustrated by the follow-
ing nonsense example60: A simple contract is entered into as 
follows: “YOUNG grants CARRIZOSA an EXCLUSIVE 
RIGHT to DO-SI-DO with the ÜBERMEISTERIN, IN 
RETURN FOR a TOT of RATATOUILLE”. Before this 
contract can be enforced, several questions must be answered. 
First are factual questions, including:
• Who or what are Young and Carrizosa? Different rules 
and standards may apply if they are individuals rather than 
if they are corporations or other entities.
• What are “do-si-do” and “übermeisterin”? It may not 
be common knowledge that do-si-do is a series of steps 
in (American) Square Dancing, and übermeisterin is a 
German official (a female lord mayor, sometimes called 
the lady mayor.)
• What is a “tot” and what is “ratatouille”? A tot is an 
obsolete liquid measure and ratatouille is a French dish—a 
very delicious vegetable stew.
Thereafter, the parties or the court must consider legal 
questions, including:
• Does Young have a legal right to determine who may dance 
with the übermeisterin? If so, how broad or restrictive is 
that right?
• May Young legally alienate that right to others? 
• Is Carrizosa a kind of person or entity that can legally 
receive that right? 
• Are there any restrictions on transactions involving rights 
to do-si-do with government officials or transfers of rata-
touille? (That is, are such transactions legal? And, if so, 
must licenses be obtained or taxes paid?)
• Is this contract equitable? (That is, is a tot of ratatouille 
an appropriate level of payment? And, if not, were the 
negotiations fair? Is public policy satisfied or should gov-
ernment intervene in the contract or adjust its terms?)
• Can the performance of the contract be verified, monitored, 
and enforced?
The answers to all of these questions can be evaluated, and 
their impact on the contract and its enforceability assessed, 
only if there are clear supporting laws and understandings 
applicable and relevant to the type of property, the type of 
use (activity), and the type of entities that are involved in 
the contract.
Box 1. Analysis of contract components
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both sides would have greater assurance that their interests 
would not be injured by entering into an  arrangement. 
In fact, the Andean Pact Decision , which is perhaps 
the most complex and difficult  law adopted to date, 
may well have become so complex in an effort to ensure 
that the parties’ interests would be protected in this new 
and unregulated market.
Until the national and international  systems con-
tain generally accepted legal underpinnings, they cannot 
operate in a more streamlined, flexible manner while still 
adequately protecting the parties to  arrangements. As a 
consequence, national  laws and contracts will have to 
contain highly protective provisions, despite their impact 
on the users’ transaction costs. The primary tools needed 
to create markets and market confidence are oversight 
and transparency. Given the international/transboundary 
nature of many  transactions, it appears that these tools 
must operate or coordinate at the international level. This 
basic point can be illustrated very simply by comparing 
the amount and nature of existing instruments and com-
mitments on  at the international level with the similar 
information regarding another new international market 
in development—the trade in carbon credits under the 
 Framework Convention on Climate Change () 
(O et al. ).
The , adopted at the same time as the , has 
regulated and negotiated at great length endeavoring to 
define these credits and to set up a consistent enforceable 
leakproof system by which they can be created, marketed, 
traded, and regulated. This has been a long and difficult 
process, even though there exists an example that is used 
at the national level. (For purposes of implementation there 
is a strong similarity between carbon credits and various 
kinds of “transferable development rights” that have been 
in use in many developing countries for decades.) When 
contrasted with genetic resources, for which there is no 
parallel or template in national or international law, the 
’s provisions and approach are very instructive.61
Oversight Tools: The Need for International 
Cooperation
On examination, the primary gap in the international 
regime relates to collaborative action—a need that is 
much more essential than any additional agreement on 
commitments62 or terms (Y ). Cooperation, and 
a consistent legal framework for that cooperation, is es-
sential to enable mutual action to enforce  arrangements 
involving private entities, academic institutions, etc.
Other important services, such as mechanisms for over-
sight of the users and uses of genetic resources, interchange 
of patenting and other relevant information, and monitor-
ing of post-removal compliance with  arrangements 
might also create economies of scale if shared among 
similarly situated countries. It would be financially very 
costly and, in some cases, practically much less effective, 
to address these needs at the national level, when a single 
solution would be both cheaper and more effective. It is 
important to note that these mechanisms are not voluntary 
enhancements of the  concept, but basic necessities of 
the system. Virtually all formal retail markets, even those 
dealing in tangible commodities, must be bolstered by 
a range of legal mechanisms and institutions to protect 
consumers from illegal practices and to ensure that mar-
kets are protected from informal acquisition of products 
without compensating the seller. , like all of these 
markets, presents opportunities for intentional deception 
and unintentional misunderstanding on both sides that 
must be controlled.
Market Transparency: Information, Registration, and 
Fairness
The lack of market information and the connected need 
for some protections of the participants in  arrange-
ments have greatly restricted  development. Without 
this information, government officials in provider countries 
cannot be certain that they are properly protecting and 
representing national interests and the interests of persons 
and entities under their jurisdiction. Nearly all government 
officials are charged with a fiduciary duty when entering 
into contracts relating to national or patrimonial assets 
or otherwise acting on behalf of the state or its citizens. 
Governments typically adopt detailed procurement and 
contracting policies and laws that call on officials to docu-
ment that they have received proper compensation in such 
transactions.
A government official who does not have credible 
market information telling him that the price and terms 
being offered are fair and reasonable will be open to the 
claim that he has failed to meet that obligation. The lack of 
transparent market information may mean that he cannot 
easily satisfy these requirements and would be unprotected 
against later claims. In markets dealing in intangible goods 
(stocks, intellectual property, or futures), principles of 
good governance require greater market oversight, at the 
national or international levels, to protect parties against 
abuse.63 This is also true of markets that are controlled or 
limited by one side of the transaction (trade in gold and 
other limited commodities controlled by a small number 
of buyers or sellers).
The entire realm of access and benefit sharing is basi-
cally a market in a new intangible commodity—genetic 
resources.  However, most  contracts require that the 
terms of the arrangement (or at least the value given) 
must be kept confidential, as a condition of the contract.64 
Information regarding these matters is essential to the par-
ties’ (especially the provider countries’) ability to enter 
confidently into these arrangements, however. This lack 
of knowledge creates a risk and a fear of entering into a 
bad deal and thereby failing in their obligation to protect 
national interests and the public.65 This fear, in turn leads to 
more cautious and complex negotiation and approval pro-
cesses, more detailed legislation, more internal ratification 
and verification processes, etc., which lead commercial 
entities to refuse to participate in  arrangements until 
the process can be streamlined.
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The  Parties have clearly recognized the importance 
of market data in achieving the equity requirements of the 
convention and of general international commercial law. In 
-, for example, they called for, inter alia, “information 
regarding… (b) The market for genetic resources; (c) Non-
monetary benefits; [and] …(h) ‘intermediaries,’” among 
their short list of the information that is “a critical aspect 
of providing the necessary parity of bargaining power … 
in access and benefit-sharing arrangements”.66
A variety of market tools could be adapted to the  
context, as part of the development of an international 
regime, including a) the registration of transactions (in-
cluding or excluding pricing information or the manner of 
calculating benefit-shares); b) certification (including cer-
tificates of origin or legal provenance) of genetic resources, 
as a prerequisite of use or further transfer; c) oversight 
institutions and mechanisms (annual reporting and permit 
requirements); and d) the creation and empowerment of 
oversight bodies, institutions, or frameworks. Contractual 
protection mechanisms and institutions can also play a key 
role in ensuring that markets are fair where one party to 
a financial arrangement has fewer financial resources or 
less technical or legal sophistication. These measures are 
also necessary to protect the environment and third parties 
(people and entities that are not included in the Agreement, 
but may be injured by it) against possible system-based 
abuses. In an international system, it may be that some of 
these processes will have to be integrated or harmonized 
across national boundaries. The possibility of an interna-
tional ombudsman has been suggested in this context.67 
In a few cases, specific mechanisms are already under 
discussion, even before the ’s international regime ne-
gotiations begin. Many Parties, for example, are seeking 
to promote international agreement on specific approaches 
and procedures, including the issues of genetic tracking 
(using certificates of origin or legal provenance, disclosure 
of origin and source in patent applications, etc.) (P  
C ). To some extent, this agreement may be 
premature—it is usually necessary first to come to critical 
decisions about the coverage of a system and the nature of 
its requirements, before deciding how to implement those 
requirements and adopting specific tools. If such measures 
are used, it will be necessary to integrate them firmly into 
legally mandated processes relating to international trans-
port of genetic material, s, and controls on marketing 
and commercialization, so that the user will have a strong 
incentive to comply with these mechanisms.
Expectations Insufficiently Realized
Finally and briefly, it is important to mention again that 
the  already obligates all Parties to adopt and imple-
ment measures that will create and support the  regime, 
but that as of this writing, only  have done so. The  
component of the  is an international framework that 
was intended to be implemented through national law. 
With only .% of Party governments having met this 
obligation, it should be unsurprising that the system is not 
functional, despite the fact that  years have elapsed since 
it was adopted. General implementation is about more than 
just . It is an important tool of the achievement of all 
three  objectives. The  has recognized that it is 
also a component of broader international objectives such 
as equalizing participation of developing and developed 
countries (with regard to both access and benefits), maxi-
mizing capacity and understanding, and empowering and 
mandating sustainable development as a part of a larger 
contractual reality.
-related expectations have another face, how-
ever—national expectations of the reasons for develop-
ing a national  system and of participating in work on 
the international regime. Investigations and workshops 
have demonstrated that most developing countries that 
attempt to develop  legislation have been preoccupied 
by possible profits. However, not all countries share this 
approach. In the late s, a brief effort was undertaken to 
promote the creation of national  strategies ( K 
and W ). Although this attempt was not ultimately 
successful,68 its results were somewhat surprising. During 
the discussion of the  Strategy idea, many quipped that 
the national  strategy would consist of a single phrase: 
“make lots of money from our genetic resources”. In a 
few situations, however, particularly countries with low 
endemism, large indigenous populations, and populations 
living in traditionally mobile lifestyles, the primary genetic 
resource strategy was identified to be the preservation of 
genetic resources and the traditional practices associated 
with them (E ). Concerns that urbanization 
and modernization will eliminate these important re-
sources and knowledge still transferred by oral traditions 
have proven a much stronger motivation than the as-yet-
unproven expectation of financial and other direct benefits. 
This is particularly true in arid and tundra countries, in 
which the volume of species and varieties may be relatively 
small, but the number of highly localized endemics quite 
high. In these countries, it is not generally expected that 
income from  arrangements would ever be sufficient 
to cover the cost of employment of an  focal point. 
However, there are strong interests in protecting genetic 
resources and associated traditional knowledge, both as a 
part of the country’s natural heritage, and as key resources 
(W et al. ). In other countries (including de-
veloped countries), it has been reported that the primary 
motivation underlying their draft access legislation is track-
ing and the desire to be aware of (and have control over) 
the kinds of research being undertaken and the nature of 
the products that will result.69 These nonfinancial interests 
have nowhere been addressed in the international regime, 
guidance, or model laws developed to date.
 
At present, the international  regime, although exist-
ing, is not functional. Usually, where legislation is rather 
sketchy in its direct provisions, it may be “fleshed out” 
by implementation (laws, regulations, practices, and 
interpretation.)  This often happens with international 
obligations, which become more concrete and imple-
mentable when countries adopt legislation to implement 
them.  Unfortunately, that process has not happened in the 
decade since the ’s  obligations entered into force. 
However, in order for a regime to be implemented through 
commercial mechanisms (contracts and property owner-
ship systems), it must be complete and consistent—capable 
of being enforced by the courts and implemented through 
legal processes. Moreover, this system must be legally 
consistent internationally. It will be nearly impossible to 
operate an  system if the basic definition of genetic 
resources is markedly different from country to country, 
for example. 
Serious attention must therefore be given to clarifying 
the concepts left vague in the international policy negotia-
tions that resulted in the . Key definitions that define 
the nature and coverage of , including the terminology 
genetic resources and use of genetic resources, must be 
developed and applied. Once the exact nature of genetic 
resources has been clarified, then basic inconsistencies in 
their legal ownership must be addressed. Beyond these 
most basic hurdles, the  system’s most serious defi-
ciency is its failure to address key financial components of 
the creation of a new market in a new kind of commodity. 
It will be essential to develop legal mechanisms to define 
that market and provide mechanisms and institutions for 
oversight and transparency of the market and the use rights 
obtained through it.
Hard Realities: Negotiation of an 
International Regime
It is necessary at this point to return to the fact that the 
 is beginning a process which it is calling “negotiation 
of an international regime on access and benefit sharing”. 
While the exact nature of the work that will be done 
under this description is not yet agreed, it is clear that 
international work is intended to make some clear prog-
ress in creating an effective system. In selecting among 
options, at each stage of these negotiations, it might be 
useful to keep several facts in mind. First is the duration 
of negotiations. Negotiation of the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety took more than eight years (those issues were 
intensively negotiated even before the  was adopted) 
(K ). Another key recent negotiation—the 
Fish Stocks Agreement under —took somewhere 
between four and  years,70 and the Kyoto Protocol to the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change is taking 
even longer.71 Moreover, negotiation is a mechanism of 
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compromise, so it is important to realize that the ultimate 
regime is unlikely to live up to the expectations of those 
who are most assertive in pressing for the creation of a new 
instrument. One needs only look at the ’s provisions 
relating to biosafety, and compare them to the Cartagena 
protocol as finally adopted, to see that there is a dramatic 
difference between pre-negotiation expectations and the 
actual result.
Another factor, however, is the unique quality of en-
vironmental negotiations, as compared with other inter-
national negotiations. As a general matter, international 
instruments are negotiated as a way of harmonizing or 
standardizing activities, conditions, or requirements across 
borders. Negotiations start from a base of national under-
standing both of how the issues are handled at the national 
level and of the nature of particular international problems 
or needs. By contrast, international environmental negotia-
tions in particular, have increasingly sought to address new 
issues as potential problems before they can cause expected 
harm or to address concerns about harm in advance, so 
that those concerns will not cause commercial disruption 
or have other negative social impacts. Thus, despite com-
plete disagreement at the highest expert levels regarding 
the nature of risks (scientific/biological, economic, and 
social) inherent in the introduction and consumption of 
s, for example, the Cartagena protocol was negoti-
ated and adopted with impetus from two mandates—the 
desire to utilize and market these new innovations and the 
concern that uncontrolled introductions might have serious 
consequences to biodiversity, health, and other factors of 
human livelihoods.
Negotiation of the  identified the use and develop-
ment of genetic resources as an activity that might have 
major impact on conservation in the future. At that time, 
however, understanding of what it might mean in practice 
was quite limited. The result was an attempt to address 
the issue through provisions that were designed to be 
somewhat open-ended, but to clearly evince the primary 
objectives and basic commitments of the parties. Fifteen 
years later, the system has still not been operational, so that 
even the new negotiations will not have the advantage of 
experience with functional market systems. Accordingly, 
the current negotiation of the international regime on ge-
netic resources will have to go forward without the benefit 
of direct experience in any country. This lack of experi-
ence also suggests another potential complexity of these 
negotiations—the final result will be relatively inflexible 
and extremely difficult to change. International agreements 
tend to be long lived, and the process of amending them 
often takes additional decades following the adoption of 
the amendment, while the existing parties decide whether 
to ratify or not. During that interim period, both old and 
new versions remain in force, with increasingly complex 
legal rules for their application.
Conclusions and Recommendations
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Recommendations: Working ‘Outside the 
Box’ 
One of the most common problems encountered in inter-
national policy forums under the  is that of repetition. 
Many very important issues seem to arise again and again 
in  meetings and other high level sessions, each time 
leading to a decision that varies little from past meetings 
and decisions.  is one example of this phenomenon. 
Some part of this repetitive approach can be explained 
by lack of financial resources and capacity in developing 
countries—problems not easily solved. It is possible, how-
ever, that by now these oft-repeated statements are only 
easy solutions that fail to consider the efforts of the past 
 years. In its initial year, the  Project has discerned, 
and partially investigated, a number of possible avenues 
for new approaches. Two in particular may form part of 
the pathway to an effective  regime.
Integration and Consistency: Re-linking ABS to Other 
Genetic Resource Issues (GMOs and Agriculture)
One recommendation to the negotiations is to consider re-
linking the suite of genetic resource issues—considering 
them collectively in the negotiation.72 There are several 
reasons to think such a merger might be useful, but the most 
important is the possibility of developing useful incentives. 
The complete lack of national  policies in developed 
countries (which would normally be very capable of cre-
ating and adopting such measures) suggests that there is 
little incentive for developed countries to comply with 
their  obligations to develop “legislative, administra-
tive, or policy measures”, as described above. In essence, 
by severing biosafety issues from  (and other genetic 
resource issues), the negotiators separated two sides of 
the market:
•  is primarily directed at the source countries’ 
issues and desires.
• Biosafety and s, although not the only use made 
of genetic resources, are certainly of particular 
importance to user countries. 
Eliminating this unnecessary distinction would em-
phasize the tie between the primarily-source-country 
concerns over access and development and the primarily 
user-country concerns regarding the open acceptance of 
products of  research, including new varieties and 
especially s. Even the most difficult definition and 
coverage issues might be more easily resolved if the full 
range of genetic matters were included in a single frame-
work. At least, negotiators would know that a decision to 
delete something from  coverage would not remove it 
entirely from the ’s governance.
In particular, this re-linking would provide a framework 
on which strong incentives could be credibly created and 
applied. Rather than the weaker incentive of doing equity, 
for example, user countries and institutions might have 
a stronger incentive of improving the market position or 
status of their  products within developing countries 
that are signatories of the . This would also create 
reciprocal business motivations for source countries in the 
development of their biosafety frameworks. In addition, it 
might give source countries confidence to streamline the 
procedures for developing  arrangements. Where the 
contents of those agreements and procedures are not the 
only bases on which countries may protect their rights and 
where an international framework exists, governmental 
negotiators will be able to develop simpler procedures 
for documenting their decisions and confirming that the 
interests of the country and its people are adequately 
protected.
Partners and Partnership
Another potential new entry into  is the creation of 
new kinds of collaboration among the Parties. To date, 
 issues have been negotiated in  Ad Hoc Working 
Groups and other committees-of-the-whole, in which 
countries which are primarily users and those which are 
primarily sources have been called upon to develop con-
sensus together on many issues. This approach ignores the 
basic premise of  work to date—that  is primarily 
governed by contract. 
From a business perspective, it is essential that each 
side of a contractual negotiation should separately develop 
its positions based on the particular facts of the individual 
contract, and thereafter negotiate for the best ultimate re-
sult on the basis of this position. Hence, it would not be 
appropriate to pre-negotiate the terms of any agreement 
by consensus of both sides of such future negotiations. 
Countries that view themselves as primarily suppliers of 
genetic materials (either of specific types, e.g., tropical 
plants, or more generally) may find it more useful to de-
velop collaborative and consensus positions among them-
selves, which could then be used in the international regime 
negotiations or in the negotiation of  arrangements 
themselves. The Group of Like-Minded Megadiverse 
Countries may serve as the first example of this kind of 
collaboration within the international negotiating forums.73 
Other such groupings, whether regional or based on shared 
species or situations, may also be possible. 
With regard to negotiation of  arrangements them-
selves, the concept of collective action has thus far re-
ceived little attention. Some commentators, however, have 
developed some valuable insights into the development 
of conglomerates of developing countries for purposes 
of increasing their access to and influence in  markets 
(V ). This issue may be very important to the 
future of the international regime.
Seller-Oriented Valuation
One final fact has begun to become obvious in the first 
year of the   Project—the value of genetic re-
sources has, up to now, been primarily determined by the 
users. There is virtually no objective way of valuing these 
resources in the absence of clear definitions and market 
information (and little basis for valuation even then). The 
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This chapter reflects the expert opinion of the author only 
and does not reflect the view and positions of . Much of 
the analysis of this chapter is supported by the initial work 
of the   Project (of which the author is project man-
ager), a three-year project of the  Environmental Law 
Center, financed by the German Ministry for Development 
Cooperation (). The objective of the  Project is 
to provide concrete research delving into the  issue, 
the manner in which it has been addressed up to now, the 
reasons for its apparent failure to meet expectations, and 
solutions based on expert advice and analysis for critical 
legal impediments to compliance. The Project gives par-
ticular attention to researching unproven assumptions and 
frequently restated conditions, “facts”, and objectives that 
have not been formally studied and confirmed. Interested 
readers are invited to find out more about the Project from 
its website at http://www.iucn.org/themes/law/abs.html 
or from the project manager at tyoung@iucn.org.
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primary suggested methods of valuation to date relate to 
the value of the user’s end-product ( K and L 
). Typically, this value is determined based on prior 
or similar products, to which some factor (volumetric cal-
culation or extrapolation of the value of the component 
that genetic resource are replacing) is applied. Often, the 
amount is just a flat fee—a small percentage of product 
net profits (which is determined by the price set for the 
product). In rare cases, the users have attempted to assign 
a commercial value to particular species’ or varieties’ 
genetic material, but again the basis of that valuation is 
difficult to justify.74 
There are some apparent flaws in this approach to valu-
ation, however. First, the  provisions are not focused 
on the value of the resource as used, but on an equitable 
share of the benefits. In this case, the objective of equity ap-
pears to be the compensation of countries for their historic 
contribution—that is, for their actions (conservation and 
responsible land stewardship) or omissions to act (the fact 
that they did not develop lands, but left them in a natural 
state). These contributions resulted in the protection and 
continued existence of entire ecosystems, not only the 
individual species.
Even apart from the question of equity-based valua-
tion, the user orientation of current valuation fails to take 
account of some serious -related issues. Especially, 
it is noted that the cost to countries of their participation 
in an  system (institutional development, legislative 
development, personnel commitment, and especially the 
costs of oversight and monitoring) may be significant, even 
if some or all parties develop collaborative mechanisms. 
It is, therefore possible that the value of genetic resources 
may be better determined by consideration of the source 
country’s perspective. 
This can be illustrated by one final hypothetical 
example—suppose Product  is currently being manu-
factured using chicken eggs as a primary ingredient. It is 
then discovered that Product  is much improved if caviar 
is substituted for chicken eggs, creating a new product 
(Product 0.) In paying for the ingredients, it is not ap-
propriate to value the caviar according to the former cost 
of eggs. Instead, the cost of Product 0 is greater than 
that of Product , reflecting the increased ingredient cost, 
including the costs of obtaining permits to acquire and 
import caviar75, and any national conditions imposed on 
the harvesting of caviar, to ensure that such harvests are 
sustainable and use environmentally sound methods. 
The most valuable contribution anyone can make to 
these negotiations will be a willingness to think outside 
the box. The negotiations must dig deeper into existing 
assumptions about , its operations, and potential, as 
well as its limitations.
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regime on ABS: A coverage analysis. /, Bonn 
Germany (forthcoming).
 
C : L I   I R
 7 In this paper, the word “regime” is used to mean the “totality of 
norms, rules, standards, and procedures as expressed in interna-
tional and national law instruments and other formal documents 
relevant to the subject” (in this case ).
 8 An explanatory guide to the , written by Gerald Moore and 
Witold Tymowsky is currently in the final editing process, with 
English publication under the auspices of the  Project expected 
by the close of . For more information, and electronic cop-
ies when available, see the   Project website (: http:
//www.iucn.org/themes/law/abs.htm).
 9 Recital  of this directive provides that the patent application 
should, where appropriate, include information on the geographi-
cal origin of biological material if known. Although this is entirely 
voluntary, as it is without prejudice to the processing of patent 
applications or the validity of rights arising from granted patents, 
it remains one of the few developed-country laws that address any 
 issues directly.
 10 The ’s  commitments, as discussed below, are quite specific, 
and relate to kinds of property that have not been recognized in 
law prior to . Accordingly, the claims that national contract 
and commercial law, without additional amendment, is sufficient to 
satisfy the Parties’  commitments suggests a need for further in-
quiry. This work is in process under the auspices of the  Project 
(/), with a final publication expected in .
 11 Judicial interpretation of private instruments with relevant legal 
effectiveness are also a key component of any legal regime.
 12 Most  contracts are between a government entity in the source 
country and a private entity or academic institution. Even where 
such agreements may, by law, be directly negotiated with the owner 
of the property from which the samples are to be taken, govern-
ment oversight or approval of the agreement may be required 
(T and S ).
 13 In this paper, the term “regulated public” simply refers to the group 
whose activities or status is covered by the law. 
 14  Article . The quoted material is enhanced by the next phrase 
in Article : “including by appropriate access to genetic resources 
and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into 
account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by 
appropriate funding”.
 15 In addition to the  binding commitments in text, the parties are 
subject to one nonmandatory provision that is particularly relevant 
to —the commitment to “consider strengthening existing finan-
cial institutions to provide financial resources for the conservation 
and sustainable use of biological diversity” (Art. .).
 16 All section references are to the  unless otherwise noted.
 17 As of this writing, there are  parties to the , and one other 
country signed the Convention in , but has never ratified it. 
(Information from , a continuously updated //
 environmental law database, now available online at http:
//www.ecolex.org.)
 18 Some countries have enacted legislation that says that any 
international agreement that the government ratifies or accedes 
to becomes the law of the land. These provisions would be very 
difficult to apply in practice, since international treaties do not 
specify rights, duties, or potential liabilities of individuals and the 
civil society. However, this “blanket legislation” is still national 
legislation, and is the vehicle by which those requirements become 
binding on persons and entities within such countries.
 19  Article . (emphasis added.)
 20 There are some “framework” instruments that are not “policy-
style”. In particular, the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea provides regulatory levels of detail on a great many issues, 
but still provides a comprehensive framework under which other 
instruments can be developed.
 21  framework tools include the Ecosystem Approach and the 
Sustainable Use principles. Others, including ones on technology 
transfer, incentives, and liability, are being discussed.
 22  entered into force in  and the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer came into force in . 
The Protocol was also amended in  and .
 23 This general perception is a function of the prominence of the first 
major  arrangement (the InBio-Merck Contract detailed in Reid, 
W., et al () Biodiversity prospecting: Using biodiversity for 
sustainable development. World Resource International), coupled 
with its frequent description of its overall program (national institu-
tional arrangements and InBio—a public-private entity) as having 
more than  existing contracts on which users are reporting, with 
the post-script that other private arrangements are not included.
 24 The excellent Costa Rican system (including a comprehensive 
legislative and institutional structure), for example, has been 
developed with very substantial levels of donor assistance over 
more than a decade. Presentation of Rodrigo Gámez, Instituto 
Nacional de Biodiversidad (io), th Norway/ Conference on 
Biodiversity (Trondheim, ). More than  years after its incep-
tion, however, the amount of income received from this system is 
far overshadowed by this ongoing external assistance. Among the 
primary payments received from user entities under access con-
tracts to date have been in-kind donations of equipment for io’s 
operations. To date, post-access “benefit-sharing” provisions have 
not been applicable, as none of the pharmaceutical companies has 
“hit” on a compound triggering such payments. This strongly sug-
gests that the Costa Rican example is not replicable. It is probably 
not reasonable to expect this level of support to be generally pro-
vided to the more-than- developing countries, and to countries in 
economic transition. Moreover, it is not clear that there is sufficient 
level of demand to ensure that  or more comprehensive programs 
of this type would be as operationally successful as the govern-
ment-owned genetic-resource research and collection institution 
(io) has become. 
 25 Although a very small number of corporate entities remain 
involved in  negotiations, this number has diminished (and con-
tinues to do so) over the past decade. In many instances, after an 
agreement is partly negotiated, additional legislative/institutional 
restrictions or requirements are discovered which add to previous 
transaction costs throwing the total above a corporation’s declared 
willingness to pay.
 26 As noted above, the ’s provisions focus solely on governmental 
processes. And the requirements of Prior Informed Consent () 
and Mutually Agreed Terms () as written in the Convention 
refer only to getting informed consent from, and negotiating terms 
with, the national government. Hence it is a matter of national 
domestic governance whether and how the source country’s gov-
ernmental system delegates its rights to information and responsi-
bilities regarding consent and terms. These matters are outside the 
purview of the Convention.
 27 See Acknowledgements.
 28 This is not a failing of the negotiations, but a “growing pain” of the 
international law process. In the past, international law (other than 
peace treaties and trade agreements, both of which are essentially 
contracts between sovereign governments) was created where 
many countries had adopted principles on a particular subject, and 
it appeared valuable to develop a single mutually agreed consen-
sus-based statement about them. The  is part of an evolution 
away from this. Given that biodiversity will be irretrievably lost 
if not protected immediately, the  seeks to address issues and 
problems that are generally recognized to be coming, but not yet 
present. The speed of ideas and development is such that, where 
possible, such problems must be governed before they are actu-
ally seen on the ground. Unfortunately, however, this means that 
conventions like the  must take action before there is direct 
experience on the particular issue at the national level. Specialists 
participating in such negotiations are rarely experts in all of the 
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subject areas that may be impacted. In the case of the , it 
appears that the experts involved were experts in law relating to 
conservation, but that no experts in contract law or (real and intel-
lectual) property rights participated in or advised the negotiations.
 29 As noted below, ownership of land (and many other kinds of physi-
cal property) is really an intangible concept, but is undisputedly 
linked to a particular physical area, and thus, essentially, tangible. 
 30 See  Articles , , and . In furtherance of this approach all  
 decisions adopting workplans or specifying action focus on 
either recommending action at the national level or providing tools 
for such action. Even provisions relating to regional cooperation 
meet with resistance in  discussions from parties who note that 
the  is implemented by national action.
 31 The Convention on Migratory Species (Bonn, , entry into 
force in ) which predates the , is now working under a 
joint program of work to ensure the integration of international 
protections of migratory species with national implementation of 
 objectives and programs of work. See Decision - (http:
//www.biodiv.org).
 32 This point is interesting in itself. Nearly all other aspects of the  
specifically address both purely domestic activities (within national 
boundaries, jurisdiction, and sovereignty) and those that cross 
national borders, whether physically or in other ways. See, e.g., 
Article  (ex-situ conservation) which includes specific discussions 
of many matters of national jurisdiction, including land and water 
matters (which are typically among the most protected concepts in 
national sovereign jurisdiction) and indigenous peoples. Even as to 
the discussions of “alien species which threaten ecosystems” (arti-
cle (h)), it has been noted that unless speaking of human beings, 
the term “alien” does not refer to nationality. Hence, this paragraph 
refers to “species not normally found in a particular ecosystem” 
(whether domestic or foreign) rather than “species brought in from 
other countries”. The specific avoidance by  provisions of any 
mention of domestic  governance is very noticeable in this 
context.
 33 In the final version, the Bonn Guidelines speak of the responsibility 
of user countries, as well as users.
 34  Conference Resolutions / and / (http://www.fao.org/).
 35  Article , definitions of “country of origin” and “in-situ condi-
tions”.
 36 In many cases, genetic resources vary widely at taxonomic levels 
below the basic “species” level. Particular varieties (subspecies that 
have been bred to consistently possess particular qualities, such as 
color, size, texture/flavor (for foods), durability, time to maturity, 
and other characteristics) are often more important for genetic 
research or utilization.
 37 These references are found only in the th clause of the preamble 
and Arts. (a) and (b) (ex situ conservation) of the  (http:
//www.biodiv.org).
 38 “[G]enetic resources collected from in-situ sources, including 
populations of both wild and domesticated species, or taken from 
ex-situ sources, which may or may not have originated in that 
country.”  Art.  (http://www.biodiv.org).
 39 Another relevant component of “unjust enrichment” is the fact that 
a country may have made a historical contribution to the asset that 
is being exploited, which should in fairness be compensated. In 
the case of genetic resources, this contribution may have been the 
improvement of traditional plant (or animal) varieties, or a long 
history of nonexploitative behavior, which resulted in the continued 
existence of an ecosystem or species that has died out in industrial-
ized or overexploitive countries.
 40 Requirements about undertaking activities in countries of origin 
(Article ); and protecting traditional and indigenous rights 
(Articles (j) and (c)), for example. The  Project will be 
undertaking additional research on the general equity requirements 
of the , and how they relate to the  regime, with publication 
expected in .
 41 , Article .
 42 , Article ..
 43 , Article .
 44 Entered into force in .
 45 A similar statement about our lack of complex understanding of the 
issue will undoubtedly be made by those who analyse the outcomes 
of the coming negotiation of the international  regime.
 46 Even in this example, of course, there was eventually a need for 
new laws to address minimum standards of safety and quality and 
to ensure that frequency markings were uniform on all radios tuned 
to particular bands. 
 47 The  Parties have noted a number of other definitional issues on 
which they believe clarification is needed, including those relating 
to “access to genetic resources”, “benefit sharing”, “commercial-
ization”, “derivatives”, “provider”, “user”, “stakeholder”, “ex situ 
collection”, “voluntary nature”, and possibly “arbitrary restric-
tions”. See Decision /,  Document ////.. 
While a number of interesting issues exist with regard to this ter-
minology, this paper will not examine any of these issues. Further 
work on them will be done through the   Project, however.
 48 Article  and relevant parts of Articles  and  of the  
specify that they are applicable to genetic resources, where the 
rest of the operative provisions of the convention are specifically 
applicable to biological resources.  decisions on  have been 
carefully limited to genetic resources. 
 49 It is notable that, in international law, “legislative history” is 
usually not considered to be a reliable guide to interpretation 
(B ). Relatively few international forums include ver-
batim transcription of debates leading to new instruments or deci-
sions. Even where some portion of the deliberations are memorial-
ised in nonverbatim reports (e.g., “report of the meeting” or “report 
of the session”), those reports usually only encompass the plenary 
discussions and/or discussions from within formal working groups. 
However, as to matters of controversy, it is common to create other 
informal groupings including “contact groups” and “friends of the 
chair”. In some cases, these meetings are only available to specified 
delegates. These deliberations although never reported frequently 
return to the meeting with a new text that is simply presented and 
reported as the agreement of the Contact Group. Finally, where 
a wide-ranging discussion has taken place (in working groups, 
contact groups,  groupings, and elsewhere), the Chair may 
sometimes develop a new “chair’s text” again, with no reporting of 
the discussions, thought processes, and other inputs.
 50  Articles ., , and ; .; . and ; . and ; . and 
; and ..
 51 The science of molecular genetics, and the practical issues of its 
use in commercial application, were incompletely understood in 
the negotiations. It is recognized that genetic modification technol-
ogy is only one of the many ways in which biological material is 
used as a template for the development of commercial products or 
other value. The questions of how “genetic resource” concepts ap-
ply to these nongenetic uses are highly complex and not resolved. 
The paragraph to which this footnote is appended describes what 
was considered in the negotiations, and not what is actually hap-
pening in practice—then or now. The  Project is in the process 
of developing further legal and advisory documents addressing 
these issues.
 52 The ownership of plants is often delimited by geographical bound-
aries, this kind of right is known in various countries by various 
names, including “easement”, “profit a prendre”, and other terms. 
Many of these terms are used in different countries to represent 
different kinds of rights.
 53 Although difficult, this challenge does not appear impossible. Note 
that the current system for protecting and marketing software also 
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required the creation of a new and consistent approach. Other 
current challenges of this type include the digital downloading of 
recorded music and the posting and use of online-but-proprietary 
information.
 54 “Principles on access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing 
for participating institutions” have been developed and indepen-
dently adopted by  botanical gardens worldwide. The principles 
are available online at http://www.rbgkew.org.uk/conservation/
principles.html.
 55 University researchers, for example, are among the primary sources 
of progress toward new amoebacidal compounds and medicines—
work that is critical for developing countries where amoeba-related 
illnesses may account for more deaths than  or cancer. (M. 
Merchant, pers. comm. May, ) 
 56 Following on the initial work of R et al. (), the   
Project is commissioning a study of the mechanisms for track-
ing gene flows at national and international levels. Publication is 
expected in .
 57 Many products are not patented, for example. And in a number of 
cases, a genetic material or biochemical compound are integral 
parts of the process of creation of a product, but do not appear in 
the product itself. 
 58 Patent officials do not currently posses the ability, expertise, and 
equipment to evaluate the whether it will be necessary to enquire 
into the genetic/biochemical source of any component of a product 
or invention being developed. Within industry, the technology 
to determine the species/variety that is the source of a particular 
molecular structure is improving rapidly. It is highly unlikely, 
however, that the equipment necessary for this work will become 
available to developing countries at a price that they can afford, or 
that they will have the capacity individually to watchdog the rel-
evant industries to test their products in cases of possible violation. 
Leif Christiansen, Diversa, presentation at International Workshop 
“Accessing genetic resources and sharing the benefits: Lessons 
from implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity”, 
- October , University of California, Davis. See http:
//www.grcp.ucdavis.edu/projects/dex.htm.
 59 Except perhaps to lawyers who practice in the area of commercial 
transactions.
 60 The author hopes that this hypothetical example will be useful in 
helping the reader to focus on the particular conceptual issue ad-
dressed and not be confused by other facts not relevant to the point.
 61 It may be that the primary lesson to be learned, however, is that 
“these things take time”. Although significantly more has been ac-
complished in legal terms toward that regime, the ’s “mecha-
nisms” for creating and operating the market in carbon credits are 
still not in force or operational.
 62 As noted above, the commitments of the Parties are already bind-
ing and mandatory.
 63 In this connection, it should be noted that such abuse is not the 
fault of the commercial or industrial entities. Rather, it is an 
outgrowth of the basic nature of such entities. They are created 
to engage in commerce and to earn profits. They are not created 
for charitable purposes or the conservation of the environment. In 
many countries, they are specifically required to demonstrate that 
they put their shareholders’ interests first—that is, that they do not 
allow other nonprimary objectives to interfere with their primary 
responsibility to make money for their shareholders. As a result, it 
is not reasonable or possible simply to expect corporate, com-
mercial, or industrial entities to take actions voluntarily that would 
either empower the parties with which they are negotiating or 
otherwise diminish the entity’s profits from a particular transaction. 
This is the basic justification for official governance.
 64 In many commercial situations, it is common to keep the contents 
(or at least key financial matters) of particular contracts confiden-
tial. These confidentiality clauses often state that the contract will 
cease, if the confidentiality requirement is breached.
 65 These fears are not unfounded. For a useful case study of the 
dangers to bulk commodity providers who are convinced to operate 
through unregulated commerce, where the market is controlled by 
a small group of buyers, see S ().
 66  - Resolution /.
 67 See, e.g.,  World Conservation Congress Resolution . 
“International Ombudsman for the Environment” (Amman, ).
 68 By and large, opposition to this approach related to the goal of 
eliminating multiple planning and strategy development processes. 
One of the primary advances of the  (and the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development where the  was 
adopted) was its recognition of the value of integrated planning, 
both as a way of minimizing the costs of multiple internation-
ally mandated planning processes and as a way of improving the 
manner in which those processes function. A separate  strategy 
seemed to roll back both of these hard-won advances.
 68 While legislation is being negotiated, the source of these comments 
has asked that his name and national government affiliation should 
not be disclosed. When the legislation is adopted (expected in 
 or ), its unique and important characteristics will be well 
publicized, and their relationship to this footnote will be clear.
 70 Estimates of how long this process took depend on whether prior 
unsuccessful rounds of negotiations are included.
 71 The Kyoto Protocol to the  was adopted  March , but 
has still not entered into force.
 72 In this connection, it is important to keep in mind that the 
Cartagena Protocol addresses only a few particular issues relating 
to the transboundary movement and introduction of s. The 
larger issues of biosafety and national policy responses are, as yet, 
not covered (M et al. ).
 73 The  was formed in February, , with the Cancun 
Declaration. It consists of about a dozen countries that are home to 
more than % of the world’s biodiversity. In addition to  meet-
ings, it has now exerted its influence in  s, the , , 
, and other meetings.
 74 Economic valuation of biological diversity is a debate that has been 
ongoing for many years and remains active. At present, no agreed 
mechanism for valuing species within ecosystems has been found. 
Once that is agreed, however, it will still be necessary to engage 
in further economic discussion regarding how a species’ “genetic 
resources” can be valued.
 75 An Appendix II species under  (http://cites.org/).
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Lessons, and Recommendations
Santiago Carrizosa
Eleven years have passed since the Convention on 
Biological Diversity () came into force and only % 
of the  countries analyzed in this study have developed 
some sort of access and benefit-sharing () policy or law 
and all of these countries are still perfecting those regula-
tions (see Chapter ). Furthermore,  laws and policies 
of these countries have approved only  bioprospecting 
projects between  and July  (see Chapter ). 
This record of policy development and implementation 
does not necessarily show that countries have been inef-
ficient, but rather cautious and inexperienced. Before the 
 was signed, most, if not all, of these countries had a 
permit system to regulate the extraction and management 
of biological resources. The transition from these permit 
systems to more comprehensive  frameworks has run 
into obstacles that include finding the economic means 
to develop such frameworks, consolidating the technical 
expertise, and obtaining the much-needed consensus about 
new and controversial issues raised by the . 
In any case, implementing these  laws and bio-
prospecting agreements have provided valuable lessons 
(see Chapter ) about the limitations, ambiguities, and 
implications of these policies that operate in complex 
scenarios where the providers and users of genetic re-
sources range from holders of traditional knowledge such 
as indigenous communities to high-end users that include 
biotechnology companies. Today, the challenge is to figure 
out a participatory strategy to develop, implement, monitor, 
evaluate, and enforce  policies for genetic, biological, 
and biochemical resources and the information associated 
with these resources. The diverse social, economic, ethi-
cal, and political implications of these policies demand 
the participation of a wide variety of stakeholders that 
include agriculture research centers, environmental s, 
indigenous and farmer communities, government agencies, 
biotechnology firms, and universities.
National  laws and policies presented in this report 
are one of the main elements of the future international 
regime on . The analysis of these frameworks (see 
Chapters  and ) illustrates many of the gaps and limita-
tions that will challenge policymakers during the negotia-
tions process of the international regime. In addition, it will 
be imperative for policymakers to revisit key  concepts 
and assumptions (see Chapter ) in order to bring clarity 
to the process.
Complex Issues 
 and  policies address the question of how to pursue 
the public good through cures for diseases, highly pro-
ductive crops, scientific opportunities, and biodiversity 
conservation, among others (R et al. , S 
, R et al ,  K and L ), 
but these policies also result in opportunity costs, ambigui-
ties, and uncertainties for various socioeconomic groups 
(G , B and S , S , 
M ). More than any other natural resource 
policy,  policies have been the target of misconcep-
tions, politics, and negative publicity. Biopiracy claims, 
poorly defined ownership rights over genetic resources, the 
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patenting of life, the protection of traditional knowledge, 
and equity issues have thwarted access initiatives and 
have also contributed to the cancellation of bioprospect-
ing projects in countries such as Mexico (see Chapters  
and ). Bioprospecting projects also remain the focus of 
fierce and intensive criticism by advocate groups that have 
great influence among indigenous organizations, govern-
ment actors, and environmental groups worldwide (see 
Chapters  and ). 
The fact that most of these policies and projects will 
indulge or deprive specific stakeholders tends to mobilize 
them to shape the policies in their interests. Taking into 
account the importance of this debate, Chapter  presented 
a comparative analysis of eight key issues (i.e., owner-
ship, scope, access procedure, prior informed consent 
(), benefit sharing and compensation mechanisms, 
intellectual property rights (s) and the protection of 
traditional knowledge, in situ biodiversity conservation 
and sustainable use, and monitoring and enforcement). In 
spite of the novel and experimental nature of most of these 
issues, it is possible to distill the following set of conclu-
sions and recommendations for improving  regimes, to 
help countries to develop more effective approaches, and 
to alert policymakers about the challenges they will face 
while negotiating the international regime on .
Conclusions
• The scope of most  policies is very broad and 
comprehensive. This has impaired the effective 
and efficient implementation of these policies. The 
scope covers nonhuman genetic ( and ), 
biological (specimens and parts of specimens), and 
biochemical (molecules, combination of molecules, 
and extracts) resources found in in situ and ex situ 
conditions.
• Since the main implication of Article () of the 
 is that ex situ genetic resources collected before 
the  entered into force are not covered by it, pre-
 ex situ collections should not be covered by the 
scope of  policies. However, in practice, most 
 policies cover these collections. In any case, 
access to pre- or post- ex situ collections has not 
been clearly defined by the  polices presented in 
this report. Ownership of these collections is still 
controversial. The scope of most  policies also 
applies to traditional knowledge associated with 
these resources, but it excludes traditional uses of 
these resources by indigenous and local communi-
ties in accordance with their traditional practices. 
• Under the , bilateral agreements have formalized 
the negotiation of benefits derived from the use of 
genetic, biological, or biochemical resources. Some 
national  laws and policies have defined criteria 
for the minimum benefits (Costa Rica, Philippines, 
Peru, and Samoa) that they expect to receive. 
Policymakers must be reminded that bioprospecting 
is not a gold mine. Since royalty rates are usually 
below %, contracts have been criticized as being 
inequitable benefit-sharing mechanisms. However, 
depending on the industry, it can generate signifi-
cant monetary and nonmonetary incentives for local 
capacity building and technological development 
as demonstrated by the Costa Rican experience 
(see Chapter ).
• Traditional and sui generis  laws and policies, 
registers of traditional knowledge,  require-
ments, certificates of origin or legal provenance, 
and benefit-sharing agreements are some of the 
mechanisms used by most countries to protect 
scientific and the traditional knowledge at differ-
ent levels. 
• Patenting of life is a very controversial issue debated 
at national and international forums. It is interesting 
to note that in some countries, such as Costa Rica, 
 policies initially excluded genes, microorgan-
isms, plants, and animals from patenting, however, 
the exclusions have been repealed years later by 
amendments to national patent laws. Furthermore, 
many countries argue that the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
() must be revised to prohibit the patenting 
of plants, animals, and microorganisms. This posi-
tion has support among several developing countries 
(e.g., the African Group) and many grassroots, in-
digenous, and some environmental groups. 
• Almost all  policies address the need to promote 
the conservation of biological diversity and impose 
some ecological restrictions and impact mitigation 
requirements on bioprospecting. According to the 
Costa Rican experience, which has the longest re-
cord of implementation of bioprospecting projects 
in the world, bioprospecting has not been a signifi-
cant source of funding for biodiversity conservation 
when compared to other sources of funding (see 
Chapter ).
• Monitoring bioprospecting activities and the right-
ful use of samples collected for commercial and 
noncommercial purposes is a difficult, expensive, 
and resource consuming task. No Pacific Rim coun-
try has in place either a national or an international 
monitoring system. Once samples leave the country 
it is very difficult to follow their use and the ex-
change of information about them. Some countries 
such as Nicaragua might require bioprospectors to 
pay for monitoring and evaluation procedures and 
other countries such as the Philippines and Peru 
might require purchasing a compliance or ecological 
bond.
• Some national  and  policies propose us-
ing a certificate of origin or legal provenance to 
track the patenting of genetic resources acquired 
illegally. This measure, however, has limitations. 
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For example, patent clerks lack the expertise and 
equipment required to identify genetic resources or 
biochemicals used for the creation of inventions, un-
less the patent applicant discloses this information. 
A certificate or origin or legal provenance has also 
been proposed as a key element of the international 
regime on .
• Should States be directly involved in the nego-
tiation of benefit-sharing agreements? Or should 
this negotiation be left to the direct providers of 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge? The 
issue of State intervention is a complex and con-
troversial question in most countries. While some 
commentators demand that the State needs to be di-
rectly involved in the negotiation of benefit-sharing 
agreements (see Chapter ), others claim that this 
practice results in bureaucratic hurdles (see Chapter 
) that lead to inefficiencies and high transaction 
costs (see Chapter ). 
• The complex nature of  policies and empirical 
data suggest that these policies are likely to be re-
vised, refined, and altered over time. The complex-
ity of  issues helps explain why policymakers 
and other stakeholders do not anticipate the prob-
lems that almost inevitably arise once policies are 
enacted. 
Recommendations
• Defining clear ownership rights over genetic, bio-
logical, and biochemical resources is a condition 
to facilitate the development of legitimate  poli-
cies. While ownership rights over in situ genetic, 
biological, and biochemical resources is relatively 
clear in many countries reviewed in this report, 
these rights still need to be clarified for resources 
found in ex situ conditions. Some countries such as 
Malaysia also need to clarify ownership of genetic 
resources found in indigenous land (see Chapters 
 and ).
• Obtaining access has been a long, confusing, 
and frustrating process for many bioprospecting 
actors that have commercial and noncommercial 
goals. In some countries there is confusion about 
who regulates access to in situ and ex situ genetic 
resources. Source countries must define an office 
or focal point to process all access applications.
• The broad and comprehensive scope of  policies 
has caused confusion among users and providers 
of genetic resources about the type of activities 
that must be regulated. Countries may follow two 
courses of action. First, if they decide to adopt a 
comprehensive scope it is important to clarify the 
range and type of activities that are covered by the 
scope of the policy. Second, countries may want 
to define a less ambitious and more concrete scope 
(see Chapters  and ) that is likely to facilitate 
access and thus minimize financial and human 
resources for both users and providers of genetic 
resources. The scope of the international regime on 
 will also have to be clearly defined and must 
acknowledge and be consistent with national  
policies. Furthermore, the scope of the international 
regime must be clear about its limitations and the 
type of activities (see Chapter ) that constitute 
utilization of genetic, biochemical, and biological 
resources.
•  policies of some countries such as the Philip-
pines have defined specific access procedures for 
bioprospectors that have noncommercial purposes. 
Some policies also facilitate access to national bio-
prospectors. However, all policies have the same 
access procedure for the biotechnology, pharma-
ceutical, seed, agrochemical, ornamental, botani-
cal medicine, and food industries that use genetic, 
biological, and biochemical resources. This cre-
ates confusion and high transaction costs among 
access applicants. Unlike a modern pharmaceutical 
company, a small domestic industry that extracts 
aromatic oils may not have the economic resources 
to go through a complex and expensive access pro-
cedure. Therefore, it may be appropriate to define 
criteria that facilitate access to low-tech and small 
commercial users of genetic, biological, and bio-
chemical resources. Such a differentiated access 
procedure would also mean that countries would 
need less human and financial resources to facilitate 
access. In most  policies access procedures for 
resources found in ex situ conditions remain a gray 
area due to ownership issues. In all cases, however, 
such access must be for environmentally sound uses 
as mandated by Article () of the .
•  should be obtained from both national authori-
ties and the providers of genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge. According to  laws and 
policies reviewed in this report,  from the gov-
ernment can be obtained through collecting permits 
or access agreements and  from the providers 
of genetic resources or traditional knowledge can 
be obtained through agreements or certificates that 
are usually the result of a consultation process. In 
any case,  procedures must be clearly outlined 
in a way that reduces time and transaction costs 
for bioprospectors and these procedures must also 
be simplified for noncommercial bioprospectors. 
Bioprospectors should be aware about the main 
cultural, economic, and social characteristics of the 
providers of genetic resources. They should be able 
to explain complex and controversial aspects of the 
research and research implications such as s.
•  policies of some countries, such as Costa 
Rica, Philippines, Peru, and Samoa, set minimum 
benefit-sharing standards that must be followed 
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by all bioprospectors. However, given the broad 
diversity of domestic and international commercial 
bioprospecting initiatives that seek access, even ap-
plying a minimum standard across the board to all 
of these initiatives might not be realistic or fair. If 
countries choose to develop such standards, they 
should define a range of them to be applied in a 
differentiated manner and depending upon the com-
mercial nature of the bioprospecting activity.
• Ensuring the effective protection of traditional 
knowledge and preventing the illegal appropria-
tion of genetic resources must occur at two levels: 
a)  must require patent applicants to disclose 
the origin of samples, traditional knowledge, and 
 agreements used for the development of prod-
ucts that they wish to protect and b) countries must 
include similar requirements in national  and 
s policies. More than half of the  countries 
examined in this report comply or are in the process 
of complying with  requirements.
• Some countries, such as Chile, have chosen to 
develop national biodiversity strategies and action 
plans (designed to implement the  as a whole) 
before they complete  policies. These plans 
and strategies may provide not only a national 
legal and political context for the development 
and implementation of  policies, but may also 
raise awareness about key issues and build local 
capacity and community-based processes that will 
facilitate future debates about  issues.
• Developing a regional  policy or strategy 
may clarify access rules for bioprospectors and 
also prevent them from negotiating the best deal 
among countries that share common ecosystems 
and species. This was one of the original goals of 
Decision , but national differences in the adop-
tion and implementation processes of the law have 
interfered with this purpose.
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Complex Stakeholders
Defining the scope of access policies, identifying strategies 
to protect traditional knowledge, and ensuring that benefits 
provide for conservation of biological diversity are just a 
few of the most challenging tasks faced by policymakers 
(see Chapter ). The great variety of agendas, perspec-
tives, and opinions regarding these issues pose quite a 
challenge for anyone seeking endorsement of  policies 
by all stakeholders. Our research identified a wide range 
of these perspectives from key national and international 
stakeholders. For example, a common perception among 
some indigenous and farmers groups and advocate s 
from countries such as Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, the 
Philippines, and Australia is that bioprospecting is a new 
form of colonialism. Many are against commercializing 
traditional knowledge and any form of bioprospecting. 
To them traditional knowledge should not be considered 
anyone’s property, nor should it be used to divide neigh-
boring communities that bid for the best deal offered by 
bioprospectors. Instead, such knowledge should strengthen 
relationships and responsibilities among and within indig-
enous communities. Some also question the efficacy and 
appropriateness of a contractual approach to protect indig-
enous interests and knowledge and to ensure the equitable 
sharing of benefits. Other groups, however, support the 
need to develop national  policies to fill current gaps 
of national laws and protect the interests of indigenous 
communities (see Chapters , , , , and ).
Some scientific and biotechnology groups from coun-
tries such as Costa Rica and Australia advocate  policies 
that facilitate bioprospecting activities in their countries. 
They support flexible policies. Policies that do not restrict 
research, but that encourage ethical behavior, fair benefit 
sharing, and the growth of the local biotechnology industry. 
Many emphasize that the lack of such a policy results in 
the loss of opportunities from bioprospecting and benefits 
to society. A few express concern that a bioprospecting 
policy can encourage access to foreign multinationals 
and the potential loss of benefits and opportunities for 
local scientists. Many, however, support partnerships and 
collaborative research with foreign organizations as long 
as this brings opportunities to local researchers. While 
some argue that  policies should differentiate between 
commercial and noncommercial research, others believe 
that making this distinction is difficult task (see Chapters 
 and ).
Some environmental groups from countries such as 
Colombia, Mexico, and Australia advocate for a bio-
prospecting policy that addresses not only commercial 
and market-related goals but also environmental protec-
tion objectives. They are usually concerned about equity 
issues and a few use the term “biopiracy” to describe unfair 
and inequitable bioprospecting contracts. Biopiracy is also 
associated with the stealing of genetic resources, the inad-
equate consultation of local communities, and the use of 
intellectual property rights to obtain monopolies over ge-
netic resources and traditional knowledge. Some argue that 
it may be more valuable to preserve traditional knowledge 
rather than commercialize it. Others emphasize that society 
at large should benefit from bioprospecting by promoting 
biodiversity conservation, economic growth, and human 
health. Some are concerned about environmental impacts 
of bioprospecting activities (see Chapters , , and ).
On the other hand, some policymakers from countries 
such as Colombia and Mexico are burdened by pressure 
from local stakeholders and international commitments 
to implement the mandate of the  and the  
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture (). They usually support com-
mercially oriented  policies that attract technology, 
foreign investment, and opportunities for local scientists 
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and industries. Others are concerned about a political 
backlash from indigenous and environmental groups 
caused by decisions to grant access to genetic resources 
under illegitimate  policies or inequitable benefit-shar-
ing agreements (see Chapters  and ). Bringing together 
this variety of perspectives, concerns, and agendas is the 
challenge faced by policymakers to ensure legitimate  
policies as indicated by policy processes carried out in 
countries that include Colombia, Costa Rica, Philippines, 
Malaysia, and Australia (see Chapter ).
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Complex Policymaking and Implementation Scenarios
How do policymakers deal with the complexity of  is-
sues? Motivations are as complicated and multiple as are 
the policy objectives. Some policymakers usually complain 
about the complexity of the issues and users they face. The 
inability to face this complexity may be responsible for the 
failure to uphold appropriate standards of equity, respect 
for traditional knowledge, and biodiversity conservation. 
The opposite danger is that the recognition of complexity 
sometimes stimulates an overreaction that puts too much 
authority in the hands of technicians mistakenly thought to 
be the experts on complexity (A and H ).
In any case, few things are more difficult for poli-
cymakers to do than to pursue the development of  
objectives in complex policymaking and implementation 
scenarios. The demands of interest groups, self-interest of 
specialized government and nongovernmental organiza-
tions, the complexity of the interactions within the system, 
and the possibility for unexpected and perverse side effects 
are ingredients certainly present in any policymaking and 
implementation processes, as exemplified by the experi-
ences in countries such as Colombia, Australia, Malaysia 
and the Philippines (see Chapter ). Furthermore, these 
factors are compounded in other countries examined in 
this report. These countries have had to face social and 
economic crisis (Solomon Islands), severe shortages of 
trained personnel (Samoa, Cook Islands, Nicaragua), 
limited fiscal and technical capacity (Vietnam), fragile 
political relationships (Cook Islands), and weak institu-
tions (Laos) (see Chapter ). In addition to these and other 
economic, political, or social conflicts, these and many 
other countries have had to address  policymaking and 
implementation processes in the context of different forms 
and levels of centralized and decentralized government 
structures that influence and determine opportunities for 
success or failure. 
Centralization vs. Decentralization: 
Finding the Conditions for Participatory 
Scenarios 
In most if not all of the countries examined in this report, 
 policymaking and implementation was often regarded 
as synonymous with centralized top-down initiatives and 
decision-making was usually monopolized by national 
governmental organizations (see Chapters  and ). This is 
the heritage of both government regimes (where the source 
of all power is usually found in the capital of the nation) 
and the top-down nature of the  and its Conference 
of the Parties (where the rules of implementation of the 
 are defined by a minority that not always represent 
the diverse interests of each country). Centralization of 
authority has been used in all societies as a way to im-
prove both information flows and the ability to design 
and implement policies. Centralization can also refer to 
concentration of power in the hands of: a) a central national 
government rather than states, provinces, or municipalities; 
b) ministries or departments rather than semi-autonomous 
authorities or corporations; c) local authorities rather than 
local communities; and d) local community elites rather 
than the broad spectrum of community members (A 
and H ). A major and well-known problem of 
centralization is that technical expertise becomes increas-
ingly scarce as one moves from the center to the periphery 
of a society and this is certainly the case in most of the 
countries examined in this report (see Chapter ). This 
issue is compounded by the fact that  concepts are 
particularly complex and complexity implies the need 
for good information. The uneven quality of information 
among stakeholders influences the focus of attention. 
Centralized expertise also fails to understand and respond 
to specific local conditions. In other words, the least pow-
erful members of society may be exploited by local elites, 
they are literally invisible to centralized planners, and na-
tional elites always find ways of dominating policymaking 
(see Chapter ). These least powerful members of society, 
particularly in developing countries, include unionized 
workers, bureaucracies, and farmer and indigenous com-
munities. Another circumstance is that centralized agencies 
usually deal with local notables partly because the local 
elite simply is more articulate and informed than the mass 
of the population. 
Decentralization by itself, however, does not translate auto-
matically into local people’s participation in the policymak-
ing and implementation process of . Decentralization 
also requires incentives such as strong local capacity and 
effective participation channels. Village cooperatives, 
labor unions, peasant organizations, and s have be-
come increasingly important channels for the activism 
of indigenous, peasant, and university-educated people. 
These participatory scenarios facilitate the articulation of 
a valid counterpoint to centralized governmental input that 
enriches the debate and contributes to more balanced  
policies (see Chapter ). Besides, common sense dictates 
that locally originated proposals can be aggregated and 
shaped to ensure that they are compatible with top-down 
policymaking approaches such as the  requirements. 
In addition, in every participatory process, it is impor-
tant to be aware of the subtleties of different stakeholders 
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that are likely to determine the outcome of the develop-
ment and implementation process of  laws and policies. 
These include:
• Public authorities are not always responsive to public 
opinion, especially when government organizations 
assume they have sufficient technical capacity and 
expertise as illustrated by the development process 
of Decision  (see Chapters  and ).
• Government and nongovernment organizations 
are not passive recipients of public opinion but 
consciously try to shape, modify, organize, and 
even control it. This is common among all organi-
zations but mainly among well-funded and strong 
organizations.
• On most  issues most policymakers and other 
stakeholders do not have an opinion in the sense 
of having thought about the issue or having a con-
sistent body of information about it. Instead most 
people are prepared to take a party line or posi-
tion rather than invest time and effort analyzing a 
specific issue as exemplified by the development 
process of the Law of Biodiversity of Costa Rica 
(see Chapter ).
Nevertheless, as the Costa Rican and Australian experi-
ences indicate, chances of developing and implementing 
effective  policies are likely to increase in a decentral-
ized context where the common denominator is strong 
local capacity and participatory mechanisms coupled with 
strong local government and nongovernment organizations 
(see Chapters  and ). Evidently, the central government 
has to be part of the development process of  policies 
or laws from beginning to end. However, the Costa Rican 
record of implementation of bioprospecting projects shows 
that successful implementation of  laws and policies 
will be facilitated when agreement and negotiation of proj-
ects take place between a minimum number of parties that 
share a common mission and with minimum intervention 
of bureaucracy and centralized government agencies. In 
contrast, as demonstrated by the Colombian experience 
an extensive and centralized bureaucratic process results 
in delays in the negotiation of projects that damage the 
morale and trust of implementers and recipients, thereby 
hampering successful implementation of  policy (see 
Chapters , , and ). 
Building Local Capacity
Policy estimation (see Chapter ) and implementation 
(see Chapter ) involve and demand technical expertise 
in  issues, biodiversity conservation, business, com-
merce, economics, negotiation, biotechnology, national 
and international law, social, and cultural issues just to 
name a few. The interdisciplinary nature of these issues 
was limited if not absent in most countries addressed by our 
study (see Chapter ). These issues demand the involve-
ment of a great variety of stakeholders in development 
processes of  polices. Building a solid national capacity 
to develop and implement these policies is a requirement 
in all the countries analyzed in this report. It is important 
not only to understand the social and economic aspects of 
the process, but also to learn about the latest technological 
developments (e.g., combinatorial chemistry or bioinfor-
matics) and the main markets (e.g., pharmaceuticals, seed, 
agrochemicals, or medicinal botany) that benefit from the 
use of biological diversity. Countries must be aware of the 
latest scientific developments that fuel these markets (see 
Chapter ). This knowledge will contribute to improve the 
negotiation stance of less industrialized countries. Most 
countries also lack negotiators. It is clear that legal and 
technical expertise of any multinational is quite superior 
compared to the understaffed and overworked negotiators 
of many of the countries analyzed in this report.
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Future Scenarios
Successful  policies are usually a reflection of the 
policy process followed for their development. Ideally, 
such a process must include the participation of all sec-
tors of society.  issues have presented new conceptual, 
political, and operational challenges to stakeholders. The 
essential role of policy experts and facilitators in explain-
ing the multiple dimensions and implications of  
policies is certainly needed in all the countries that are 
attempting to develop and implement the . To actually 
work once established, the  policy must have the broad 
support of all relevant sectors of government and society; 
fit within the country’s larger strategy for conserving and 
sustainably using biological diversity; and be supported by 
decentralized government and nongovernment processes 
and capabilities sufficient to implement it (M et al. 
). Building local capacity to improve policy initia-
tion and estimation is a priority for most of the countries 
reviewed in this study.
A hopeful scenario for the next ten years might find that 
at the celebration of the th anniversary of the , coun-
tries will have found the necessary conditions to facilitate 
the access to genetic resources and the equitable sharing of 
benefits derived from them. Bioprospecting will be a sig-
nificant source of income for local communities that in turn 
will be able to invest a percentage in the conservation of the 
habitats from which samples were collected.  policies 
will no longer be perceived as a barrier for academic and 
scientific noncommercial research. The concept of biopi-
racy will no longer be associated with inequitable benefit-
sharing agreements and large multinationals. Instead these 
firms will be part of a voluntary international network of 
“biomonitors”. These biomonitors, assuming they have 
the right incentives, will be the recipients and users of 
genetic resources and biochemical compounds, they will 
ensure that these samples include basic information about 
their source country, fair benefit-sharing agreements, and 
 
C : C, L,  R 
whether traditional knowledge was used for the collec-
tion of samples. This information will be reported to an 
international clearinghouse mechanism that will report to 
the source country of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge. Unfortunately, this optimistic and naïve ac-
count of events is quite unlikely.
Instead, in the next ten years countries and biopros-
pectors will probably continue to experience many of the 
policy development and implementation obstacles, limita-
tions, and problems described in this report (see Chapters 
 and ). Many will have completed their  policies, 
but most will still be fine-tuning key provisions. Some 
countries will still be looking for financial assistance and 
technical expertise to complete  policies. It is hoped 
that most ownership rights of in situ and ex situ genetic 
resources will have been clarified. Under the  , 
germplasm exchanged by participants in the multilateral 
system will not be entitled to any  protection, but some 
will argue that isolated genes should be given such pro-
tection. Patented and marketed products derived from the 
germplasm (exchanged under the rules of the multilateral 
system) will have to pay a sum of money to an interna-
tional fund of the . The size, terms, and fairness of 
such a payment will certainly be a key issue of debate. 
Patented products that are not commercialized will not 
have to share economic benefits but new products derived 
from them that are patented and commercialized will have 
to contribute financially. Monitoring and enforcing this 
chain of improvements and obligations will certainly be 
a logistical nightmare.
The International Regime on  (see Chapter  and 
Appendix ) will most likely include a mix of voluntary 
and mandatory components that will continue to rely on 
contracts as a primary mechanism for . Given biopiracy 
concerns, a key discussion in the negotiation will probably 
revolve around the need for an international monitoring 
mechanism or certification system for samples and bio-
prospecting projects.  may have to be amended to 
include requirements to disclose the source of samples, 
traditional knowledge, and nonconfidential terms of ben-
efit-sharing agreements when products and processes are 
patented.
The  Bonn Guidelines on  adopted by the 
Sixth Conference of the Parties of the  will continue 
guiding countries embarked on the development of  
frameworks. However, governments and bioprospecting 
groups will continue facing controversial issues such as 
the patenting of life, access to traditional knowledge, and 
the perception that all benefit-sharing agreements are not 
equitable. These issues will continue to control the devel-
opment and implementation of national  frameworks. 
Developing and implementing national  laws and poli-
cies will continue to be a slow process in which multiple 
sectors of society with different interests, agendas, views, 
and backgrounds must and will continue playing a role. 
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Appendix 1: Conclusions
from an International Workshop
“Accessing Genetic Resources and Sharing the Benefits: Lessons 
from Implementing the Convention on Biological Diversity”
Held at the University of California, Davis USA on 
– October . Workshop participants discussed 
preliminary results of the findings presented in this 
report. Information about the status of   laws and 
policies and bioprospecting projects in the Pacific Rim 
countries that signed the  was updated until July . 
The workshop also provided an opportunity to define the 
main elements and gaps of the existing international sys-
tem of   governance, the main elements of the future 
international regime on  , and measures that might be 
taken by the international community to enhance effec-
tive international governance. Forty-five experts on  
issues from seventeen Pacific Rim countries, multilateral 
organizations involved in  implementation, s with 
 expertise, collections-based organizations, industry, 
and academia participated1.
Background
In , the Convention on Biological Diversity () 
provided a mandate for countries to develop national ge-
netic resources access and benefit-sharing () policies. 
In the last ten years, however, countries have encountered 
multiple obstacles in developing such policies. Further 
motivation for developing national  policies was pro-
vided by the  Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic 
Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits 
Arising out of their Utilization. In addition, the Plan of 
Implementation that came out of the  Johannesburg 
World Summit on Sustainable Development recommended 
(a) promotion of the wide implementation of and contin-
ued work on the Bonn Guidelines on  as an input for 
countries developing  policies and (b) the negotiation of 
the development of an international regime to promote the 
fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from the use 
of genetic resources. Only a limited number of countries 
have developed and implemented  policies and there 
has been a slowing of the flow of genetic resources and 
reciprocal benefits between countries.
These are the main conclusions reached during the work-
shop:
Main elements of the existing international system of 
ABS governance
• Hard law elements (, , International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture, international phytosanitary laws, 
regional and national , , and traditional 
knowledge laws and policies).
• Soft law elements (Bonn Guidelines, national bio-
diversity strategies and action plans, and regional 
policies, such as Organization of African Unity  
Model Law).
• Codes of Conduct: Professional societies (such 
as the International Society for Ethnobiology), 
institutional groups (such as botanical gardens), 
and private sector companies have adopted codes 
of conduct or ethics that provide guidelines about 
the collection of samples and traditional knowledge 
and benefit-sharing criteria.
 
Gaps in the existing international system of ABS 
governance
• Many countries are struggling to develop national 
 laws and policies. Lack of technical expertise, 
budgetary constraints, weak government structures 
and political support, local social conflict, and con-
flict over ownership of genetic resources are some 
of the factors that have prevented the development 
of these laws and policies. In the Pacific Rim region 
 countries have signed the . Only % of 
these countries have developed a national  law 
or policy, % of these countries are in the process 
of developing these laws and policies, and % 
are not engaged in any systematic process leading 
to the development of these  frameworks (last 
update July ).
• Implementation of  policies and laws has been 
relatively poor all over the world. In the Pacific Rim 
region, national  laws in Costa Rica, Mexico, 
the Philippines, Samoa, and the United States (not 
a  member) have been invoked to facilitate 
access to a total of  bioprospecting projects 
between  and July  (other projects have 
been implemented under bilateral  agreements). 
Issues identified with the slow implementation of 
national laws include  conflicts, lengthy and 
overly complex application procedures, ambigui-
ties in the scope of  frameworks, inadequate 
biodiversity conservation incentives, and variation 
in the expertise on these issues among the indi-
viduals assigned the responsibility for carrying 
out the development of  policies from nation 
to nation.
• There is a gap between expectations of what biopros-
pecting might deliver and the reality of what it can 
deliver. For some persons, the issue is that as yet 
there are no clear guidelines on what amounts to 
equitable benefit sharing; there is an excessive fo-
cus on monetary benefits; and technology transfer 
is neither well defined and understood nor well 
linked to genetic resources access and utilization; 
For others, however, the issue is an excessive focus 
on nonmonetary benefits and technology transfer 
thereby obfuscating the crux of the problem: unre-
alistically low royalty rates that are entertained in 
negotiations only because of rent-seeking behavior 
by authorities in the source country.
• There is a wide perception that the  has not led 
to any significant increase in technology transfer, 
one of the pillars of the ’s  provisions.
• Knowledge of the processes of science and dis-
covery in biotechnology, of intellectual property, 
and of market-established agreement (or contract) 
terms is fragmentary.
• There is an absence of compliance and verification 
mechanisms to monitor and enforce the ’s  
provisions, however, it is widely accepted that the 
courts should be only a final recourse.
• There is a shortage of information gathering, 
exchange, and dissemination mechanisms, and a 
need to enhance the capacity and scope of the CBD 
clearinghouse role.
Main elements of the future international regime on 
ABS
• An international regime will continue to include 
elements of both soft and hard law, and may in-
volve implementation of the , strengthening of 
the Bonn guidelines, and development of provider 
and user measures and international arbitration 
systems.
Measures that might be taken by the international com-
munity to enhance effective international governance
• User measures such as disclosure of origin, vol-
untary certification schemes, and adoption of in-
centives and other measures to secure technology 
transfer and import/export and transport regulations 
might promote compliance with  policies and 
help to ensure the equitable sharing of benefits and 
an increase in transfer of technology.
• Components of national  policies designed to 
attract researchers (including both academic and 
corporate bioprospectors) to study biodiversity 
could be an effective means to counter the global 
trend of declining bioprospecting efforts and in-
crease opportunities for benefit-sharing, advance-
ment of science, and furthering our understanding 
of biodiversity.
• Development of an internationally recognized 
system to document the flow of genetic resources, 
including where appropriate a means to provide 
evidence of , has an important part to play in 
consolidation of an effective system of international 
 governance. The use of the terms certificates 
of origin, source, and provenance have different 
political and practical implications. Studies to 
clarify these concepts would be useful.
• The transfer of samples to third parties should not 
be carried out except to the extent authorized by 
the countries of origin or the authorized ex situ 
collection that provided the sample.
• Transfer of technology is one of the principal forms 
of nonmonetary benefit sharing provided for in the 
 and is a crucial component of . It would 
be useful if the  could initiate gathering of in-
formation and analysis of these questions: Where 
do genetic resource-related technologies occur and 
where have they been transferred?; What is the ex-
tent of recipient capacity to use and further develop 
such technologies?; Where has transfer been sus-
tainable and where not?; and What are the reasons 
for success or failure in transfer of technologies?
A B  S  B
 
• It is important to explore the possibility of develop-
ing guidelines for technology transfer in the context 
of articles  and  of the . One approach 
meriting consideration would be to have the  
include within its program of work the development 
of guidelines on technology transfer.
• An ombudsman or complaints authority associated 
with the , as well as at regional and national 
levels, offers an interesting possibility for develop-
ment of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. 
An ombudsman office at the level of  may be 
linked to a linked series of regional structures for 
monitoring compliance with the  and Bonn 
Guidelines in  agreements.
A 
Endnotes
 1 A roster of workshop particpants is available at : http://www.grcp.ucdavis.edu/projects/ABSdex.htm.
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sultant for Latin America, received a B.S. in Biology at 
the Universidad de los Andes (Colombia) and an M.S. in 
technology and Policy at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (). Mrs. Ferreira’s main interest is the de-
velopment of renewable natural resource policies, includ-
ing biodiversity in developing countries. She led the devel-
opment of Colombia’s National Biodiversity Strategy and 
Action Plan, as well as the country’s Forest Policy in . 
Her recent work has been on access to genetic resources, 
focusing on identifying strategies of value addition in the 
country of collection of the resources. Her latest publica-
tion “Protección al Conocimiento Tradicional. Elementos 
Conceptuales para una Propuesta de Reglamentación. El 
Caso de Colombia” (Co-author), relates to the protection 
of traditional knowledge in Colombia.
Luis Flores-Mimiça
Luis Flores-Mimiça is a legal advisor for the London-based 
 Consumers International. Mr. Flores-Mimiça holds 
a law degree from the Universidad Católica de Chile and 
received his M.S. in environmental law and sustainable 
development from the same university. Mr. Flores-Mimiça 
has been a consultant for the National Commission for 
the Environment of Chile on access and benefit sharing 
issues, including the implementation of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity.
Dominique Hervé-Espejo
Dominique Hervé-Espejo, a lawyer and researcher at the 
Environmental Law Center from the University of Chile, 
received her Master of Laws (LL.M) in Environmental Law 
from University College London in . Her research 
interests are the relationship between international and na-
tional environmental law, mainly in the area of biodiversity 
and biotechnology. Regarding access to genetic resources 
in Chile, she has worked for the National Commission of 
the Environment analyzing and providing legal assistance 
in the development of a national regulatory framework. 
Ms. Hervé-Espejo has published several articles in Chile 
on the issue of biodiversity and biosafety. 
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Jorge Larson-Guerra
A biologist from Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
México, since  Mr. Larson-Guerra has collaborated 
with the National Commission for the Knowledge and 
Use of Biodiversity () in activities related to 
biodiversity policy. He was technical coordinator of the 
Mexican Delegation to the negotiations of the Cartagena 
Protocol on the Transboundary Movement of Living 
Modified Organisms, –. He was also fellow 
of the Leadership Fund of the MacArthur Foundation 
with the project “Intellectual property and biological re-
sources in rural Mexico”, –. In  and  
Mr. Larson-Guerra was also a Member of the Mexican 
Delegations to the Intersessional Meeting of the Ad-
Hoc Working Group on Article j and related topics in 
the Convention on Biological Diversity. Currently, he is 
the coordinator of the Collective Biological Resources 
Program at .
Christian Lopéz-Silva
Christian Lopéz-Silva is a lawyer specialized in bio-
technological law. He holds an M.S. in biotechnological 
law and he is currently pursuing doctoral research in the 
Sheffield Institute of Biotechnological Law and Ethics, 
in the United Kingdom. Mr. Lopéz-Silva has worked in 
the environmental sector as legal adviser for the Mexican 
government in the regulation of biotechnology. He 
worked for the Ministry of Environment and the National 
Commission for the Knowledge and Use of Biodiversity, 
which involved collaborating with the Interministerial 
Commission on Biosafety and Genetically Modified 
Organisms. Mr. Lopéz-Silva has advised in the negotia-
tion of scientific and bioprospecting agreements and has 
been involved in the analysis of regulation on access and 
benefit sharing, traditional knowledge, intellectual prop-
erty rights and biosafety. 
Patrick McGuire
A geneticist, with Ph.D. from the University of California, 
Davis (), he serves as director of the University of 
California’s Genetic Resources Conservation Program 
(), a statewide program in the Division of Agriculture 
and Natural Resources. His research focus has been plant 
cytogenetics, crop improvement, and genetic resource 
conservation. The mission of  is with California’s 
biological diversity and its conservation in the broadest 
sense: onsite and offsite conservation of the native flora and 
fauna, collections of germplasm amassed for agricultural, 
medicinal, and industrial uses, and collections of genetic 
stocks, tissues, cells, and  developed for teaching and 
research purposes. With , he has organized and sup-
ported training in genetic and genomic resources conserva-
tion, organized symposia and conferences, and coordinated 
and edited several publications: symposia and conference 
proceedings, reports from task forces, and descriptions of 
major collections.
Mohamad Osman
Mohamad Osman is an associate professor with the School 
of Environmental and Natural Resources Sciences in the 
Faculty of Science and Technology at the Universiti 
Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM), and holds a B.S. in 
Agricultural Genetics and M.S. in Genetics from the 
University of California, Davis in , and Ph.D. in Plant 
Breeding and Genetics from the University of Wisconsin, 
Madison in . He was involved in agricultural research 
for  years with the Malaysian Agricultural Research 
Development Institute (), and had served for a long 
time as a rice breeder and in various other positions at 
 before joining  in . Dr. Mohamad’s re-
search interests are on the applications of  molecular 
markers and the use of induced mutations in crop im-
provement and breeding research. Currently, his research 
focus is on rice and roselle improvement. Over the years, 
he has developed a strong interest on genetic resources, 
biodiversity and their intellectual property, biosafety, 
legal and other related issues, and was actively involved 
in many national committees including Task Force on 
National Policy on Biological Diversity, Task Force on 
Access to Genetic Resources, Task Force on Biosafety and 
Drafting Committee on National Policy on Biotechnology. 
Dr. Mohamad has published several articles on access to 
genetic resources and has represented Malaysia in inter-
national meetings and forums. 
Sally Petherbridge
Sally Petherbridge received her LL.M. in environmental 
law from the Australian National University, Canberra, 
in . From  to  she worked in the Access 
Taskforce and Biodiversity Policy Section in Australia’s 
Department of the Environment and Heritage. She was 
closely involved in policy issues relating to access to 
genetic resources, traditional knowledge and intellectual 
property, in particular, the Voumard Inquiry into Access 
to Biological Resources in Commonwealth Areas and the 
subsequent development of draft regulations on access 
and benefit sharing. She presented papers on develop-
ments in Australia at the second meeting of the Panel of 
Experts on Access to Genetic Resources (Montreal, March 
) and at a  regional workshop (Brisbane, June 
). She also attended the second meeting of the  
Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore 
(Geneva, December ) and the sixth Conference of the 
Parties ( ) to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(The Hague, April ). Access and benefit sharing and 
traditional knowledge were two of the major items on the 
  agenda. 
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Manuel Ruiz
Manuel Ruiz, is Director of the International Affairs 
and Biodiversity Program of the Peruvian Society for 
Environmental Law, based in Lima, Peru. Mr. Ruiz holds 
an M.S. degree in Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law. He has been working on biodiversity- related issues 
since  and has been actively involved in developing 
national and regional policies and laws related to genetic 
resources, biosafety, and protection of traditional knowl-
edge. He has been advisor to the Peruvian Government 
and consultant on these issues to , , , , 
, Andean Community, and other international organi-
zations. Mr. Ruiz has written multiple books and articles 
on the implementation of Decision , the protection of 
traditional knowledge, and practical aspects related to the 
implementation of the  International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture.
Preston T. Scott
Preston T. Scott is a founder and currently serves 
as Executive Director of the World Foundation for 
Environment and Development (), which is an in-
dependent nonprofit organization based in Washington, 
.  was established in  to promote international 
cooperation and conflict resolution initiatives in the field 
of environment and development. Mr. Scott is a graduate 
of the college and law school of the University of Virginia 
(having received degrees in law, and with honors in history, 
government, and political theory) and is a member of the 
bars of the District of Columbia and Virginia. While at the 
University of Virginia School of Law, Mr. Scott served as 
Executive Editor of the Virginia Journal of International 
Law.  After entering law practice in , he developed 
environmental audit and compliance programs under 
various air, water, hazardous waste, and toxic substances 
laws. His work subsequently focused on international 
technology transfers, embracing issues relating to envi-
ronmental law, intellectual property rights, finance, and 
trade as a partner with the Palo Alto, California law firm 
of Fenwick & West, where he served as counsel to many 
different national parties in various international disputes 
involving matters of substantive policy formulation as well 
as procedural issues relating to institutional arrangements 
and public participation. Mr. Scott’s recent work has fo-
cused on specialized institutional arrangements relevant 
to biodiversity conservation initiatives, with emphasis on 
access and benefit-sharing issues involving national parks 
and other protected areas. 
Jorge Soberón-Mainero
Jorge Soberón-Mainero has served as Executive Secretary 
of the Mexican National Commission for the Knowledge 
and Use of Biodiversity since . He holds B.S. and 
M.S. degrees in biology from the Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México and a Ph.D. in Biology from Imperial 
College, London University. Dr. Soberón-Mainero was a 
member of the Subsidiary Technical Advisory Panel of 
the Global Environment Facility (–) and partici-
pated in the Scientific Advisory Council of the -World 
Conservation Monitoring Centre. Dr. Soberón-Mainero has 
been a researcher at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
México and his interests include population and conserva-
tion biology and mathematical modelling, topics in which 
he has published more than forty papers and chapters in 
books. He has been member or president of the Mexican 
Delegation to most Conferences of the Parties of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity.
Tomme R. Young
Tomme Young is a graduate of Hastings College of the 
Law (), and the University of Southern California 
(). Ms. Young is Senior Legal Officer at the  
Environmental Law Center in Bonn, Germany. Throughout 
her  years as a lawyer, she has developed a specialized 
expertise in many areas of environmental law and policy. 
Internationally, Ms. Young has served as a special advisor 
on environmental and sustainable development issues to 
foreign governments, under the auspices of several  
agencies. She has advised the governments of  coun-
tries in Europe, Africa, Asia, Oceania, and the Americas, 
on legislative drafting and negotiations and regulatory 
development. In the field of international agreements 
and , Ms. Young has focused particularly on the 
legal and legislative issues of practical implementation, 
most recently through designing and managing The ABS 
Project, a three-year project aiming at providing tools 
and support to direct implementation of the  objec-
tives at international, regional, and local levels. Prior to 
this project, she has written extensively on a number of 
key legal and institutional issues relating to the creation, 
operations, and activities under the , , , 
Ramsar, the World Heritage Convention, and , as 
well as regional instruments and institutions. Her work 
focuses on increasing effectiveness, analyzing obstacles, 
and implementing sustainable use through legal, legisla-
tive, administrative and policy measures. Ms. Young’s 
other international publications include legislative reports 
and analyses addressing national and regional legislative 
status and particular environmental issues in the fields of 
forest, conservation, environmental protection, pollution 
prevention, coastal and marine management,  issues, 
liability, and compliance.
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Appendix 3.
Contact Information of Primary Contributors
A. Countries with ABS policies
1. Colombia
Paola Ferreira
Consultant
85 G Prospect St.
Ridgefield, CT 06877 USA
ferreirap@aol.com
2. Costa Rica
Jorge Cabrera-Medaglia
Consultant
Apdo. 1487-1002
San José, Costa Rica
jorgecmedaglia@hotmail.com
3. Ecuador
Luis Suarez
Director Ecociencia
Fundación Ecuatoriana de Estudios Ecológicos
San Cristóbal N44-495 y Seymour
Quito, Ecuador
Biodiversidad@ecociencia.org 
Joseph Henry Vogel
Associate Profesor
(formerly Professor of Economics at FLACSO, Ecuador)
Department of Economics, University of Puerto Rico
Rios Piedras
PR 00931, San Juan, Puerto Rico
josephvogel@usa.net, josephvogel@hotmail.com 
4. Mexico
Francisco Chapela
Estudios Rurales y Asesoría Campesina
Priv. Elvira 120, Fracc. Villa San Luis 68020
Oaxaca, México
era@mesoamerica.org.mx
http://www.mesoamerica.org.mx/era/
José Carlos Fernández-Ugalde
Dirección de Economía Ambiental
Instituto Nacional de Ecología 
5to nivel, Av. Revolución 1425, Tlacopac San Angel 01040
México, D.F. México
cfernan@ine.gob.mx, jc_fernan@hotmail.com
http://www.ine..gob.mx/
Jorge Larson-Guerra
Cordinador del Proyecto Recursos Biologicos Colectivos
Comisión nacional para el conocimiento y uso de la 
biodiversidad (CONABIO) 
Avenida Liga Periférico - Insurgentes Sur No. 4903,
Col. Parques del Pedregal, Delegación Tlalpan
14010 México, D.F. México
jlarson@xolo.conabio.gob.mx
http://www.conabio.gob.mx/
Christian López-Silva
Consultant
Avenida Liga Periférico - Insurgentes Sur No. 4903,
Col. Parques del Pedregal, Delegación Tlalpan
14010 México, D.F. México
christian_adicional@yahoo.com
Part 1. Persons consulted for specific country information (case study authors and 
survey respondents) grouped first by status of country with respect to ABS policies and 
then by country
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4. Mexico continued
Jorge Soberón
Secretario Ejecutivo
Comisión nacional para el conocimiento y uso de la 
biodiversidad (CONABIO)
Avenida Liga Periférico - Insurgentes Sur No. 4903,
Col. Parques del Pedregal, Delegación Tlalpan
14010 México, D.F. México
jsoberon@xolo.conabio.gob.mx
http://www.conabio.gob.mx/
5. Philippines
Paz J. Benavides II
Consultant
408 Sterten Place Condominium, 116 Maginhawa Street, 
Teachers’ Village
Quezon City 1100 Philippines
pjbcaps@broline.com
6. Peru
Manuel Ruiz
Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental
Prolongación Arenales 437
Lima 27, Peru
mruiz@spda.org.pe
http://www.spda.org.pe/
7. Samoa
Vainuupo Jungblut
Principal Environment Officer
Department of Lands and Environment, Private Bag
Apia, Samoa
Vainuupo.Jungblut@mnre.gov.ws
Clark Peteru
Environmental Legal Advisor
South Pacific Regional Environment Programme
PO Box 240
Apia, Samoa
clarkp@sprep.org.ws, peteru@samoa.ws
Cedric Schuster
Director 
Pacific Environment Consultants Ltd 
PO Box 3702
Apia, Samoa
cmlschuster@yahoo.co.nz, cschuster@conservation.ws
8. Thailand
Jade Donavanik
Consultant 
Thailand Biodiversity Center 
15th Floor Gypsum Metropolitan Tower,
539/2 Sri-Ayudhya Rd.
Bangkok, 10400 Thailand
jade@biotec.or.th
Chaweewan Hutacharern
Head of Entomology and Microbiology Group
Dept. of National Parks, Wildlife, and Plant Conservation
61 Paholyothin Road, Chatuchak
Bangkok 10900 Thailand
chahut@forest.go.th 
9. United States of America (USA)
Preston Scott
Executive Director
World Foundation for Environment and Development (WFED)
1816 Jefferson Place, NW
Washington, DC 20036-2505 USA
PTScott@aol.com
http://wfed.org/
B. Countries working towards the development of ABS 
policies
1. Australia
Sally Petherbridge
Environment Australia
3 Myall St
O’Connor ACT 2602 Australia
Sally.Petherbridge@ea.gov.au
http://environment.gov.au/
2. Cambodia
Men Sarom
Director Plant Breeding
Cambodian Agricultural Research and Development Institute 
(CARDI)
P.O. Box 01
Phnom Penh, Cambodia
msarom@bigpond.com.kh
3. Canada
Kelly Banister
Assistant Professor
School of Environmental Studies, University of Victoria
University House 4, Box 3060
Victoria, BC, V8W 3R4 Canada
kel@uvic.ca
http://web.uvic.ca/~scishops
4. Chile
Luis Florez-Mimiça
Consultant
El Vergel 2647, Departamento 302, Providencia
Santiago, Chile
lucasarbol@yahoo.com.ar 
Dominique Hervé-Espejo 
Professor
Facultad de Derecho
Universidad Diego Portales
República 105
Santiago, Chile
Dominique.herve@prof.udp.cl
5. China
Dayuan Xue
Director of Nature Conservation and Biodiversity Division, 
Nanjing Institute of Environmental Science, State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA)
8 jiang-wang-miao St., P.O.Box 4202
Nanjing 210042 P.R. China
duedayuan@hotmail.com
http://www.nies.org
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6. Cook Islands
Ben Ponia
Aquaculture adviser 
SPC-Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
B.P. D5 - 98848 Noumea Cedex
New Caledonia, Cook Islands
Benp@spc.int
http://www.spc.int/
7. El Salvador
Jorge Ernesto Quezada Díaz
Gerente de Recursos Biológicos 
Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales 
Alameda Roosevelt y 55 avenida norte Torre El Salvador 
(IPSFA), 4 nivel
San Salvador, El Salvador
quezada@marn.gob.sv
http://www.marn.gob.sv
8. Fiji
Luke V. Qiritabu
Department of Environment
P. O. Box 2131, Government Buildings
Suva, Fiji
lqiritabu@govnet.gov.fj 
Manasa Sovaki
Principal Environment Officer
Department of Environment
PO Box 2131, Government Buildings
Suva, Fiji
biodiversity@suva.is.com.fj, msovaki@yahoo.com 
9. Guatemala
Yuri Giovanni Melini
Centro de Acción Legal-Ambiental and Social de Guatemala 
(CALAS)
13 calle 8-61. zona 11,
Nivel 2 Apartamento «D» Colonia Mariscal
C.P. 01011 Ciudad de Guatemala, Guatemala
direccion@calasgt.org and yuri@melini.com 
http://www.calas.org.gt/ 
10. Honduras
José Antonio Fuentes
Director General de Biodiversidad
Secretaría de Recursos Naturales y Ambiente (SERNA) 
100 Mts. al Sur del Estadio Nacional
Tegucigalpa, M.D.C. Honduras
dibio@sdnhon.org.hn, ddibio@sdnhon.org.hn
http://www.serna.gob.hn/
Carlos Roberto Midence
Analista Ambiental
Secretaria de Recursos Naturales y Ambiente (SERNA) 
100 Mts. al Sur del Estadio Nacional
Tegucigalpa, M.D.C. Honduras 
carlosmidence@hotmail.com 
http://www.serna.gob.hn/
11. Indonesia
B. Satyawan Wardhana
Head of Division for Biodiversity Conservation
Ministry of Environment
4th Floor, Building B, Ministry of Environment; D.I. Panjaitan 
Kav 24
Jakarta 13410 Indonesia
iwan_wardhana@hotmail.com; chmcbdri@rad.net.id
http://www.menlh.go.id/
12. Japan
Junko Shimura
Principal Research Scientist
National Institute for Environmental Studies
16-2 Onogawa Tsukuba
Ibaraki 305-8506 Japan
junko@nies.go.jp
http://www.sp2000ao.nies.go.jp/
Seizo Sumida
Managing Director 
Japan Bioindustry Association
Grande Bldg 8F, 26-9 Hatchobori 2-Chome, Chuo-ku
Tokyo 104-0032 Japan
sumida@jba.or.jp
http://www.jba.or.jp/
13. Malaysia
Mohamad bin Osman
School of Environmental and Natural Resource Sciences
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
43600 UKM Bangi
Selangor, Malaysia
mbopar@pkrisc.cc.ukm.my
14. Marshall Islands
Raynard Gideon
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
P.O. Box 1349
Majuro, Marshall Islands 96960
mofaadm@ntamar.net
15. Micronesia
M. J. Mace
Former Assistant Attorney General
FSM Department of Justice
400 Magazine Street, Suite 401
New Orleans, LA 70130
mjmace02@yahoo.com
16. New Zealand
Doug Calhoun 
Partner Law at A J Park
Huddart Parker Building, 1 Post Office Square,
PO Box 949
Wellington, New Zealand
doug.calhoun@ajpark.com, becky.white@ajpark.com
http://www.ajpark.com
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17. Nicaragua
Javier Guillermo Hernández Munguía
Asesor legal
Ministerio del Ambiente y los Recursos Naturales 
Km. 12 1⁄2 Carretera Norte
Managua, Nicaragua
javihermun@hotmail.com
http://www.marena.gob.ni/
18. Niue
Tagaloa Cooper
Head Environment Officer 
Environment Unit, Department of Community Affairs
PO Box 77
Niue
environment.ca@mail.gov.nu
http://www.gov.nu/appeal.htm
19. Panama
Marisol Dimas and Adela Olivardia
Departamento de Conservación de la Biodiversidad,
Autoridad Nacional Ambiental
Albrook, edificio 804
Panama City, Panama
biodiversidad@anam.gob.pa
http://www.anam.gob.pa/
20. Papua New Guinea
Rosa N. Kambuou
Principal Scientist
National Agricultural Research Institute
PO Box 1828
Port Moresby, National Capitol District, Papua New Guinea
dlplaloki@datec.com.pg 
http://www.nari.org.pg/
21. Republic of Korea
Sang-Weon Bang
Research Fellow
Korea Environment Institute (KEI)
Bulkwang-Dong 613-2, Eunpyong-Gu (Zip:122-706)
Seoul, Republic of Korea
swbang@kei.re.kr
http://www.kei.re.kr
22. Russian Federation
Sergey M. Alexanian
N.I. Vavilov All-Russian Research Institute of Plant Industry
42-44 Bolshaya Morskaya St.
190000 St. Petersburg, Russian Federation
s.alexanian@vir.nw.ru
http://www.vir.nw.ru/
Vera Moshentseva
Senior Analyst 
Department of Life and Earth Sciences 
Ministry of Industry, Science and Technologies
of the Russian Federation
125009 Moscow, Tverskaya 11 Russian Federation
moshentseva@minstp.ru
23. Singapore
Lena Chan
Assistant Director (Nature Conservation)
National Parks Board, Singapore Botanic Gardens
1 Cluny Road, Singapore 259569
Lena_CHAN@nparks.gov.sg
http://www.nparks.gov.sg/parks/sbg/par-sbg.shtml
24. Solomon Islands
Moses Biliki
Director 
Environment and Nature Conservation Division,
Ministry of Forests, Environment and Nature Conservation 
P.O Box G24
Honiara, Solomon Islands
mbiliki@hotmail.com, komaridi@welkam.solomon.com.sb, 
mosesb@solomon.com.sb
Carolina Lasen Diaz
Staff Lawyer
Foundation for International Environmental Law and 
Development (FIELD)
52-53 Russell Square,
London WC1B 4HP UK
carolina.lasen@field.org.uk
http://www.field.org.uk
Cedric Schuster
Director 
Pacific Environment Consultants Ltd 
PO Box 3702
Apia, Samoa
cmlschuster@yahoo.co.nz, cschuster@conservation.ws
25. Vanuatu
Donna Kalfatak
NBSAP Project Coordinator
Environment Unit
Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry, Fisheries and 
Environment
Private Mail Bag 063
Port Vila, Vanuatu
environ@vanuatu.com.vu
26. Vietnam
Hoang Duong Tung
Deputy Chief, Networking and Database Management 
Division, National Environment Agency (NEA) of Vietnam
67 Nguyen Du
Hanoi, Vietnam
htung@nea.gov.vn
http://www.nea.gov.vn/
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C. Countries not involved in any process leading to the 
development of ABS policies
1. Kiribati
Tererei Abete-Reema
Environment and Conservation Division-ECD, MESD, 
Ministry of Environment
P.O. Box 234, Bikenibeu
Tarawa, Kiribati
tererei.mesd2@tskl.net.ki
2. Laos
Sourioudong Sundara
Director General, Research Institute of Science, Science 
Technology and Environment Agency, Prime Minister’s Office
P.O. Box 2279
Vientiane, Laos
sourioudong@yahoo.uk, science@laotel.com
3. Nauru
Cedric Schuster
Director 
Pacific Environment Consultants Ltd 
PO Box 3702
Apia, Samoa
cmlschuster@yahoo.co.nz, cschuster@conservation.ws
A  
4. Palau
Steven A. Daugherty
Assistant Attorney General
PO. Box 1365
Palau
StevenAD@palaunet.com 
5. Tonga
Aminiasi Kefu 
Senior Crown Counsel
The Solicitor General, Crown Law Department,
P.O. Box 85
Nuku’alofa, Tonga 
aminiasi.kefu@tcc.to
6. Tuvalu
Cedric Schuster
Director 
Pacific Environment Consultants Ltd 
PO Box 3702
Apia, Samoa
cmlschuster@yahoo.co.nz, cschuster@conservation.ws
Part 2. Editors and authors of analysis chapters, alphabetically by surname.
Stephen B. Brush
Professor
Department of Human and Community Development
University of California
One Shields Avenue
Davis CA 95616-8602 USA
sbbrush@ucdavis.edu
Santiago Carrizosa
Research Ecologist
Genetic Resources Conservation Program
University of California
One Shields Avenue
Davis CA 95616-8602 USA
scarrizosa@ucdavis.edu.edu, scarrizosa@yahoo.com
http://www.grcp.ucdavis.edu/index.htm
Patrick E. McGuire
Director
Genetic Resources Conservation Program,
University of California
One Shields Avenue
Davis CA 95616-8602 USA
pemcguire@ucdavis.edu
Brian D. Wright
Professor
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 
University of California
207 Giannini Hall #3310
Berkeley, CA 94720-3310 USA
wright@are.berkeley.edu
Tomme Rosanne Young
Senior Legal Officer
IUCN Environmental Law Center 
Godesberger Allee 108-112
53175 Bonn, Germany
tyoung@elc.iucn.org
http://www.iucn.org/themes/law/
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IUCN – The World Conservation Union
Founded in 1948, The World Conservation Union brings together States, government 
agencies and a diverse range of non-governmental organizations in a unique world 
partnership: over 1000 members in all, spread across some 140 countries.
As a Union, IUCN seeks to infl uence, encourage and assist societies throughout the 
world to conserve the integrity and diversity of nature and to ensure that any use of natural 
resources is equitable and ecologically sustainable. A central Secretariat coordinates the 
IUCN Programme and serves the Union membership, representing their views on the 
world stage and providing them with the strategies, services, scientifi c knowledge and 
technical support they need to achieve their goals. Through its six Commissions, IUCN 
draws together over 10,000 expert volunteers in project teams and action groups, focusing 
in particular on species and biodiversity conservation and the management of habitats and 
natural resources. The Union has helped many countries to prepare National Conservation 
Strategies, and demonstrates the application of its knowledge through the fi eld projects 
it supervises. Operations are increasingly decentralized and are carried forward by 
an expanding network of regional and country offi ces, located principally in developing 
countries.
The World Conservation Union builds on the strengths of its members, networks and 
partners to enhance their capacity and to support global alliances to safeguard natural 
resources at local, regional and global levels.
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